Future Naval Air contribution to "small wars"

[pvebber]

Some thoughts on Lind's chapter.

Blue water vs green/Brown water - This is a weakness of the navy and the primary impetus for the bi- and rimodel navy constructs. It is not however a "trade blue water for coastal water". You MUST maintain control of the Blue to enable control of the others. Lind seems to make this too stark a shift, rather than an "in addition too".

He nails the people issues pretty well. We train specialists and then expect then to morph into generalists when they put their eagles and stars on. although on the part about giving COs a pass on grounding ships as a consequence of "bold manuever" I can think of ZERO cases of a grounding being caused by "bold manuever"... Far more dangerous is the penchant for relieving COs for "political incirrectness" of various degrees. Some, like sexual escapes with crew members are valid, others, like "XO movie night" hijinx rate demotion vice excommunication - but unlike the enlisted ranks where "getting busted" is relativel common, I think it would be far better to do a Star Fleet and "Bust Adm. Kirk, back down to Captain" in some of these cases.

On "you should not spend a dime on fights that are not in your interest" I could not disagreemore. How many wars have been in the participants "best interests". Wolrd War 1 was impossible" becasue it was not in anybody's interest. Yet it happened. We can't rely on "rational actor" assumptions with the irrationality of war.

On Mahan vs Corbett, Corbett won by a large margin in the new Maritime Strategy debate. Particularly his ideas on limited and unlimted wars, uses of naval power, and the role of fleets to influence, not just fight. Lind could refresh himself on Corbett in his argument about carriers...

On submarines - This is something a lot of folks get wrong. Submarines are not capital ships - they are ANTI-capital ships. In the naval context, it is not always true that "he that can destroy a thing, controls a thing". Submairnes can DENY sea control, but they can't MAINTAIN it. Maintaining sea control means ensuring that you can conduct the maritime activities you want, without interferrence form the adversary. With only heavyweoght torpedoes as armament, they can do little to counter pirates, corvette and smaller craft, and control the airspace over a maritime region.

The biggest prpoblem subs have, is a very limited field of regard. They need to be cued to targets - particulalry adversary submarines. That means that even if you had a fleet of 200 subs, you could do little to safeguard your own maritime commerce, or blockade an enemy that controled the skies over the waters you are trying to blockade. That is why we won the battle of the atlantic, and why a fleet of submaires is a potent sea DENAIL force, but never a sea CONTROL force.

These are things you currently need a Carrier group to do. Far from being the tautology of "the carrier group exists to protect the carrier group" the escorts exist to protect the CV so it can project power and control the surrounding seas. The reformer vision of "task oriented" CV oadouts already exists - and as he states has been demonstrated. We have desinged the new LHA-6 AMERICA to be even more flexible. But a CVN is predominantly a sea contro platform, and since aircraft are the most effective form of sea control, they are pretty effective at that. So effective that we have taken that mission for granted and instead focused them on supporting operations ashore.

The problem with decouplin airwings from their normal airwing is a big reason the Navy is going the UCAV route. Slow, stealthy, highly manueverable, long range UCAS, not a carrier based A-10 will be the "jaeger air" of the future. Helos can treat a CV as "just another airstrip" (though the Army had a huge hissy fit about going feet wet...) Other aircraft which are not designed to land on carrieres and piloted by non-carrier expereinced aviators area huge safety problem that LInd tends to overlook.

Lind's critique is the first time I've seen someone say aircaraft carriers remain useful, but CRUDES types are obsolete. If CRUDES air defense is ineefective in coastal areas, then that means IADS in general are ineffective in coastal areas, since if anything, Aegis is more advanced than shore based IADS. If CRUDES can't defend a CV, then how can the CV stil be useful? A CV is the best defense of a CV??? How come a CV can't defend itself then??? Sorry but Lind is out of his element here and isn't nearly as well informed as his smug tone implies.

In the Amphibous thing, I'm very surprised he did not ask the question of why we don't use joint high speed vessels in lieu of LCS for a lot of "4GW" support. LCS is 650+M$ a copy, JHSV is 170M$. It can support the operations of caostal watercraft far more effectively than LCS, or Amphibs that cost over 1B$ a copy.

To control the sea you must be able to control the air over the sea, and have situational awareness of what is going on undersea. The most efficient thing we have to do that currently is a carrier strike group. How long that will be true remains to be seen and will be a function to a large extent on how the inteplay of long range strike and long range ISR-T plays out over the next 10-15 years.

[slapout9]

The problem with decouplin airwings from their normal airwing is a big reason the Navy is going the UCAV route. Slow, stealthy, highly manueverable, long range UCAS, not a carrier based A-10 will be the "jaeger air" of the future. Helos can treat a CV as "just another airstrip" (though the Army had a huge hissy fit about going feet wet...) Other aircraft which are not designed to land on carrieres and piloted by non-carrier expereinced aviators area huge safety problem that LInd tends to overlook.

I would agree with that. UCAV's are just guided missiles, which like I said everything is a platform to launch a missile if you want to win. But I generally liked the chapter. One thing Lind did get wrong was the thing about the Falklands. 10 more Exocet Missiles and the whole war may have turned out very differently.

[pvebber]

I do need to correct myself on "heavyweight torpedoes" being the principle sub weapon. They also carry ASCMS and long range strike weapons.

They are extremely limited however in the use of these weapons because of the limited filed of regard (a sub can only organically attack what it can see with its radar (<20nm) sonar (CZ at ~30nm agianst a noisy surface ship) or ESM (maybe a little longer than sonar, out to at most 50nm if there are good surfce ducts). To use a 200nm anti ship Cruise missile requires third party targeting and submarine strike weapons are limited mostly to fixed shore targets, of things queued by UAVs tlaking back tothe sub.

With the exception of the SSGN (which will be gone in 15 years without replacement) a sub can only muster a salvo about equal to a single aircraft.

Creating a "sea control submarine" is akin to building an SSBN is is currently an option not being considered becasue of the expense - like 10+ billion with weapons and unmanned vehicles. For 2 of those you get a Carrier battlegroup. Withthe Subs you have maybe the firepwer of one War at Sea Strike from the CV, then you need to go back to port and rearm. The carrier can saddle back up and regenerate such strikes, or conduct a cyclic "conveyor belt" of ordnace for long periods.

From a small wars standpoint, the question bolis down to what is it you want aviation assets (manned nad unmanned craft and vehicles) to do for you, and with what periodicity? With that one can look at the cost vs risk of expandable (submarine-based) or regenerative (CV based) assets providing those requirements.

[slapout9]

From a small wars standpoint, the question bolis down to what is it you want aviation assets (manned nad unmanned craft and vehicles) to do for you, and with what periodicity? With that one can look at the cost vs risk of expandable (submarine-based) or regenerative (CV based) assets providing those requirements.

That is why I said weld 2 carriers together and put some of everything you have on them and then protect it as best you can. Stop thinking of it as just a moving airport but as an entire moving military base.

[pvebber]

You mean like...(see attached)

This is a grunch of oil platforms welded together to make a floating air field big enough for the Air Force to luv

[pvebber]

Of course the Chinese always try to do us one better. Theirs has a port inside!

[slapout9]

Of course the Chinese always try to do us one better. Theirs has a port inside!

Exactly! A Marine base...... some air force,some navy,some infantry,some artillery,some tanks,some LCACS. A topless bar, a Bar-B-Que shack, a beer joint and a small NASCAR track.....and you would be ready to go. But remember you will lose some to missile attacks so learn to live with it.