End of Empires: who and what was responsible? (post WW2)

[jmm99]

in the case of Vietnam:

from JMA,
When the whole thing starts to turn upside down then people start to question whether the people you are fighting for are worth the effort and the sacrifice and the cost. Kind of like looking for a justification to pull out.

That generic assertion can be true; that is, "not worth the effort and the sacrifice and the cost" can be a "makeweight" - a late in the game dodge - to "justify" a "cut and run". On the other hand, it can be a consistent argument for not intervening in the first place - which argument continues throughout the intervention and may prevail to result in a termination of the intervention.

In the case of Vietnam, the "Vietnam ain't worth much" thesis goes back to whether or not the US should provide materiel assistence in May 1950, or whether more direct measures should be taken. The 1950-1951 War College conclusions (my post #13) presented a 5-point argument:

(1) The United States had probably made a serious mistake in agreeing with its allies to allow French power to be restored in Indochina. As a colonial power, France had done little to develop indigenous civilian and military leaders and civil servants in preparation for the countries' eventual independence.

(2) Indochina was of only secondary strategic importance to the United States. The economic and military value of Vietnam, the most important state in the region, was not impressive. Politically and socially Vietnam was obviously entering an unstable period with uncertain consequences. In any event, it did not warrant the commitment of US forces to its defense.

(3) General war planning by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) envisioned a strategic defense in the Pacific, drawing the U.S. forward defense line to include Japan, South Korea, and the offshore island chain (Okinawa-Taiwan-the Philippines). But in Southeast Asia the line was drawn through the Isthmus of Kra on the mainland, excluding all of Indochina and most of Thailand. Thus, the Straits of Malacca and populous, endowed Indonesia were considered to be the prime strategic targets of the region.

(4) Militarily the region in general and Vietnam in particular would be an extremely difficult operational area, especially for U.S. forces. Unlike the relatively narrow Korean peninsula, Vietnam presented very long land and coastal borders that would be almost impossible to seal against infiltration and difficult to defend against overt military aggression. Much of the region was covered with dense jungle and much was mountainous. Weather, terrain and geographical factors combined to present formidable obstacles for military operations and logistic support.

(5) Politically and psychologically the United States, if it were to become involved, would have to operate under severe disadvantages, for it would inherit the taint of European colonialism. The United States should not become involved in the area beyond providing materiel military aid.

which was reiterated by other military leaders throughout the course of the conflict (e.g., the JCS in 1954 and Ridgway from 1954 into 1970).

JCS IndoChina 1954.jpg

Ridgway 500000.jpg

Never Again Schoolmates.jpg

(all three snips from Dave Petraeus' thesis)

Those "Never Again, but-ers" were neither pacifists nor "cutters and runners". They simply recognized from the outset that Vietnam would be a very hard slog (if not impossible after Pres. Kennedy decided to "neutralize" Laos and Cambodia) - requiring a huge investment if a ground war were pursued.

The LBJ administration (largely a continuation of Kennedy administration personnel) and LBJ himself marginalized the JCS - McMaster's Dereliction of Duty lays out the case (and the lies) in detail (68 Customer Reviews). He reaches much the same conclusions as I did (back in the 1960s) and hold now (pp.333-334):

The war in Vietnam was not lost in the field, nor was it lost on the front pages of the New York Times or on the college campuses. It was lost in Washington D.C., even before Americans assumed sole responsibility for the fighting in 1965 and before they realized the country was at war; indeed even before the first American units were deployed. The disaster in Vietnam was not the result of impersonal forces but a uniquely human failure; the responsibility for which was shared by President Johnson and his principal military and civilian advisers. The failings were many and reinforcing: arrogance, weakness, lying in the pursuit of self-interest, and, above all, the abdication of responsibility to the American people.

I'd add that many of the failings lay in excessive idealism (in both domestic and foreign affairs - e.g., the Great Society and Third World Modernization); and, in the related ideology that everything can be managed and controlled, including warfare.

I'd also add that, whatever one concludes as to Vietnam, the end result in Southeast Asia was not a disaster for the US. Dayuhan doesn't believe the US had much (if anything) to do with that; I differ. There is no point in arguing different beliefs.

My conclusion: each case, and its arguments pro and con, for US intervention, past and present, must be examined separately. An assertion attibuting motives and stereotypes - based on a generic proposition (true only in some cases) - is frankly as dumb as saying: "If you ain't for me (my beliefs), you are against me."

Regards

Mike