End of Empires: who and what was responsible? (post WW2)

[Dayuhan]

In your article you lay out FDR's vision. Despite his best efforts his vision failed to be fulfilled and as can be or should have been anticipated the resulting failure was a train smash. Truman (and the rest of the free world) had to deal with the wreckage.

FDR died before much of this vision had a chance to get much effort... and there's been nothing cited or said here that suggests that the post-war train wreck was somehow caused by FDRs vision. Certainly there are many other causes available for consideration; why would anyone think that the post-war chaos was somehow solely a consequence of one man's dream? Q quite bizarre contention, really...

For three terms and 82 days FDR prepared the ground work for his vision and as such a series of activities had been set in motion and as has been stated the ghost of FDR still haunts US foreign policy to this day.

FDRs actual time in office was spent responding to the exigencies of depression and war, not pursuing a long-term vision. In an average day between 1929 and 1945, how much time did American Presidents have had to spend pursuing any dream beyond getting through that day intact? It was not an easy time.

His sudden death did not bring all that he had started to an immediate halt. There was momentum which carried his vision forward.

Stated, but unsupported. What specific "set of activities" was set in motion, and what specific impacts are you suggesting they had on subsequent developments?

His Four Policemen idea relied on emasculating the British and consigning them to a subservient role to the US and tasked with "looking after" western Europe. In this he succeeded.

The US didn't "emasculate the British". They didn't need to; the British did that all by themselves. If you're going to allege US emasculation, please explain how exactly you think this took place. Postwar Britain was not in a position to "look after" anything, regardless of anything the US did. The European powers weren't "emasculated" by any outside force, they fought each other until they were depleted. The process culminated in WW2, but didn't start there.

As stated and proved by history he backed the wrong horse in China.

Possibly so, but in the long run did it really make much difference in the way things emerged in China? I see no reason to believe that it did, or that US backing for Mao would have somehow brought the Chinese into some kind of pro-US fold. Is there anything beyond vague "what if" speculation to suggest that US China policy post WW2 was a critical element in setting that country's direction? The US isn't necessarily in the center of everything. Chiang was going to fall, Mao was going to take over, and Mao was going to run things his way... and this is what would have happened no matter what FDR had decided or who he had backed. Whatever vision FDR had for China was an insubstantial cloud in a gale-strength wind. He was not in a position to impose his visions on China, and who he backed or didn't back was not a deciding factor in what happened.

His supposed "understanding" of Stalin was a disaster. He was so desperate to bring and keep Stalin on board that he was prepared to be manipulated by Stalin at just about every turn. To the extent that he was prepared to exclude eastern European countries from his third pillar "The Right of Self-Determination" and allow Stalin a free hand. 50 years later eastern Europe is trying to recover.

Again, what happened didn't happen because of FDR. FDR could have placed East European independence at the core of his vision and it wouldn't have made any difference. The Soviet Union would still have finished the war in physical possession of Eastern Europe. Stalin would not have given up that possession because of any vision FDR might have had, and there was nothing that FDR could have done to compel him to give up that possession. FDR's dreams were dust in the wind, no impact at all on that equation. In practical, realistic terms, what did FDR ever do that allowed the Soviets to occupy Eastern Europe, which they would have done in any case? In practical, realistic terms, what could FDR have thought, said, or done that would have removed the Soviets once that occupation was established? Nothing. The dream was a dream, what happened was what would have happened in any event. It was never FDRs choice to make.

His post colonial outcome was naive to say the least. The mind boggles that he thought that it would work by "Enabling formerly colonial societies to achieve independence through an evolution of governance, rather than revolution against governance; all under the watchful eye of the four policemen."

And these four objective policemen would guide these nations to "Self-Determination" and independence "through an evolution of governance"? Come on.

A very naive vision indeed... but again, what impact did this vision actually have on the subsequent decisions made by colonized peoples and colonial powers after FDRs death? The colonies were going to break away no matter what FDR envisioned. That didn't happen because of FDRs vision, it happened because the colonized wanted out, the colonial powers no longer had the capacity to keep them in, and support for Empire on the home front was evaporating. How was any of that a consequence of FDRs vision? How did FDRs vision affect, say, the mutinies among British armed forces in India, the subsequent spread of strikes and riots, and the British realization that they could no longer keep the colony?

Again, where are the specific actions that link this nebulous vision to what actually happened? There was a vision, there were subsequent events, but how do you justify a claim that the vision was the cause of the subsequent events?

Lots of people had visions at the close of WW2. Most of them were blown away by events, events driven not by any individual's vision but by a complex interplay of a huge array of competing interests. The people who drove the actual decolonization process didn't make their choices and decisions because of FDRs dreams, they had their own reasons.

FDR could have believed that empire was as wonderful as a Rudyard Kipling fantasy, and empires would still have fallen as the dust from WW2 settled. The imperial powers were too depleted by war to hold on, the people in the colonies knew it, and the home front had other priorities. It was done, finished, over, no matter what FDR wanted. Where was the tangible impact of his vision? What actions were based on this vision and how exactly did they affect the decolonization? Is there anything but speculation in these contentions?

As an aside I am somewhat taken aback at the denial displayed by some in relation to the effect of FDR on the world. If his foreign policy was positive for the US I can't for the life of me see how. He was certainly not good for Europe, Africa and large chunks of Asia. So for who and where did FDR idealism work?

I wouldn't call FDRs postwar impact hugely positive or negative. He died too soon to have much postwar impact at all. Like most Presidents he was a man of his times, many of his actions were reactions to often desperate circumstances, and he was driven as much by need as by vision. The only vision he had that was ever implemented was prevailing at war, by the time the rest of it came to doing he was dead and other people's visions took over. Like so many others, his visions were overtaken by events beyond his control and dissipated with few real consequences. Of interest to those curious about the history of visions, but with very little impact on how the postwar world actually emerged.

The question at hand is whether FDRs idealism had any real impact at all on post-war decision making or post-war actions. Idealism has no impact on anyone until it is translated into action. What actions were driven by this idealism, and what consequences did they produce that weren't well on the way to happening in any event?

"Great man" history, as stated before here, rarely explains anything with any adequacy... nobody's that big and there are too many other trends and influences at play. Decolonization certainly saw many mistakes by many people, but if you want to connect those mistakes to the vision of a man who died before that process got underway you'll have to show some kind of evidence of causative links between the vision and actual events. So far we've seen none at all.

[Bob's World]

Individuals matter. In that regard, FDR, as the leader of a nation emerging as the most powerful of its era, mattered.

But on the issues of the end of colonialism?? Populaces in the collective matter far more than any individual. The US acted to re-establish as many colonial governments as we did to liberate colonial populaces. We did so in the name of Containment, national interests, and often simply because we were new in the role of "Leader" and were uncomfortable in telling or former superiors "No." No surprises really in any of that, human nature and all. It was people seeking liberty, respect, justice, and a government that drew its legitimacy from them and not from others, that carried the day. It was popualces who, empowered by information and knowledge who found the understanding that things could be better than what they had always known, and the courage to act to achieve that end. Sometimes we lent a hand up, too often that hand held a gun and a demand to get back into the box of colonialism. Communism had to be contained, and we had decided that certain nations would have to put their goals for liberty on hold in order to serve as a line of defense against that ideological threat.

At the end of the day, that is the common element that bonds and binds us all. We are human, and we cannot escape that foundation of commonality that all of our differences are piled upon.

I was forwarded a terrific speech given by Major General Buster Howes, OBE, Commandant General of the Royal Marines, in it he quoted several historic figures, but one in particular spoke to me that has relevance here. "Thucydides, the father of political realism, believed that we are fixed by a trinity of honour, fear and interest."

Indeed. As individuals, as collectives, as nations, as national leaders. It is time for us to reassess what scares us, and to realize that others are scared as well, others have points of honor they feel compelled to act upon, and others have interests that will differ from our own. In this understanding we will find solutions that serve our interests in a manner that leaves our honor intact.

I don't know if this is "complicated," "complex," or "simple." I do know that it is damn hard.

[slapout9]

Bob, to pick up on Grand Strategy as opposed to down the line strategies of a military kind.

I have found the lack of understanding of the difference between a nation's Grand Strategy and other subordinate strategies to be widely prevalent.

From my own little war one hears nonsense like "Tactical Victory, Strategic Defeat" and when challenged about which strategy the result is silence.

I borrow from your article where you quote Dr. Peter Feaver on Grand Strategy as follows:


B]Note:[/B] I left the last point out as I don't see it contributing to the definition of Grand Strategy.

You may want to consider starting a discussion on this topic as you seem to be one of the few who seems to grasp the subject clearly.

Is it possible for America to have a Grand Strategy? The reason I ask is in a 2party system one party always has to make the other party look bad in order to get elected. To have and follow a Grand Strategy requires some type of a Unified appraoch by both parties in order to pursue the Strategy.

[Steve Blair]

Is it possible for America to have a Grand Strategy? The reason I ask is in a 2party system one party always has to make the other party look bad in order to get elected. To have and follow a Grand Strategy requires some type of a Unified appraoch by both parties in order to pursue the Strategy.

This has been discussed before in a number of places on the board. My position has always been that it isn't possible for the U.S. to have a grand strategy, and that has more to do with our basic system than the 2-party framework. When you're in a two-year cycle of revolution, consistency isn't easy. Also, our system focuses inward in most cases (especially with Democrats after say 1900).

[Steve Blair]

Individuals matter. In that regard, FDR, as the leader of a nation emerging as the most powerful of its era, mattered.

Obviously they do. The question becomes how much do they matter and how wide is their actual influence. "Great man" theory also tends to focus excessively on the impact of the "great man" and much less on the actions of those around him or the society that produced the "great man." FDR was a product of, and in some ways a reaction to, his time.

[Ken White]

The US system doesn't allow for a 'grand strategy.' Numerous attempts to implant one have always run afoul of the electoral cycle AND the fact that Americans, unlike most from the European hearth are not in favor of long term stability, deeming it (a) unlikely to sustain and (b) inimical to progress.

Also agree with Steve on the 'Great Man' theory. In most cases, it's not the man -- or woman -- but a series of events and the era that produce the appearance. The case can be made that the US has always produced a 'great' President when it seemed to need one and that most of the others were mediocrities. It is also noteworthy that History takes some time to be properly absorbed and seeming muddlers get elevated to good while some phenomenons get downgraded to terrible

That's a function of events, not personality. Events and that same system that doesn't augur for a grand strategy...

[Fuchs]

Well, Germans like von Bismarck or Friedrich II were the driving force behind the events that created their reputation. The former was clearly a great man of grand strategy - both in domestic and foreign policy.

[Bob's World]

To be clear, on the topic of this thread, I give credit to "great populaces" rather than to "great men."

As to the topic of Grand Strategy, it reminds me of the old saying in regards to women, "can't live with them, and you can't live without them."

I will, however, take the optimistic position on this. Rather than bemoaning how our divisive political process makes a Grand Strategy untenable, I will instead offer that a good grand strategy becomes a force for providing a common purpose to both parties that facilitates coordination and compromise. The certainty of the Soviet threat and the Containment grand strategy are often sorely missed in certain circles. Replacing that with "counterterrorism" and a debate over kinetic vs. nation building tactics leaves critical thinkers on both sides of the aisle feeling like there must be something more fulfilling to guide and shape our actions.

Historically grand strategies have been threat-based. A mosquito of a threat such as AQ does not make a worthy opponent for a nation of the substance of the United States, and we embarrass ourselves when we attempt to make it out to be one. We need a new focus worthy of our nation and our people. We also need that focus to be a positive one rather than a negative one. We will have real threats soon enough, it will be sad if we squander an era of relative peace and stability chasing mosquitoes. Energy independence free of fossil fuels is such a focus. An economy based in our own efforts and accomplishments is such a focus. Turning minor irritants such as Iran or AQ into something bigger than they are is unworthy. Becoming a global charity or peddler of US morality is unworthy. We need a grand strategy. Something worthy of our nation that we can unify around and pursue with alacrity.

Cheers!

Bob

[Steve Blair]

Well, Germans like von Bismarck or Friedrich II were the driving force behind the events that created their reputation. The former was clearly a great man of grand strategy - both in domestic and foreign policy.

Fuchs, you seem to have missed part of the point. Great man theory clearly has its uses, and I do think it has a bit more weight in the pre-1900s era. But it is still not the be-all and end-all of historical analysis. Bismarck also existed within a system that allowed him to function in this way.

Great man theory is more useful in systems where a monarch of some sort exercises almost total political and military control over a state. As the state or system expands, the usefulness of great man theory decreases. Great men still matter, as mentioned above, but you also have to start looking at a wider scope of people or events to see just how they matter and what they may or may not influence.

[ganulv]

As Marx said, “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.”

[davidbfpo]

Yes, Moderator at work. It is now 'End of Empires: who and what was responsible? (post WW2)' and emphasis added.

[Bob's World]

While I can not prove that he single handedly led to the end of empires,

If Ken White had been in the movie "300" the title of the film would have been "1"

[JMA]

I thought the matter of an ill/sick/incapacitated President had been dealt with after Woodrow Wilson?

These matters keep rearing their ugly heads because it has been reported that JFK was ill at the Vienna in 1961 when the wily and experienced Khrushchev in Kennedy' own words "beat the hell out of me."

Here's a review of Kempe's book: Berlin 1961

... and from the review this applies also to another "very inexperienced, even immature" young US President:

... as Mr. Kempe puts it in the final sentence of this mind-shaking work of investigative history, an example "of what unfree systems can impose when free leaders fail to resist."

And Charlie Rose's interview with Kempe

[Dayuhan]

... maybe we need a thread for "decisions by US Presidents, and speculations about their impact".

Can't comment on the book, which I haven't read, but the reviewer's judgment is called into some question with this:

Mr. Kempe's point is that Kennedy's indecisiveness in the early stages of the crisis produced the wall itself, an exponential increase in East-West tension, and, in the half-century that followed, other fateful consequences that included the Cuban missile crisis—and, though Mr. Kempe doesn't say so, the Vietnam War, along with social and strategic spores that lodged in the American psyche and darkened world opinion with results yet to be revealed.

The idea that the Vietnam War was a "consequence" of events in Berlin is really pretty bizarre, especially since that war was already in progress in 1961, albeit without American involvement.

The litany of "consequence" seems a bit overblown to me. It's rare in world events to see such a broad range of trends trace back to a single event, an event that was in itself one in a long chain of events. I suspect that the impact is being exaggerated to enhance the significance of the point being made... and "spores that lodged in the American psyche and darkened world opinion with results yet to be revealed" seems way melodramatic.

What we don't know in any such case is what would have happened if other actions had been taken. Was Kennedy worked by Kruschev? Probably. Would things have turned out vastly differently if he'd taken a different approach? We don't know. Would more "toughness" have prevented the wall? We don't know. If the wall hadn't gone up, would subsequent events in Eastern Europe have changed dramatically? We don't know. How much "toughness" would it have taken to kick off a war? We don't know. Would that war have been won by the West? We don't know. Would Europe have survived that war? We don't know.

Anyone who claims to know "what would have happened if..." is full of it. Speculation is speculation and always will be.

What we do know is that there was no war in Europe, the Soviet Union collapsed, and despite all the mistakes along the way (there will always be mistakes) the overall strategy of containing the Soviets until their inherently dysfunctional economic system brought them down from the inside was ultimately effective. Long way from perfect, but could have been much much worse. Could it have been done faster, or better? Maybe. We don't know. We also don't know what the unintended consequences of any attempt to do it faster and better would have been.

... and from the review this applies also to another "very inexperienced, even immature" young US President:

How so? The current young President doesn't have to worry about what unfree systems are imposing due to his failure to resist... where is any "unfree system" imposing on the US? The greatest problems the US faces are not in the foreign policy realm at all, but in the domestic economic system that provides the capacity to resist imposition. Neither those problems nor those of foreign policy are as dire as they are sometimes built up to be, but that's usually the case.

[Ken White]

The idea that the Vietnam War was a "consequence" of events in Berlin is really pretty bizarre, especially since that war was already in progress in 1961, albeit without American involvement.

The Military Assistanc and Advisory Group, Viet Nam stood up on 1 November 1955 but there had been a Military Equipment Delivery Team (which also had some advisors) there since September of 1950. There were eight US KIA from 1957 through 1960, 16 during 1961 alone before any Kennedy buildup and it climbed thereafter. Beyond bizarre. The Brothers Kennedy decided to go to war to bring a US economy out of the doldrums (~90% IMO) and to show they were tough (~10& IMO). Anything Nikita did was ancillary to that.

Viet Nam is fascinating. It was the progenitor of much of the left right divide and not only in the US. I've read a lot of 'history' of that war and found very, very little that does not have a great deal of misinformation and / or bias -- in both directions. Strangely, most (not all) of the stuff I've read on Korea tracks with little to no bias or ideological cant and what I've read of other wars tracks with what people who were in them told me. Veet Name was weeerd...

As an aside and based solely on that review, many of Kempe's other assertions appear beyond dubious.

...The greatest problems the US faces are not in the foreign policy realm at all, but in the domestic economic system that provides the capacity to resist imposition. Neither those problems nor those of foreign policy are as dire as they are sometimes built up to be, but that's usually the case.

Quite true...

[Dayuhan]

The Military Assistanc and Advisory Group, Viet Nam stood up on 1 November 1955 but there had been a Military Equipment Delivery Team (which also had some advisors) there since September of 1950. There were eight US KIA from 1957 through 1960, 16 during 1961 alone before any Kennedy buildup and it climbed thereafter. Beyond bizarre.

True, and I should have said "with minimal American involvement". Somehow it's hard to think of America as "involved" these days unless we're in something up to our eyeballs, easy to forget that it was not always so.

The Brothers Kennedy decided to go to war to bring a US economy out of the doldrums (~90% IMO) and to show they were tough (~10& IMO). Anything Nikita did was ancillary to that.

I'd guess there was a bit of desire to draw the kind of "rally round the leader" spirit that wartime Presidents once enjoyed... another thing that's changed!

[RTO]

in the case of Vietnam:



That generic assertion can be true; that is, "not worth the effort and the sacrifice and the cost" can be a "makeweight" - a late in the game dodge - to "justify" a "cut and run". On the other hand, it can be a consistent argument for not intervening in the first place - which argument continues throughout the intervention and may prevail to result in a termination of the intervention.

In the case of Vietnam, the "Vietnam ain't worth much" thesis goes back to whether or not the US should provide materiel assistence in May 1950, or whether more direct measures should be taken. The 1950-1951 War College conclusions (my post #13) presented a 5-point argument:


which was reiterated by other military leaders throughout the course of the conflict (e.g., the JCS in 1954 and Ridgway from 1954 into 1970).

Attachment 1470

Attachment 1471

Attachment 1472

(all three snips from Dave Petraeus' thesis)

Those "Never Again, but-ers" were neither pacifists nor "cutters and runners". They simply recognized from the outset that Vietnam would be a very hard slog (if not impossible after Pres. Kennedy decided to "neutralize" Laos and Cambodia) - requiring a huge investment if a ground war were pursued.

The LBJ administration (largely a continuation of Kennedy administration personnel) and LBJ himself marginalized the JCS - McMaster's Dereliction of Duty lays out the case (and the lies) in detail (68 Customer Reviews). He reaches much the same conclusions as I did (back in the 1960s) and hold now (pp.333-334):



I'd add that many of the failings lay in excessive idealism (in both domestic and foreign affairs - e.g., the Great Society and Third World Modernization); and, in the related ideology that everything can be managed and controlled, including warfare.

I'd also add that, whatever one concludes as to Vietnam, the end result in Southeast Asia was not a disaster for the US. Dayuhan doesn't believe the US had much (if anything) to do with that; I differ. There is no point in arguing different beliefs.

My conclusion: each case, and its arguments pro and con, for US intervention, past and present, must be examined separately. An assertion attibuting motives and stereotypes - based on a generic proposition (true only in some cases) - is frankly as dumb as saying: "If you ain't for me (my beliefs), you are against me."

Regards

Mike

Excellent analysis. When I came back from my tour on March 8, 1968, I still thought there was a slight chance for success. However, by the end of 1968 it became clear that the American public wanted out. I still supported the war because I thought it was shameful to leave the South Vietnamese hung out to dry. The United States never had a large margin for error and far too many mistakes were made (exemptions, one year tours, too many support troops,etc.) between the assassination of President Diem and the Tet Offensive

[Ray]

Any comments with depth on British colonisation of India?

[davidbfpo]

Dayuhan in Post 180 writes:

Ask yourself, honestly... if the British hadn't assured the return of French rule in 1945, or if the Americans had not stepped in after the French defeat and forced the division of Vietnam in 1954... would that not have led to a Vietnamese solution to a Vietnamese problem?

Over the last few years with my irregular reading on post-VJ Day allied military action, including the USMC expedition in Manchuria, I have always been puzzled by the logistics of the period.

I understood that imperial allies such as the British Empire, the Dutch and French after VE Day and VJ Day relied upon American shipping, not only for national survival (food), but also to fight Japan and restore imperial rule. If true and to my knowledge neither France nor the Dutch had large serviceable merchant fleets, maybe not the British, then French and Dutch troops reached Indochina and what is now Indonesia on US ships.

Yes, Roosevelt was again empires and colonialism. Not so sure about Truman.

Just asking if anyone knows.

[Bob's World]

David,

You are correct. We will never know what would have happened if Roosevelt would have survived, but it is pretty safe to assume that the Colonial powers would have been denied from reasserting their influence over their former colonies. Not so much because Americans are such great libertarians, but we sure as hell hated the monopolies on trade and the restricted access we had to endure under the colonial system.

I suspect that Roosevelt would also not have bought into the Containment strategy. I suspect he would have been more in alignment with other, far less intrusive and expensive approaches offered by policy thinkers such as Walter Lippmann. But containment is the approach we adopted, and at tremendous cost of treasure and influence it sufficed to avoid a major conflict between the Soviet-led East and the American-led West. But it is long past time to move on. We continue to apply variations of containment as a whole to the globe, and to specific problems as well. We spent years containing Saddam's Iraq. We seek to contain AQ and their ideology in the FATA (which I will never understand), we seek to contain Iranian and Chinese influence within regions that are logically within their spheres of influence. We need to recognize that such spheres can, will and do overlap, and will do so to greater degree and frequency as other regional powers continue to rise and as the brief era of US hegemony fades. This is a return to a much more normal dynamic than what existed during the Cold War. It is a different thing, not a bad thing. What will make it good or bad is how well we adapt to deal with the changes.

What I find myself very frustrated with, however, are the following questions for my fellow Americans:

1. When did the Constitution become irrelevant?

2. When did the Declaration of Independence become inconvenient?

3. When did the thinking of our historic leaders, such as Washington and Lincoln become "illegitimate"?

Inertia is a powerful force, and it is one we are caught up within. The sooner we recognize that the better.
Not