End of Empires: who and what was responsible? (post WW2)

[Bob's World]

Steve,

You know the old adage, "if you are in charge of everything, you are responsible for everything."

I don't recall anyone putting the US in charge, that is a claim we have made for ourselves. The fact that implied responsiblity comes along with that is unavoidable.

The best cure is to not set oneself up as "being in charge of everything" to begin with. This brings us back to FDR. Yes, he indeed called for an end to Colonialism, and that did not play well with his Euro buddies. But I am sure that Chruchill choked on his cigar smoke and spit scotch when FDR laid his concept of "The Four Policemen" on him. This was a plan for the League of Nations to be replaced following the war by a coaltion of the US, Russia, China and the UK to share responsibilities for maintaining security around the globe.

Of course, we all know how that played out. After WWI UK, France and the US remained competitiors, but on (relatively) friendly terms, as they divied up the spoils of conquest. Following WWII these "four policemen" broke quickly into two camps, resulting in what we like to call "The Cold War."

It is a concept with some merit though, and perhaps the number is more like 6 and India and Brazil join the mix....

(But don't jump up and beat your chest proclaming "I'm in charge!!" and not expect to be held responsible when something breaks or goes wrong)

[Steve Blair]

Bob,

Not my point, really. I was making a sarcastic observation about the tendency to start many historical conversations in the middle of the scenario to "prove" someone's point.

FDR called for many things...many of which were either not practical or ill-advised (or downright stupid). But he wasn't the only leader who made such errors during that time (soft underbelly of Europe, anyone?). And he had precious little (if anything) to do with dysfunctional borders in Africa, tribal divisions created or exploited to maintain control, or brutal (or ignorant) colonial administration.

Blaming FDR and/or the US is convenient, but it steadfastly ignores many realities that he/the US had nothing or little to do with creating. Wilson, if I remember correctly, also tried to proclaim the end of colonialism.

But whatever, right? Carry on....

[jmm99]

The empires (British, French and Dutch) did end in SE Asia and South Asia. Ah, an end to colonialism and imperialism. The US became the major non-communist player.

It took over that role (if we take the Worldview of what its spokesmen said, wrote and presumably believed) for the most noble of reasons (e.g., GEN Westmoreland was only one of many Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson era spokesmen who sang the same song):

Indeed, history may judge that American aid to South Vietnam constituted one of man's more noble crusades, one that had less to do with the domino theory and a strategic interest for the United States than with the simple equation of a strong nation helping an aspiring nation to reach a point where it had some reasonable chance to achieve and keep a degree of freedom and human dignity. It remains a fact that few countries have ever engaged in such idealistic magnanimity; and no gain or attempted gain for human freedom can be discounted.

(link in post #13). That perception fit the Worldview of those times in both Dutchess County and Houghton County.

The Worldview of, say, the British, French and Dutch was quite different. Quite rationally in their perception they saw the US "takeover" as a coup - and the new US role as neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism (or other names, such as Pax Americana, American Hegemony, American Exceptionalism, etc.).

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

The Worldview of, say, the British, French and Dutch was quite different. Quite rationally in their perception they saw the US "takeover" as a coup - and the new US role as neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism (or other names, such as Pax Americana, American Hegemony, American Exceptionalism, etc.).

Certainly it's easier to blame the Americans than to admit that the bloody wogs ran you out of town. Saving face is by no means an exclusively Asian pastime.

As far as I can tell the reasoning, using the term loosely, goes like this:

FDR was opposed to imperialism

Empires subsequently fell

Therefore FDRs opposition to imperialism caused the fall of empires.

As egregious a fallacy as one is likely to find, but people will believe what they will. If this was a psychology forum we could delve deeply into what factors enable a mind to believe such things despite inability to produce any coherent evidence of a causative link. As it is I shall remain mystified.

[davidbfpo]

I am not an Imperial history expert nor have read in depth, but there is merit in Dayuhan's last post - blame anyone, especially a dead US President, for our own failures.

In 1945 Great Britain, France and the Netherlands were exhausted. Two had undergone the deep trauma of defeat and occupation.

I suspect part of the answer why people

believe what they will

lies in psychology and politics. A contemporary illustration maybe found in this UK politicians comment:

Business Secretary Vince Cable says it has been a challenge for the government to explain to the public how bad a state the economy is in.

Change a few words and maybe it would fit 1945?

Incidentally I do not agree with his explanation, mainly as it appears to ignore the impact of political decisions for many years on the UK economy.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-13480971

[Tukhachevskii]

Pt. 1

by Dayuhan
Japan was a rising industrial power, almost devoid of natural resources. With regional resources largely locked up in closed-loop colonial trade[snip].

My understanding of Japanese decision making may not be as thorough as yours but from the authorities I’ve read America’s role in pushing Japan towards war with the “west” (as opposed to Russia) is generally considered important, which see...

[from The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 6] The Japanese army's war plans, reflecting emphases rather than strict numerical priorities, ascribed first importance to the Russians as the potential enemy from the time of the Russo-Japanese War until the birth of the Soviet Union. With the increase in American influence in the Far East attending a deterioration in U.S.-Japanese relations, the United States replaced Russia after 1918 as the main national enemy. (p. 315)

The Japanese national defence policy was revised further in the mid- 1930s. After the breakdown of the naval accords in 1935, the navy in particular stressed the growing danger of American containment. The giant American naval building program, the major American manoeuvres conducted near Midway Island, and espionage reports on the top-secret Orange War Plan alarmed navy leaders. By 1936, the Japanese navy had drawn up new contingency plans based on "defence in the north, advance to the south." In other words, the naval general staff was looking toward Southeast Asia, a zone of special interest to the colonial powers there, especially Britain and Holland. As a result, the British were added to the list of national enemies in the revision of 1936. However, operational planning against England, involving the neutralization of Hong Kong and Singapore, was not introduced until 1939, and anti-Dutch operations not until 1941.(my italics, p.318)

As for Japan’s post-war prosperity you can’t compare the pre-war international system to the post-war one. Nor should one forget the reasons for Japan’s post-war prosperity...the need for the US to have a strong Asian power whose economy was tied into the US thus buttressing and supporting the American world system and forestalling Communism (the same reasoning behind the Marshall Plan); Japan became part of the US informal empire (completing Commodore Perry’s earlier “venture” in 1853). Japan’s current economic woes are part of that post-war legacy too. In fact...

by Dayuhan
How would "letting the US into those markets and their own" have hurt either to colonies or the home countries, even to the limited extent to which the US penetrated the markets of the remaining colonies? [snip] It should be noted that free trade has not only benefited the US: it's allowed many other nations, both from the old powers and from new ones, to rise and prosper. A huge improvement, it would seem to me.

I take it that the recession- which began in the US and cascaded throughout the economic systems embedded in US capital- is irrelevant? The current global recession is largely to do with American ineptitude in financial matters (deficits, recycling debt, etc.) coupled with the dollar’s position as global trading currency of choice and the manner in which “Western” economies are imbricated (admittedly with the establishment of the EU and the Eurozone things are now a little more complex).

by Dayuhan
An empire requires direct rule, [&c]. Take away a word's meaning and it means nothing at all. Respect the word.

I don’t quite know what to make of that. Words have many meanings and subtle nuances (see Grice on “implicature”). By your dictionary definition Jefferson’s statement that America is an “empire of liberty” means what, exactly? Or, for that matter, what does empire mean when Hamilton (Fed. Paper 22) says that “The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of the consent of the people”? Very odd. Empires can be territorially contiguous and non-contiguous as well as exhibit formal and informal hierarchical relations (for a start) that’s hardly in contradiction to the dictionary definition. Throwing simplistic dictionary definitions into the fray is hardly conducive to comprehending complex situations. Wittgenstein warned against the very logical positivist fallacy of ascribing a singular meaning to a word when in reality “usage defines meaning”. Cf the following explication from “What’s at Stake in the American Empire Debate”;

ideal-typical empires [...] differ from hegemonic and unipolar orders because they combine two features: rule through intermediaries and heterogeneous contracting between imperial cores and constituent political communities. These characteristics constitute ideal-typical empires as a form of political organization with particular network properties. Ideal-typical empires comprise a “rimless” hub-and-spoke system of authority, in which cores are connected to peripheries but peripheries themselves are disconnected—–or segmented—–from one another. When a particular set of relations takes on an imperial cast, a number of important changes occur in the basic dynamics of international politics:

First, dynamics of divide-and-rule supplant traditional balance-of-power politics. Imperial control works, in part, by preventing resistance in one periphery from spreading to other peripheries. Some of the most important challenges to imperial rule arise, therefore, when imperial policies, exogenous shocks, transnational movements, or other developments trigger uncoordinated or coordinated simultaneous resistance in multiple peripheries.(cont. below...

[Tukhachevskii]

Second, the key axis of political relations shift from interstate to intersocietal. Imperial cores exercise rule through local intermediaries over various actors within the domestic sphere of constituent political communities. This structure creates endemic tradeoffs between, on the one hand, the advantages of indirect rule and, on the other, the principal-agent problems that stem from intermediary autonomy. Imperial control of particular peripheries also involves local processes of divide and- rule. Imperial authorities utilize various strategies that, through accident or design, succeed by preventing various local actors from forming widespread coalitions against the terms of imperial control. These strategies, which we call “pivoting” and “binding,” carry with them specific costs and benefits for imperial authorities.

Third, empires face specific problems of legitimating their control. Imperial rule involves heterogeneous contracts that specify varied rights and privileges to different peripheries; empires function most effectively when they maintain their authority over extremely diverse audiences who, in turn, place differing demands on imperial authorities. Empires often best navigate these cross pressures by engaging in “multivocal” or “polyvalent” signalling: by projecting different identities and commitments to discrete audiences. (p253-4)

The above article also eloquently covers a lot of the ground I’d have to yomp over regarding America and Empire (perhaps Latin America would have been a better subject matter) although for specific examples (which include the USSR among others) cf. Krasner’s excellent “Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy” (i.e., Marshall Plan conditionality, America’s role in literally recreating Japan and Germany in an image that suited it, Italy, etc. Don’t get me wrong, it was preferable to the Ruskies).

With respect to this...

by Dayuhan
Why would de-colonization assume a prior political identity? Are you suggesting that people with no prior large-scale political identity can legitimately be occupied and ruled by foreign forces against their will? Whether political identity emerged pre or post colonization seems quite irrelevant to any question of self-determination... [&c].

...I suspect we are in agreement. My original post stressed the “loaded” or “essentially contested” nature of the term “de-colonisation”. Resistance, you are correct in adducing, is very often the catalyst that generates a shared identity. I did not dispute this only that the idea of de-colonisation very often assumes a prior existing identity. What I was objecting to, and my failure in explaining is obvious, was that de-colonisation is very often described as analogous to the collapse of Soviet bloc “overlay” (thus freeing pre-existing states with stable historical consciousnesses) when in fact is was, to use your phrases, sloppier and messier. Nothing in my post precluded or even rebuffed any of the points you raise.

Given your statements here...

Originally Posted by Dayuhan. It's actually very difficult to know what would have happened if WW2 had not occurred, and any such construction is by necessity very speculative indeed.

&

It's easy to speculate that a different approach by someone, somewhere, might have changed the course that the collapse of colonial empires took. Any such speculation is... well, speculative, and we don't know where the road not taken would have led. Likely to an only slightly different form of mess: collapse is by nature a sloppy process.

...I’ve lost the will to argue as I no longer know what we’re arguing about. I don’t particularly disagree with you but I take exception to the idea that somehow the US is an exception to the historical rule or that its position as a (informal) empire is somehow a negative value judgement on the US. However, I suspect that we could argue till the cows come but I don’t really have the stomach for it (especially when I didn’t really want to saying anything in the first place); I shall gracefully bow out. Been nice sparring with you champ.

[JMA]

Blaming FDR and/or the US is convenient, but it steadfastly ignores many realities that he/the US had nothing or little to do with creating.

That is merely your opinion and one which has been called "patriotic orthodoxy" in the past.

The presidency of FDR represents a low point in US and world history to the extent that his level of harm is on par with the likes of Hitler. At least nobody is demanding reparations ... yet.

[JMA]

Certainly it's easier to blame the Americans than to admit that the bloody wogs ran you out of town. Saving face is by no means an exclusively Asian pastime.

As far as I can tell the reasoning, using the term loosely, goes like this:

FDR was opposed to imperialism

Empires subsequently fell

Therefore FDRs opposition to imperialism caused the fall of empires.

As egregious a fallacy as one is likely to find, but people will believe what they will. If this was a psychology forum we could delve deeply into what factors enable a mind to believe such things despite inability to produce any coherent evidence of a causative link. As it is I shall remain mystified.

This is a nonsense argument. Humourous though

[JMA]

To provide some supporting fires to one of Dayuhan's points:

FDR was absolutely against colonialism (though much of that was his hate of the way it served to exclude the US from participating in rich markets. During WWII FDR met with the leaders of Tunisia, Morocco, etc and sold "democracy" and "self-determination" to an audience buying "liberty" while Churchill sat there and stewed (no booze at the dinner may have been his chief complaint). FDR also went in great detail about the value of doing business with the US...

As they say... with friends like some US Presidents who needs enemies? ... and Israel is about to find that out too.

Note: before there is too much sulking around here I for one am talking about the weaknesses and failures of certain US Presidents. Most countries (who elect heads of state) have a tendency to elect ego driven narcissistic presidents who have massively over-inflated opinions of their own ability. The trouble with the US is that the scope for creating devastation being the head of state of a super power that much bigger and more assured.

So, when colonialism expired at the end of WWII as we were calling for that to happen; there were also long suppressed populaces newly empowered by a modern info age standing up and making the cost exceed the benefit of such arrangements.

1945 the modern info age?

Colonialism didn't expire... it was pushed.

[Fuchs]

JMA; it had been obvious in places like India that the age of colonialism was about to end. Without WW2, India would probably have gained sovereignty before 1945.

The Italian annexation of Abbyssinia in '37 and the Japanese attempts to quasi-colonialise China had already created much contempt in Europe. Colonialisation was already out of fashion by the 30's and even the colonialisation fo former Ottoman empire territories immediately after WWI as well as of former German colonies was done with new excuses, because flat-out colonialisation wasn't en vogue back in '19 any more.

Let's also keep in mind that decolonialisation actually began in 1815 (I know, anglophone-centric people don't think that way).

[JMA]

It took over that role (if we take the Worldview of what its spokesmen said, wrote and presumably believed) for the most noble of reasons (e.g., GEN Westmoreland was only one of many Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson era spokesmen who sang the same song):

Portion of quoted piece: "It remains a fact that few countries have ever engaged in such idealistic magnanimity; and no gain or attempted gain for human freedom can be discounted."

In many situations it has been seen that the "heart" behind the US action has been in the right place. That has to be respected. However, it is the implementation that has been almost universally poor. Libya is the latest best example of this.

The Worldview of, say, the British, French and Dutch was quite different. Quite rationally in their perception they saw the US "takeover" as a coup - and the new US role as neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism (or other names, such as Pax Americana, American Hegemony, American Exceptionalism, etc.).

Regards

Mike

OK, so can we agree then that the US used the situation at the time to "takeover"? Then whether it was a "coup" or a natural assertion of authority that comes with power becomes academic.

[jmm99]

from JMA
OK, so can we agree then that the US used the situation at the time to "takeover"?

and the US has stuck itself with nannytude since WWII in some eyes - or with evil step-mothertude in other eyes.

Leaving my soundbites aside, the idealism expressed by GEN Westmoreland was equalled or exceeded by the idealism of the economic side of the New Frontier and its successor Great Society. One can trace that idealism back in US history through Ike (our Crusader in Europe), Truman, FDR, Wilson and Teddy Roosevelt, to Turner's 1893 "Frontier Thesis".

Walt Rostow (e.g., his 1960 "Stages") typified the economic side, which was intended to become a managed, perpetual motion machine that would solve the World's problems, as outlined from the gitgo by JFK:

.... a New Frontier -- the frontier of the 1960's, the frontier of unknown opportunities and perils, the frontier of unfilled hopes and unfilled threats. ... Beyond that frontier are uncharted areas of science and space, unsolved problems of peace and war, unconquered problems of ignorance and prejudice, unanswered questions of poverty and surplus. [JFK, 1960 Nomination Acceptance]

Given unlimited economic growth in the US, but more important to the argument, in the Third World, the terms "unsolved", "unconquered", "unanswered" would drop into the dustbin of history. So, the Alliance for Progress, etc., which engaged the US (and US business interests) in many other economies.

Similarly, the US became engaged in global military matters, where one can trace an idealistic line through Maxwell Taylor, William Westmoreland and Creighton Abrams. Of the last and the Vietnam War, his son stated (last sentence of Lewis Sorley's, "A Better War"): "He thought the Vietnamese were worth it." Others (including JMM) thought otherwise.

Dayuhan's thesis ("easier to blame the Americans than to admit that the bloody wogs ran you out of town") may have some validity to it. I would not be so dogmatic. I do view US actions after WWII to the present as being motivated more by an unselfish spirit than by a selfish intent to achieve global American domination. You can call that "patriotic orthodoxy" if you wish - I've been called both "fascist" and "communist"; so what the hell, being called a "patriot" is an improvement.

Though I believe most of these Americans were motivated by idealism (I'd say excessive idealism, which allowed some of them to lie without apparent guilt), their actions could be rationally viewed as part of an outright global power grab. If your ox or water buff is gored (as the various colonial powers were), you really don't give a damn about the gorer's motives.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

Similarly, the US became engaged in global military matters, where one can trace an idealistic line through Maxwell Taylor, William Westmoreland and Creighton Abrams. Of the last and the Vietnam War, his son stated (last sentence of Lewis Sorley's, "A Better War"): "He thought the Vietnamese were worth it." Others (including JMM) thought otherwise.

Idealism is fine if genuine. And I accept that at some levels the concern for Vietnam was genuine but that sort of intervention gets shot to hell it not clearly targeted and properly resourced. Which even with my limited knowledge of Vietnam was what happened there. When the whole thing starts to turn upside down then people start to question whether the people you are fighting for are worth the effort and the sacrifice and the cost. Kind of like looking for a justification to pull out.

I don't know what crock FDR sold the American nation but his supposed concern for Britain was nothing of the kind. Not being a Brit I am not going to slash my wrists over that but clearly it seems that the spin doctors have seen to it that the actions of the FDR Administration are seen to have been an American sacrifice to save the free world when it was nothing of the kind... only naked exploitation of a ripe situation for national gain.

Dayuhan's thesis ("easier to blame the Americans than to admit that the bloody wogs ran you out of town") may have some validity to it.

Not valid. Its just the kind of nonsense he produces when he runs out of stuff to say.

The question that must be asked of those who advocated the accelerated independence of the colonies after WW2 is who must take responsibility for what happened afterwards?

You see soldiers who screw up tend to be hauled over the coals in one form or tuther (and so it should be), but the politicians who are responsible for the really big screw ups (like the deaths of millions and the misery of millions more) seem able to slip away like thieves in the night.

[Dayuhan]

The question that must be asked of those who advocated the accelerated independence of the colonies after WW2 is who must take responsibility for what happened afterwards?

The question is whether that advocacy actually had anything to do with what happened. Neither you nor anyone else has presented anything even remotely resembling evidence to suggest that it did.

Roosevelt had a low opinion of empire, but opinions don't topple empires. Empires didn't fall because a dead President didn't like them, they fell because the colonized people didn't want to be colonized any more, the colonizers lacked the capacity to compel them to be colonized, and the folks on the home front ceased to support the effort to compel them to be colonized. If you want to suggest an American hand in all this you need evidence that American actions accelerated the fall of empire. Words and opinions won't do it.

Certainly the US often stepped in and tried to fill the vacuum left by retreating empires. Certainly they brought their own combination of idealism and avarice to the table, and often made messes nearly as monumental as those made by the original colonizers. That doesn't mean the US caused the fall, though... I can't think of a case where the US supplanted a colonial power that would not have fallen soon of its own accord.

Wouldn't it have been a bit hypocritical of FDR to have fought to roll back the Japanese "Co-prosperity Sphere" and then to have supported the European Empires? Not like there was any real difference...

[jmm99]

in the case of Vietnam:

from JMA,
When the whole thing starts to turn upside down then people start to question whether the people you are fighting for are worth the effort and the sacrifice and the cost. Kind of like looking for a justification to pull out.

That generic assertion can be true; that is, "not worth the effort and the sacrifice and the cost" can be a "makeweight" - a late in the game dodge - to "justify" a "cut and run". On the other hand, it can be a consistent argument for not intervening in the first place - which argument continues throughout the intervention and may prevail to result in a termination of the intervention.

In the case of Vietnam, the "Vietnam ain't worth much" thesis goes back to whether or not the US should provide materiel assistence in May 1950, or whether more direct measures should be taken. The 1950-1951 War College conclusions (my post #13) presented a 5-point argument:

(1) The United States had probably made a serious mistake in agreeing with its allies to allow French power to be restored in Indochina. As a colonial power, France had done little to develop indigenous civilian and military leaders and civil servants in preparation for the countries' eventual independence.

(2) Indochina was of only secondary strategic importance to the United States. The economic and military value of Vietnam, the most important state in the region, was not impressive. Politically and socially Vietnam was obviously entering an unstable period with uncertain consequences. In any event, it did not warrant the commitment of US forces to its defense.

(3) General war planning by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) envisioned a strategic defense in the Pacific, drawing the U.S. forward defense line to include Japan, South Korea, and the offshore island chain (Okinawa-Taiwan-the Philippines). But in Southeast Asia the line was drawn through the Isthmus of Kra on the mainland, excluding all of Indochina and most of Thailand. Thus, the Straits of Malacca and populous, endowed Indonesia were considered to be the prime strategic targets of the region.

(4) Militarily the region in general and Vietnam in particular would be an extremely difficult operational area, especially for U.S. forces. Unlike the relatively narrow Korean peninsula, Vietnam presented very long land and coastal borders that would be almost impossible to seal against infiltration and difficult to defend against overt military aggression. Much of the region was covered with dense jungle and much was mountainous. Weather, terrain and geographical factors combined to present formidable obstacles for military operations and logistic support.

(5) Politically and psychologically the United States, if it were to become involved, would have to operate under severe disadvantages, for it would inherit the taint of European colonialism. The United States should not become involved in the area beyond providing materiel military aid.

which was reiterated by other military leaders throughout the course of the conflict (e.g., the JCS in 1954 and Ridgway from 1954 into 1970).

JCS IndoChina 1954.jpg

Ridgway 500000.jpg

Never Again Schoolmates.jpg

(all three snips from Dave Petraeus' thesis)

Those "Never Again, but-ers" were neither pacifists nor "cutters and runners". They simply recognized from the outset that Vietnam would be a very hard slog (if not impossible after Pres. Kennedy decided to "neutralize" Laos and Cambodia) - requiring a huge investment if a ground war were pursued.

The LBJ administration (largely a continuation of Kennedy administration personnel) and LBJ himself marginalized the JCS - McMaster's Dereliction of Duty lays out the case (and the lies) in detail (68 Customer Reviews). He reaches much the same conclusions as I did (back in the 1960s) and hold now (pp.333-334):

The war in Vietnam was not lost in the field, nor was it lost on the front pages of the New York Times or on the college campuses. It was lost in Washington D.C., even before Americans assumed sole responsibility for the fighting in 1965 and before they realized the country was at war; indeed even before the first American units were deployed. The disaster in Vietnam was not the result of impersonal forces but a uniquely human failure; the responsibility for which was shared by President Johnson and his principal military and civilian advisers. The failings were many and reinforcing: arrogance, weakness, lying in the pursuit of self-interest, and, above all, the abdication of responsibility to the American people.

I'd add that many of the failings lay in excessive idealism (in both domestic and foreign affairs - e.g., the Great Society and Third World Modernization); and, in the related ideology that everything can be managed and controlled, including warfare.

I'd also add that, whatever one concludes as to Vietnam, the end result in Southeast Asia was not a disaster for the US. Dayuhan doesn't believe the US had much (if anything) to do with that; I differ. There is no point in arguing different beliefs.

My conclusion: each case, and its arguments pro and con, for US intervention, past and present, must be examined separately. An assertion attibuting motives and stereotypes - based on a generic proposition (true only in some cases) - is frankly as dumb as saying: "If you ain't for me (my beliefs), you are against me."

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

The issues of Alger Hiss, Harry Hopkins and Yalta lead to lengthy discussions. See, e.g., J.E. Haynes, American Communism and Anticommunism, and more specifically on Venona, Hiss and the on-going arguments. On Venona, take a gander at this thread, The Rosenberg Case Resurrected. If one does not know Venona (pro & con - the intercepts are ambiguous at times), one is doomed to repeat history - making lousy assertions about "reds" and "pinks".

This post is devoted to a much narrower topic, which deals with a single comment by Patrick J. Hurley. I went to Don Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1956) because of Dayuhan's citation of Patti's book. Since Hurley was a contemporary in China with Patti, I was interested in seeing what he might have said about Patti. He didn't say anything.

However, the book is inscribed "To Mike from Mother, Christmas 1959" - so, Steve, thank you for the memories (I mean that sincerely - her birthday was 3 May). I suppose the bottom line to her was that Hurley was an anti-communist and an anti-imperialist - a position congruent with her White (e.g., Mannerheim) Finnish background.

Of course, Hurley was an interesting guy for his earlier years alone (before becoming Hoover's Secretary of War). He was the son of a poor Irish miner and then orphaned. He owed his early book learning to Ben Smallwood, Chairman of the Choctaw Council. He cowherded with one Will Rogers and grew up with Victor "Dick" Locke (another Chairman of the Choctaw Council). He was educated at Indian University (the only Irishman of the bunch - who became more "Choc" than the "Chocs", the captain of the football team). He became national attorney for the Choctaws, and a spectacular success in oil and gas law. An "Okie from Muskogee".

While he was Pres. Roosevelt's envoy (and then ambassador) to China, he engaged in a verbal war with John S. Service, John Paton Davies, Jr., John Carter Vincent, Raymond P. Ludden. He did not "war" very much with Joseph Stilwell - both were in different ways "anti-imperialists"; but recommended Stilwell's relief. Hurley found Albert Coady Wedemeyer more acceptable.

Hurley (whom Uncle Joe Stalin considered a "a very tough baby") found the Yalta Agreement to be totally unacceptable. However, he did not blame FDR for its terms (Lohbeck, p.368):

"There is a tendency now," Ambassador Hurley wrote later, "to charge the Yalta Secret Agreement to President Roosevelt. President Roosevelt is dead, but I can say he was not guilty. He was a very sick man at Yalta, and the surrender of China to the Communists in the Secret Agreement of Yalta was engineered by the officials of the American State Department under the brilliant leadership of a young American, Alger Hiss." [19]

19. Letter from Hurley to the Atlantic Monthly, Sept. 28, 1950.

As to Yalta and HST (Harry S. Truman), Hurley:

... held out hope that after President Roosevelt's death, President Harry Truman would recognize what he regarded as the errors of Yalta and would rectify the situation, but his efforts in that direction were in vain. On November 26, 1945, he submitted a scathing letter of resignation.

"I requested the relief of the career men," he wrote, "who were opposing the American policy in the Chinese Theater of war. These professional diplomats were returned to Washington and placed in the Chinese and Far Eastern Divisions of the State Department as my supervisors. Some of these same career men whom I relieved have been assigned as supervisors to the Supreme Commander in Asia. In such positions most of them have continued to side with the Communist armed party and at times with the imperialist bloc against American policy."

(from the Wiki, which is from Lohbeck's book)

Hurley (in the above quote) is consistent as an anti-communist and an anti-imperialist.

As a sidebar, Hurley, as part of "imperialism", identified the Zionist movement as an imperialist movement. I'm somewhat lost as to the logic of that, but here's the source - again from Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley Meets David Ben-Gurion.

The key point from Hurley is whether FDR was mentally competent at Yalta. My gut, in my "incarnation" as an estate planning attorney, says "Big ?". The next question is when did FDR's mental slide begin ? A large stroke (which killed him) is often preceded by a series of smaller, mind-destroying strokes.

So, JMA, please consider the alternative that FDR at Yalta was "dotty as hell". It does open up some vistas.

Regards

Mike

PS: I can't give you any help as to Jimmy Carter. I've never been able to figure him out.

[JMA]

in the case of Vietnam:

That generic assertion can be true; that is, "not worth the effort and the sacrifice and the cost" can be a "makeweight" - a late in the game dodge - to "justify" a "cut and run". On the other hand, it can be a consistent argument for not intervening in the first place - which argument continues throughout the intervention and may prevail to result in a termination of the intervention.

Yes, I accept that there were those who wanted to stay out of Vietnam from the outset as there were others who changed their minds or formed an opinion later on.

If one looks at Afghanistan I would be counted among those who maintain that apart from the special forces that helped to target the bombing no combat troops should have been committed to Afghanistan. The aim there (as I understood it) was simple, Strike AQ and punish the Taliban for harbouring AQ. That mission was achieved in magnificent style (apart from missing OBL) in a very short period.

Then we look at Libya where because the implementation of the intervention has proved to be totally incompetent questions are beginning to be asked about whether the intervention was a good idea in the first place. I maintain it was and the resources were available (mainly through US who had decided to intervene anyway) to comply with the mandate given under UNSC 1973 to remove threats to the civilian population in a matter of days.

Now had a short sharp and decisive action taken place then the naval ships could have been free to move down the Med to off Syria so Obama could ask Assad "are you going to behave or do you want some of the same?"

[Dayuhan]

Any accusation that Roosevelt delivered China to the Communists at Yalta or delivered Eastern Europe to the Soviets at Yalta has to address the question of what Roosevelt could have done to remove the Soviets from Eastern Europe or prevent the Communists from taking over China.

It's already been pointed out here that the Soviets were in physical possession of Eastern Europe, and that short of full-scale war with the Soviets, for which no political support existed in the US, nothing FDR could have said or done at Yalta was likely to dislodge them.

Hurley's views on China are no secret of course, but there's little real reason to believe that anything the US could have said or done, at Yalta or elsewhere, would have kept Mao from taking China. The long-time "China hands" that Hurley argued with had years in China under their belts, much of it out in the field. Most spoke Chinese, several were born in China. Hurley arrived in China as an Ambassador, and knew only what he was told. Reasonably he should have listened to his men in the field, but what they were saying - that Chiang Kai-Shek was finished and Mao was going to win - was, for those days, politically incorrect. It was also true, but I suppose that was less obvious then, especially to those who knew nothing of China.

Not really very much substance in an accusation that Roosevelt, compos mentis or not, delivered China or Eastern Europe to the Commies unless there was some practical course he could have taken to save them from the commies. It's not at all clear that any such course was available.

[jmm99]

To tell the truth, I was not quite one "who wanted to stay out of Vietnam from the outset". A month or so ago, my neighbor (lets's call him "Lightning Rod"; who was an F-4 jockey in the later 60s and early 70s) and I got into a conversation about Linebacker II - where he flew interference for the B-52s. His BLUF was that we should have launched Linebacker II eight years before (in 1964); and that "we should have taken out all the dikes". In his typical style, he felt compelled to remind me that the spelling was not d-y-k-e-s, but d-i-k-e-s. So, as I've said before (somewhere): "Choice Lemay. Not LBJ".

McMaster (pp.42-44) recounts three major viewpoints on the JCS in Nov 1963 - the Army (Wheeler) and Navy (McDonald) were basically "go with the flow". Maxwell Taylor was very much Kennedy-McNamara (and later Johnson); he had managed to get Lemay to accept the 1963 Geneva Nuclear Test Ban[*]. Taylor himself propounded "flexible response"; and was more than open to the concept of "graduated pressure".

The bottom line for Lemay was massive air retaliation against threats to the US - so a "hard knock" policy against North Vietnam was simply adding 1 + 1 to him. The Lemay policy was surrogated by Barry Goldwater, and everyone in his campaign (including JMM among the grunts) knew it - though Lemay had to keep his mouth shut. We got swamped and the "peace candidate" was elected.

The third viewpoint was that of David Shoup (MOH; USMC Commandant), who propounded something of a "vital interest" test. From McMaster (p.43):

A trip to South Vietnam in 1962 confirmed his abiding conviction that the United States should "not, under any circumstances, get involved in land warfare in Southeast Asia."

My own choice was Lemay's decisive strike first (not likely a "win", but it would have taken NVN a long time to recover - and it was worth a chance); but, if not that, the Shoup approach (shared by many, including MacArthur) of no Asian land wars.

So, as to Astan, agree:

from JMA
If one looks at Afghanistan I would be counted among those who maintain that apart from the special forces that helped to target the bombing no combat troops should have been committed to Afghanistan. The aim there (as I understood it) was simple, Strike AQ and punish the Taliban for harbouring AQ. That mission was achieved in magnificent style (apart from missing OBL) in a very short period.

As to Libya:

from JMA
Then we look at Libya where because the implementation of the intervention has proved to be totally incompetent questions are beginning to be asked about whether the intervention was a good idea in the first place. I maintain it was and the resources were available (mainly through US who had decided to intervene anyway) to comply with the mandate given under UNSC 1973 to remove threats to the civilian population in a matter of days.

My view on that (totally negat as far as the US is concerned) has not changed since day 1.

---------------
[*] Lemay (less than a Taylor friend) blew his cigar smoke at Taylor at JCS meetings, who hated it. I've done that to non-smokers in less exaulted meeting rooms (a neat tactic then).

Ironically, my future boss Arthur Dean negotiated the 1963 Geneva Test Ban. I was hired to the law firm by John Stevenson (who soon after became Legal Adviser at DoS for the Nixon-Kissinger administration), and also worked for Bob MacCrate (who later was outside legal counsel for LTG Peers re: My Lai). I'm not about to speak for them as to what positions they took on Vietnam - you can find that open source with a bit of digging. They did influence my views as to "Vietnamization".

Regards

Mike