Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Abu M for carrying a review of a new book on LeT by Stephen Tankel:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawam...r-e-taiba.html

The last sentence:

Tankel has produced one of the definitive accounts of Lashkar’s rise as well as the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and his book should be the go-to-guide for those looking to understand Pakistan’s reliance on proxies against India and its attached baggage.

Link to:http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/023...SIN=0231701527

[davidbfpo]

Stratfor have published a summary briefing 'The Evolution of a Pakistani Militant Network' and it is republished with their permission.

Link:http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110...itant-networks

[Polarbear]

This morning, while doing some other research, I came across this paper from the Indian Center for Land Warfare Studies. It might be of Interest for you.

Singh, Rohit, Understanding the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, Center for Land Warfare Studies, Manekshaw Paper No 26, 2011

http://www.claws.in/download.php?act...13258MP_26.pdf

Regards PB

[Polarbear]

The current issue of the "Survival" magazine contains an article from Georgetown professor and AfPak expert C. Christine Fair. Therein she tries to revise the widely accepted opinion that Pakistan relies on terrorist groups like LeT to solve its external security needs especially vis-a-vis India. For Fair this view "overlooks the domestic significance of militant groups. In fact, LeT plays an important role within Pakistan, countering other militants that have begun attacking the state and citizens alike, especially since 2002."
This means that solving the Indian-Pakistani rivalry is only one part of the solution and will not motivate Pakistan to cut its ties to these radical groups.

C. Christine Fair, Lashkar-e-Tayiba and the Pakistani state, Survival 53, 4, 29-52

[davidbfpo]

By none other than Zenpundit, albeit in an Indian magazine, pg.26-28 on the PDF link:http://zenpundit.com/wp-content/uplo...ommunityed.pdf

His review ends:

Storming the World Stage is a solidly researched book by Stephen Tankel that is apt to become the mandatory reference on Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and a useful resource on the general subject of Pakistan’s historical resort to proxy warfare. With his examination of Lashkar-e-Taiba, Tankel has made a worthy contribution to our understanding of terrorism and jihad in South Asia.

We have elsewhere discussed the Mumbai attack in 2008 and Zen comments, if not qualifies his review:

LeT also demonstrated in Mumbai a fluid tactical excellence in its use of off-the-shelf technology, small arms and mobility to reap an enormous return-on-investment by attacking soft targets, much along the asymmetric lines advocated by warfare theorist John Robb. Tactics that are a critical threat to any open society by forcing it to take preventive measures which are ruinously expensive and contraindicated to keeping society free and democratic. This is another topic that might have received greater analytical exploration.

[omarali50]

Mishandling by the dominant post-imperial powers (?driven in part by individual official's guilty conscience about having supported multiple evil proxies of their own? I am always curious if such psychodynamics plays any significant role in world affairs? or is it just grist for novelist's mills and can be ignored? I am never sure..) has allowed this threat to grow. I know colonel Roberts and many others will disagree, but I think some critical skill sets and organizations nurtured by the Pakistani state COULD have been shut down or pushed into small-scale criminality if the international community had been clear about its own objectives. That chance may now be lost.
In short, I continue to push the theory that ruinous expensive countermeasures are not the only option. The weak spot on the terrorist side was the state apparatus, not the clandestine networks themselves. By focusing on street level criminals, the operation as a whole was allowed to get away in what may have been a limited "window of opportunity".
I continue to believe that the PEOPLE of Pakistan would have been much better off it the STATE of Pakistan had faced some more pressure on this account. I genuinely believe that my obsessive carping about this issue is driven by a sincere desire to see the people of Pakistan and the Indian subcontinent leave stupid zero-sum games behind and grab a chance to transform living standards for one fourth of the world. But even I can see that I probably come across as some kind of pakiphobic monomaniac. I do try to step back and re-examine my assumptions. Maybe not hard enough?
It seems genuinely hard to know our own motives.

[zenpundit]

By none other than Zenpundit, albeit in an Indian magazine, pg.26-28 on the PDF link:http://zenpundit.com/wp-content/uplo...ommunityed.pdf

His review ends:

We have elsewhere discussed the Mumbai attack in 2008 and Zen comments, if not qualifies his review:

Hi David

Thank you for linking. I would give Tankel's book a strong recommendation, I learned a lot about LeT from it, but his thrust is predominantly a political-historical narrative. The subject could use a theological drill-down as well as a critical assessment from a security threat perspective

[davidbfpo]

It took time to fully read Dr. Stephen Tankel's book and here is my review.

'Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba' by Dr. Stephen Tankel is a superb piece of scholarship, notably in the access gained to insiders, observers and members of the group (commonly referred to as LeT).

Yes it contains some puzzles, many of which pre-date the Mumbai attacks in 2008 and he answers nearly all in detail.

The relationship between LeT, ISI, and the Pakistani Army is made stark, which will reinforce much of the despair many in the Western governments feel about dealings with those institutions. What I think is more important is the description and evaluation of how LeT, as a civil and religious organisation has grown to a point where the Pakistani civil state cannot confront them.

We know that militant and extremist groups fractionate by their very nature, what Dr. Tankel repeatedly observes is that LeT whilst disciplined it is also un-disciplined. Key members, often acting as cadres or direct action / paramilitary advisers leave and pursue their own objectives for the ‘cause’ often returning to the group. Given the reported skills of LeT this aspect should not be overlooked and one issue is how much attention should be given to the international movement of possible members, many of whom will be “clean skins” and have Western passports?

The ‘exit, entry’ aspect begs a simple question, are LeT a new version of Conan Doyle’s ‘White Company’, skilled mercenaries who will fight (or today facilitate) well for any part of the ‘cause’. With their trans-national network it is surprising we’ve seen LeT on the world stage so little; reflecting in plots in Australia and Denmark notably.

Given that LeT’s origins lie in Kashmir and the now intermittent violence in the Indian-ruled part, in which LeT can play a role I am surprised that Dr. Tankel does not consider the contemporary support for this primarily nationalist cause beyond Pakistan. In the UK there are those who argue the Kashmiri cause resonates far less today and is reflected in the lack of any type of support for LeT. The callous shootings in Mumbai, notably at the main railway terminus, which included Muslims, undermined their legitimacy – ‘Not in my name’ comes to mind and something I've heard here in the UK amongst South Asian Muslims.

Making an assessment of LeT who entered ‘the stage’ in 2008 is made harder by the simple fact that it appears to have exited the stage since then. Was the response so negative after the media spotlight shifted, perhaps the attack a ‘one off’ and are LeT just a capable reserve option for it’s Pakistani partners?

History will be the judge of this actor, Dr. Tankel thank you; now the audience can know them better and so judge them far better.