U.S. Touts Provincial Reconstruction Teams as a Model

[Jedburgh]

29 Jan 08 testimony before the HASC Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee on Interagency Reform: Can the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Case Study Illuminate the Future of Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations?

Carlos Pascual, The Brookings Institution

...as a nation we need to understand that addressing conflict and helping nations build peace is a national security priority. It requires both civilian and military capacity. Yet we do not have a national security budget – we have a budget for defense and another for foreign affairs. A stabilization and reconstruction capacity that is essential for the success of defense missions will remain under funded if it is not seen as part of an investment in national security that cuts across accounts....

Barbara Bodine, Princeton University

Michele Flournoy, Center for a New American Security

Nora Bensahel, RAND

....there are some ways to minimize some of the negative effects of interagency competition and increase U.S. capacity for stability operations. These include:

1. Manage interagency competition....

2. Create incentives for interagency secondments....

3. Increase the capacity of USAID....

4. Establish flexible funding mechanisms....

5. There is no substitute for an involved president and an involved Congress....

[Jedburgh]

14 Feb 08 testimony before the HASC Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee on Provincial Reconstruction Teams: A Case for Interagency National Security Reform?:

Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Policy)

Stephen D. Mull, Acting Asst Secretary, Bureau of Pol-Mil Affairs, DoS

Michael E. Hess, Asst Administrator, Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance Bureau, USAID


(Barry Pavel, Principal Deputy Asst SecDef (SOLIC and Interdependent Capabilities), also appeared, but a transcript of his testimony is not available.)

[PhilR]

I think its been pointed out elsewhere, but its worth noting that that PRTs in Afghanistan are different from those in Iraq. Having just left Baghdad, I'm more familiar with Iraq. In Iraq, the PRTs are State Department organizations that, while they have military members, are supervised by the US embassy (by the Office of Provincial Affairs--OPA). Iraq PRTs, for the most part, do not have their own organic security capability and are reliant on nearby military units. My understanding is that the PRTs in Afghanistan are part of the military chain of command (reporting through DoD)and have a small military unit (platoon?) organic to provide security and help them move around the battlefield.
I think these differences are significant when you consider the underlying impact on the missions and capabilities of the PRTs in each campaign.

[marct]

I think its been pointed out elsewhere, but its worth noting that that PRTs in Afghanistan are different from those in Iraq.

From my limited understanding of the PRTs in Afghanistan, it's somewhat more complex than that. I believe there are 12 operating in the American sector, 10 of which are US (1 Turkish and 1 Aus). Lines of reporting are "complex", and sometimes involve a dual structure. There are also separate PRTs and "embedded" PRTs - the ones with troops.

[Surferbeetle]

USIP Report # 152

The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified

by Robert M. Perito

http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr152.html

Summary

* Important lessons for current and future U.S. peace and stability operations can be found in the experiences of Americans who served in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. PRTs are small, joint civilian-military organizations whose mission is to promote governance, security, and reconstruction throughout the country.
* In June 2005, the United States led thirteen PRTs and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) directed nine. This multinational program was characterized by an emphasis on flexibility, a proliferation of national models, and an ad hoc approach to security and development.
* The U.S. model featured a complement of seventy-nine American military and three civilian government representatives. The U.S. PRTs stressed governance, force protection, and quick impact development projects to "win hearts and minds."
* The PRT emphasis on governance translated into supporting the respective provincial governors.
* Security was limited to self-protection, providing a security presence, and assisting Afghan forces.
* Reconstruction projects suffered from a lack of coordination and oversight. Military involvement in development brought criticism from relief agencies that claimed it put them at risk by blurring the distinction between combatants and humanitarian workers.
* In the view of many PRT veterans, the entire multinational PRT program would benefit from an agreed concept of operations and an effective central coordinating authority. The U.S. PRTs would profit from interagency delimitation of civilian and military roles and improved civilian agency staffing, funding, and administrative support.
* PRT veterans believe the addition of USAID representatives and better coordination with Afghan national development plans improved U.S. PRT reconstruction efforts. Rapidly disbursing long-term funding sources available to civilian representatives would rationalize and speed reconstruction efforts, which should focus on security-related infrastructure.
* PRT veterans also argue that PRTs are primarily military organizations; thus, better suited for performing security-related tasks. PRTs should concentrate on supporting Afghan security sector reform and providing a security presence in contested areas.

[Jedburgh]

USIP Report # 152

The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified

Also from USIP on the PRTs in Afghanistan, conducted a bit over two years ago:

Oral Histories: Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Teams

The link brings you to a page of links to pdf files with the transcripts of interviews with US government officials, military personnel, and members of international organizations and NGOs.

[Surferbeetle]

A 2006 article from Die Zeit in German

http://www.zeit.de/online/2006/44/bu...landseinsaetze

Die laufenden Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr

Die Bundeswehr ist momentan mit insgesamt rund 9000 Soldaten an zehn verschiedenen internationalen Einsätzen beteiligt. Ein Überblick über die Missionen.

'The Ongoing Overseas Missions of the Bundeswehr'

'The Bundeswehr is currently covering (partitioned in) 10 different international missions with approximately 9,000 soldiers. A summary (overview) of the missions."

It goes on to cover activities in UNFIL in Lebanon, EFOR in Bosnia, EUFOR RD in the Congo, Active Endeavour in the Atlantic?, UNMIS in Sudan, UNOMIG in Georgia, and UNMEE in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

For this thread the detail on OEF support to Maritime security off the Horn of Africa and the Humanitarian mission in Northern Afghanistan is of interest.

For those of you who catch the ZDF video podcast of the daily news (in German and free) the 1 February 2008 show pretty much captures Germany's attitude towards sending combat troops into southern Afghanistan 'No we already have the third largest contingent of troops'.

We will see if this attitude changes with the coming spring and associated snowmelt and opening of the mountain passes...

[davidbfpo]

I understand the value of PRTs and am aware that the Czechs are soon to have an independent one, with a reinforced Army company alongside - alas cannot recall which province they are going to.

In Helmand, where the UK and allies are there is a UK PRT. There the difficulty has been in getting Kabul to release funding - allocated to Kabul - so £20m in one year built twenty wells. Not value for money there and heaven knows what the annoucement by PM Gordon Brown in late '07 of an aid allocation of £200m actually will produce.

Security first. Then build schools and sink wells.

None of the collective experience augurs well for the much-mooted USAID effort in NWFP, where security is unclear and local hostility guaranteed. Afghans are too poor - yes proud - not to accept help, however meagre.

I suspect the idea of a NATO/UN "overlord", sorry co-ordinator, is underpinned by the diversion of aid funds.

davidbfpo