Symmetrical Defense Strategies?
I recently finished Decoding Clausewitz (highly recommended), and after reading his thoughts on the superiority of defense versus offense it hit me that to some degree the coalition and the Taliban are both implementing defensive strategies.
We initially conducted an aggressive offense, and many AQ and Taliban were foolish enough to stand and fight a largely conventional fight against superior U.S. forces. However, once they retreated across the border into Pakistan we both implemented largely defensive strategies. We continue a series a pin prick attacks and limited maneuver, as do the Taliban, but there is no concerted offensive by either side that seeks a decisive victory. For the coalition to conduct a decisive offense, it would have to attack into Pakistan (beyond the occassional drone strike and raid), which at the moment is not politically acceptable. For the Taliban to conduct a decisive offensive it would have to be able to defeat coalition forces in battle and drive them from Afghanistan. Not going to happen anytime soon.
Winning the support of the populace really won't deter either side, as long as the Taliban has sanctuary in Pakistan, and parts of Afghanistan. The center of gravity is still the will of the Taliban to continue to resist, and I suspect our will to continue to resist is our center of gravity. Ultimately that will transition to the Afghan security forces' will to resist. I see no reason this war coudn't continue endlessly if neither side tired of the fighting, but of course as history has demonstrated repeatedly eventually one side will decide the investment of blood and treasure isn't worth the victory.
If both sides are locked in a defensive strategy, and both are seeking victory by breaking the will of the other to resist, then will our current strategy succeed? Will a focus on the population somehow transition to the Taliban having less will to fight? If they resist because we're there, and we are the underlying cause for the conflict I see no logical correlation in a population centric strategy that ignores the continued safe havens in Pakistan. Furthermore, it can be assumed that at least a percentage of our billions in aid to Pakistan are being diverted to support the Taliban (as is much of our aid money in Afghanistan), so we continue to fund the Taliban indirectly with our current approach, which lessens the pressure on them to cease resisting.
Clausewitz wrote that political conditions have transformed most wars into mongrel affairs, in which the original hostilities have to twist and turn among conflicting interests to such a degree that they emerge very much attenuated.
That seems to be exactly what has happened to our strategy in Afghanistan, Clausewitz also wrote that, "the balance of military force is not the critical strategic variable, what matters is the relative strength of the attacker and the defenders determination."
Why we may have more relative strength in killing power, but since we are unable to apply it effectively (against TB safehavens), that seems to be largely irrelevant unless we plan to sustain the Afghans in a defensive posture for many years to come after our combat forces depart, and that assumes that the Afghans will be willing to do this.
In a symmetrical defense strategic war who has the advantage? If we don't have the advantage how do we achieve it?
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