RFI: In criticism of defense in depth

[davidbfpo]

Selil,

The vivid example that comes to mind dates back to the Yom Kippur War, October 1973, on the Suez canal front, where the Israeli fixed defences, the Bar Lev Line, were penetrated by the Egyptians and elements pushed beyond into relatively IIRC open ground. The Israeli (IDF) response was to attack with an armoured brigade, held in reserve and one account I read referred to seeing hundreds of dots digging in. Then the tanks were hit by hundreds, if not more, of ATGMs (Sagger ?) and the brigade was destroyed. IDF rapidly changed the brigade structure to an all-arms format, so later attacks had artillery, mortars and infantry alongside tanks. It was a bit of shock to the IDF.

Not sure if that helps.

[Fuchs]

Well, the Israeli fort line along the canal and their fortified passes were no defence in depth. they did intend to hold the Suez line; the depth of Sinai rather served as buffer against the long-range artillery harrassment of 70/71 than as a planned space for manoeuvre IIRC.

The Egyptian defensive positions didn't practice much elastic defence or defence in depth either. They did even lack the necessary effective mobile reserve to handle the later breakthrough.

The Israeli armor brigade was so terribly imbalanced in part because that saved much active-service personnel in comparison to a forward-deployed well-rounded brigade. The example was thus a rare and special exception.

[CR6]

Link from Combat Studies Institute

Overview of US Army tactical doctrine from defense in depth to active defense. It might put a combat arms spin on the information concepts you are presenting.

[ablowyr3]

There is a book called Defence In Depth by Frederic P. Miller. This might be what you are looking for.