Just read this article from the current Military Review on your Brain in combat. Thoughts on this?
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...630_art010.pdf
Your Brain In Combat
Just read this article from the current Military Review on your Brain in combat. Thoughts on this?
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...630_art010.pdf
Interesting. Nothing really new but does pull together a lot of threads.
Not a bad article. I can provide a short version of an element he cites that has long been known and that we used to practice but seldom do today. From the article :Exactly.Decades of neuroscience research have firmly shown that the brain is highly adaptable and that repeated activities designed to create specific behaviors—like combat training—literally “change cellular structure and strength of connections between neurons.”50 (emphasis added / kw)
I do not rabidly disagree with his recommendations but suggest that it is far less important they be implemented than it is that more and better combat training be conducted. Not necessarily at a CTC. Perhaps ideally not at a CTC...
Initially I thought this article would relate to combat leadership meaning the commander being "under fire" himself rather than merely commanding troops who themselves are "under fire" (or in contact). However, I quote from the article:Originally Posted by slapout9
If this is the case then I can hardly think what would distract the "leader" (as defined) from the cognitive processes command in battle requires. Those given to emotional responses and propensity for cognitive distraction would surely be weeded out early in the officer selection and training process?In this article, the term “leader” refers to any individual who is responsible for leading several groups of soldiers in maneuver against the enemy and must manage multiple battlefield systems. This leader spends most of his battlefield time outside of his weapon’s sights.
Outside of the weapon sites has a lot of different meanings. Could mean you're in the TOC, could just mean you're in the thick of it with a rifle in one hand, and the handset up to your ear with the other hand - in both cases you're outside of the weapon sites. Kind of vague in the description.
Selecting officers based on their responses in realistic training....sounds great. How do we get started? We still have commanders that take their LTs out for a run in order to determine who the new Scout PL is going to be; and base moves of company commanders on year group, time of CCC, staff time, and other measures that generic nothing in the way of a leadership metric.
Maybe my experiences are out of the norm, but I've never had to run in PTs and running shoes over to establish an LP/OP, or conduct reconnaissance on an NAI, and the last I checked my PT card didn't cover my ability to adjust fire, call in a MEDEVAC, or conduct a KLE.
I think Ken White is hinting at some very salient and noteworthy points. However, as we rush to close theaters and begin an age of austerity, we are likely to see the dime & washer drill replace reflexive fire; see Table XII (using SLAP-T rounds of course, $15 as opposed to about $1200 avg cost for training rounds for a main gun, IIRC) replace force-on-force maneuvers; and then to see CCTT replace Table XII, Table VIII; and thought experiments will likely replace battle drill training for our infantry. It's just too expensive to buy ammo, pay for fuel, and replace uniforms and equipment that get destroyed in a typical field exercise. That said, I think we need to suck it and find a way to sustain (assuming it's already done) good training.
Been there, done that...
Unfortunately, the incompetent will always be with us -- at all ranks and grades. The system catches many but can never catch all and the number of shoddy leaders that slip through varies, it's cyclical. A good CofSA has his effect 15-20 years down the road. Conversely, a bad one does the same thing. The Personnel system rewards conformity and mediocrity so that has been true since WW I and the Army thus waxes and wanes.
It also reflects civilian society...That's the been there, done that. All you mention and more has occurred before and the Army survived. There were times in the late 50s-early 60s and again in the late 70s and the 90s when all those things were problematic -- even to the extent of inadequate funding for fuel causing vehicles to stay in the motor pool for entire fiscal quarters.However, as we rush to close theaters and begin an age of austerity...That said, I think we need to suck it and find a way to sustain (assuming it's already done) good training.
Good news is there is an unintended benefit. In austere times, people learn literally to do more with less and one has to innovate and use initiative. Those latter two things get stifled all too often in periods of excessive money being available.
There's also the benefit that less funding is available for the micro-managers to stick their nose into things.
Consider that the 'broke' Army of the 1930s did okay when committed after a few minor bubbles and the almost equally relatively poorly funded Army of the early 60s did okay in Viet Nam -- until the money kicked in, the second team got hired and the politics got overly intrusive. The American solution of throwing money at things that do not work rarely really succeeds in fixing the problems. Making do has its merits...
At the risk of being a heretic, I think the CTCs are also inimical to good training and they are ungodly expensive in all aspects including travel and equipment. They have some merit but having seen Army units before their inception and after, I'm not convinced the results justify the significant expense. Just the opposite, in fact. Aside from the CTCs, the Task, Condition and Standard solution of BTMS severely and adversely affected Army Training.
Dump both those and the picture ahead may not be nearly as bleak as one might think.
Got so busy being philosophical I lost the thread -- in austere times, you can't just buy stuff and do things by rote or even afford running shoes, you have to THINK and not waste money on inessentials. That in itself is what they call "good trainin'." Great exercise for the brain...
Last edited by Ken White; 05-28-2011 at 04:01 PM.
I understand one of the claims the author is making is that one part of the brain (the limbic system) does what most of us would call reaction and a different part of the brain (the prefrontal cortex) does what most of us would call thinking. What I have a harder time understanding is where exactly the concept of “reflexive” fits into his model. On the one hand there are responses to immediate stimuli that are neither written nor spoken (hearing a rattlesnake or seeing a shark’s fin sorts of things) that I think most everyone would agree are reflexes. But if you have ever seen an excellent poker player or offensive coordinator you can get the sense that they are working with No Mind. I don’t understand whether or not the author is claiming that the limbic system is involved with reflexive actions.
Am I correct in assuming that there is an HR problem for the U.S. Army insomuch as any junior officer who shows a knack for the sort of leadership described in the paper is soon enough promoted to a rank where it is no longer part of his job?
The Peter Principle is not limited to the military, but it is perhaps the most profound in bureaucracies like the military. That said, poorly designed ticket punching structures / systems do a lot to exacerbate the Peter Principle.
Last edited by Kiwigrunt; 05-28-2011 at 09:37 PM.
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
No, while I can't speak for the US Army, I think you are going in the wrong direction with this.
Officers become valuable to the military when the reach field officer (major) and beyond. Their time as junior officers is merely to prepare them for real command say from battalion level upwards.
Platoon commanding (while considered by many to be the happiest and most personally rewarding command experience due to the intimacy of the personal combat leadership experience) is merely an apprenticeship. In this a bright eyed and bushy tailed lieutenant will find an old and bold and hairy ass'd platoon sergeant a few steps behind him to support/guide/assist/advise and when necessary press him in his first command experience. Note platoon sergeant is not a command position as they go from section/squad to platoon to company and so on. The platoon sergeant should be tactically qualified to company level and be able to take over command should casualties demand. So why not give command of a platoon to the most experienced and capable? Because this officer apprenticeship is most often the career make or break for a young officer and an important testing/proving ground. Yes, there are a few late bloomers but that's another story.
Where I come from it is the time as platoon commander (30 months for rifle platoons) which sets him in a career stream. The first thing that happens is that the course order these youngsters passed out with gets "adjusted" career wise over the next 30 months and then thereafter every year with the annual assessment until the pecking order is resolved. So in the simplest terms out of every 12 platoon commanders you get 4 company commanders and then of the 4 one Lt Col battalion commander. Now out of this process you will still get a number of company commanders who don't shape up and then even a number of battalion commanders the same. There is a continual selection and weeding out process... which is not fool proof.
I say fool proof specifically because politics play a more and more important role the higher the rank level. This would be internal politics and then from the idiots in the government departments or congress/parliament/whatever. Then of course should a general mobilization take place then due to war-time escalation everyone gets over promoted by a few levels and quality flies out the window.
After all that it is probably only for a few years in a thirty odd year career where an individuals performance in the closeness of the "look into his eyes then kill him" type combat counts. However this performance (positive or negative) will live with him for the rest of his career.
You need to credit the military with the knowledge that comes through experience that it appreciates that there are certain young officers who may prove to be outstanding combat officers but may not be suitable for higher command and then there will be those (as stated) who will be "carried" by their platoon sergeant but grow into capable, possibly even outstanding, senior officers as they would be late bloomers.
You will find many complain about "check the box" personnel management in the larger militaries. This takes the personal out of career management so it is unlikely that truly meritorious officers will rise (as the should) above the rest as they too are trapped in a system where everyone gets a chance regardless of how unsuitable.
So don't hold your breath that some fire-ball of a young officer will have an accelerated career due to his prowess in combat.
...then one must have a war when one is a platoon commander to prove this matter as much to oneself as to the military. A quick 6 month tour is not really enough but is better than nothing.
Well, to somewhat more clearly define the terms, the author is laying out the idea that the limbic system handles decison-making and information processing when one is in a fight-or-flight state. So, yes, according to him, the limbic system is involved with what you're calling reflexive actions.
Re leaders and selection
Well, yes and no. Sr NCOs are leaders who remain with troops more or less throughout their careers. As has been noted, Jr offrs are really apprenticing for Sr command, so there is a slightly different basket of traits being sought or developed.
Which is the other point we need to recall - you dont select good leaders, you make them. Not everyone has the potential to become a good leader, so you select those that do. But then you train them to lead. Even instinctive leaders still need training and study to be their best.
Thats what the article is about - some suggestions on training leaders to remain more calm and more effective in battle.
From where I'm sitting (on my lofty perch as an 18 y.o. highschool student) I think that officer selection and training weeds out the canidates who can't operate effectively because of the severity of their emotional responses and/or cognitive distractions, however, I also believe that these two reactions are something that every combat leader undergoes to one degree or another, and that teaching techniques to suppress or eliminate these responses would allow leaders to focus more on the nessecary cognitive task at hand, making them more effective at their positions.
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