I guess the question comes down to how much control the US actually needs to exercise over the South China Sea. After all, it is not our territorial water either.

Several interesting (to me, anyway) issues all touch this topic:

1. Spheres of influence: All major nations have spheres of influence. This is reasonable and smart. The questions and conflicts arise around issues of how large should any particular nation's sphere be, how they define their unique role within that sphere, where spheres overlap, how those who live within these spheres feel about that foreign intrusion of policy and presence, etc. We live in an age where the US has grown used to exercising a global sphere of influence, at least for certain issues. Other states that are rising in power are seeking to expand their own spheres of influence. Is ours too large, or are our expectations too extensive?? How do we deal with the overlaps that will naturally occur? This is an important, dynamic issue, and one we need to deal with logically. The most illogical position would be to assume that the status quo of the Cold War would endure as a new normal.

2. National interests. Closely related, but nations have interests, which is why they worry about spheres of influence. Sometimes these are shared with other nations, sometimes they are neutral, and sometimes they are in conflict. Knowing clearly what ones own true and vital interests are is important to keep one's own appetites in check. Appreciating the interests of others is equally important. I don't think the US does a very good job on either count in recent years. The largest contributor to US problems in this regard is the post-Cold War adoption of the belief that we make ourselves safer when we make others more like us, thereby making such conversions a vital interest. This is such a "born again Christian" approach to foreign policy. We are so excited about what we find to be so wonderful for ourselves, that we make a royal ass of ourselves by hard selling the same to everyone we deal with. As a counter I offer that "we make ourselves safer when we are perceived as the nation most dedicated to helping others to be more like themselves." This is the essence of the principles of liberty and self-governance our nation was founded upon.

3. Control vs. Influence. Control is in the eye of the person on the receiving end. I suspect we are perceived as a little to a lot too controlling just about everywhere.

4. Vulnerability. The US is so used to being big, rich, strong and powerful. But rising states adopting relatively low-cost counters to out big, rich, storng, powerful platforms make us feel vulnerable. We don't like that feeling. That is natural, the real question is what we do about it. Currently our approach is to simply spend more to make us even bigger, stronger and more powerful, even though it is no longer a reasonable cost validated by a true threat to do so. Like a gambler doubling down on losing hands in an effort to catch back up. Time to perhaps play a new game. Our national security is based on far more than just our military might, and to over spend building big, expensive, vulnerable platforms not only weakens other aspects of the equation; but if placed to the test and defeated, even in part, by smaller asymmetric means, we will lose so much credibility and influence that it could be a sea-change event. It has happened many times before, even in recent times. When Spain lost her Armada; when the French fleet was defeated at Trafalgar; when the Russian fleet was crushed by Japan; when Japan's fleet was crushed by the US; etc. Why would we push such a large, vulnerable target so deep into an opponents face so as to dare him to prove how vulnerable it truly is?

National leaders have recognized that the US is at a strategic turning point. They have directed a "pivot" of focus from Europe toward the Pacific. But I believe it is still only a half-step in the right direction. We have refocused our military, but we have not yet rebalanced and refocused our Ends-Ways-Means as a whole for engaging the world. The logical time to have launched such a major review was during the Clinton administration. It might have saved us a great deal of trouble if we had; but better late than never. This is not a Democrat issue or a Republican issue, as both sides of the aisle are equally culpable. Similarly, this is not a Defense vs State issue, as again, each are equally culpable. This is a national issue and an issue of national importance. It may well play out some day in the South China Sea, but it will affect us all.

How the US Navy deals with naval issues as we execute this pivot is far too important to leave to the Navy to decide. Same with our Air, Land, Space, Cyber and SOF forces. Each will see the problems through the lens of their own equities, and will overly push for solutions that make sense in that context. Time for a new, larger context to balance this all against.