South China Sea and China (2011-2017)

[Dayuhan]

If you mean to say you live closer to the South China Sea than others and because of that your opinions are more credible, say it straight out. In any event, it is a poor argument.

I don't think any opinion stated here has any inherent credibility. I pointed out that one might expect those with the most to lose from a given threat or potential threat to be the ones most concerned about it. In this discussion, for whatever reason, that appears not to be the case.

I do suspect that those closest to the events in this case may have been following the situation more closely for a longer time than some others in the discussion, and that this may have something to do with the attitudes displayed, but that's only conjecture.

The passage you quoted, twice, could be viewed as a prediction of war I guess, if you are not a careful reader. That is my fault since I should write with the expectation that uncareful readers abound. What I should have written was "could" instead of "will", as in "J-20s could be flying around picking off American jets" rather than "J-20s will be flying around picking off American jets".

That would be more clear and would more accurately reflect my opinion. After all us opinion leaders and makers bear a weighty responsibility. But in my defense, you could have J-20s picking off F-18Fs in situations well short of wars.

People on all sides of these questions point out what could happen. I'm sure that those in China who want to see greater spending on naval forces routinely point out that somewhere down the line the US Navy could be interdicting Chinese merchandise exports and commodity imports in waters far outside the range of current Chinese military capability. Probably some have real concerns about that possibility - when someone has a knife near your neck it's small consolation to note that he hasn't used it yet - and probably some have material vested interests in greater military spending. The same is true in the US: some who talk up the China threat are probably really really scared, and there are probably also some who have a material vested interest in seeing greater spending aimed at combating threats. In each case those who actually make decisions and have influence over the opinions of others (that would not include us, we're just a few folks yakking on the internet) need to maintain equal wariness of the potential threat and of those who would exaggerate that potential threat to serve their own interests.

But since my opinion carries such weight nowadays, I'll state what it is concerning chances of war with Red China in 10 years. I don't know. Maybe, maybe not. Things could run the gamut from an all out destroy both countries exchange of nukes to something like the navel (I used that word just for you BA) war we fought with France around the turn of the 18th to 19th centuries to Operation Praying Mantis to amity on the order of that we have with the Aussies.

Obviously many things could happen in the next ten years. My insignificant guess, though, is that the next ten will look a lot like the last ten. There will continue to be low-level incidents: fishing boat intrusions, arrests of fishermen. pressure to release arrested fishermen, harassment of exploration ships, occasional games of chicken. An actual shooting incident involving ships or aircraft is quite possible. I would not expect any such incident to escalate: none of the parties involved have anything to gain from combat.

I'd expect the US Navy to continue sailing task forces through the SCS, and to continue holding both bilateral and multilateral exercises with SCS border states. The Chinese will continue to denounce each event.

The Philippines will buy a few more retired coast guard cutters from the US and will try to upgrade them with missile systems. They may try to buy a few ships, though not necessarily from the US (the Italians have offered frigates that would suit and probably be cheaper than anything the US could offer). The Philippine F16 purchase will continue to be tossed around but may not go anywhere; the cost of both acquisition and operation is high, supporting systems would have to be in the package, and they wouldn't really change the picture much.

The Vietnamese will beef up coast-based radar and missile systems (I personally think the Philippines would be wise to take that course too, instead of prioritizing high profile ships and aircraft, but I don't make decisions), and take delivery of some submarines. Other SCS states will continue upgrading their navies as economic conditions permit, as they have been doing for the last few decades.

The Chinese will issue the mimeographed ritual complaint with every acquisition, while stocking up as much gear as they can. They'll be a presence in the SCS, and will probably volunteer more assets for anti-piracy work, partly to protect their shipping but largely to gain experience with operations in distant waters.

I don't expect the Chinese to gobble anyone up or to invade anyone. Not much to be gained by it for them, and high potential costs.

Of course there are many jokers in that deck, the most prominent and most likely being significant internal upheaval in China, which could go any number of ways with a wide range of outcomes, all completely beyond the control or meaningful influence of any outside party.

The actions of late have been a big naval buildup in the face of no threat

You may persist in saying there is no threat, but their perception of threat is more important than our ever so impartial assessment of threat, and they perceive a threat, justifiable or not. We do maintain significant military forces in Korea, Japan, and Okinawa, and along their key commercial arteries in the Middle East... would we feel threatened if they had forces in similar proximity to our mainland and our vital commercial routes?

The US maintains an enormous Navy in the face of no threat. The Russians, British, French, Italians maintain significant navies in the face of no threat. Actual or aspiring major powers with extensive maritime trade maintain navies, threat or no threat. Been that way for centuries, why would it change now?