South China Sea and China (2011-2017)

[carl]

I didn't write they generically were unimportant. You do a lot of standing broad jumps at wrong conclusions. I didn't write they were all unnecessary, merely that the ones you've mentioned are not totally critical and that there were workarounds. You might also consider the issue of when which Islands may be a detriment and when they might be beneficial...

Actually you sort of did write that island and land bases were generically unimportant.

In post no. 232 you wrote "I'm somewhat surprised that an airplane driver thinks those Islands form any kind of barrier at all in this era.

Be careful with the pundits and think tanks, most of them are 30-40 years behind the times strategically and operationally. All of them must have and / or see crises to survive." The two preceding sentence referring to the importance of holes in the line of barrier islands.

In post 242 you wrote "Um, you did note that I mentioned those guys were 30-40 years out of date? So are some of those inept Generals and Admirals you despise...", this in response to my saying "I don't need pundits to tell me that island bases are vital."

In post 242 you also wrote "For that and the rest of your paragraph, nuke boats don't need fillups, are not susceptible to ICBMs or cruise missiles and we do not have a monopoly but do have a decisive (advisedly chosen word.. ) edge in that sphere. I doubt that will change in the next twenty to thirty years." This was in response to my saying ships needed land bases and islands in order fill up."

So in posts 232 and 242 you said things that sounded like simple dismissals of the importance of land bases for navies.

But then things evolved.

In post 272 you wrote "They are if you're going to use Carrier Battle Groups and surface warships though I'm unsure why you would do that in anything above mid intensity conflict (where they have their uses). In a high intensity fight, the Carrier and surface ships are big fat targets and an impediment until a lot of sanitizing in the objective area has occurred." This in response to my saying that land bases are as useful as ever.

So we are getting to an admission that land bases are useful for things mid intensity conflict and below.

Now in post 293 you said "The surface stuff is all necessary, certainly for less than total warfare but also for later stages of major conflicts and for operations outside the primary sea battlespace. Bases are also necessary, no question. Those things are not at issue; the issue is one of where things are located and when they are used. Thus it is not a question of needs and capabilities, simply one of employment."

So now with this post and 293 you say that land bases are needed for navies. Good. Now that we have that settled, we can deal with the separate question of which land bases are needed.

In any event, I'll now go a step farther and suggest that for a variety of reasons (not least including who can best cope with time:distance issues and net weapon available numbers) we're better off without that outer perimeter you and John Foster Dulles like. Ducks sitting and all that. Recall that Pearl Harbor was an attack on US Soil and it got a response. An attack on Taiwan or the Philippines will NOT get such a political response -- nor should it.

You may have seen me rail against the FOBs in Afghanistan -- that's a tactically unsound approach that violates the fundamentals of avoiding tieing down force to fixed locations, avoiding tactical repetition and not providing easy targets as well as several others. The Islands you want -- as opposed to all the other places available in the pacific -- are FOBs and they are as dumb as the bases in the 'Stan. Fixed Bases are targets and they severely inhibit the most important fundamental, Maneuver and it's ally, Flexibility.And some learned the fundamentals the hard way and know that some, not all, new tools will not change everything but can and will aid in accomplishing those fundementals and changing, if slightly, the way business is done.

The war against the Japanese was one of moving forward from one island base to take from the Japanese another island base and then doing it again and again. All the big battles that occurred resulted from contesting islands. We destroyed most of the Japanese mobile military along the way. So from this I conclude that, if it comes to it and I hope to God it doesn't, to defeat Red China or rather the PLAN and supporting aviation, the sea power that would do it has to be close enough to do it. So that means islands, as you say in post 293. So given all that, (which you won't, but I will) it seems to me foolish to give up the first islands in that barrier without a fight, since without possession of those island, I think the best we could hope for would be a stalemate with the PLAN, which would be a long term strategic victory for them and a long term strategic loss for us.

Fixed bases are vulnerable as you say. And of course in a perfect world you would eschew them. But in this imperfect world logistical considerations must be tended to. With those considerations in mind, if we lost that first line of barrier islands, we could never retake them. If we couldn't retake them, we could not defeat the PLAN. If we can't defeat the PLAN, strategically we lose and will put on the defensive. That possibility worries me.

A lot of new stuff is borderline worthless for warfighting -- but some of it has great merit and applies directly to those fundamentals. Note the subject of my last comment and Google it. Not much new under the sun -- or sea. Nothing I've mentioned is really new except possibly the X-37 which is only kinda new; all those items have been seen and used before and all the current iterations have been in development for years except the X-47B which the Navy is moving big bucks to -- do those stodgy Admirals know something...

Google what? I got mixed up. If you mean drones and space planes and hypersonic missiles, that stuff to me is like guided air to air missiles were in the 1950s, of some use but it they would not be what they were cracked up to be until 30 years later.

As an aside, it is important to realize with fundamentals that one cannot pick and choose those one likes -- you have to take them all, they're part of an inseparable total package...At the risk of sounding Clintonesque, define 'conveniently.'

Define also 'sea fight.' Sub surface, surface, above the surface or way, way, way above the surface...

Nope, I don't think I will. It is obvious from the context of all I have written on this so you should think back.

You may not think so but the Navy thinks it fights in all those and does so simultaneously. They consider themselves a Sea service. They also have well over 50 year experience at it and that matters a great deal -- plus they have a lot of experience dealing with 'inconvenience'...

Well I should hope so. That is what they get paid for. But the Navy has decided to count hospital ships and PCs as battle force ships so maybe sometimes they don't do so well.

All unduly bellicose, the Chinese, hopefully, will be smarter than we are likely to be and none of this is likely to be problematical for a good many years if ever. You worry too much...

We'll see. I hope I am wrong.

[carl]

I think ( ??? ) you said what I said.

Yes, it takes a long time to get production line up to speed -- 1939/1940 to 1943/1944 is three to five years anyway you count the start and end.

Yes, by 1943 everything was in place and totally serious. Before that things were coalescing and production was ramping up and most everyone was getting more serious by the day -- but it was 1943 before the Draft picked up almost everyone, the WPB controlled civilian employment in war industries, rationing was extended to most items and the services had learned that incompetent commanders had to be rapidly relieved and uniformly did that. All the efforts of many people from 1939 until then culminated in a reasonably good and serious effort by most Americans and the Nation by late 1943.

Not so on the Navy, a lot of the pre-war ships were lost for some good and bad reasons. The Navy was very slow in getting ready for WW II. In fact, the Maritime Adminsitration with its 1936 shipbuilding standardization and building plan was ahead of the Navy and helped the Navy get their late 1939 plan going and that only because it became obvious there was going to be a war and Franklin was adamant that we be involved. The only big class building and arriving prior to the war that fought heavily in the Pacific was the Gleaves Class and they weren't the best destroyers around, That 1939 plan saw the Fletchers, Clevelands, Baltimores, South Dakotas and Essexes but they didn't start arriving in the fleet until mid 1942 as didThe Atlantas and the Independence class CVLs (which FDR had to browbeat the Navy into ordering; then as now, they wanted BIG Carriers -- more people, thus bigger budget slice...). Most of the program didn't hit the fleet until '44. The Navy effectively won in the Pacific with those 1939 Program ships while most of the pre-war ships were assigned to the Atlantic Fleet where the combat was far less demanding. Also note the Navy and the Marines knew war with Japan was coming and prepared for it as best they could -- and that only seriously after 1939 and even then slowly. The Army OTOH did not want war with Japan and tried to ignore the Pacific...

You're correct that we didn't turn it on all that fast and that we couldn't even do that well today -- except for aircraft and some other stuff; certainly not for ships, tanks, artillery and the like, though...

Sorry. I got mixed up when you said getting serious. I thought you meant when we started taking the thing seriously not when we started actually getting it right.

I figured that the Japanese were checked at Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal in '42. All the carriers that fought in those actions were pre-39 carriers except the Hornet. The Washington, North Carolina and South Dakota were all pre-39 battleships. The cruisers, or most all, that fought in '42 were pre-39 ships. Finally I counted 12 pre-39 destroyers lost in '42 (I only had one book to look at) and over a 1/3 of destroyers the Navy had on Dec 7 were WWI flush deckers. This ship counting is minor except to show that we checked the Japanese with what we had ordered prior to '39. We did it with ships we acquired before the need became obviously critical.

As far as the Army goes, I'll defer to what you say.

[Bob's World]

Carl,

Again, and this cannot be emphasized enough, when you say "first line of barrier Islands" you are talking about the Philippines, Taiwan and Japan. The first and latter are not at risk, the one in the middle is already part of China.

Kind of like China arguing that it needs to hold Catalina and the Channel Islands to keep the US contained to the mainland.

Really?

You do understand that Taiwan is not a base for US military operations, right? We don't base ships or planes there and certainly have no land forces there. It is, after all, part of China. What exactly do you think we are giving up in terms of securing US national interests?

Taiwan was a vital part of our Cold War strategy in the Pacific. A moral victory and a thorn in the side of the Sino-Soviet pact. But that is over. Behind us. Obsolete. No longer critical to our current strategic priorities. It is time for the US to stop being an obstacle to the resolution of this internal Chinese issue.

Get out your map. When (not if) China consolidates Taiwan back into the fold they will have advanced a little, but are still nearly 7,000 miles from Los Angeles. Is this really worth fighting over? Why would we not be working to negotiate the smooth transition instead? If Taiwan decides that no, they would rather fight China than rejoin China, let that be their decision made with the full facts on the table. To allow them to assume we will fight China to delay the inevitable is not fair to them or to us. It could lead to miscalculations. Ones with serious consequences.

Loyalty is an admirable trait. Mine is to America first.

I know Taiwan has been a major provider of troops during the Cold War to help us in our European mission; and that they were first to stand up and send troops to help in the Gulf War, and later in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that such a staunch ally should be rewarded (tongue placed firmly in cheek).

I respect your choice if you decide someday to travel to Taiwan to fight with them in their separatist movement with China, but that should be your personal choice for personal reasons. Much like the Lincoln BDE in Spain. You can help organize a Corps of Taiwanese Americans to go with you, though I wonder how many would volunteer. If ordered our military personnel will certainly go as well. But none of that creates a national interest for doing so.

Hopefully our "pivot" to the Pacific brings issues like this out of the realm of emotional debates of outdated strategies, and puts them back on the table to assess afresh.

[carl]

Councilor:

I did look at the map. I do understand that Taiwan is not a base for US military operations, now.

You understand that regardless of how you view the status of Taiwan, it is not currently a base for PLAN nor PLA forces. It is as the name implies, a barrier to their ops. And that is what we would be giving up in terms of US national interests, that it is not a base for the PLAN nor PLA and that it could be a base for us. We also would be giving up the willingness of some millions of people to keep the PLAN and PLA from using Taiwan as a base. That seems important to me.

I looked at the map again as you suggested. And east of Taiwan, once you get past the Volcano Islands, you run into Hawaii, a US state, long before you get to L.A. I noticed too that the Philippines are closer to Taiwan than they are to the Chinese mainland. That proved useful to attacking air forces in the past.

Are you frustrated with me and my opinions Mr. Jones? That you are is the only thing I can think of when you make references to the Lincoln Brigade. It may surprise you to know that my first loyalty is to the US also, an opinion different from yours notwithstanding.

[Dayuhan]

Should the US do nothing? And feel that all things are bright and beautiful and things will work out?

Or should US undertake to frustrate China in her designs to indicate enough is enough?

What exasctly do you want the US to do do prevent China from selling missile technology to North Korea? Of from buying oil from Iran? Or from selling arms to Iran?

Kwajalein Atoll

The island is about 1.2 square miles (3.1 km)

The U.S. Army has an installation at Kwajalein Atoll (USAKA).

Every atoll and every island has its value.

Iran dug into the mountain to build its reactors! Some would think that is crazy!

Necessity is the Mother of Invention!

There's a small observation station on Kwajalein, which exists to monitor ballistic missile tests. You could build suich a station on Pag-asa, but there wouldn't be much point, as there are no tests to monitor. As Bob's World says, you could build a small Coast Guard or weather station there. You could not relocate thousands of Marines from Okinawa or build a military facility large enough to have any impact on the balance of power in the SCS.

In any event, the US is not in fact building anything on Pag-asa. If they were, you could be sure the Chinese would be howling about it. The Philippine Government is repairing a badly eroded airstrip and a small wharf capable of docking shallow-draft vessels. Not a "seaport". That's all.

to defeat Red China or rather the PLAN and supporting aviation, the sea power that would do it has to be close enough to do it. So that means islands, as you say in post 293. So given all that, (which you won't, but I will) it seems to me foolish to give up the first islands in that barrier without a fight, since without possession of those island, I think the best we could hope for would be a stalemate with the PLAN, which would be a long term strategic victory for them and a long term strategic loss for us.

Will somebody with great strategic knowledge tell me why the US would need or want to rerun WW2, sail into areas where China has support from land-based aircraft and missiles, and fight there? China's great vulnerability is economic dependence on trade routes that extend far outside their naval reach. Why not exploit that vulnerability? Embargo Chinese imports to thje US, Set up in the Indian Ocean, cut off the oil coming in from the Middle East and Africa and the trade going out to those locations and Europe?

In the unlikely event that it's ever necessary to fight China, why would we fight them where they are strongest?

[carl]

Will somebody with great strategic knowledge tell me why the US would need or want to rerun WW2, sail into areas where China has support from land-based aircraft and missiles, and fight there? China's great vulnerability is economic dependence on trade routes that extend far outside their naval reach. Why not exploit that vulnerability? Embargo Chinese imports to thje US, Set up in the Indian Ocean, cut off the oil coming in from the Middle East and Africa and the trade going out to those locations and Europe?

In the unlikely event that it's ever necessary to fight China, why would we fight them where they are strongest?

That is a very good point. That probably is their greatest weakness. But two play in the sea fighting business. And one of the objects, I would guess, of our side would be to keep them from interfering with the sea lanes to Japan and other places. If Taiwan was not able to be used by the PLAN, it would be that much harder for them to do that.

Also, the US would absolutely not want to re-run WWII. That is why you wouldn't want to lose that island, and those islands in the first place. So you wouldn't have to.

[Ken White]

Actually you sort of did write that island and land bases were generically unimportant.

In post no. 232 you wrote "I'm somewhat surprised that an airplane driver thinks those Islands form any kind of barrier at all in this era. (emphasis added / kw)

THOSE would be Taiwan, the Philippines (and even Guam...) -- your outer barrier...

So in posts 232 and 242 you said things that sounded like simple dismissals of the importance of land bases for navies.

That could be my fault for a lack of specificity, I guess...

But then things evolved.

Or maybe not...

In post 272 you wrote "They are if you're going to use Carrier Battle Groups and surface warships though I'm unsure why you would do that in anything above mid intensity conflict (where they have their uses). In a high intensity fight, the Carrier and surface ships are big fat targets and an impediment until a lot of sanitizing in the objective area has occurred." This in response to my saying that land bases are as useful as ever. (emphasis added / kw)

As emphasized, I wrote about CBGs and surface warships -- Committing them to major action in a high intensity war ala WW II is likely to have the same result the initial commitment it then did -- loss of half the fleet. So I asked why would one make such a dumb commitment. If one does not, then one does not need bases 'conveniently' located to the conflict zone.

So we are getting to an admission that land bases are useful for things mid intensity conflict and below.

Not what I wrote but I can accept that as often if not always correct. I'd design a force that didn't need them, at least as currently used (a more than 30-40 year old concept, more like 3-4,000...) but I'm not in charge and we have what we have. That's what we have but it isn't mandatory that we use it stupidly...

Now in post 293 you said "The surface stuff is all necessary, certainly for less than total warfare but also for later stages of major conflicts and for operations outside the primary sea battlespace. Bases are also necessary, no question. Those things are not at issue; the issue is one of where things are located and when they are used. Thus it is not a question of needs and capabilities, simply one of employment."

So now with this post and 293 you say that land bases are needed for navies. Good. Now that we have that settled, we can deal with the separate question of which land bases are needed.

You often misquote or misunderstand what I write, my fault perhaps but it does create unnecessary confusion. To my mind, a need for some bases and / or islands was never an issue or question; I referred to specific Islands / bases and to me, the issue has always been employment; i.e. which bases are useful (and concomitantly, which are less so...).

So from this I conclude that... the sea power that would do it has to be close enough to do it. So that means islands, as you say in post 293. So given all that, (which you won't, but I will) it seems to me foolish to give up the first islands in that barrier without a fight, since without possession of those island, I think the best we could hope for would be a stalemate with the PLAN, which would be a long term strategic victory for them and a long term strategic loss for us.

We can disagree on all that. Just because that's what you conclude doesn't make it so; the sea power that will "do it" has to be survivable and effective, not necessarily close. Close can be a significant disadvantage. We have greater reach than anyone -- we should use it wisely instead of playing by the other guys rules on his turf -- or in his ocean...

With those considerations in mind, if we lost that first line of barrier islands, we could never retake them. If we couldn't retake them, we could not defeat the PLAN. If we can't defeat the PLAN, strategically we lose and will put on the defensive.

Your basis for those conclusions is? I'm particularly interested in your rationale for the first statement as that seems to be the crux of your argument. You can again elect not to answer but that assertion is not supported by any evidence of which I have knowledge. In fact all those statements appear to be assumptions on your part that have no basis other than whimsy.

That possibility worries me.

We noticed...

Google what? I got mixed up. If you mean drones and space planes and hypersonic missiles, that stuff to me is like guided air to air missiles were in the 1950s, of some use but it they would not be what they were cracked up to be until 30 years later.

Which is where we now are and then some; thus my suggestion it might be wise to eschew 30-40 year old ideas. The Google reference was to the USS Grayback. That idea of 1956 wasn't what it was cracked up to be, didn't work that well -- until the nuke boats and Tomahawk got together in 1983. It appeared to have merit about 30 years later, 40 years later it was an agreed winner and now almost 60 years later it's an extremely potent weapon and the SSGN with 154 Tomahawks is unsettling to a lot of folks if not to you.

The Navy wanted to develop high explosive warheads to replace the nuclear warheads on some Trident missiles back in '03. Congress denied it -- but now, they are more receptive and HE Warhead Tridents will be even more worrisome than Tomahawks...

Others also worry about what the X-37 is for even if you don't...

Nope, I don't think I will. It is obvious from the context of all I have written on this so you should think back.

I realize what you define as 'conveniently.' Similarly, I'm sure you understand that I disagree with your definition. I asked the question as a suggestive you might want to rethink that. I am not surprised that you do not.

Well I should hope so. That is what they get paid for. But the Navy has decided to count hospital ships and PCs as battle force ships so maybe sometimes they don't do so well.

That's domestic politics for you...

The Navy didn't decide to do that. The Administration, the SecDef and SecNav decided to do that. Totally different thing. A really rather unimportant thing other than as political fodder. Happens after every war. This is probably your first post war interlude. It'll be my fifth. They get easier to take as they go along.

We'll see. I hope I am wrong.

We indeed will. Perhaps.

[Ken White]

I figured that the Japanese were checked at Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal in '42. ... This ship counting is minor except to show that we checked the Japanese with what we had ordered prior to '39...

Coral Sea was a strategic victory but a tactical defeat and it cost the Navy dearly. Not only was Lexington lost but Yorktown was severely damaged and thus barely made it to Midway in June. Midway was a near run thing and only our possession of their code and a little luck helped make it a win -- it was a turning point, no question but it did not stop the Japanese. That only occurred a year or more later as we reached parity in strength then moved ahead. Guadalcanal ended in February, 1943. So I'll stick with 43 as the year we really got serious -- or started getting it right.

That was also the year the 1939 program started making itself felt. So yeah, we held, to an extent, the Japaneses with pre '39 ships but we lost a bunch of 'em. We could not have won without all of them.

Minor point, both the North Carolina and Washington, a class of two were indeed pre '39 ships -- but both were commissioned in 1941 and South Dakota, a '39 program ship wasn't until '42 as I mentioned and as were all her three sisters; their better and bigger sisters, the six ship Iowa class were in the 1940 program and hit the fleet in '43.

We did it with ships we acquired before the need became obviously critical.

We did it with what was available at the time and the cost was heavy due to the lesser capabilities and small numbers. We do not have to do that today for a number of reasons...

You wrote in reply to Dayuhan:

... And one of the objects, I would guess, of our side would be to keep them from interfering with the sea lanes to Japan and other places. If Taiwan was not able to be used by the PLAN, it would be that much harder for them to do that.

Questionable assertion on several counts. Japan could be easily reached from the North and North East, to include from Russia as well as the great circle from Canada or the US and the ability of others to interfere with that is minimal. For that matter, Qingdao and the Shantung Peninsula and the whole coast down to Shanghai are all much closer to Japan. Give them Taiwan and figure their radius of effective action and sea lanes to Japan are not significantly impacted; long detours in wartime are common.

Also, the US would absolutely not want to re-run WWII. That is why you wouldn't want to lose that island, and those islands in the first place. So you wouldn't have to.

Even if you you didn't have those Islands, you wouldn't want to or have to re run WW II though you seem determined to believe that's the only option...

China gets no significant advantage from holding Taiwan, we acquire major disadvantages by trying to hold it. I think you missed part of Dayuhan's question. I'll re-post part of it but in reverse order:

"In the unlikely event that it's ever necessary to fight China, why would we fight them where they are strongest?"

"...why the US would need or want to rerun WW2, sail into areas where China has support from land-based aircraft and missiles, and fight there?"

Indeed. Sail in or stay in...

[Ray]

Ken White,

Like it or not, the issue is simple. The USA is no pushover to hand over its pristine position to anyone, least of all a Johnny Come Lately. Do you really feel that US is a weak and limp state and masquerading to be a superpower? What is a superpower? Leaving world dominance to others when it has worked hard to achieve that place?

Of course, there will be the peaceniks who would go crackers to propagate the idea that there must be peace at all cost. Noble thoughts, but then Neville Chamberlain could never do down the ignominy to which he sunk, all because he, too, thought peace could be bought at all costs, including surrendering the right to defend one’s national interests.

What are US national and strategic interests?

Is it to promote China to become an economic and military giant, capable of challenging the US supremacy?

If so, why is the US not hunkering down on Mainland US and not undertaking military and quasi military forays around the world including the South China Seas, or having military bases all over the world including ‘insignificant atolls and islands', more so, when its own economic health is not all that bright? There has to be some Method in the Madness. What is it?

On the issue of CBG being redundant and nuclear submarine being the order of the day, it is worth having a look at the US Air Sea Battle concept. Is that concept the creation of the daft? I am sure that the US military is not staffed by people who do not know their job and responsibilities, and are those out here better qualified and equipped?

No, it is not that I am saying those who are out here giving their valued opinion on the US military and strategies are not competent. Indeed they are, but it is confusing for a non American to be told that indeed the US military and its national planning infrastructure is in the hands of novices and totally clueless!

Not a comforting thought I will say, given that India and US have 'converging' views on many issues. Can't say yes to incompetence, can we, even if we are the 'little guys'?

Further, it is condescending to feel that the US is fighting 'the little guys’ wars.

Am I to understand that the US is overwhelmed with Christian compassion and that the US has no strategic or national interests in doing what the US is doing? That line of thought I would find as steeped in naivety!

Let us for once agree that the US should allow China its space and allow China to become an economic and military superpower and extend its influence to Central Asian Countries and its oilfields, usurp all the natural resources including Oil in the South China Seas, become the predominant voice in US’ backyard of South America and Mexico, rule the waves in the Indian Ocean to include the Straits of Hormuz through which maximum of world’s oil resources pass ( daily oil flow of almost 17 million barrels in 2011) and so on.

I am sure the pacifists would agree that it is all hunky dory to allow China to be the head honcho!

But where does it place the US, the superpower of the world?

Am I do understand it is kosher for the US to abdicate its position to China. If so, I have nothing more to say!


**************


In so far as blaming Kennedys for Vietnam, it is understandable. Vietnam bruised the ego. The same ego that you feel should be canned and refrigerated so as to allow China to replace the US as a world power.

Let us look at WWII that is such a triumph for the US.

What if the US lost WW II?

Would you still feel that Roosevelt was a great chap?

All loves a winner.

Victory has many fathers, Defeat is an orphan!

Here is what the peaceniks have to say of Roosevelt. Just like what you feel about the US entering in War in Vietnam.

President Roosevelt's Campaign To Incite War in Europe:
http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v04/v04p135_Weber.html

One cannot please all!

Observe the one time darling of the US - George Bush!

He is the reason why the war hero John McCain lost! John McCain had all the qualifications to have won the election. Bush's policy that only created body bags ruined his prospects. Bring the boys back was the cry. Why? Because US is not a Nation that likes to be defeated. It is worse when ragtag chaps make life and war miserable!

The American psychology does not encourage a loser or be with the losing side!

If Vietnam was won, you would have been cheering for the Kennedys.

All the world loves a Winner!

[Dayuhan]

Also, the US would absolutely not want to re-run WWII. That is why you wouldn't want to lose that island, and those islands in the first place. So you wouldn't have to.

The US can't "lose" those islands, because the US hasn't got them, and you can't lose something you don't have.

You seem to be assuming that the Chinese will inevitably boil forth from their borders in an effort to conquer everything in sight, along the lines of imperial Japan. What's the basis for that assumption? More important, what would you have the US do about it, given the real-world economic and domestic political constraints.

Seems to me that we were never going to be the only major power out there forever. China's rise was not of our making, and there's not much if anything that we could have done or can do to stop it. They've been successful. Like most successful nations they're making their presence felt. Is that the end of the world, or is it something that can be adjusted to and managed?

It seems a bit premature to pretend that China is challenging ther US for global dominance. What they're doing is asserting military parity in waters in close proximity to their mainland. Not the same thing.

Also recall that the biggest challenges and constraints China faces are internal, not external.

Again, when all the terror is done and the garments are rent and we've pulled our hair out in woe over the possibility of having a peer competitor in one part of the world... what would you have us do about it?

Let us for once agree that the US should allow China its space and allow China to become an economic and military superpower and extend its influence to Central Asian Countries and its oilfields, usurp all the natural resources including Oil in the South China Seas, become the predominant voice in US’ backyard of South America and Mexico, rule the waves in the Indian Ocean to include the Straits of Hormuz through which maximum of world’s oil resources pass ( daily oil flow of almost 17 million barrels in 2011) and so on.

How did any of that come into the discussion?

China has staked out its space - by achieving a degree of economic success - and that's not for the US to allow or disallow. The US doesn't decide who gets to do business or who's allowed to build ships. The world changes; old actors diminish, new ones rise. You deal with the changes as they come... hopefully without hysteria, though there's been a fair share of that around here.

[Ray]

How did any of that come into the discussion?

You missed it?

Wasn't convenient?

This is the first time I am told that strategy is area/Nation centric and is not complementary to the world scenario.

I am still learning.

Thanks!

True US cannot allow or disallow.

But US actions seems to work at some places!

Odd,right?

Should we join you, Ken White and Bob's World and say - Down with Dollar Imperialism?!!!!!

It seems a bit premature to pretend that China is challenging ther US for global dominance.

Correct!

China is merely establishing her God given rights.

The US and the neighbours are being paranoiac!

Silly chaps!

[Ray]

Also recall that the biggest challenges and constraints China faces are internal, not external.

One knows nothing about China's biggest challenges and constraints that are external, but everything about is internal threats and challenges!!

That is rich, given the way China conducts itself! Totally secretive about its internal affairs!

It is good to have non Chinese batting for China!

Gives a very balanced view!

Hopefully there are Chinese who reciprocate.

Backword seems to not agree!

He has gone off the radar clutter!

[Ray]

Seems to me that we were never going to be the only major power out there forever.

What makes you feel so?


Given up the Ghost?

Thrown in the towel?

Is that what is the USA?

Land of losers?

I am yet to get that impression!

[Dayuhan]

You missed it?

Wasn't convenient?

I haven't noticed any of this going on...

...become the predominant voice in US’ backyard of South America and Mexico, rule the waves in the Indian Ocean to include the Straits of Hormuz through which maximum of world’s oil resources pass

It all just seems overdramatized and exaggerated and... honestly, a bit hysterical. We need to respond to what China does, to the extent that response is required, not panic over remote doomsday scenarios.

Backword seems to not agree!

He has gone off the radar clutter!

He probably thought it cluttered, a reasonable conclusion.

[Backwards Observer]

To some extent I agree with Ray, the estimable gentleman from Calcutta. There are indications that India is a borderline failed state, and without serious involvement by the US risks a descent into further volatility in an already highly unstable region. Such a descent might serve to embolden nationalistic elements in neighbouring countries who seek to capitalize on such turmoil.

Once a beacon of integrity, India's military is in disarray

Indians wearied by a litany of corruption scandals and failures of government in recent years have been able to take comfort in the fact that one national institution – the armed forces – remained unbesmirched, its reputation for efficiency and integrity intact.

No longer. Leaked secret memos, million-dollar bribe allegations, a “near-coup experience” and a bizarre dispute over the army chief’s birthday have badly tarnished the image of the 1.3 million-member fighting force that controls nuclear weapons in a volatile region.

[...]

The pattern is such that the general’s personal motivations have emerged as the leading theory to explain all of the recent developments. Gen. Singh is a distinguished veteran of India’s 1971 war with Pakistan and was a stalwart but unremarkable figure until recently. But to many observers, it seems that having won the top job, he is loathe to leave it.

“He’s lost the plot in the last year,” said Maj.-Gen. Mehta. “This is the last ditch effort of a man who is saying ‘I haven’t got what I wanted’ – the act of a man in despair, saying ‘if I’m going down why don’t I take a few others down with me.’”

Once a beacon of integrity, India's military is in disarray. - The Globe and Mail - April 18, 2012

...

On the positive side, military bilateralism between China and India suggests that China is now taking the China threat seriously and is co-operating with India on the containment of China:

India climbdown may help China border dispute

Predictions of a looming Sino-Indian war were "utter nonsense", Gen Singh said.

"I must tell these futurologists and experts to stop this nonsense of predicting a Indo-China war, first in 2010, then in 2012 and now in 2020. They will be proved wrong as we will not fight. We are competitors, not rivals," he said.

"These experts have no ground knowledge, they don't know that Chinese and Indian soldiers actually play volleyball on the borders.

"We have plans for extensive military-to-military interactions between the two countries," Gen Singh told the conference. "That includes joint military exercises."

He said India will nevertheless not compromise on its military preparedness.

India climbdown may help China border dispute - BBC - April 17, 2012.

[Ken White]

Like it or not, the issue is simple.
...
What are US national and strategic interests?
...
Am I do understand it is kosher for the US to abdicate its position to China. If so, I have nothing more to say!

I understand your interest and possible goals in all that but suggest the issues -- there are many -- are not simple; our interests are many and varied and may not always coincide with the desires of others -- yourself, for example... -- and I for one have not and am not suggesting the US abdicate anything.

In so far as blaming Kennedys for Vietnam, it is understandable. Vietnam bruised the ego. The same ego that you feel should be canned and refrigerated so as to allow China to replace the US as a world power.

I spent over two years fighting in that fiasco -- it was a dumb war (all wars are dumb, that one was particularly so) and I can assure you my ego isn't bruised one little bit. I do not blame the Kennedys for the war, though I may have used that word because others did, I simply assert that they voluntarily threw us into it for reasons of domestic politics and that was not wise. Nor are the Kennedy's responsible for the fact that the Army did not fight Viet Nam well or properly.

Let us look at WWII that is such a triumph for the US...What if the US lost WW II?...Would you still feel that Roosevelt was a great chap?

I have bad news for you -- I don't think Roosevelt was a great Chap -- I don't think any politician is great in any sense. Most are sort of slimy and dishonest; Roosevelt was no exception. He had very little to do with the winning of WW II, though he had a great deal to do with getting us into it and then using it to stick it to the UK and France.

If Vietnam was won, you would have been cheering for the Kennedys.

No, I would not. No more than I cheered Bush (who I do give credit for doing something that needed to be done; not his fault his Army screwed it up...) and I think McCain is dumber than a box of rocks.

It's not about winning or losing, it's about the politics involved and crass stupidity.

All of which has little or nothing to do with the South China Sea -- except that we can be stupid about it as some advocate, or not. I simply hope that the latter is true. I have no problem with violence, all for it in fact and I am not afraid that China is too big or something along that line. I simply say if one is going to disagree, it should be on a rational basis; if one is going to fight, go for it but do not do that stupidly and do not do it with half hearted measures. Do it right...

[Ray]

I am glad the report of Indian Army in disarray brought cheer to the honourable Chinese friend. Understandable.

However, do permit me to demolish the misplaced thought (to put it politely) . I will not take recourse, by rubbishing it perfunctorily as ‘unreliable/ untrustworthy’ and instead prove that the so called ‘disarray’ is a figment of imagination and journalistic voyeurism!

Leaked secret memos, million-dollar bribe allegations, a “near-coup experience” and a bizarre dispute over the army chief’s birthday have badly tarnished the image of the 1.3 million-member fighting force that controls nuclear weapons in a volatile region.

Leaked Secret Memo. If one had researched one would have seen that it was not the army that leaked the so called secret memo. It is said that it was from other sources. This so called ‘secret memo’ was on the critical deficiencies of the Army. It is well known that the ‘Arms Lobby’ are angered over the new procedures adopted by the Govt to ensure that the ‘bribes’ can no longer be paid to ‘influence’ an arms deal. Therefore, there is a strong suspicion that the Arms Lobby which is known to be well entrenched played its role in leaking the memo.

A word about the importance of Arms Deals in India. In spite of legitimate lobbying, to include by the US President and the Ambassador for the MMRCA deal of US$16.36 billion, which all felt that de facto will be in favour of the US, India selected the French Rafale! The MMRCA deal was so hotly contested that the very next day (IIRC), the US Ambassador to India resigned for ‘personal reasons’. Imagine this – personal reasons happened overnight! That is how Indian Arms deals become a big deal!

The deals are so important to foreign countries that apart from legitimate lobbying by foreign Govts, there are in addition a whole lot of shady and sleazy arms lobbyists who make a killing and would give an arm and a leg to swing the deal in favour of the company they represent!

Million Dollar Bribes. If one knew how the arms are bought by India, one would realise that that it is not the Army that buys the Arms. They (Army) merely undertake trials and opines which of the weapons selected for trials is ideal for the Army’s requirement. It is the Price Negotiation Committee which decides what is to be bought and in which there is also political considerations cranked in. In that Committee, the Military plays no part!

’Near Coup’ Experience . This is a laugh. Imagine two battalions are being used to topple a Govt! Do people think that the Indian Govt is a pack of cards?

It is journalistic imagery and sensationalism that converts a routine exercise into a ‘near coup’.

That apart, why should two battalions from different and far away stations be brought in to undertake a coup, when two Brigades are station in Delhi itself with a whole Division 40 minutes away from Delhi?

In addition, there were contingents of Infantry, tank units, mechanised units, artillery units, Air Defence artillery unit, Special Forces and a whole lot of others with their equipment already stationed for the Army Day and also for the Republic Day parade? A total of 26,000 personnel!

Therefore, it is not the Indian Army in disarray, but the journalist’s logic!

As far as the Chief’s age controversy, it is an error of bookkeeping between two branches of the Army, as also some political skulduggery so that the political favourite can be promoted without the Chief upsetting the apple cart.

Maj Gen Mehta is a Govt front since his current job (as retired officer) is at the dispensation of the Govt. One would hardly expect him to forsake his bread and butter. His brother is an Editor of an important national magazine that is pro Govt!

If one had observed the TV discussion on this issue, where retired ranking military officers participated, they all, without exception, batted for Gen VK Singh.

On Gen VK Singh's statement on India and China, no serving Chief will say anything that is contrary to the official Govt view. If he does, he will summarily be dismissed!

China may try as it might to disarm India with its ‘charm’, but it is as fickle as the wind and it cannot be taken seriously. It is India's experience that China speaks from both sides of its mouth, as the American saying goes!

That is why India today successfully launched her ICBM Agni V that can reach all parts of China with multiple warheads!

Speak softly, but carry a big stick!

If the US wishes to play its role in this region, there is no reason for India to object. Both are on the same page, so to say!

It is so amusing to read that our honourable Chinese gentleman classifies India as a borderline failed state! Thank the Lord that he showed kindness in not classifying it as a breadbasket case requiring propping up by western nations with food and money!

As the quote goes - A little knowledge is a dangerous thing, but a little want of knowledge is also a dangerous thing.

[carl]

Coral Sea was a strategic victory but a tactical defeat and it cost the Navy dearly. Not only was Lexington lost but Yorktown was severely damaged and thus barely made it to Midway in June. Midway was a near run thing and only our possession of their code and a little luck helped make it a win -- it was a turning point, no question but it did not stop the Japanese. That only occurred a year or more later as we reached parity in strength then moved ahead. Guadalcanal ended in February, 1943. So I'll stick with 43 as the year we really got serious -- or started getting it right.

That was also the year the 1939 program started making itself felt. So yeah, we held, to an extent, the Japaneses with pre '39 ships but we lost a bunch of 'em. We could not have won without all of them.

Minor point, both the North Carolina and Washington, a class of two were indeed pre '39 ships -- but both were commissioned in 1941 and South Dakota, a '39 program ship wasn't until '42 as I mentioned and as were all her three sisters; their better and bigger sisters, the six ship Iowa class were in the 1940 program and hit the fleet in '43.We did it with what was available at the time and the cost was heavy due to the lesser capabilities and small numbers. We do not have to do that today for a number of reasons...

Yes, so to sum up, we checked the Japanese with ships that were acquired before the need became obviously critical.

You wrote in reply to Dayuhan:Questionable assertion on several counts. Japan could be easily reached from the North and North East, to include from Russia as well as the great circle from Canada or the US and the ability of others to interfere with that is minimal. For that matter, Qingdao and the Shantung Peninsula and the whole coast down to Shanghai are all much closer to Japan. Give them Taiwan and figure their radius of effective action and sea lanes to Japan are not significantly impacted; long detours in wartime are common.Even if you you didn't have those Islands, you wouldn't want to or have to re run WW II though you seem determined to believe that's the only option...

Not questionable. Look at the map. Ability to interfere with convoys going through the North Pacific to Japan is minimal eh. I thought you said range isn't that important to nuke subs, which they have. Those boats could get there. The trick is to make it harder for them. That is why barrier islands are nice to have.

The whole coast down to Shanghai is blocked by Japan and Korea. That is why Japan is called a barrier island. Subs can't sail through it. Keep Taiwan from them and their radius of action is affected and they have to contend with a land mass that can base forces of various kinds that will try to kill them as they make the passage. Long detours in war are common and are always a disadvantage to those who have to make them. Costs time, which is important. Conversely, they are always an advantage to those who force the enemy to have to make them.

Even if you you didn't have those Islands, you wouldn't want to or have to re run WW II though you seem determined to believe that's the only option...

You're right. If we lost the first line of barrier islands (Dayuhan, I know we don't own those islands but you know what I mean your protestations about semantics to the contrary), Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, the game would be over anyway. We would have to get good at groveling. If we lost Taiwan, we would never get it back and keeping the others would be very hard. So that is why I think it wise that they stay on our side.

I seems to be determined to be determined about all sorts of things, in your eyes, that I ain't actually determined about.

China gets no significant advantage from holding Taiwan, we acquire major disadvantages by trying to hold it.

They do get significant advantage and we lose significant advantage. See all I've written before. We do accrue the risk of making a totalitarian police state cross with us. We have a history of doing that.

I think you missed part of Dayuhan's question. I'll re-post part of it but in reverse order:

"In the unlikely event that it's ever necessary to fight China, why would we fight them where they are strongest?"

"...why the US would need or want to rerun WW2, sail into areas where China has support from land-based aircraft and missiles, and fight there?"

Asked and answered. I didn't miss a thing.

[carl]

THOSE would be Taiwan, the Philippines (and even Guam...) -- your outer barrier...That could be my fault for a lack of specificity, I guess...Or maybe not...As emphasized, I wrote about CBGs and surface warships -- Committing them to major action in a high intensity war ala WW II is likely to have the same result the initial commitment it then did -- loss of half the fleet. So I asked why would one make such a dumb commitment. If one does not, then one does not need bases 'conveniently' located to the conflict zone.Not what I wrote but I can accept that as often if not always correct.

Ok, good. We agree that islands and land bases are useful in a general sense, sometimes more, sometimes less.

I'd design a force that didn't need them, at least as currently used (a more than 30-40 year old concept, more like 3-4,000...) but I'm not in charge and we have what we have.

What would this force consist of? How would you do it?

Your basis for those conclusions is? I'm particularly interested in your rationale for the first statement as that seems to be the crux of your argument. You can again elect not to answer but that assertion is not supported by any evidence of which I have knowledge. In fact all those statements appear to be assumptions on your part that have no basis other than whimsy.

How do I conclude that if we lose those barrier islands we will never take them back? Well let's confine it to Taiwan for simplicity's sake. If the PLA was ensconced on Taiwan, they could re-enforce from across the Taiwan Strait. Not very far. We would have to come over from North America. That is real far. Nothing whimsical about looking at the map and figuring that with economy's that are getting to be of similar strength, you can't dislodge somebody from an island only a Taiwan Straits away from the main base by mounting an attack across the breadth of the Pacific.

Which is where we now are and then some; thus my suggestion it might be wise to eschew 30-40 year old ideas.

Only if they don't still make sense. Forrest was to reputed to have said "Keep up the scare". Made sense 4X30-40 years ago. Still does.

...the SSGN with 154 Tomahawks is unsettling to a lot of folks if not to you.

The Navy wanted to develop high explosive warheads to replace the nuclear warheads on some Trident missiles back in '03. Congress denied it -- but now, they are more receptive and HE Warhead Tridents will be even more worrisome than Tomahawks...

154 Tomahawks means 154 1,000 pound warheads. That will worry Libya and Argentina. Red China would laugh at the notion that 154,000 pounds of warheads is going to phase them at all. That is a continental power we're talking about. And once those missiles were used, back to base the sub would have to go to reload. The farther away the base, the longer that would take.

HE Tridents? Congress was wise. That would have been a real expensive way to miss.

Others also worry about what the X-37 is for even if you don't...

Buck Rogers in my view. Looks cool though and will probably show up on the next iteration of "24".

I realize what you define as 'conveniently.' Similarly, I'm sure you understand that I disagree with your definition. I asked the question as a suggestive you might want to rethink that.

Then why did you ask? I already thought about it.

The Navy didn't decide to do that. The Administration, the SecDef and SecNav decided to do that. Totally different thing. A really rather unimportant thing other than as political fodder. Happens after every war. This is probably your first post war interlude.

I'll concede that, though I am older than you believe.

[Ken White]

Yes, so to sum up, we checked the Japanese with ships that were acquired before the need became obviously critical.

Okay, checked and those that arrived in about 1943 were able to move from checked to skunked. Got it.[quote] I thought you said range isn't that important to nuke subs, which they have. Those boats could get there.[quote]How many do they have, how well do they work, how good are the crews?

The trick is to make it harder for them. That is why barrier islands are nice to have.

A big pot of money is nice to have; most of us get by without one.

The whole coast down to Shanghai is blocked by Japan and Korea. That is why Japan is called a barrier island.

Uh, okay -- what do you call Korea? I don't recall Japan being considered as on of those barrier islands in this discussion, I acknowledge that it could be so considered but then so could Australia...

If we lost the first line of barrier islands... Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, the game would be over anyway. We would have to get good at groveling.

You have a rationale for all that or is it just a thought?

I seems to be determined to be determined about all sorts of things, in your eyes, that I ain't actually determined about.

Perhaps. Since you mention it, you seem to be determined to take things as personal attacks when none is intended...

They do get significant advantage and we lose significant advantage. See all I've written before. We do accrue the risk of making a totalitarian police state cross with us. We have a history of doing that.

I've read most of what you've written on this topic and warfighting in general and disagree with about all of it. Somehow, "the risk of making a totalitarian police state cross with us.' is not going to keep me awake at night. Yeah, we have a history of doing that. How did that work out for them?

Asked and answered. I didn't miss a thing.

Mmm, I didn't see an answer unless you're talking about Post 306 where you stated some opinions that are at very least arguable. He may accept it as an asnwer, but IMO, you just keep saying the same thing -- we can't leave...