South China Sea and China (2011-2017)

[davidbfpo]

Carl's response to my post:

David, we had Russian Bears flying near the UK and the US often during the Cold War. We didn't do much about it besides escort them and exchange photo opportunities. They weren't looked upon as provocations. Why can't the Red Chinese be held to the same standards?

A few months ago here in the UK there was a story that Russian aircraft, IIRC 'Bears' again, had entered UK territorial airspace, along with lurid headlines, but on closer reading the planes had entered the UK air defence identification zone (ADIZ) which extends a long way beyond UK territory. Nowhere did the reporting state how close the planes had been to actual UK territory / jurisdiction.

What is normal and accepted can at times change rapidly without warning.

So for example if P3 Orion's are on missions near China first I'd ask what is the gain -v- loss; then I'd impose different rules, notably extending the distance from Chinese legal jurisdiction (I'm not aware whether PRC claims a 12 mile territorial limit, the UK IIRC only claims 3 miles).

Only towards the end of the 'Cold War' in Europe was there enough trust and confidence, with verification, between NATO and the Warsaw Pact so we understood each other. Long time since I read the Confidence Building Measures (CBM) literature; this might help:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_...rces_in_Europe

I don't know whether there is an agreement, let alone institutions and practices, between the USA, PRC and others in the region.

[carl]

I don't know whether there is an agreement, let alone institutions and practices, between the USA, PRC and others in the region.

I don't know either but The Economist article Ray cited says this "At present, despite much Pentagon prompting, contacts between the two armed forces are limited, tightly controlled by the PLA and ritually frozen by politicians whenever they want to “punish” America—usually because of a tiff over Taiwan."

That is one of the things that is part of the pattern that concerns (I'll change words today for those of you who are tired of "worries") me. They don't seem to want to talk about these nuts and bolts things, just bluster and engage in small provocations. You have to talk about this stuff to avoid misunderstandings and shooting.

[JMA]

I don't know either but The Economist article Ray cited says this "At present, despite much Pentagon prompting, contacts between the two armed forces are limited, tightly controlled by the PLA and ritually frozen by politicians whenever they want to “punish” America—usually because of a tiff over Taiwan."

If this rank childishness is what passes for diplomacy then I just don't know. Not sure how much is specifically Chinese in character but there should be a legitimate concern that they have nuclear weapons.

[Ray]

3 new chinese boats sighted in disputed shoal
Thursday, 19 April, 2012


THE Philippines on Thursday confirmed that three Chinese fishing vessels have been sighted near the disputed waters of the Panatag or Scarborough Shoal, where it was locked last week in a tense standoff with surveillance vessels from China......l

Chinese state media reported on Thursday that another ship had been sent to the disputed area that has been the subject of the standoff since April 10.....

The standoff started on April 10 when the BRP Gregorio del Pilar, the Philippine Navy’s largest warship, encountered eight Chinese fishing boats filled with clams, whale sharks and other endangered species.

The ship attempted to confiscate the shipment and arrest the fishermen, but it was blocked by Chinese maritime surveillance ships....

http://www.manilastandardtoday.com/2...isputed-shoal/

So, it continues!

[Ray]

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

ARTICLE: XVIII

Section 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning military bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

Mutual Defense Treaty (U.S.–Philippines)

Article IV

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article V

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.


Bajo de Masinloc

Bajo de Masinloc is an integral part of the Philippine territory. It is part of the Municipality of Masinloc, Province of Zambales. It is located 124 nautical miles (220 kilometers) west of Zambales and is within the 200- nautical-mile (370 kilometers) exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and Philippine continental shelf.

A Philippine Navy surveillance aircraft, patrolling the area to enforce the Philippine Fisheries Code and marine environment laws, spotted eight Chinese fishing vessels anchored inside the Bajo de Masinloc (Panatag Shoal) on Sunday, April 8, 2012. On April 10, the Philippine Navy sent the BRP Gregorio del Pilar to the area. In accordance with established rules of engagement, an inspection team was dispatched and it reported finding large amounts of illegally collected corals, giant clams and live sharks in the compartments of the Chinese fishing vessels.

The actions of the Chinese fishing vessels are a serious violation of the Philippines’ sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction. The poaching of endangered marine resources is a violation of the Fisheries Code and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES).

Basis of sovereignty

Bajo de Masinloc (international name, Scarborough Shoal) is not an island. Bajo de Masinloc is also not part of the Spratlys.

Bajo de Masinloc is a ring-shaped coral reef, which has several rocks encircling a lagoon. About five of these rocks are above water during high tide. Some of these rocks are about three meters high and can be seen above the water. The rest of the rocks and reefs are submerged during high tide.

Bajo de Masinloc’s chain of reefs and rocks is about 124 nautical miles (220 km) from the nearest coast of Luzon and approximately 472 nautical miles (850 km) from the nearest coast of China. Bajo de Masinloc is located approximately along latitude 15°08’N and longitude 117°45’E. The rocks of Bajo de Masinloc are situated north of the Spratlys.

Obviously then the rocks of Bajo de Masinloc are also within the 200 nautical mile EEZ and the 200 nautical mile continental shelf of the Philippines.

Distinction

A distinction has to be made between the rocks of Bajo de Masinloc and the larger body of water and continental shelf where the geological features are situated. The rights or nature of rights of the Philippines over Bajo de Masinloc are different from the rights it exercises over the larger body of water and continental shelf.

The Philippines exercises full sovereignty and jurisdiction over the rocks of Bajo de Masinloc, and sovereign rights over the waters and continental shelf where the rocks of Bajo de Masinloc are situated.

The basis of Philippine sovereignty and jurisdiction over the rocks of Bajo de Masinloc is distinct from that of its sovereign rights over the larger body of water and continental shelf.

A. Public international law

The rocks of Bajo de Masinloc are Philippine territory.

The basis of Philippine sovereignty and jurisdiction over the rocks is not premised on the cession by Spain of the Philippine archipelago to the United States under the Treaty of Paris. That the rocks of Bajo de Masinloc are not included or within the limits of the Treaty of Paris, as alleged by China, is therefore immaterial and of no consequence.

Philippine sovereignty and jurisdiction over the rocks is likewise not premised on proximity or the fact that the rocks are within its 200 nautical mile EEZ or continental shelf under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos). Although the Philippines necessarily exercises sovereign rights over its EEZ and continental shelf, the reason why the rocks of Bajo de Masinloc are Philippine territory is anchored on other principles of public international law.

As decided in a number of cases by international courts or tribunals, most notably the Palmas Island Case, a mode for acquiring territorial ownership over a piece of real estate is effective exercise of jurisdiction. In the Palmas case, sovereignty over the Palmas Island was adjudged in favor of the Netherlands on the basis of “effective exercise of jurisdiction” although the island may have been historically discovered by Spain and historically ceded to the United States in the Treaty of Paris.

In the case of Bajo de Masinloc, the Philippines, since it gained independence, has exercised both effective occupation and effective jurisdiction over Bajo de Masinloc.

The name Bajo de Masinloc (which means Shallows of Masinloc or Masinloc Shoal) itself identifies the shoal as a particular political subdivision of the Philippine province of Zambales, known as Masinloc.

Maps

One of the earliest known and most accurate maps of the area, named Carta Hydrographical y Chorographica de las Yslas Filipinas by Fr. Pedro Murillo Velarde, SJ, and published in 1734, showed Bajo de Masinloc as part of Zambales.

The name Bajo de Masinloc was given to the shoal by the Spanish colonizers. In 1792, another map, drawn by the Alejandro Malaspina expedition and published in 1808 in Madrid, Spain, also showed Bajo de Masinloc as part of Philippine territory. This map showed the route of the Malaspina expedition to and around the shoal. It was reproduced in the Atlas of the 1939 Philippine Census.

The Mapa General, Islas Filipinas, Observatorio de Manila published in 1990 by the US Coast and Geodetic Survey, also showed Bajo de Masinloc as part of the Philippines.

Philippine flags have been erected on some of the islets of the shoal, including a flag raised on an 8.3-meter high flag pole in 1965 and another Philippine flag raised by Congressmen Roque Ablan and Jose Yap in 1997. In 1965, the Philippines built and operated a small lighthouse on one of the islets in the shoal. In 1992, the Philippine Navy rehabilitated the lighthouse and reported it to the International Maritime Organization for publication in the List of Lights (currently this lighthouse is not working).

Bajo de Masinloc was also used as target range by Philippine and US naval forces stationed in Subic Bay in Zambales. The Philippines’ Department of Environment and Natural Resources together with the University of the Philippines has also been conducting scientific, topographic, and marine studies in the shoal. Filipino fishermen have always considered the shoal their fishing grounds because of its proximity to the coast of southwest Luzon.

Archipelagic baselines

In 2009, when the Philippines passed an amended Archipelagic Baselines Law fully consistent with Unclos, Bajo de Masinloc was classified under the “Regime of Islands” consistent with the Law of the Sea.

“Section 2. The baseline in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as “Regime of Islands” under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the Unclos:

a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596; and

b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.”

The above and the post below which is in continuation of the above is from a US Korean UN veteran.

How far would this be correct?

[Ray]

Contd (read as a continuation of the above)

Comments on Chinese claims

Question:

But what about the historical claim of China over Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal)? Does China have superior right over Bajo de Masinloc on the basis of its so-called historical claim? China is claiming Bajo de Masinloc based on historical arguments, claiming it to have been discovered by the Yuan Dynasty. China is also claiming that Bajo de Masinloc has been reflected in various official Chinese maps and has been named by China in various official documents.

Answer:

Chinese assertions based on historical claims must be substantiated by a clear historic title. It should be noted that under public international law, historical claims are not historical titles. A claim by itself, including historical claim, could not be a basis for acquiring a territory.

Under international law, the modes of acquiring a territory are: discovery, effective occupation, prescription, cession and accretion. Also, under public international law, for a historical claim to mature into a historical title, a mere showing of long usage is not enough.

Other criteria have to be satisfied, such as that the usage must be open, continuous, adverse or in the concept of an owner, peaceful and acquiesced by other states. Mere silence by other states to one’s claim is not acquiescence under international law. Acquiescence must be affirmative such that other states recognize the claim as a right on the part of the claimant that other states ought to respect as a matter of duty. There is no indication that the international community has acquiesced to China’s so-called historical claim.

Naming and placing on maps are also not bases in determining sovereignty. In international case law relating to questions of sovereignty and ownership of land features, names and maps are not significant factors in the determination of international tribunals’ determination of sovereignty.

Question:

What about China’s claims that Bajo de Masinloc is traditional fishing waters of Chinese fishermen?

Answer:

Under international law, fishing rights are not a mode of acquiring sovereignty (or even sovereign rights) over an area. Neither could it be construed that the act of fishing by Chinese fishermen is a sovereign act of a state nor can it be considered a display of state authority. Fishing is an economic activity done by private individuals. For occupation to be effective there has to be clear demonstration of the intention and will of a state to act as sovereign and there has to be peaceful and continuous display of state authority, which the Philippines has consistently demonstrated.

Besides, when Unclos took effect, it has precisely appropriated various maritime zones to coastal states, eliminating so-called historical waters and justly appropriating the resources of the seas to coastal states to which the seas are appurtenant. “Traditional fishing rights” is in fact mentioned only in Article 51 of Unclos, which calls for archipelagic states to respect such rights, if such exist, in its archipelagic waters.

It should also be noted, that in this particular case, the activities of these so-called fishermen can be hardly described as fishing. The evidence culled by the Philippine Navy showed clearly that these are poaching, involving the harvesting of endangered marine species, which is illegal in the Philippines and illegal under international law, specifically the CITES.

B. Basis of sovereign rights

As earlier indicated, there is a distinction between the rocks of Bajo Masinloc and the waters around them. The question of ownership of the rocks is governed by the principles of public international law relating to modes for acquiring territories. On the other hand, the extent of its adjacent waters is governed by Unclos. The waters outside of the maritime area of Bajo de Masinloc are also governed by Unclos.

As noted, there are only about five rocks in Bajo de Masinloc that are above water during high tide. The rest are submerged during high tide. Accordingly, these rocks have only 12 nautical miles maximum territorial waters under Article 121 of Unclos. Since the Philippines has sovereignty over the rocks of Bajo de Masinloc, it follows that it has also sovereignty over their 12 nautical miles territorial waters.

Question:

But what about the waters outside the 12 nautical miles territorial waters of the rocks of Bajo de Masinloc, what is the nature of these waters including the continental shelves? Which state has sovereign rights over them?

Answer:

As noted, Bajo de Masinloc is located approximately at latitude 15°08’N and longitude 117°45’E. It is approximately 124 nautical miles off the nearest coast of Zambales. Clearly, the rocks of Bajo de Masinloc are within the 200 nautical miles EEZ and continental shelf of the Philippines.

Therefore, the waters and continental shelves outside of the 12 nautical miles territorial waters of the rocks of Bajo de Masinloc appropriately belong to the EEZ and continental shelf of the Philippines. As such, the Philippines exercises exclusive sovereign rights to explore and exploit the resources within these areas to the exclusion of other countries under Unclos. Part V of Unclos, specifically provides that the Philippines exercises exclusive sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage resources whether living or nonliving, in this area. Although other states have the right of freedom of navigation over these areas, such rights could not be exercised to the detriment of the internationally recognized sovereign rights of the Philippines to explore and exploit the resources in its 200 nautical miles EEZ and continental shelf. To do otherwise would be in violation of international law, specifically Unclos.

Therefore, the current action of the Chinese surveillance vessels within the Philippine EEZ is obviously inconsistent with its right of freedom of navigation and in violation of the sovereign rights of the Philippines under Unclos. It must also be noted that the Chinese fishermen earlier apprehended by Philippine law enforcement agents may have poached not only in Bajo de Masinloc but likely also in the EEZ of the Philippines. Therefore, these poachers have violated the sovereign rights of the Philippines under Unclos.

What is the truth?

[Ray]

Chinese daily calls for "small-scale war" against Philippines

http://topics.dallasnews.com/article/03fL1sr1VAfIx

[Ray]

Philippines joins Japan, Australia on Spratly Islands; approves hotline with Vietnam

http://apdforum.com/en_GB/article/rm...ia-philippines

The expats, who have the feel of the local pulse, opine that Philippines are cool to China.

Could they explain this?

[Dayuhan]

The expats, who have the feel of the local pulse, opine that Philippines are cool to China.

Could they explain this?

What's to explain? Yes, there's a cool relationship. Lot of jostling and shoving. No panic going on, nor is there any imminent threat of war.

[JMA]

The expats, who have the feel of the local pulse, opine that Philippines are cool to China.

Could they explain this?

Ray, seen it many times here in Africa where expats (who are living better there than they would at home) remain delusionally optimistic and positive about their future and that of their country of residence.

Its all about them and their future you see.

[Dayuhan]

Ray, seen it many times here in Africa where expats (who are living better there than they would at home) remain delusionally optimistic and positive about their future and that of their country of residence.

Its all about them and their future you see.

My country of residence has all manner of problems and there are probably more reasons for pessimism than optimism, but the China Threat is way down the list of issues. The Philippines is very likely to lose control over some fishing areas... well, can't really say "lose control", since they never really had it, and might miss out on some energy exploration opportunities, though there's been no Chinese effort to mess with the Malampaya platform or other exploration efforts in that area. The average Filipino is not likely to be affected, though there are some emotional issues at stake.

It's not as if we're facing invasion or anything like it. The domestic problems are far more pressing.

[slapout9]

link to 52 minute TV special about War between China and USA.... that is already happening.... but it is a SBW kind of Warfare. Pay special attention to the last 5 minutes where a Chinese Military Analyst flat out admits it!


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DznkE...eature=related

[SWJ Blog]

This Week at War: NIMBYs in the South China Sea

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[Ray]

Ray, seen it many times here in Africa where expats (who are living better there than they would at home) remain delusionally optimistic and positive about their future and that of their country of residence.

Its all about them and their future you see.

Very well said!

There could be no better an explanation!

[Ray]

link to 52 minute TV special about War between China and USA.... that is already happening.... but it is a SBW kind of Warfare. Pay special attention to the last 5 minutes where a Chinese Military Analyst flat out admits it!


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DznkE...eature=related

A fascinating video that encapsulates the aim of China and the modes of achieving the same!

[Dayuhan]

Very well said!

There could be no better an explanation!

If you don't want to address the points being made, I suppose it's easiest to assume that anyone whose assessment of threat diverges from yours is "delusionally optimistic and positive". I'm still curious about exactly what, specifically, we're supposed to be so afraid of.

Robert Haddick has a piece on the subject on the SWJ blog, here:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/thi...outh-china-sea

which links to another article, here:

http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news...-tours-040812/

Both have some bearing on the discussion. Worth noting that nobody is discussing permanent bases in the Philippines or elsewhere in SEA, just more frequent exercises and rotating deployments. Haddick's mention of the "toxic", "corrosive", and "politically overbearing" is a reasonable summary of why that's the case. It's also a bit hard to see how having bases within easy missile range of the Chinese mainland is going to be an advantage to the US in the event of conflict, as the installations would be very vulnerable.

I personally don't see the prospect of exercises and deployments changing anything. The presence of 4500 Americans participating in the current Balikatan exercise didn't deter the Chinese from intruding at Scarborough Shoal, and it's not likely that other exercises would deter them from similar bouts of pushing and shoving... might well make those bouts more likely, as the Chinese will feel obligated to show that they aren't intimidated. A great deal of what goes on in these cases is posturing for domestic consumption, and it's more about letting politicians say they're doing something than about the impact on the supposed antagonist.

The last paragraphs of the Marine Corps Times article, referring to the raunchy party atmosphere of Philippine deployments, points to what's likely to become a bone of contention in the whole process. Filipinos have to balance between the fairly marginal impact these deployments will have on relations with China and the distinctly unwelcome social impact the deployments are likely to have. Americans often underestimate the degree to which the environment that grew up around American installations led many individuals and institutions that would normally be sympathetic to US goals (social conservative and religious organizations among them) to oppose the US presence.

Of course the US could address that problem simply by keeping the boys off the booze and the girls, which would also avoid distractions like the Daniel Smith rape case, but somehow that seems unlikely.

[carl]

It's also a bit hard to see how having bases within easy missile range of the Chinese mainland is going to be an advantage to the US in the event of conflict, as the installations would be very vulnerable.

Missiles are just a method of delivering a load of high explosives on a target. In that respect, the effect on a target they have isn't any different from aircraft bombs. Various installations have been vulnerable to being targeted by high explosive aircraft bombs for going on 100 years now. But the fact that they were vulnerable didn't have much to do with whether that vulnerability was fatal or decisive. All of North Vietnam was vulnerable to air attack by 1972 and they won anyway. Malta was vulnerable for years but it hung on and the forces based there were able to hurt the Axis severely.

So the fact that a base is vulnerable to attack by itself is neither here nor there. You have to judge whether the damage you can inflict from that base is worth the damage it may take. Guam I think is indispensable if you want to damage Red China in the event, God forbid that it would happen, of a war. It would be vulnerable to missile attack but how many can they throw, how much HE is in each warhead, how accurate are the warheads, how well would we be able to shoot down or decoy the warheads, how effective would hardening the base be etc etc. Whether the base would be worth the effort would depend upon the answers to those questions.

[carl]

Americans often underestimate the degree to which the environment that grew up around American installations led many individuals and institutions that would normally be sympathetic to US goals (social conservative and religious organizations among them) to oppose the US presence.

That is an excellent point, that I of course, never thought of.

Of course the US could address that problem simply by keeping the boys off the booze and the girls, which would also avoid distractions like the Daniel Smith rape case, but somehow that seems unlikely.

You are probably right but I don't see why it has to be like that. In The Left-Handed Monkey Wrench the author made the point that sailors acting up when on shore leave did so sometimes because nobody really bothered to give them alternatives. When people made the effort to guide them toward something other than tearing the place up, a lot of sailors took advantage of it and things calmed some.

[Dayuhan]

Missiles are just a method of delivering a load of high explosives on a target. In that respect, the effect on a target they have isn't any different from aircraft bombs. Various installations have been vulnerable to being targeted by high explosive aircraft bombs for going on 100 years now. But the fact that they were vulnerable didn't have much to do with whether that vulnerability was fatal or decisive. All of North Vietnam was vulnerable to air attack by 1972 and they won anyway. Malta was vulnerable for years but it hung on and the forces based there were able to hurt the Axis severely.

So the fact that a base is vulnerable to attack by itself is neither here nor there. You have to judge whether the damage you can inflict from that base is worth the damage it may take. Guam I think is indispensable if you want to damage Red China in the event, God forbid that it would happen, of a war. It would be vulnerable to missile attack but how many can they throw, how much HE is in each warhead, how accurate are the warheads, how well would we be able to shoot down or decoy the warheads, how effective would hardening the base be etc etc. Whether the base would be worth the effort would depend upon the answers to those questions.

Haddick phrased it like this...

some military analysts fear that in a shooting war with China, missile strikes could close U.S. air bases and ports on the island, preventing the Marine infantrymen there from getting to where they might be needed....

...Under a growing missile threat, field commanders will likely prefer the flexibility afforded by an expeditionary approach compared to the vulnerability of fixed bases -- such as Okinawa -- located within easy range of Chinese missiles.

He referred to Okinawa, as nobody credible is seriously discussing bases in the Philippines.

Certainly there'd be a balance to be weighed, but apparently there's concentrating too much force in a vulnerable area could lead to a situation where that force could easily be neutralized.

There's also a question of what threat exactly we're trying to deter, and how likely that threat is to materialize. Having rapidly mobile Marine forces in the area would be of great value in a land confrontation between South and North Korea, but would have limited applicability in many of the more likely scenarios involving China. It would not, for example, be much of a deterrent to the naval and air shadow boxing that's gone on in the SCS. Again, the presence of 4500 US troops in the Philippines for the Balikatan exercsie didn't deter the Chinese from pushing at Scarborough Shoal, and may well have encouraged them.

That is an excellent point, that I of course, never thought of.

I'd say the two major factors that took the anti-bases movement out of the vociferous but ineffectual left corner and into the mainstream were residual bad feeling over the decades of American support for Marcos and distaste at what had grown up around the bases. Resentment over the support for Marcos has faded a bit with time, though the US still has very limited credibility as a champion of democracy. The second concern is still very much active, understandably. Angeles and Olongapo at the peak made Sodom and Gomorrah look like paragons of moral rectitude.

Not saying those were the only factors in play, but they were major ones. At the crux of it money was a key issue; the Philippine Senate made it clear that there would have to be a large increase in compensation, the US side declined to offer much. That to some extent may have been an example of the local habit of saying "no" by asking a price you know will be refused. At the level of popular support I suspect the money was less an issue than the factors cited above, and of course a simple desire to stop feeling like a colony.

You are probably right but I don't see why it has to be like that. In The Left-Handed Monkey Wrench the author made the point that sailors acting up when on shore leave did so sometimes because nobody really bothered to give them alternatives. When people made the effort to guide them toward something other than tearing the place up, a lot of sailors took advantage of it and things calmed some.

I don't think it has to be like that, but I think it will be like that. One of the stupidest things about the Smith case was the ease with which it could have been prevented, if a bit of discipline and supervision had been applied. There's a "boys will be boys" attitude in some quarters, and some memories of "the good old days" in Subic. Of course not everyone thought those days so good, and that's where the problems start.

[davidbfpo]

Reading the last few posts and knowing a tiny bit of history around US military use of bases in the Phillipines and Japan made me wonder. Have we considered here the effect of impact of military sex tourism? I know sex tourism is an academic subject and has been written about a lo, plus in the popular press..

I am sure this issue is not unique to the Pacific Rim, although I cannot immediately recall contemporary public stories about it.