South China Sea and China (2011-2017)

[Bob's World]

Thank you.

I am not confused. It is you who has not understood what I was stating.

It is just the point I was making.

The increase in aid indicates that the US is concerned about China's hegemonic pursuit in SCS in general and the threat to Philippines in particular.

And the Philippines allowing greater access to airfields and areas for bases indicates that the Chinese forays into areas claimed by China is paramount in their threat perception.

This has always been true, there is no change of US policy here, only a change of Filipino willingness to welcome conventional security forces due to their own growing concerns over China.

US policy is much closer to what Carl advocates than to what I advocate. I merely state my own opinion here, and my opinion is that the majority opinion is based on a shaky foundation and far more likely to result in unnecessary warfare with China than it is to prevent or prevail over the necessary conflicts that might well someday arise. I recognize I could be wrong, but this is a forum to discuss these things, not to all sit around deluding ourselves with happy group think. We'll leave that for the various think tanks, political parties, military HQs, and others who sit in monoculture groups, staring at problems through a set of corporate approved lenses.

[carl]

Carl,

You live in a simple world where things are black and white; good and evil; us and them. You define that world solely from the perch of your own perspectives, agendas and aspriations. That works for you, but I live in a world where nothing is that simple.

To simply ignore the Chinese perspective is crazy. To simply agree with their perspective is crazy as well.

Try this. Study China for a few days, and then attempt to write a post from the perspective of the Chinese version of yourself, born and raised and equally as sure of the rightness of his country as you are of yours. For every one of you there are a dozen of such counterparts. Worth remembering as you go up to their door acting like you own the place and looking for a fight.

Bob:

Responding that I am a simple and unsophisticated fellow but that you are a sophisticated fellow and that if I study hard I may become a sophisticated fellow too was not something I expected. It was not a useful response but it was a response.

[Ray]

This has always been true, there is no change of US policy here, only a change of Filipino willingness to welcome conventional security forces due to their own growing concerns over China.

US policy is much closer to what Carl advocates than to what I advocate. I merely state my own opinion here, and my opinion is that the majority opinion is based on a shaky foundation and far more likely to result in unnecessary warfare with China than it is to prevent or prevail over the necessary conflicts that might well someday arise. I recognize I could be wrong, but this is a forum to discuss these things, not to all sit around deluding ourselves with happy group think. We'll leave that for the various think tanks, political parties, military HQs, and others who sit in monoculture groups, staring at problems through a set of corporate approved lenses.

Given what I was reading from those who claimed to know Philippines, I was wondering if what I was reading in the media and think tank papers were wrong.

The fact that the US has made a substantial increase in the aid to Philippines and the fact that the Filipinos are spooked to welcome the US back, does indicate that the media and the think tanks are right that China is now #1 threat and that the US is not poodlefaking in the SCS with routine naval exercises and deployment and rotation of troops or shoring up Guam!

[Bob's World]

Bob:

Responding that I am a simple and unsophisticated fellow but that you are a sophisticated fellow and that if I study hard I may become a sophisticated fellow too was not something I expected. It was not a useful response but it was a response.

That's not what I said. But it is a black and white interpretation of what I said.

[carl]

That's not what I said. But it is a black and white interpretation of what I said.

Ahh...just so. (Thank you Scott Turow, who writes real good books by the way)

[Dayuhan]

It is interesting to note the increase in the funding from what the US gave for fighting AQ elements and what it is now giving.

Actually the current figure is still well below that of 2003, when the so-called "AQ elements" were a major concern for the US. That figure gradually declined and has now bumped up again. In absolute terms it hardly matters, 12 million or 50, it's tiny either way and completely irrelevant to the Philippine level of preparedness vs. China. What does $28 million buy in US military equipment?

If you want to know what the aid is about, look at what is actually being supplied. The F-16s and OHP-class frigates that the Philippines were asking about were not provided. The only large items were 2 old Coast Guard cutters with much of their weaponry removed. Has anything been given or promised that would mean anything in a conflict with China? Hardly. Do you see air defense systems or SSMs in the package? No. It's a molehill, not a mountain.

The AQ threat continues to be there or has it gone?

If there is still the AQ threat, then it requires no elaboration as to why the US has increased the aid.

There was never an "AQ threat" in the first place. There was a fairly rapacious group of nominally Islamist bandits operating primarily on Basilan and Jolo that had once had links to AQ, links that were almost entirely dormant by the time the US got involved in fighting them. There was (and is) a secessionist insurgency on Mindanao that has some links to AQ and international Islamist groups, but the US has stayed out of that fight, though US-supplied equipment has been involved.

Why the US chose to get involved in a fight that has so little to do with AQ or Islamist terror overall is another question, one best suited to another thread, but it's unlikely that China has much to do with it. Do you really think the Chinese care about 600 SF guys running around Zamboanga, Basilan, and Jolo? It's neither a threat nor a deterrent.

It is also worth noting that the Philippines are offering the United States greater access to its airfields and may open new areas for U.S. soldiers to use.

What’s actually been offered is a bit of a mystery: many reports say this or that was offered, but there’s little really credible information on whether these were bargaining chips that weren’t picked up, and if any deal has been struck, it hasn’t been announced locally. Given local political sensitivities it’s likely that troop presences would have to be transient and in fairly small numbers. The extent to which airfield access would be useful to the US in anything but an extreme situation or for the occasional refueling stop is open to question: there are few purely military airfields in the Philippines, most are shared with civilian traffic and are minimally secured.

If the sum of the upgrades in US/Philippine military cooperation amount to $28 million in aid increases, a few more exercises, an occasional Marine deployment, and more frequent ship/aircraft visits, what does that amount to? Mostly show, I’d say. It’s not likely to deter anything, which of course both sides would know. By timing the recent Scarborough Shoal incident to coincide with the Balikatan exercise, the Chinese sent a fairly clear message that the conduct of such exercises and the presence of US forces is not going to prevent such incidents.

Given what I was reading from those who claimed to know Philippines, I was wondering if what I was reading in the media and think tank papers were wrong.

The fact that the US has made a substantial increase in the aid to Philippines and the fact that the Filipinos are spooked to welcome the US back, does indicate that the media and the think tanks are right that China is now #1 threat and that the US is not poodlefaking in the SCS with routine naval exercises and deployment and rotation of troops or shoring up Guam!

If “The Filipinos” collectively are “spooked to welcome the US back”, why has the government not publicly announced any such deal… if indeed any such deal has been made?

The notion of a “#1 threat” perceived universally by “The Philippines” is simply not consistent with the reality on the ground here, as anyone who’s been observing traditional and social media in the Philippines over time knows. Even though the Scarborough standoff remains ongoing, it’s no longer the story du jour, coverage has faded and it’s no longer getting much more than the occasional cursory mention.

Again, you have to look at what exactly is being threatened. The Chinese are threatening to take over some fishing grounds and some potential energy resources. There’s no public perception of a threat to “gobble up” or “enslave” the Philippines (to use some terms that have appeared on threads here), and if you look at both public and government perceptions across the board there’s a lot more preoccupation with domestic affairs. It’s by no means certain that all the talk over the last few months is actually going to lead to anything much: talk is cheap, and common. Certainly Philippine politicians used the recent incident as an opportunity for some nationalist crowing, and tried to use it as a lever to pull some more hardware out of the US (an effort that seems to have failed). Whether the excitement will last or not remains to be seen.

Thank you.

I am not confused. It is you who has not understood what I was stating.

It is just the point I was making.

The increase in aid indicates that the US is concerned about China's hegemonic pursuit in SCS in general and the threat to Philippines in particular.

And the Philippines allowing greater access to airfields and areas for bases indicates that the Chinese forays into areas claimed by China is paramount in their threat perception.

No “areas for bases” have been offered, or even discussed.

If the US really expected increased aid to have an impact on “China’s hegemonic pursuits” or on any perceived threat to the Philippines, wouldn’t they have to provide a lot more than $28 million to make any meaningful difference? Again, take away the rhetoric and look at what material is actually being provided.

Of course you’ll see what you choose to see, but I think you’re looking at only a small part of the available information, and making conclusions based primarily on pre-positioned assumptions.

I do not entirely agree with RC Jones' recommendations, though I do appreciate his more nuanced approach. Clearly the US has to recognize that China is and will continue to be a presence in the SCS, Yellow Sea, and other regional waters. There's little point in trying to use bluff, bluster, and threat to try to force the Chinese to back down on claims; it's never wise to make threats you aren't willing to back up with action.

Treating China - and everyone else - with respect makes sense. Deference - toward China or toward anyone else - should IMO be avoided. The current approach to territorial disputes involving marine areas - we are not taking sides in the disputes but we'd like to see them resolve peacefully and in accordance with appropriate international laws and conventions - makes sense to me, though it will never be a point of agreement. I don't think there should be an absolute commitment to military intervention in any circumstance, but I have no problem with a position stating that actual aggression against a neighboring state (as opposed to pushing and shoving in disputed territory) could be met with a full range of economic and military response... nothing wrong with keeping them guessing about what might or might not be done.

I do not personally think the US should predictably defer to Chinese sensibilities over arms sales to Taiwan. That needn't be a territorial red line, just a clear indication that we reserve the right to do what business we choose with whom we choose, when we choose. Selling arms isn't aid, it's business, and the Chinese do plenty of it. So do we.

In short, I don't think the US should be predictable. Respect is fine, deference is not. Absolute commitments are overly restrictive; open options keep everyone guessing. Occasionally challenging a Chinese "red line" just to show we will not be bossed around makes sense. Throwing our red lines up against theirs across the board makes - to me at least - less sense.

The reality is that there is going to be tension and jockeying in the SCS for a long time, just as there has been for the last few decades (this didn't start this year). It doesn't require an exaggerated response and it's not going to be settled any time soon. Appropriate response has to be presented in accordance with conditions at any given time, and overreaction is to be avoided.

[Ray]

US to renew naval power in Asia-Pacific: Panetta

by Staff Writers
Washington (AFP) May 29, 2012

The United States will renew its naval power across the Asia-Pacific region and stay "vigilant" in the face of China's growing military, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said Tuesday.....

http://www.spacewar.com/reports/US_t...netta_999.html

[Dayuhan]

[B]US to renew naval power in Asia-Pacific: Panetta[/B

From the above...

Panetta encouraged the new naval officers to forge stronger security ties with China even as he vowed the United States would not let down its guard.

"We need you to strengthen defense ties with China. China's military is growing and modernizing. We must be vigilant. We must be strong. We must be prepared to confront any challenge," he said.

Overall, an epic collection of platitudes, which of course is what you expect from a speech.

The idea of a shift to the Pacific is of course much discussed, but what it will actually come down to in practice remains to be seen. So far not much. There's a lot of construction on Guam, but that's not a shift to the Pacific, it's a shift away from Okinawa. Other than that, all we have to go on is some very general words, with no real shift in force structure or policy. That may or may not change. We'll see.

Realistically, despite all the talk of the Pacific, I expect the Middle East to retain a significant US naval and air presence. It's where the oil comes from, and that matters. There are also a lot more countries that are willing to host a significant US military presence, something that's lacking in much of the Pacific.

[Ray]

From the above...



Overall, an epic collection of platitudes, which of course is what you expect from a speech.

The idea of a shift to the Pacific is of course much discussed, but what it will actually come down to in practice remains to be seen. So far not much. There's a lot of construction on Guam, but that's not a shift to the Pacific, it's a shift away from Okinawa. Other than that, all we have to go on is some very general words, with no real shift in force structure or policy. That may or may not change. We'll see.

Realistically, despite all the talk of the Pacific, I expect the Middle East to retain a significant US naval and air presence. It's where the oil comes from, and that matters. There are also a lot more countries that are willing to host a significant US military presence, something that's lacking in much of the Pacific.

I find that at many threads you take a strident Chinese line. I am sure you have good reasons to do so and indeed that is wonderful.

However, what is interesting is that you rubbish everything that does not suit your line of thinking without any substance being offered why you do so.

If everything said by others is platitudes or garbage, one wonders if the Chinese alone have inherited the earth.

Could you substantiate what you have said with some links or some cognisable facts rather that assuming the role of an Oracle?

If oil is what will hold the US attention in the Middle East, what makes you feel that the SCS is not a gold mine in oil?

Could it not be that the US is backing horses that would be grateful to share the spoils with the US for 'protecting' them from the Chinese ogre?

taong hindi kakilala

[Ray]

Panetta leaving on 9-day trip to Asia

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta leaves Wednesday on a nine-day trip to Asia to bring allies there up to speed on the United States' new Pacific-orientated defense strategy.

"Basically the core of what we are trying to do with the swing through Asia, is to give a comprehensive account to partners and everyone in the region about what the rebalance to the Asia/Pacific will mean in practice," a senior defense official said while briefing reporters about the trip.''

http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/0...-trip-to-asia/

I take it that he is not wasting the US taxpayers money for an expensive jamboree just to spew pious platitude.

[Dayuhan]

If everything said by others is platitudes or garbage, one wonders if the Chinese alone have inherited the earth.

Politicians speak in platitudes, in the US, in China, and in most other places. Speeches rarely warrant much attention until you see how - or if - they are translated into actions.

If oil is what will hold the US attention in the Middle East, what makes you feel that the SCS is not a gold mine in oil?

The USGS estimates (2010) that discovered and undiscovered oil reserves in all of Southeast Asia, only a fraction of which are within the SCS, are 21.6bbl:

http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2010/3015/pdf/FS10-3015.pdf

Proven reserves in Libya alone are over 76bbl, more than 3 times as much. Iraq's are 112bbl, though they are now claiming new exploration has raised that much higher. The GCC overall has 469bbl of proven reserves. Weigh that up against 21.6bbl including undiscovered reserves, much of which is not within the contested area, and tell me where the "gold mine" is, and where the naval resources are likely to go if oil is a concern.

Gas reserves in the SCS appear to be a bit larger, but the US doesn't exactly need more gas, being in the midst of a glut that's driven prices so low that producers are shutting wells down.

Could it not be that the US is backing horses that would be grateful to share the spoils with the US for 'protecting' them from the Chinese ogre?

Has the US offered anyone protection? If so, who? As referenced above, are the supposed "spoils" even worth all that much?

taong hindi kakilala

That would translate to "a person unknown to you". To whom do you refer?

If you meant "person who knows nothing", that would be "taong walang alam", for future reference.

[Dayuhan]

And just in case anyone thinks the recent incidents mark a unique spike in regional conflict, a bit of history...

http://205.254.135.7/countries/regio...s.cfm?fips=SCS

Military Clashes in the South China Sea* Since 1970 (to 2002)

1974 China, Vietnam

China seized the Paracels from Vietnam, with 18 of its troops killed in clashes on one of the islands.

1988 China, Vietnam

Chinese and Vietnamese navies clashed at Johnson Reef in the Spratlys. Several Vietnamese boats were sunk and over 70 sailors killed.

1992 China, Vietnam

Vietnam accused China of landing troops on Da Luc Reef. China seized almost 20 Vietnamese cargo ships transporting goods from Hong Kong from June - September.

1994 China, Vietnam

China and Vietnam had naval confrontations within Vietnam's internationally recognized territorial waters over Vietnam's Tu Chinh oil exploration blocks 133, 134, and 135. Chinese claim the area as part of their Wan' Bei-21 (WAB-21) block.

1995 China, Philippines

China occupied Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef. Philippine military evicted the Chinese in March and destroyed Chinese markers.

1995 Taiwan, Vietnam

Taiwanese artillery fired on a Vietnamese supply ship.

1996 China, Philippines

In January, Chinese vessels engaged in a 90-minute gun battle with a Philippine navy gunboat near the island of Capone, off the west coast of Luzon, north of Manila.

1997 China, Philippines

The Philippine navy ordered a Chinese speedboat and two fishing boats to leave Scarborough Shoal in April; the Philippine navy later removed Chinese markers and raised its flag. China sent three warships to survey the Philippine-occupied islands of Panata and Kota.

1998 Philippines, Vietnam

In January, Vietnamese soldiers fired on a Philippine fishing boat near Tennent (Pigeon) Reef.

1999 China, Philippines

In May, a Chinese fishing boat was sunk in a collision with Philippine warship. In July, another Chinese fishing boat was sunk in a collision with a Philippine warship.

1999 China, Philippines

In May, Chinese warships were accused of harassing a Philippine navy vessel after it ran aground near the Spratlys.

1999 Philippines, Vietnam

In October, Vietnamese troops fired upon a Philippine air force plane on reconnaissance in the Spratlys.

1999 Malaysia, Philippines

In October, Philippine defense sources reported that 2 Malaysian fighter planes and 2 Philippine air force surveillance planes nearly engaged over a Malaysian-occupied reef in the Spratlys. The Malaysian Defense Ministry stated that it was not a stand-off.

2000 China, Philippines

In May, Philippine troops opened fire on Chinese fishermen, killing one and arresting 7.

2001 China, Philippines

During first three months, the Filipino navy boarded 14 Chinese flagged boats, confiscated their catches, and ejected vessels out of contested portions of the Spratlys.

2001 China, Philippines

In March, the Philippines sent a gunboat to Scarborough Shoal to, "to ward off any attempt by China to erect structures on the rock".

2002 Philippines, Vietnam

In August, Vietnamese troops fired warning shots at Filipino military reconnaissance planes circling over the Spratlys.


Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose...

[Ray]

Politicians speak in platitudes, in the US, in China, and in most other places. Speeches rarely warrant much attention until you see how - or if - they are translated into actions.

How droll.

Generalisation and rubbishing everything seems to be your signature whenever stumped!

International interaction or actions don't happen overnight just because some people think that it is otherwise a Punch and Judy show.

Eg OBL dead or alive the US President had promised. Now, how many years ago was that?

And how many years did it take to do so after painstaking work by all concerned including the US Administration?

Of course, those who see everything that does not give instant result and to their satisfaction as platitudes and waffle, and in the interim, would be quick to rubbish all and be pleased as Punch with the line that it is all blubbering and drivel.

One has to understand that Statecraft is not Instant Coffee!

It is a very tiresome and even thankless process.

But then one has to be a part such a process to realise the heartbreaks and agony that goes into the same.

I wonder if people have noticed how those who are running a Country grey so fast.

The USGS estimates (2010) that discovered and undiscovered oil reserves in all of Southeast Asia, only a fraction of which are within the SCS, are 21.6bbl:

http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2010/3015/pdf/FS10-3015.pdf

Proven reserves in Libya alone are over 76bbl, more than 3 times as much. Iraq's are 112bbl, though they are now claiming new exploration has raised that much higher. The GCC overall has 469bbl of proven reserves. Weigh that up against 21.6bbl including undiscovered reserves, much of which is not within the contested area, and tell me where the "gold mine" is, and where the naval resources are likely to go if oil is a concern.

Gas reserves in the SCS appear to be a bit larger, but the US doesn't exactly need more gas, being in the midst of a glut that's driven prices so low that producers are shutting wells down.

The line of argument that policies or action of a Govt/Nation is solely confined to the current situation is amazing!

National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are the IC's most authoritative written judgments on national security issues. NIEs usually provide information on the likely course of future events and highlight the implications for U.S. policymakers.

The keyword is FUTURE!

Why is the US extracting oil and gas from Shale?

I believe the production cost of a barrel of shale oil was US$95 per barrel. The economics is dependent on the price of oil (Standard).

The US industry suffered losses during the last major investment into oil shale in the early 1980s, when a subsequent collapse in the oil price left the projects uneconomical.

So the requirement of oil and gas never is less!

Has the US offered anyone protection? If so, who? As referenced above, are the supposed "spoils" even worth all that much?

Would it mean that it is the belief that the US Navy is roaming the Pacific just because it has nothing worthwhile to do and requires to burn up fuel so that there is a shortage of gas and the prices skyrocket in the international market?

As of 2011, I believe the US Pacific Fleet consists of the Third and Seventh Fleets, Naval Air Force, Pacific; Commander, Naval Surface Forces Pacific; Naval Submarine Force, Pacific.

Here is the Task for the Pacific Command from the horses mouth. Nothing could be more authentic, even though you feel that everything other than what you feel is meaningless prattle.

STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL ROBERT F. WILLARD, U.S. NAVY
COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE
28 FEBRUARY 2012

Seven major security challenges confront the U.S. across this region, which encompasses half of the earth’s surface, including:

 Defense of the homeland, U.S. territories and compact states in the
Pacific.

 The need to continuously manage and optimize U.S. alliances and
strengthen regional partnerships, in particular, advancing the relationship
with India.

 The threat posed by the DPRK’s nuclear aspirations, proliferation,
provocations, and potential to cause regional instability.

 China’s military modernization – in particular its active development of
capabilities in the cyber and space domains - and the questions all these
emerging military capabilities raise among China’s neighbors about its
current and long-term intentions

 Three nuclear armed states, including Russia, China, and India, and North Korea’s nuclear aspirations, together with the threat of WMD proliferation

 Numerous transnational threats, ranging from proliferation, trafficking of
narcotics and persons, and piracy, to persistent natural and manmade
disasters

 Challenges to freedom of access to, and security within, maritime and air domains, and space and cyberspace, by both state and non-state actors.

http://armed- services.senate.gov/statemnt/2012/02%20February/Willard%2002-28-12.pdf

Should I say more?

Or is the good Admiral also pandering to pious and meaningless platitudes?

[Ray]

And just in case anyone thinks the recent incidents mark a unique spike in regional conflict, a bit of history...

It is unique given the current geopolitical and geostrategic situation.

Hilary Clinton and Panneta are not the jetsetting lot who are roaming the globe for kicks!

Of late, they seem to be hyperactive!

[Ken White]

Hilary Clinton and Panneta are not the jetsetting lot who are roaming the globe for kicks!

Of late, they seem to be hyperactive!

On the first item, I wouldn't bet on that.

On the second, you can expect that to increase markedly as we near the election in November. After which it will drop precipitously...

[carl]

On the second, you can expect that to increase markedly as we near the election in November. After which it will drop precipitously...

There may be some truth to that, but as far as influencing the election, it won't. Most Americans know little if anything about Red Chinese designs on the South China Sea. What election interest there is in foreign policy has to do with Afghanistan and the ever noble Israel. So if Clinton and company are jetting about more than normal and it does have to do with the South China Sea, it is a wasted effort as far as the elections go. They know that so if they are jetting about more than normal, it is for another reason. Tourism maybe, but I don't think Mrs. Clinton worries about getting a tan anymore.

[Ken White]

There may be some truth to that, but as far as influencing the election, it won't.

The point was that an upcoming election breeds hyperactivity in the political classes, all elements not just defense and foreign affairs types (though they rise to the forefront 'cause those are definitely the Presidents bailiwick...). It does not, as you write, really influence many people but it does give credence to any Administration that is busy, busy, busy -- "...working for all Americans and a stable world" and trying to establish a reputation for 'toughness.'

Note the amount of effort going into looking busy without actually doing much.

Most Americans know little if anything about Red Chinese designs on the South China Sea.

And what they do know is hyped to make things look terribobble -- our system demands terribobbleness to keep the money spigots turned on. Both budget bucks from Congress and contributions from the hoi polloi. Well, from the worry wart segment of the polloi, anyway.

... So if Clinton and company are jetting about more than normal and it does have to do with the South China Sea, it is a wasted effort as far as the elections go.

It doesn't, or only peripherally so -- it's not about China, it's all about looking busy until November.

Little to nothing they do is going to faze the Chinese much.

They know that so if they are jetting about more than normal, it is for another reason.

Always possible, I suppose but after watching both parties in the electoral cycle for a number of years, one starts to see a pattern. One that has very little to do with defense or diplomacy. On a related note, it is surprising just how many American foreign relations 'crises' or 'problems' crop up in the summers of Presidential election years

[ganulv]

I don't think Mrs. Clinton worries about getting a tan anymore.

Thank you for that image, carl.

[carl]

Thank you for that image, carl.

A wise diplomat uses all the tools at her disposal. It is for the good of the country.

[Dayuhan]

The line of argument that policies or action of a Govt/Nation is solely confined to the current situation is amazing!

National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are the IC's most authoritative written judgments on national security issues. NIEs usually provide information on the likely course of future events and highlight the implications for U.S. policymakers.

The keyword is FUTURE!

Why is the US extracting oil and gas from Shale?

I believe the production cost of a barrel of shale oil was US$95 per barrel. The economics is dependent on the price of oil (Standard).

The US industry suffered losses during the last major investment into oil shale in the early 1980s, when a subsequent collapse in the oil price left the projects uneconomical.

So the requirement of oil and gas never is less!

Of course the requirements are never less. The point is simply that the US has an abundance of gas (it's been described as "the Saudi Arabia of natural gas") and is thus less concerned with foreign gas supplies than with foreign oil supplies.

The whole idea that the SCS is rich in oil and gas reserves has become a mantra, mindlessly repeated without question or analysis. The media love the idea because it raises the prospect of conflict: everybody knows that conflict is "all about oil".

So the question remains: how much oil and gas is really there, by credible estimates? If you looked at the link referenced above, you'll see that, as I pointed out, estimated discovered and undiscovered oil reserves for all of SE Asia, not just the SCS, are a miniscule fraction of the proven reserves in the GCC.

There's a bit more gas in SE Asia than oil but the disparity remains. Estimated discovered and undiscovered gas reserves for all of SE Asia (again, much of this is not in or near the SCS) are 299tcf, per the same USGS report. That's about 1/3 of the proven reserves in Qatar alone. US recoverable reserve estimates are up to 2543tcf.

The bottom line is that there is absolutely no tangible evidence that the SCS is or is likely to be anybody's energy "gold mine", to use your phrase. That's why I said above that no matter how much we talk of a shift to the Pacific, the Middle East is likely to continue being an equally large focus of naval attention, maybe a larger focus, for years to come. Policies shift every few years. Where the oil is doesn't shift, and it ain't in SE Asia.

Even if the SCS energy reserves are developed, that oil and gas is goong to be consumed locally, where demand is large and growing, not in the US... and from the US perspective, it doesn't matter at all whether that oil and gas is pumped and used by China, the Philippines, or Vietnam.

The whole SCS energy non-issue is a classic example of a molehill being hyped into a mountain. That's not a "pro-Chinese" or "pro-US" perspective, it's just a feeble attempt to bring some rationality into the conversation.

Would it mean that it is the belief that the US Navy is roaming the Pacific just because it has nothing worthwhile to do and requires to burn up fuel so that there is a shortage of gas and the prices skyrocket in the international market?

Trying to stay with the point, the US has not committed itself to protecting anyone in SE Asia, and certainly isn't like to exchange such a commitment for access to resources that aren't even all that remarkable. The idea that the US is going to protect the SE Asian nations in exchange for access to energy reserves just doesn't hold up to examination. The reserves aren't that exciting and no commitment of protection has been made... so what's to talk about, beyond speculation?

I'm honestly not all that interested in the statements or travels of officials. Lots of talk, but they are always talking. We won't know what any of it means until and unless actual policy changes or force redeployments are made. Until (and unless) that happens, any assessment of where the talk is going remains highly speculative at best.