South China Sea and China (2011-2017)

[Dayuhan]

http://globalnation.inquirer.net/440...uck-on-ph-reef

Chinese warship stuck on PH reef

A Chinese warship has run aground on a reef off Palawan while patrolling contested waters in the West Philippine Sea, an Australian newspaper reported on Friday...

[Dayuhan]

Good summary of the players and the issues:

http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/F...-responses.pdf

[carl]

This is an interesting article and shows how the Red Chinese use fishermen and paramilitary nautical units as the thin end of a wedge when engaging in territorial expansion.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...ilitary_moment

It also suggests that those Kilo subs the Viets are acquiring may be more important than we think.

[JMA]

This is an interesting article and shows how the Red Chinese use fishermen and paramilitary nautical units as the thin end of a wedge when engaging in territorial expansion.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...ilitary_moment

It also suggests that those Kilo subs the Viets are acquiring may be more important than we think.

Carl, the question must be asked... who are they kidding?

I mean are there really people out there too dumb to read their play?

[carl]

I mean are there really people out there too dumb to read their play?

Not very many, almost none probably. But there are many who don't want to see. The sight is a little scary so it is more soothing not to look.

I re-read the article and noticed it contained this "Nor should we overlook honor as a motive animating Beijing's actions." That makes the sight even scarier because in the context of the article "honor" means getting some back, revenge for the slights of the last 120 years. That brings some pretty powerful emotions into play.

[JMA]

Not very many, almost none probably. But there are many who don't want to see. The sight is a little scary so it is more soothing not to look.

I re-read the article and noticed it contained this "Nor should we overlook honor as a motive animating Beijing's actions." That makes the sight even scarier because in the context of the article "honor" means getting some back, revenge for the slights of the last 120 years. That brings some pretty powerful emotions into play.

Well if its revenge they are after the Japanese are in for a rocky ride down the line.

[Dayuhan]

This is an interesting article and shows how the Red Chinese use fishermen and paramilitary nautical units as the thin end of a wedge when engaging in territorial expansion.

This citation echoes something I've said repeatedly here:

Expectations are sky-high among the Chinese populace. Having regularly described their maritime territorial claims as a matter of indisputable sovereignty, having staked their own and the country's reputation on wresting away control of contested expanses, and having roused popular sentiment with visions of seafaring grandeur, Chinese leaders will walk back their claims at their peril. They must deliver -- one way or another.

This is why a blustering US response with implicit threats (that we aren't prepared to back) and an implicit demand that the Chines back down are such a bad idea. The Chinese will have to respond in kind: it's politically impossible for them to be seen backing down. At the same time, we push about the only button that can get the Chinese populace to rally behind their government. Where's the advantage in that?

Realistically, this problem isn't going away any time soon, and there's no immediate policy that's going to change the situation on the water. Saber-rattling bluster won't help and will probably make things worse. That doesn't mean anyone has to walk away and concede the issue, it just means there's no quick easy solution.

It also suggests that those Kilo subs the Viets are acquiring may be more important than we think.

Not so easy to confront a fishing fleet with a submarine.

I read something not long ago expressing concern over a proliferation of submarines in the SCS and the practicality of their use. Apparently the depth of the water confines operations to fairly limited spaces and there was concern over collisions and unplanned encounters. I'll try to find it again, it sounded plausible but I don't know enough about submarines to have an opinion.

What the Vietnamese are doing that works as an economic area denial strategy is installing a network of shore-based SSMs and SAMs that cover waters in the EEZ. I personally think the Philippines should adopt that strategy rather than pouring huge sums into ships and aircraft that would probably not survive the first day of an actual conflict, but WTFDIK?

[carl]

This citation echoes something I've said repeatedly here:

This is why a blustering US response with implicit threats (that we aren't prepared to back) and an implicit demand that the Chines back down are such a bad idea. The Chinese will have to respond in kind: it's politically impossible for them to be seen backing down. At the same time, we push about the only button that can get the Chinese populace to rally behind their government. Where's the advantage in that?

Realistically, this problem isn't going away any time soon, and there's no immediate policy that's going to change the situation on the water. Saber-rattling bluster won't help and will probably make things worse. That doesn't mean anyone has to walk away and concede the issue, it just means there's no quick easy solution.

You do say that all the time. But I always reply that the Red Chinese gov whipped up most of that sentiment and, being the masters of a very strong police state, they can tone it down.

One man's blustering response is another man's reasoned statement that things will be only allowed to go so far. We have to make sure that the line is clear and if that results in a hysterical reaction by the populace (I don't think it would) then that is what will be. And it will be mostly because a captive population has been relentlessly propagandized since 1949.

You are right that there is not quick easy solution.

Not so easy to confront a fishing fleet with a submarine.

Not so easy, unless you surface and night and blast them with machine gun fire then disappear. The Vietnamese will play as rough as anybody I'll bet. But there are better ways than using a sub, though I bet the sub guys can come up with all sorts of fun ways to use the boat.

I read something not long ago expressing concern over a proliferation of submarines in the SCS and the practicality of their use. Apparently the depth of the water confines operations to fairly limited spaces and there was concern over collisions and unplanned encounters. I'll try to find it again, it sounded plausible but I don't know enough about submarines to have an opinion.

Good observation. I don't know about the actual conditions in the South China Sea either but the physical configuration of the place makes a big difference. I did read that some people opined that the Vietnamese erred by buying Kilos because they are fairly large and the French Scorpene (?) would have been a better choice because it was smaller.

But in any event those Kilos seem to cause the Red Chinese some concern.

What the Vietnamese are doing that works as an economic area denial strategy is installing a network of shore-based SSMs and SAMs that cover waters in the EEZ. I personally think the Philippines should adopt that strategy rather than pouring huge sums into ships and aircraft that would probably not survive the first day of an actual conflict, but WTFDIK?

I didn't know the Vietnamese were doing that. It seems sensible. There will have to be some kind of aircraft flying about out there though. There has to be a recon capability to give those missiles targets.

[Dayuhan]

You do say that all the time. But I always reply that the Red Chinese gov whipped up most of that sentiment and, being the masters of a very strong police state, they can tone it down.

I think you're missing the reasons why they whip it up, and why they can't afford to tone it down. I think you miss it because you seem to see the Chinese populace as a suppressed and passive mass that poses no threat to the government. That's a long way from reality: the Chinese government is a lot more worried about its own people than they are about anything the US will do.

There are a lot of pissed off people in China. They are pissed off at the rampant corruption, at the flaunting of huge wealth by people they actually see, about huge and growing disparities in wealth. With economic growth looking to settle back to less stratospheric levels, more people will be more pissed off.

The Chinese do respect the government for having made China strong again, for making it a credible global force for the first time in Chinese memory. With the economy going into a potential rough patch, that nationalism is something the government needs. They have to keep it fired up, it keeps helps distract the populace from things the government doesn't want them thinking about. They really aren't in a position to tone down the nationalism, and they certainly aren't in a position where they can afford to publicly back down on regional issues.

One man's blustering response is another man's reasoned statement that things will be only allowed to go so far. We have to make sure that the line is clear and if that results in a hysterical reaction by the populace (I don't think it would) then that is what will be. And it will be mostly because a captive population has been relentlessly propagandized since 1949.

On what basis does the US go around declaring what it will and will not allow in the South China Sea? That's even assuming that we have a clear line that we are willing to enforce, which of course we don't.

Not so easy, unless you surface and night and blast them with machine gun fire then disappear. The Vietnamese will play as rough as anybody I'll bet. But there are better ways than using a sub, though I bet the sub guys can come up with all sorts of fun ways to use the boat.

I think the subs, like the land-based missiles, are primarily a deterrent, though with a greater range than the land-based missiles.

The Chinese do not want a major fight in the South China Sea, at all. That would be devastating to them no matter what the outcome: virtually all of their trade passes through the sea and if it were closed to commercial shipping for even a short time the impact would be huge.

The Vietnamese know they can't fight a full-scale naval/air war against China, but they also know they don't have to: they just have to pose enough threat that such a war would be very unattractive... after all, the Chinese haven't that much to gain. The most likely conflict would be in the form of a naval skirmish, and the Vietnamese have got that base covered fairly well. There's a solid chance that if the Chinese got into a limited skirmish with the Vietnamese the outcome could be equivocal, and the Chinese could even suffer a bit of a bloody nose (losing ships or aircraft). That might be militarily insignificant, but it would be politically devastating.

That's one reason why if the Chinese do decide to push for a skirmish it will be with the Philippines, which has no capability at all.

What we've seen and what I think we'll continue to see, is pushing and provocation right up to the point where shooting looks possible, then backing down. Of course that's a risky game, and somebody could easily miscalculate and set something off, but that's what we've got. I don't see where in this picture the US can draw a credible "line" that it would have the capacity and will to enforce.

Good observation. I don't know about the actual conditions in the South China Sea either but the physical configuration of the place makes a big difference. I did read that some people opined that the Vietnamese erred by buying Kilos because they are fairly large and the French Scorpene (?) would have been a better choice because it was smaller.

The contention was that the subsea geography forces submarines into limited areas and limited corridors, making ASW easier and raising the possibility of accidental encounters or even collisions. Again, I haven't the knowledge to take a position on that, but the argument seemed at least superficially credible.

But in any event those Kilos seem to cause the Red Chinese some concern.

Probably so, for the reasons stated above.

I didn't know the Vietnamese were doing that. It seems sensible. There will have to be some kind of aircraft flying about out there though. There has to be a recon capability to give those missiles targets.

Most of the missiles I believe work with shore-based radar, though in the event of actual conflict some other power - can't imagine who - might easily step in and provide the Vietnamese with detailed intel on whose ships are where.

I've read that Vietnam is buying the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, a joint India/Russia project, Ray might no more about that. They already have a number of Russian-built systems deployed, enough to provide a reasonable deterrent to anyone thinking of slapping them around.

[Ray]

You do say that all the time. But I always reply that the Red Chinese gov whipped up most of that sentiment and, being the masters of a very strong police state, they can tone it down.

That is so obvious.

They whip up issues and then act so coy!

And they do have many sympathizers the world over, who remind me of Mahatma Gandhi - peace at all cost! In India there are many such people, mostly our Communist cadres!

Brahmos is not for sale; at least from India.

However, what is worrisome is that notwithstanding what is officially stated, US may not be very accommodating to allow the Chinese to do what she wants in SCS.

But then I could be wrong! For all what one knows and given what I learn here, the US may just curl up and lick its wounds with so many campaigns that have not been really very successful!

Who knows?

[Dayuhan]

Brahmos is not for sale; at least from India.

Reports like this:

http://www.indiandefence.com/forums/...e-vietnam.html

were rampant last year, but hard to know how credible they are. Can't believe everything you read online.

A Russia/Vietnam joint venture building a version of the SS-N-25 Switchblade has been announced, and Russia has sold Vietnam a couple of the Bastion anti-ship missile systems, along with many older models.

Therre's also been some talk of the Russians moving back into Cam Ranh Bay, though in what numbers and role is far from clear, seems mostly talk (if not just rumor) so far.

It will be interesting to see how relations between the bear and the dragon proceed if all this heats up and the Russians emerge as a supporter of the Vietnamese.

However, what is worrisome is that notwithstanding what is officially stated, US may not be very accommodating to allow the Chinese to do what she wants in SCS.

But then I could be wrong! For all what one knows and given what I learn here, the US may just curl up and lick its wounds with so many campaigns that have not been really very successful!

I don't think the Chinese are planning to take any single step that would be aggressive enough for the US to make a response to. They seem more after a gradual assimilation of bits and pieces, without actual conflict if possible. It will be going on for quite a while, and there will doubtless be twists and turns.

[davidbfpo]

Dayuhan and others raise the issue of Sino-Russian relations, which we have not given serious thought to:

It will be interesting to see how relations between the bear and the dragon proceed if all this heats up and the Russians emerge as a supporter of the Vietnamese.

Why would the Russians side with Vietnam? Surely there is far more to gain with PRC, apart from buying old Russian weapon systems and offering port facilities Vietnam has IMO little to offer.

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan and others raise the issue of Sino-Russian relations, which we have not given serious thought to:

Why would the Russians side with Vietnam? Surely there is far more to gain with PRC, apart from buying old Russian weapon systems and offering port facilities Vietnam has IMO little to offer.

India and Vietnam, both considered potential rivals to China, are major buyers of Russian military hardware, and it's not only old systems. Russia needs the sales, not only for the money but to keep production lines open and to achieve economies of scale for its own purchases, especially with fewer sales going to the Middle East. How the Chinese feel about that is hard to say, not much public discussion. That in itself is odd; if the US was selling 6 submarines to Vietnam the Chinese would be howling about it.

It's always very difficult to know what's really going on with Russia/China relations. Certainly there's a great deal of trade going on and everything looks friendly on the surface. There's a long history of tension between them, though, and several potential flash points. The Chinese are pouring investment is and trying to build influence in Kazakhstan and other oil-producing Central Asian states, and the Russians have to see that as a challenge in a traditional sphere of influence. There are reports of concern that Eastern Siberia is increasingly becoming economically an adjunct to China. Possibly the Russians see influence in Vietnam and India as a potential counterweight to China down the line, in the event things don't stay so friendly?

All speculative of course. I personally think in the medium to long term Russia-China conflict is more likely than Russia-US conflict, but all such ideas are... well, speculative again.

[carl]

I think you're missing the reasons why they whip it up, and why they can't afford to tone it down. I think you miss it because you seem to see the Chinese populace as a suppressed and passive mass that poses no threat to the government. That's a long way from reality: the Chinese government is a lot more worried about its own people than they are about anything the US will do.

There are a lot of pissed off people in China. They are pissed off at the rampant corruption, at the flaunting of huge wealth by people they actually see, about huge and growing disparities in wealth. With economic growth looking to settle back to less stratospheric levels, more people will be more pissed off.

The Chinese do respect the government for having made China strong again, for making it a credible global force for the first time in Chinese memory. With the economy going into a potential rough patch, that nationalism is something the government needs. They have to keep it fired up, it keeps helps distract the populace from things the government doesn't want them thinking about. They really aren't in a position to tone down the nationalism, and they certainly aren't in a position where they can afford to publicly back down on regional issues.

You have stated the crux of our differing views, the degree to which the Red Chinese gov's actions are dictated by the desires of the population. My reading of history since 1949 shows decades of unimaginable suffering inflicted by the gov upon the people. They didn't much care what the people thought and the people, God love 'em (because the gov viewed them as livestock), couldn't do a damn thing to help themselves. So I view with much skepticism your contention that the Chinese people will rise against the Red Chinese gov because they haven't directed the PLAN to be forceful enough against the Vietnamese and the Filipinos.

Two things strike about the position you say the Red Chinese gov is in. The first is as if a master continually eggs on a dog to attack a neighbor and then keeps shouting to the neighbor to keep moving the property line back or he won't be able to control the dog.

The second thing is if what you say is true, the Red Chinese have placed themselves in a similar position to the Pak Army/ISI in that they have created something they can't control that will ultimately destroy their country because war is inevitable. And it is inevitable because people eventually stop backing up. However, I don't think what you say is true.

On what basis does the US go around declaring what it will and will not allow in the South China Sea? That's even assuming that we have a clear line that we are willing to enforce, which of course we don't.

We've gone over this numerous times. The same basis the has motivated the actions of the RN and the USN over the last hundreds of years, freedom of navigation on the high seas.

The Chinese do not want a major fight in the South China Sea, at all. That would be devastating to them no matter what the outcome: virtually all of their trade passes through the sea and if it were closed to commercial shipping for even a short time the impact would be huge.

Absolutely. Sun Tzu said that. They want it without having to fight. There are two sure ways to avoid a fight. They can stop wanting it, or the rest of the world can give them what they want. The first way maintains the status quo, which is pretty good, no fighting lots of people getting rich. The second way is a bad precedent for freedom of navigation, thereby worldwide prosperity; and it bodes ill for anybody near or not so near to Red China who wants to do anything at all without first clearing it with the Central Committee.

So the problem for the rest of the world is maintaining the status quo until they stop wanting it. Hard problem. In my view one of the first things to be realized when dealing with a problem like this is to understand the nature of the antagonist. The Red Chinese are murderous thugs and when dealing with thugs you don't appease them or they come at you again faster for more.

The Vietnamese know they can't fight a full-scale naval/air war against China, but they also know they don't have to: they just have to pose enough threat that such a war would be very unattractive... after all, the Chinese haven't that much to gain. The most likely conflict would be in the form of a naval skirmish, and the Vietnamese have got that base covered fairly well. There's a solid chance that if the Chinese got into a limited skirmish with the Vietnamese the outcome could be equivocal, and the Chinese could even suffer a bit of a bloody nose (losing ships or aircraft). That might be militarily insignificant, but it would be politically devastating.

Sound reasoning...if. I am not sure the Viets have the capability you ascribe to them. The Kilos won't be ready for years.

That's one reason why if the Chinese do decide to push for a skirmish it will be with the Philippines, which has no capability at all.

Very true. And ultimately, the Philippines and Vietnam will depend on us to back them up.

What we've seen and what I think we'll continue to see, is pushing and provocation right up to the point where shooting looks possible, then backing down. Of course that's a risky game, and somebody could easily miscalculate and set something off, but that's what we've got. I don't see where in this picture the US can draw a credible "line" that it would have the capacity and will to enforce.

Our line is freedom of navigation maintained, the South China Sea remains international waters, territorial disputes resolved via international negotiation not fait accomplis (sic) pulled off by fisherman, shacks on stilts and PLAN frigates cruising around 3000 yards away. I think we have the will to do this and have started putting pieces in place already, however clumsily. I fear sometimes though we might be a bit wobbly on the fisherman/shack side.

The contention was that the subsea geography forces submarines into limited areas and limited corridors, making ASW easier and raising the possibility of accidental encounters or even collisions. Again, I haven't the knowledge to take a position on that, but the argument seemed at least superficially credible.

I caution you Dayuhan, submarines and everything about them is completely fascinating. If you plunge into that subject it may be a long time before you surface.

Most of the missiles I believe work with shore-based radar, though in the event of actual conflict some other power - can't imagine who - might easily step in and provide the Vietnamese with detailed intel on whose ships are where.

Unless you get real high tech and real expensive, radars are line of sight. There are only a few countries with over the horizon radars and neither Vietnam nor the Philippines are one of them. Anti-ship missiles will almost certainly need aircraft, somebody's or others, for targeting.

I've read that Vietnam is buying the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, a joint India/Russia project, Ray might no more about that. They already have a number of Russian-built systems deployed, enough to provide a reasonable deterrent to anyone thinking of slapping them around.

But are those systems, like the Kilos, operational yet? That is the main point of the article, until they get operational, there is a time of greater danger.

[carl]

That in itself is odd; if the US was selling 6 submarines to Vietnam the Chinese would be howling about it.

That is a great point! Why indeed. Boy does that open up possibilities along the deep dark conspiracy theory, deals within deals line. I never thought of that before nor have I read anyplace else anything about why Red China isn't livid about that.

As far as Russia goes though, except for selling arms I count them out. It is a criminal state and afflicted with an insoluble demographic decline. They won't be a factor.

[Dayuhan]

You have stated the crux of our differing views, the degree to which the Red Chinese gov's actions are dictated by the desires of the population. My reading of history since 1949 shows decades of unimaginable suffering inflicted by the gov upon the people. They didn't much care what the people thought and the people, God love 'em (because the gov viewed them as livestock), couldn't do a damn thing to help themselves.

You may have noticed that things have changed a bit in China over the last 20 years. The most visible change is in economic progress, but in order to achieve that change other things have changed as well. There's a huge cadre of mid level managerial and professional workers that wasn't there before: they're educated, connected, and aware. A lot more people have traveled, and a lot more are online. A much higher percentage of the population is urban. People are much more connected and information is a lot harder to control. Expectations are much higher and awareness of corruption is omnipresent (corruption seems more an issue than repression for many). The government has kept a lid on that by delivering constantly expanding prosperity, but they can't sustain the rate of expansion forever and the expectations will keep rising. Actions aren't "dictated" by the need to keep the populace under control, but that need is an ever-present influence.

In short, the same economic expansion that worries outsiders has created an enormous problem for the Chinese Government. They cannot afford another Tiananmen: they couldn't keep it bottled up, and they know it.

So I view with much skepticism your contention that the Chinese people will rise against the Red Chinese gov because they haven't directed the PLAN to be forceful enough against the Vietnamese and the Filipinos.

That's an extreme exaggeration of what I said. Obviously nationalist pride isn't the only factor involved. It remains the case, though, that the Chinese Government do rely (like many other governments) on whipping up nationalism, conjuring external threats, and directing anger outward, and that they clearly believe that they cannot afford to be seen backing down or looking weak.

The second thing is if what you say is true, the Red Chinese have placed themselves in a similar position to the Pak Army/ISI in that they have created something they can't control that will ultimately destroy their country because war is inevitable. And it is inevitable because people eventually stop backing up. However, I don't think what you say is true.

War doesn't become inevitable when nobody is willing to back down. In this case nobody wants to back down, but nobody wants to fight either. So they shadow-box, they maneuver, they push as far as they can without provoking actual conflicts. That's a risky business of course, and an armed flareup is always possible. It's unlikely that such a flareup would escalate to war, simply because nobody in the picture wants a war.

We've gone over this numerous times. The same basis the has motivated the actions of the RN and the USN over the last hundreds of years, freedom of navigation on the high seas.

Nobody has restricted or proposed to restrict freedom of navigation. The issue isn't freedom of navigation, the issue is the rights of various claimants to exploit fisheries and potentially other resources. How does the US justify telling others where they can or cannot fish, or explore for oil and gas?

Absolutely. Sun Tzu said that. They want it without having to fight. There are two sure ways to avoid a fight. They can stop wanting it, or the rest of the world can give them what they want. The first way maintains the status quo, which is pretty good, no fighting lots of people getting rich. The second way is a bad precedent for freedom of navigation, thereby worldwide prosperity; and it bodes ill for anybody near or not so near to Red China who wants to do anything at all without first clearing it with the Central Committee.

Neither extreme is likely, and there's lots of room in between. Realistically, what we're likely to see for the medium-term future is a continuation of the status quo, which is somewhat unsettled but within tolerable limits. I don't see how it's in the interests of the US to try and alter that status quo or dictate a resolution.

Sound reasoning...if. I am not sure the Viets have the capability you ascribe to them. The Kilos won't be ready for years.

They have the capacity, even without the submarines. The submarines would extend that capacity over a wider area. The Vietnamese could do real damage in a skirmish near their own shores, and they wouldn't be likely to engage in one at any distance. Not saying they'd win a war, but the Chinese aren't likely to want to take a bite at them, because they can and will bite back.

Very true. And ultimately, the Philippines and Vietnam will depend on us to back them up.

The Vietnamese are not going to depend on the US for anything. Of course they'll do what they can to build relations, as they do with Russia, India, and others, but they won't be depending on the US. Realistically, the US isn't going to go into conflict over fishing rights or energy exploration rights, and the Chinese are going to keep things below that threshold.

Our line is freedom of navigation maintained, the South China Sea remains international waters, territorial disputes resolved via international negotiation not fait accomplis (sic) pulled off by fisherman, shacks on stilts and PLAN frigates cruising around 3000 yards away. I think we have the will to do this and have started putting pieces in place already, however clumsily. I fear sometimes though we might be a bit wobbly on the fisherman/shack side.

Nobody is challenging freedom of navigation, and the US is not going to police fishermen and oil exploration. People will simply have different opinions on what territory belongs to who, and that disagreement will be in place for some time. The US is not in a position to force the Chinese to accept international arbitration of territorial disputes.

That is a great point! Why indeed. Boy does that open up possibilities along the deep dark conspiracy theory, deals within deals line. I never thought of that before nor have I read anyplace else anything about why Red China isn't livid about that.

I would not want to speculate on anything going on between Russia and China. I'm sure they do not trust each other, and for good reason. Vietnam and India ar both traditional customers for Russian arms; possibly the Chinese don't make an issue of it because they know it wouldn't do any good. We'll see what happens.

As far as Russia goes though, except for selling arms I count them out. It is a criminal state and afflicted with an insoluble demographic decline. They won't be a factor.

The Chinese have criminality and demographic issues of their own. Russia is not the empire it once was, but that doesn't mean they wouldn't fight over their territory or what they perceive as their sphere of influence... and of course they remain a nuclear power. No way to know how things will emerge on that front, and no way to influence developments either... sit back and watch.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by davidbfpo

Why would the Russians side with Vietnam? Surely there is far more to gain with PRC, apart from buying old Russian weapon systems and offering port facilities Vietnam has IMO little to offer.

Their interests are security, economic, and political. The interest in establishing access in Vietnam is its strategic location, just like the naval bases they're pursuing in Cuba and the Seychelles. It isn't a threat to us or China necessarily, but suspect it will definitely increase the risk of rising tensions between the emerging powers in the region. Russia trades with China, and China values their economic relationship since they need access to Russia's oil and gas. Interesting developments all around.

http://www.businessweek.com/news/201...s-cuba-vietnam

Russia is in talks to set up naval bases in former Cold War allies Cuba and Vietnam as President Vladimir Putin undertakes the country’s biggest military overhaul since the Soviet era.

“We are working on establishing navy bases outside Russia,” Vice-Admiral Viktor Chirkov, the navy’s commander-in- chief since May, said in an interview with the state-run RIA Novosti news service and confirmed by the navy. “We aim to set up resupply bases in Cuba, the Seychelles and Vietnam.”

http://english.cntv.cn/program/asiat...8/110216.shtml

Russia and Vietnam have agreed to further strengthen their energy cooperation. The agreement was reached Friday when Russian President Vladimir Putin met his Vietnamese counterpart Truong Tan Sang in Russia’s Black Sea resort of Sochi.

Vladimir Putin said, "With Russia’s participation, Vietnam’s first nuclear energy plant will be built. Of course during the building of this very important and great object we will use the very highest technology. The Russian government is providing credit to Vietnam. The total value of the credit is 10 billion US dollars."

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/12...ry-engagement/

Finally, throughout its 13 years of APEC membership, Russia has failed to clearly outline the economic interests it wishes to pursue with its regional APEC partners. Nor has it utilised numerous APEC opportunities to articulate its strategic trade vision. This is well indicated by its limited participation, and lack of submissions, to APEC committees and groups, including an indifference toward the agendas of important APEC fora such as the Economic Committee and the Committee on Trade and Investment. The only APEC forum with which Russia has recorded engagement is the Counter-Terrorism Task Force, further indicating that Russia’s participation seems not to be driven by economic considerations.

Consequently, Russia will likely focus on a number of more narrowly defined initiatives in drafting the 2012 APEC agenda. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s remarks in Honolulu and a recent APEC meeting in St.Petersburg suggest the topics of interest will be energy, transport and food security. Russia apparently sees APEC as an opportunity to assert its role as a premier energy supplier, a transport ‘bridge’ between the Asia Pacific and Europe and a competitive food exporter to the region. This self-perception is not new and rests partly on domestic assumptions that the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Northern Sea Route will be feasible alternatives for commercial cargo travelling between the Asia Pacific and Europe. In order to fulfil at least some of these ambitions, huge investment in the physical infrastructure of Russia’s Far East is required. Translating these complex and mostly unilateral interests into the APEC language of concerted multilateralism will require a lot of creativity.

[Ray]

India and Vietnam, both considered potential rivals to China, are major buyers of Russian military hardware

As far as India is concerned, Russian hardware is history.

[Dayuhan]

Foreign Affairs on the impending Chinese leadership transition:

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articl...each?page=show

Relevant paragraph:

On the South China Sea, for example, Beijing's approach is drifting "from maintaining stability to safeguarding sovereignty," as the well-connected Chinese academic Jin Canrong recently argued in People's Daily. The last time the sea became a flashpoint, in 2009-10, the leadership stepped in to remind the country's hawks that defending sovereignty was important but ultimately subordinate to focusing on economic development. With politics now in command, it is unlikely that anyone will risk looking soft on defending China's "core interests" by calling for restraint.

The bit about politics and the need to not appear soft sounds almost American, in a not entirely reassuring way...

[Dayuhan]

As far as India is concerned, Russian hardware is history.

Interesting... are these incorrect then?

http://www.defenseworld.net/go/defen...ite%20Problems

These 42 new Su-30 MKI will be delivered over four years, beginning 2014.

http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20110204/162455171.html

The IAF has awarded the MiG corporation a $900 million contract to upgrade all of its 69 operational MiG-29s.

Again, these projects would seem of value to the Russians not only for the money they bring in, but for their ability to keep the production lines for these aircraft open, active, and able to supply their own air force.

I'd also thought that India just took delivery of a Russian-built submarine and was expecting another... and aren't the Russians heavily involved in the Brahmos and PAK-FA programs?

All just stuff off the internet of course, and possibly not trustworthy...