South China Sea and China (2011-2017)

[AdamG]

JAPAN- A longtime no-war pledge has disappeared from Japan's Liberal Democratic Party's annual working policy revealed on Sunday, while the ruling party vowed to continue visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine and push ahead constitutional revision, in another move leading the country in a far-right direction, observers said.

At its 81st LDP annual convention in Tokyo, the party removed the pledge that Japan would "never wage a war", China Central Television reported on Sunday.

http://news.asiaone.com/news/asia/ja...-no-war-pledge

[jmm99]

I thought I'd post this image to relate our "Pacific Pivot" to the areas to the west of what I believe are the far littorals that the US must protect.

Americas-Centric 100.jpg

That is, the areas to the west of the limit of US force projection to protect that littoral (blue line), which have Aus-NZ separate (dark blue line); and then the non-Chinese East, Southeast and South Asian countries (orange line), not to include Astan and Pstan. The US "pivot to the Pacific" began well over a hundred years ago and most of the islands are either part of the United States or are states freely associated with the US.

The states ringing China have somewhat different interests than the US vis--vis China; and cannot, without losing credibility, be seen as American lapdogs. Therefore, separate China policies are indicated, but co-operation is also indicated.

In a recent speech, the new Indian ambassador emphasized India's "shift to the east".

Regards

Mike

[carl]

Mike:

Those blue lines exclude Europe. We have been in three wars, two hot, one cold in order to keep Europe in a state we would prefer it to be in. I don't see how things have changed so much that we wouldn't do it again if a threat arose.

Also I don't think a map display of areas we are interested in does justice to the desire to preserve the system of free navigation the Royal and United States Navies created and maintained over the last 200 years. That system is a fundamental that has become so normal that we all take it for granted. We shouldn't. And that is the biggest threat Red China's expansionism pose's in my mind, the disruption of that system.

[jmm99]

Those blue lines exclude Europe. We have been in three wars, two hot, one cold in order to keep Europe in a state we would prefer it to be in. I don't see how things have changed so much that we wouldn't do it again if a threat arose.

Yes, they exclude all the continental masses of the Old World, including Europe. The US is good at breaking things using high tech, very violent methods to which most Europeans are opposed. Even if we could keep Europe "in a state we would prefer it to be in" (a doubtful proposition), hegemony over Europe would entail costs which would be better expended in the Americas.

If a threat to the United States (and it would have to be existential or close to that) arose from the continental masses, we have more than adequate reach to neutralize that threat - preferably, by targeted direct actions, but also by more violent actions to include nuclear.

Do not completely despair, however, because in order to protect our far littorals, we must have at least co-operative relations with the littoral nations of the Atlantic and Pacific. Those nations all have their own special interests re: the more interior countries. So, a gigantic alliance of littoral states, pressed fit into "one size fits all", simply won't work. Moreover, in power and uses of power, all countries are not equal - one cannot compare Mauritania with the UK and France, which are nuclear powers. Thus, the US would have to protect its far littorals the old-fashioned way via bi-lateral arrangements, individually negotiated and maintained.

Also I don't think a map display of areas we are interested in does justice to the desire to preserve the system of free navigation the Royal and United States Navies created and maintained over the last 200 years. That system is a fundamental that has become so normal that we all take it for granted. We shouldn't. And that is the biggest threat Red China's expansionism pose's in my mind, the disruption of that system.

Those light blue lines include all of the World's oceans, except for the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea and the Inland Seas. Primary responsibility for those waters should rest on the nations enclosed by the orange line. Again, bi-lateral relations are indicated, with realization that each of those nations has different interests with respect to China. Air and Naval exercises (and limited landing exercises) are not foreclosed because in certain circumstances (e.g., blockade of China) US forces would have to cross the blue line. Our standard global nuclear policy would remain in effect.

An SME on the military strengths of the "orange line" countries can inform us of their ability to take on maritime control of the Indian Ocean and the more coastal waters from Vietnam to Japan.

The map is a containment structure vs. Red China's expansionism. I don't think China will push the envelope against the US. If it engages in a conventional war, its assets (all those bonds and stocks) and its nationals' assets within US jurisdiction will be forfeit to the US. If that war went nuclear, China could severely hurt us with varying estimates of US casualties (depending on first strike, etc. - 10-100 million), but China's concentrated coastal and near interior populations (most of its population) would cease to exist - as would China as a nation. The "orange line" countries each have different considerations re: China, as do Australia-NZ. One size won't fit all; and the US must realize that.

Regards

Mike

[Bill Moore]

I thought I'd post this image to relate our "Pacific Pivot" to the areas to the west of what I believe are the far littorals that the US must protect.

Americas-Centric 100.jpg

That is, the areas to the west of the limit of US force projection to protect that littoral (blue line), which have Aus-NZ separate (dark blue line); and then the non-Chinese East, Southeast and South Asian countries (orange line), not to include Astan and Pstan. The US "pivot to the Pacific" began well over a hundred years ago and most of the islands are either part of the United States or are states freely associated with the US.

The states ringing China have somewhat different interests than the US vis--vis China; and cannot, without losing credibility, be seen as American lapdogs. Therefore, separate China policies are indicated, but co-operation is also indicated.

In a recent speech, the new Indian ambassador emphasized India's "shift to the east".

Regards

Mike

Your blue lines indicate a conventional threat we must be prepared to block at your proposed defensive line. I don't think a conventional military threat to the U.S. proper exists in my opinion in East Asia. Instead we are faced with a number of asymmetric/unconventional threats ranging from long range missiles, WMD, to cyber that drawing defensive line in the water won't protect us from.

Furthermore, half the population of the earth and the economic center of the global economy lies beyond your blue line, and the U.S. has strategic economic interests it must protect in that region, which is the driving reason for our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. This is also the reason the rebalance isn't all about the military, but unfortunately the military gets 95% of the media coverage which creates a terrible misrepresentation of what we're trying to do.

[Bob's World]

Bill,

It just dawned on me the parallels between your argument (PACOM's argument) above today, and the one they routinely made 7-10 years ago.

Then it was about how many Muslims lived in that region. How Indonesia was the largest Muslim populace nation on the planet, the numbers of Muslims in Malaysia, India, Philippines, etc. All true, but they were selling those demographic facts as rationale for greater war on terrorism activity; completely discounting that there was very little terror threat to the US in those areas.

PACOM hated the war on terror though, as it robbed them of resources as we shifted everything that wasn't nailed down over to CENTCOM, and they hated how it marginalized the Big Navy, Big Airforce missions in the Pacific with traditional Cold War threats and missions.

But now the statisticians are back. Today it is not facts about demographics, but rather facts about economics. Ok, so true enough, the Asian region is a massive engine of economic growth these days. True enough, but just like the Muslim facts of the last decade, I have to wonder if this doesn't add up to a military threat to the US either....

I can see where it could very well be the problem PACOM proclaims it to be...but I also have a very strong sense of Deja vu; and I also know how the people in that building think. Dominated by Air and Naval officers, the world always tends to look a whole lot like what they do for a living.

[Bill Moore]

Not exactly a novel idea that the world looks different depending upon where you sit. For example, I know there are some people in USSOCOM who tend to view the world through a population centric lens and think DOD should be focused on engaging populations around the world because in their view nation-states no longer matter. Of course they like that view because they believe it gives them a competitive advantage regardless of how inaccurate the claim is. As for economic interests, those comments are from our national leadership, not PACOM. Unlike some, PACOM leadership does listen to what national leadership tells them to focus on. They don't have the luxury of pursuing their priorities.

[jmm99]

Your blue lines indicate a conventional threat we must be prepared to block at your proposed defensive line. I don't think a conventional military threat to the U.S. proper exists in my opinion in East Asia. Instead we are faced with a number of asymmetric/unconventional threats ranging from long range missiles, WMD, to cyber that drawing defensive line in the water won't protect us from.

Lines, whether "lines drawn in the sand" or "lines drawn in the sea", are symbolic representations of real policies. Thus, we have the Line of Gaius Popillius Laenas (a Containment Zone) and the Lakshman Rekha (a Protective Zone); and both legends provide us useful advice.

My little lines drawn in the seas establish both a Containment Zone (vis-a-vis China; is your "East Asia" a euphemism for China ?); and a Protective Zone (for the Americas, by extending force projection to the far littorals of the Atlantic and the Pacific). With respect to the Americas, cultivation of strategic co-operation (bi-lateral) between the US and those American states that can afford to join in far littoral naval force projection is indicated. Brazil is an easy example.

You and I certainly don't want to engage in a semantic debate about defining "conventional" and "unconventional", or "symmetrical" and "asymmetrical", in this thread. So, I'll take your "conventional military threat" to mean something like carrier task forces, divisional landing faces and air wings - Normandy, Okinawa, etc.

So long as a solid Protective Zone exists, the "U.S. Proper" will face little risk of large conventional attacks from anywhere in the World. That type of attack (the Red Dawn Scenario) would play into our high-tech, highly violent abilities. However, the "U.S. Proper" could face risk from attacks by smaller conventional forces - whether an independent group of TVNSAs, or a proxy group for another state. Moreover, in the "Inland Sea" area from Japan-Korea to Taiwan, and in the "Guam Salient", a US-China conventional armed conflict might well have an unpredictable outcome.

I look at carrier task forces, divisional landing faces and air wings + your "long range missiles, WMD, to cyber" as being part of our tool chest - and part of the aggregate "tool chest" of our possible opponents. Not all are as blessed individually in certain areas as we are; but we cannot continue to engage them on their terms. We have to pick and choose our fights, remembering that both the military struggle and the political struggle must be included in our plans.

My "defensive line" (your words, twice used) is scarcely that. Of course, since WWII and the UN Charter, the concept of "Aggressive War" has been outlawed. So, we Americans start with something of a "defensive posture" - no "first strike" (but, that has exceptions ranging from an all-out nuclear attack to the smallest direct action targeting one person - "It all depends ..."). My views are not one of "passive defense", where one will get his a$$ knocked around the boxing or wrestling ring. My views are best viewed as those of aggressive counter-punching and counter-grappling - with multiple attack options. Some are local, some are regional, and some (because of the nature and source of the threat, especially if existential or near so) are global. Some are directly USAian and some would be via "proxies". They do include DIME and more.

I could go on to everyone's boredom; so, I'll simply say that in policy and strategy (political and military working together), my view is along the lines suggested by Andre Beaufre - e.g., Introduction to Strategy (with particular reference to Problems of Defense, Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age) (and link to following review):

In a book of searing brilliance, General Andre Beaufre contends that the West has failed to develop a strategic method of thought in politics, economics, and diplomacy to employ in the dialectic of two opposing wills on the world scene. We have assumed, wrongly, that military strategy is the only strategy (and military strength the most important strength) and because military strategy has often failed, we have relegated the whole strategic art to the museum shelf.

General Beaufre constructs a modern "algebra of war" that incorporates classic military strategy as well as nuclear and indirect strategies - examining them as abstract concepts of attack, surprise, deception, and showing how and when they can be used most effectively in achieving specific aims in global conflict. In our time, when the awesomeness of nuclear weapons, imposes limits on the use of military strength, it is the other aspects of strategy that must come to the fore. Indirect strategy is the strategy of the future.

"I am convinced that in strategy, as in all human affairs, it is ideas which must be dominant and the guiding force. In war the loser deserves to lose because his defeat must result from errors of thinking, made either before or during the conflict."

and, Deterrence and Strategy:

General Beaufre applies his capacity for clear logical thinking and lucid expression to this basic problem of deterrence. He shows that it is governed by special laws, differing according to degree of force employed and the number of participants in this frightening game. He analyzes its effect upon military structure in the nuclear age and gives a thought-provoking picture of the world problems which may face us the year 2000.

Both books are needed to understand where Beaufre is coming from and going to. See also, Liddell-Hart, Strategy: the indirect approach; and Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, are useful companions to Beaupre - besides Clausewitz, Jomini and Frederick the Great, a masterful counter-puncher and counter-grappler.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

I invite examples and discussion as to Bill's comment:

Furthermore, half the population of the earth and the economic center of the global economy lies beyond your blue line, and the U.S. has strategic economic interests it must protect in that region, which is the driving reason for our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. This is also the reason the rebalance isn't all about the military, but unfortunately the military gets 95% of the media coverage which creates a terrible misrepresentation of what we're trying to do.

Yes, there are lots of people, land and wealth in Eurasia and Africa. Besides, MacKinder told us in 1904 that we had to focus our Worldview there.

Later, in 1919, Mackinder summarised his theory as:

"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;
who rules the World-Island controls the world."
(Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 106)

Any power which controlled the World-Island would control well over 50% of the world's resources. The Heartland's size and central position made it the key to controlling the World-Island.

Of course, we "dumb" Americans and TR were ignoring MacKinder back in 1904:

A century ago, on 25 January 1904, Halford J. Mackinder delivered a paper entitled "The Geographical Pivot of History" to an audience of the Royal Geographic Society. The distinguished English geographer contended that the age of sea power was ending and land power was about to become the key element of global strategic dominance. The new pivot in Mackinder's system of geographical determinism consisted of "the closed heartland of Euro-Asia" (p. 8), that is, Russia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. He believed that if Russia were to ally with Germany they would form the strongest empire in the world. Britain, the United States, and Japan—the world's most powerful sea powers—would be at a fatal strategic disadvantage and powerless to contest with the heartland powers for control over the economic, military, and political future of the world.

Mackinder had the bad fortune to deliver his prescient paper at precisely the moment when each of the three major sea powers was making its distinctive bid to demonstrate the controlling power of navies. Japan was challenging Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) and demonstrating that a relatively small nation with a major navy and shrewd naval strategy could resoundingly defeat Mackinder's potentially all-powerful land power. The United States, under the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, was building almost two battleships per year and had just commenced construction of the Panama Canal. This combination would enable the U.S. Navy to exert Mahanian command of the seas in both the western Atlantic and throughout much of the Pacific Ocean. England was about to launch the super battleship Dreadnought, which would render all other major naval combatants hopelessly inferior and obsolescent—much as would be the case with the American super carriers of the Cold War era.

So, what the hay, why should we bow to that long-deceased monument today ?

Seriously, I am interested in your statement:

... the U.S. has strategic economic interests it must protect ...

If you could, I'd appreciate some examples to have a framework for a reasoned discussion. My general questions about "US strategic economic interests" are the following:

1. Is the economic interest "had" by the US people; i.e., the US as a nation state "owns" it; or

2. Is the economic interest "had" by US special interest groups; they "own" it; or

3. Is the economic interest "had" by a foreign state or foreign interest groups; it or they "own" it.

Another set of questions applicable to all three situations is whether:

1. The economic interest is of direct strategic import to the "US as a nation-state", and/or to "US special interest groups"; or

2. The economic interest is of indirect strategic import to the "US as a nation-state", and/or to "US special interest groups", but of more direct strategic import to US "allies, partners, etc." (and whether they are capable or not of protecting that interest themselves).

I'm open to discussion.

Regards

Mike

[Bill Moore]

If you could, I'd appreciate some examples to have a framework for a reasoned discussion. My general questions about "US strategic economic interests" are the following:

Quote:
1. Is the economic interest "had" by the US people; i.e., the US as a nation state "owns" it; or

2. Is the economic interest "had" by US special interest groups; they "own" it; or

3. Is the economic interest "had" by a foreign state or foreign interest groups; it or they "own" it.

Another set of questions applicable to all three situations is whether:

Quote:
1. The economic interest is of direct strategic import to the "US as a nation-state", and/or to "US special interest groups"; or

2. The economic interest is of indirect strategic import to the "US as a nation-state", and/or to "US special interest groups", but of more direct strategic import to US "allies, partners, etc." (and whether they are capable or not of protecting that interest themselves.

I'm open to discussion.

Mike,

Fair enough, this is my initial response and then I'm watching the Super Bowl

I'll start with I feel very comfortable with what we're trying to accomplish in PACOM AOR with our allies and partners for a number of reasons. First there is general consensus it is a good thing for all concerned, to include the nations we compete with economically. Second, in my opinion of course, our moral compass is on target, since it is supportive of overall development, supportive of human rights, and recognizes each nation's sovereign interests (they're equals at the table). This wasn't the case during my years in PACOM in the 80s when we were supporting tyrants to maintain our status quo with the USSR. While most of us understood the logic we couldn't help but feel a bit dirty at the end of the day.

You can go to PACOM's website and look at it unclassified strategy, a key component of it is:

In accordance with national guidance, our desired end state is that the Asia-Pacific is secure and prosperous, underpinned by U.S. leadership and a rules-based international order.

Our National Defense Strategy also points to economic interests (largely protecting the international economic system that so many countries are dependent upon).

The maintenance of peace, stability, the free flow of commerce, and of U.S. influence in this dynamic region will depend in part on an underlying balance of military capability and presence. Over the long term, China’’s emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect the U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways. Our two countries have a strong stake in peace and stability in East Asia and an interest in building a cooperative bilateral relationship. However, the growth of China’’s military power must be accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in the region. The United States will continue to make the necessary investments to ensure that we maintain regional access and the ability to operate freely in keeping with our treaty obligations and with international law. Working closely with our network of allies and
partners, we will continue to promote a rules-based international order that ensures underlying stability and encourages the peaceful rise of new powers, economic dynamism, and constructive defense cooperation.

You mentioned a containment strategy in your posts, but the U.S. doesn't have a containment strategy. There are a lot of concerns with growing tensions between China, Japan, Philippines, Vietnam, and a number of other states in the region, but the intent is to resolve those issues using the existing rules instead of these nations resorting to military coercion or force, which could (though it doesn't have to, which is important to keep in mind) escalate into a much larger conflict which in theory would rock the global economy. I'm not an economist, so I can't assess if those arguments are overstated or not, but there seems to be general consensus globally that continued stability and economic growth in the region is in everyone's best interests. To your question above, that means 1-3.

From the Department of State

http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2013/12/218291.htm

Economic Aspects of the Asia Rebalance

The past few decades have produced an extraordinary period of prosperity in the East Asia-Pacific region. It has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty across the entire region and fostered dynamic, innovative economies that today are fueling global growth. The World Bank recently projected that the East Asia-Pacific region will contribute 40 percent of global growth this year, and some forecasters expect that nearly 50 percent of world growth over the next two decades will be generated in this region, yielding hundreds of millions of new middle class consumers.

Tapping into the economic dynamism of the East Asia-Pacific is vitally important for U.S. interests. Even as we continue to lay the foundation for future economic ties, we are already seeing progress in many areas. For instance, trade with the East Asia-Pacific region grew by 22 percent between 2008 and 2012, far outpacing the 13 percent growth in global U.S. trade. In 2012, U.S. exports of goods and services to the East Asia-Pacific region totaled nearly $555 billion, an increase of 31 percent since 2008, which supports an estimated 2.8 million U.S. jobs.

Another one from State,

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/pl/2013/218776.htm

Benefits for the United States

Through the rebalance, we are positioning the United States to better promote its interests as the center of global politics, economics, and population growth continues to shift to the East Asia-Pacific. By increasing our engagement in the region, the United States is:

Supporting efforts that create and sustain American jobs (in 2012, $555 billion in U.S. exports of goods and services to the region are estimated to have supported as many as 2.8 million U.S. jobs); Making America safer and more secure; Helping expand the ranks of democratic and prosperous states.

One can argue over the "how" we protect our interests in the region, but I think one would have to be pretty irrational to make a claim we don't strategic interests there. Unlike Bob's outdated perceptions of current strategy, the reality is as stated in a recent SWJ post we're still pre-strategic when it comes to China. We have a action officer level discussion on what if, but that doesn't reflect policy or senior leadership views in uniform necessarily. We do have a regional strategy that is focused on maintaining peace through engagement and deterring aggression in the region for all the reasons stated above (and more). This gets to my point about your lines only addressing half of our strategy. Of course protecting the homeland is always a priority, but we have interests beyond that require us to engage and assure the nation-states beyond that line that we intend to maintain regional security, which doesn't mean advocating for a large land force to dominate the Asia land mass, but expanded partnerships and posturing the "right" capabilities to deter and respond to a crisis in the region. How we should that will be debated from here to eternity.

[jmm99]

Thank you for the references above, but particularly for your suggestion to get the information directly from the PACOM website. Besides the basic background items (USPACOM Strategy, Defense Strategic Guidance, Facts, Exercises & Engagements, History), the Asia Pacific Economic Update page (2005-2012, with 2 to 4 volumes per year) will give me a take on PACOM's viewpoint and increase my understanding of the AOR's economies. So, I've some reading to do.

My eventual conclusions may differ from those of PACOM and the Asia-Pacific Chamber of Commerce.

The AOR map (no lines drawn in the seas there !):



leads me to believe that my little lines drawn in the seas (if effected, which seems highly improbable in the New World Order) would change PACOM's rice bowl into this:



I will also look for our strategic plan for Mongolia - I'm told that they like Americans.

Regards

Mike

[carl]

Mike:

Europe remains an area of vital interest to the US for the same reason it did in the past century, it is hugely important economically. We couldn't afford to let that economy slip from amongst our trading partners. That would cost us economically, a lot. Granted right now there isn't much around to threaten them and thereby us. But things change. I think us Americans don't really see that they do. Guys like JMA do though because of where they live. Yes, the Euros aren't too interested in fighting anybody now, but then they weren't in the 20s and 30s either. But when a threat came, they changed their minds and we responded.

I am a little unclear about how you feel about the Red Chinese threatening to essentially take over the South China Sea, thereby overthrowing the system of free navigation the RN and USN established and preserved. That is the prime danger in my view, the overthrow of that system. And ironically I think the overthrow of that system would hurt more than any other nation, Red China itself. The reason for that is they would have clearly demonstrated that a nation can take over a portion of the high seas and the USN won't stop them. If that happens, the Red Chinese will look into the mirror and say to themselves 'Hey, if we can do that, somebody else can do that, like the Indians!.' Every other nation will see that too. When that happens it will lead to nautical anarchy, which will lead to a lot of wars and will severely curtail free trade which will impoverish a lot of people in the world. I don't think we realize the importance of a merchant vessel being able sail around unimpeded without having to pay tribute to the PLAN here, say the Ukranian navy there or the South African navy down way down under.

[jmm99]

In the Best Interests of the Sugar Market

So, in any area that is economically important to US business interests, the US military must become the Better Business Bureau, Chamber of Commerce, Smart Zone Incubator - and throw in a lot of muscle whenever US trade flow is threatened ?

I don't think so; but that seems to have become the rallying cry for the New World Order globalists, especially those of a liberal-progressive Wall Street bent.

Rough Riders, Youtube, at about 1:57:45 to about 1:59:10 - Why We Are Here > Not For The Sugar Market. But that was then; and the New World Order is definitely now.

--------------------------------
Containment in the South China Sea

PACOM has no containment strategy for China (Bill Moore's post above). But, USPACOM Strategy does announce this BLUF for China:

The United States believes that a strong U.S.-China partnership is essential for peace, prosperity, and both regional and global security.

Do you think that the Land of Unrestricted Warfare is going to be our "partner" ? Let's all just get along and sing Kumbayah.

Moreover, as Bill pointed out in his post:

You mentioned a containment strategy in your posts, but the U.S. doesn't have a containment strategy. There are a lot of concerns with growing tensions between China, Japan, Philippines, Vietnam, and a number of other states in the region, but the intent is to resolve those issues using the existing rules instead of these nations resorting to military coercion or force, which could (though it doesn't have to, which is important to keep in mind) escalate into a much larger conflict which in theory would rock the global economy.

My position is simple. Let the people of the region decide whether they are willing to die to defend their territorial sovereignty. The Indians and Vietnamese have made that commitment in defending their borders. What is the position of the other "orange line" countries ? If they are not willing to "draw a line in the sea" and defend it to the death, why should we defend it for them ?

It could well be that some "orange line" nations will talk a good game about territorial sovereignty, but will accept baksheesh (like a couple in South Asia) and allow its impairment - hoping that China will be a kind and gentle "partner". Ultimately, it's their choice and not ours.

Regards

Mike

[carl]

Mike:

The fact of the matter is a maritime trading nation like ours can't prosper unless we have pretty free access to world markets, especially the wealthy ones like Europe, and they have pretty free access to ours. What threatens that threatens our prosperity and our standard of living. People and nations will fight to avoid being poor. If our ability to trade goes down so does our standard of living. Not too noble sounding I'll grant but being poor sucks and not being poor is worth fighting for, especially your children not being poor.

From that we get the importance of freedom of the seas. It is not enough that each little nation tries to defend its freedom of the seas. That is impossible. The Netherlands can't make sure that their merchantmen can sail unimpeded on any body of international water in the world. Nor can they make sure international waters stay international waters. They depend upon the system we have in place now to do that. And that system ultimately depends upon the USN and allied navies backing it. If the USN stopped doing that, the allies would have nothing to coalesce around and the system would collapse. The US would be hurt by that because it would hurt world trade and that would hurt us, along with everybody else to include Red China and Japan and India and other rich powerful countries that would start taking action. Things would get dark and ugly pretty quick.

This is a small wars site and I think we don't tend to see how vitally important free navigation is to the welfare of the world and how important sea power is to maintaining free navigation.

[Steve Blair]

Actually one could contend that many of our (the US's) external small wars resulted from the desire to secure or preserve freedom of navigation (the need for provisioning/coaling stations comes to mind, along with preventing other nations from securing locations that might block navigation). We've "backed into" a number of involvements for those reasons.

[Dayuhan]

I am a little unclear about how you feel about the Red Chinese threatening to essentially take over the South China Sea, thereby overthrowing the system of free navigation the RN and USN established and preserved. That is the prime danger in my view, the overthrow of that system.

A declaration of sovereignty over the South China Sea is not in itself interference with trade, any more than Panama's declaration of sovereignty over the canal was in itself interference with trade. Given that the vast majority of the maritime traffic in the region is coming to or from Chinese ports, and that China depends more on maritime trade than any other nation on earth and would be intensely vulnerable to teat-for-tat responsive restraint elsewhere, it's hard to see any incentive for them to interfere.

Not that I think we should accept or recognize their claim, but there's little to be gained by going all irate over it. Insisting that they drop the claim is pointless, because they won't and we can't force them to. The status quo for some time has been that they claim, others counter-claim, everybody ignores everybody else's claim, and the pushing and shoving stays at a fairly low scale. That's liveable. The current policy of "we don't take sides on the claims, but we'd like to see them settled peacefully and without restraint on navigation", combined with ambiguity on what would or wouldn't provoke a response, seems reasonable to me. I don't see how getting all truculent and confrontational would improve matters.

[Dayuhan]

This, from Bill's PACOM citation:

In accordance with national guidance, our desired end state is that the Asia-Pacific is secure and prosperous, underpinned by U.S. leadership and a rules-based international order.

seems to me a likely sticking point, both with allies and potential antagonists. We need to remember that despite all the rhetoric about the obsolescence of the nation-state and the rise of the non-state actor, East Asia remains the domain of traditional nation-states with substantial amounts of nationalism in play. The East Asian nations do not consider themselves to be inferiors or natural subordinates. If we expect to "lead", as in we decide and others follow, we're not going to do very well. Obviously that doesn't mean we submit to the dictates of others, but there's a thin line to be walked, and if we wade into The Pivot with the assumption that we are The Leader there's likely to be some messy times.

[Dayuhan]

Rough Riders, Youtube, at about 1:57:45 to about 1:59:10 - Why We Are Here > Not For The Sugar Market. But that was then; and the New World Order is definitely now.

The "New Worl Order" might not be so new, and there might have been things the Rough Riders didn't know. Elihu Root had in private law practice ably served the American Sugar Refining Company, one of the great industrial conglomerates of the day, and the ASRC had a quite surpassing interest in bringing cane sugar production inside the tariff wall. Of course the acquisition of actual and potential sugar producing territories under Root's administration may have been completely coincidental.

My position is simple. Let the people of the region decide whether they are willing to die to defend their territorial sovereignty. The Indians and Vietnamese have made that commitment in defending their borders. What is the position of the other "orange line" countries ? If they are not willing to "draw a line in the sea" and defend it to the death, why should we defend it for them ?

Will and capacity are two different things. Our problem is what to do if they have the will but not the capacity. Realistically, that will depend on our assessment of our interests at the time and under the specific circumstances in question.

It could well be that some "orange line" nations will talk a good game about territorial sovereignty, but will accept baksheesh (like a couple in South Asia) and allow its impairment - hoping that China will be a kind and gentle "partner". Ultimately, it's their choice and not ours.

Less to do with hoping for kindness and gentleness than with not wanting to get stomped. When a Jack Russell Terrier faces off with a Rottweiler, the choices are limited. The terrier can keep up in the bark department, but when it comes to biting he's either going to accommodate or get chomped.

How the US can or should respond to any of this is anything but clear, especially as the manner of China's evolution going forward is anything but clear. I do not see "lines in the sea" or red lines of any description being terribly useful, especially if we're not 100% sure we're willing to back them up. It's not a situation with a clear answer, beyond maintaining presence, engagement, flexibility, and ambiguity.

[jmm99]

The "New World Order" might not be so new, and there might have been things the Rough Riders didn't know. Elihu Root had in private law practice ably served the American Sugar Refining Company, one of the great industrial conglomerates of the day, and the ASRC had a quite surpassing interest in bringing cane sugar production inside the tariff wall. Of course the acquisition of actual and potential sugar producing territories under Root's administration may have been completely coincidental.

I'm well acquainted with the "New World Order" of the Spanish-American War, and better acquainted with the NWO which led to the Panama Canal. So were those Rough Riders whose families were involved in those NWOs. Sgt. Ham Fish KIA was a type for that family background, though he did not accept their financial investments as a basis for his going to war (or so says John Milius' script).

The movie clip reflects a number of different reasons for going to war. The ending viewpoint of the clip - that one should not go to war for the benefit of the "Sugar Market" - is one shared by me and by Smedley Butler, War is a Racket (1935), although I add the caveat that he had his era and context and I have mine.

The remaining two "points" of your message are generalized rhetorical snipping - as to which your "Jack Russell Terrier faces off with a Rottweiler" is an excellent metaphor.

Regards

Mike

[Bill Moore]

This, from Bill's PACOM citation:
seems to me a likely sticking point, both with allies and potential antagonists. We need to remember that despite all the rhetoric about the obsolescence of the nation-state and the rise of the non-state actor, East Asia remains the domain of traditional nation-states with substantial amounts of nationalism in play. The East Asian nations do not consider themselves to be inferiors or natural subordinates. If we expect to "lead", as in we decide and others follow, we're not going to do very well. Obviously that doesn't mean we submit to the dictates of others, but there's a thin line to be walked, and if we wade into The Pivot with the assumption that we are The Leader there's likely to be some messy times.

There are many ways to provide leadership that are not offensive, and I think most nations in the region appreciate U.S. leadership both from a regional/global security model and economic model perspective since it benefits many and is a known system. That doesn't mean they want the U.S. to be a hegemon, so of course we need to lead in a way that is non-offensive and non-threatening to our friends. I'll buy there is a thin line to be walked, which overall we seem to do fairly well. We fully anticipate messy times, but taking the long view as long as we're generally on track and accept the messy times as a bump in the road we'll be fine.