Importing protein, Chinese style:
Only one tenth gets consumed directly, it is mostly animal feed coming from the Americas.
Malaysia is also a key part of the protein import due the palm oil production.
Pushing (mostly) rice and wheat production has been a long-standing Chinese policy.
A slightly more detailed view on the shipping routes in Asia, but as usual I did not verify it.
Last edited by Firn; 02-05-2014 at 07:17 PM.
... "We need officers capable of following systematically the path of logical argument to its conclusion, with disciplined intellect, strong in character and nerve to execute what the intellect dictates"
General Ludwig Beck (1880-1944);
Speech at the Kriegsakademie, 1935
@carl: Indeed, I have little doubt that if things go down terribly the wrong way the citiziens of China and partly those of other nearby nations will pay the highest price. In a really desperate situation nuclear strikes might at least get used as a threat.
I understand very little about naval matters but I can see the vital importance of maritime trade, among it increasingly imports of basic ressources for the Chinese population. I really hope that the cooler heads will prevail in the SCS.
... "We need officers capable of following systematically the path of logical argument to its conclusion, with disciplined intellect, strong in character and nerve to execute what the intellect dictates"
General Ludwig Beck (1880-1944);
Speech at the Kriegsakademie, 1935
Firn:
From your linked pdf in #630, WHO WILL FEED CHINA: AGRIBUSINESS OR ITS OWN FARMERS? - Decisions in Beijing echo around the world (August 2012), I found this comment interesting (at p.3):
because it points up a major problem for the Chinese (what to do with those 300-400 million ex-farmers who have moved or will move to the cities - e.g., send some of them to Africa to find African consorts !); and a major contradiction (as a good Maoist might say) between the "place" of those 300-400 ex-farmers and the "place" of China's 4th richest man and member of the CEA-CPPCC.China has 800 million farmers, of which 300-400 million are moving to cities. That will increase the demand for agricultural products and decrease the supply. This is positive for agricultural companies, like us.” says New Hope Group President Liu Yonghao, China’s fourth richest person and Vice-Chairman of the Committee for Economic Affairs of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.
The ex-farmer problem (exacerbated by other internal Chinese problems) illustrates the "Fear of Internal Revolt" part of Bob's statement in #639:
The ca. 1900 +- 50 yrs "semi-feudal, semi-colonial" state of China (Mao's analysis), was indeed humiliating to a proud people with a long history of dominance and expansion. The "semi-feudal" problem was Chinese-caused; the "semi-colonial" problem was "Western"-caused. The "semi-colonial" problem has been solved, except for China's long memory of it. Judging from the 300-400 million ex-farmers and the elite such as Mr Liu Yonghao, the "semi-feudal" problem still exists. Thus, the Chinese fear of internal revolt and how to avoid it are very real factors today.Certainly the old adage of "Fear, Honor, Interest" drives Chinese thinking. Fear of internal revolt, Honor of a hundred years of external humiliation, and interest in avoiding the first while correcting the second.
Regards
Mike
Last edited by jmm99; 02-05-2014 at 08:40 PM.
Maybe, but I wouldn't put it like that. The difference as I see it is that I figure the system is a unified whole that can't degrade gracefully. If it is compromised in a major way, as it would be if Red China were to annex the South China Sea, it would collapse. My interpretation of your view is that the system can persist outside the immediate area of contention, the South China Sea. It can be damage tolerant so to speak. That isn't a difference in ideological views, that is a difference in judgment of possible consequences.Originally Posted by jmm99
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
Carl:
My perception of your messages is that they often tend to be idealistic. Whether you, the messenger, is an idealist is a matter for you and those who know you well.
My wife long ago (in an opinion she still has) said to me: "You're all gray on the outside; and all black and white on the inside." I guess that says that I'm a realist on the outside (hence adaptable), but a flaming idealist on the inside. I think my messages tend to be realistic, until one hits the core; but that is my perception of my expressed perceptions.
"Judgment of possible consequences" starts off as being distinct from ideology, but it may be very much related to ideology or the lack thereof. For example, the person who is the same black and white on the outside, and on the inside, is scarcely likely to yield a micron on anything. The other person, who is the same gray on the outside and the inside lacks the capacity to decide anything - going through life saying, "well on one hand this; but on the other hand that; but ...," etc.
One's "Judgment of Possible Consequences" can be expressed in terms of "Integral Rigidity" (an engineering term IIRC), where it can be absolute, absent (the all gray person, who has no spine at all) or locational.
Absolute Integral Rigidity is illustrated by the Onion Person, who says "Don't let one onion layer be peeled, lest the core be lost" - perhaps in looking too hard at the outer layers, sight is lost of the crucial attack which cuts to the core:
Integral Rigidity - Onion.jpg
Our AQ-takfirist brethren are examples of absolute integral rigidity - which happens to be a weakness in their case when they attempt to take over an area which has different or less dogmatic beliefs.
Moving away from absolute integral rigidity is my wife's picture of me - "Let 'em eat the outer apple, but protect the core":
Core Integral Rigidity - HydrogenOrbitals.jpg
But, even one who is gray on the outside, black & white on the inside (as in the hydrogen atom above), has to recognize (absent delusion) that Integral Rigidity cannot apply to the core if there is no core - as in these helix conveyor pipes :
Outer Layer Integral Rigidity Helix-Conveyor-SD-.jpg
(which happen to be Chinese imports, advertised as stated).
Now, back to your statement of the "Judgments of Possible Consequences":
If forced to choose right now, my choice would have to be intuitive; and it would be that the maritime trade system is more like a hydrogen atom. Frankly, I don't have enough facts to "try" the issue of Chinese "annexation" of the SCS in my mind, much less to pontificate on the policy to be followed. Two of Firn's charts are spinning around in my head as I write.I figure the system is a unified whole that can't degrade gracefully. If it is compromised in a major way, as it would be if Red China were to annex the South China Sea, it would collapse. My interpretation of your view is that the system can persist outside the immediate area of contention, the South China Sea. It can be damage tolerant so to speak.
The bottom line: To endorse or refute what seems to be your logic, and my "hydrogen atom" hypothesis (some outer orbital damage is survivable), we need facts. I repeat myself:
1. Identify the MSRs, the states using them, the statistics on use, etc.; in short, the proportionate value to each state of its share. Subset, what alternate routes can be used once the blockade and/or other action begins.
2. Determine the capabilities of the US vs China in a one-on-one in the South China Sea (with optional scenarios for each side).
3. Do #2 with respect to the capabilities of the ASEANs and non-ASEANs vs China in a multiple-on-one in the South China Sea (with optional scenarios for each side).
In Mahanian terms, determine the proportionate "means and opportunities" for each interested party - and who shells out the treasure and gives up the blood.
Perhaps, you've done all of that - or are you making your decision on the basis of general principles ?
Regards
Mike
Mike:
Your three points are about action in the South China Sea and capabilities of prospective combatants and what might ensue given those capabilities. What you seem to be looking for is an intelligence assessment of the maritime battle field. My point has nothing at all to do with that. My point is the damage that will be done to the system of free navigation if Red China could successfully annex the South China Sea, an area of the world that is now open ocean. A nation would have successfully taken part of the open ocean for itself. The other nations of the world and navies of the world, led by the big dominant navy, the USN, would not have been able to stop that. That would set an example that could be followed. A psychological barrier as much as a physical one would have been crossed. Nations would think that if Red China could pull it off, others could pull it off too. Then there would be problems. It is sort of like the line that was crossed in the L.A. riots. Some ill inclined people realized that the cops can't be everywhere at once if they all go out at once. Same thing happened in London. Once that psychological barrier is breached, things can go south fast.
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
Carl:
And my point is whether Red China could successfully annex the South China Sea IF countered by one or IF countered by many.
And, yes, I do want intelligence assessments (pl.) of the maritime battle fields (pl.); and realistic and intelligent appreciations of the chances of winning.
Obviously, if China decided to "annex a chunk of sea" (in itself an interesting concept), it could do so if no one countered it.
A fair set of questions is what will happen if:
Next fair question: Does it matter which "chunk of sea is annexed" ?1. China annexes a chunk of sea and no one opposes - what effect on trade?
2. US opposes China; US loses - what effect on trade?
3. US opposes China; US wins - what effect on trade?
4. Many oppose China; Many lose - what effect on trade?
5. Many oppose China; Many win - what effect on trade?
I'd argue that it does, as illustrated by one of Firn's charts (World trade routes), which I marked up:
Global Shipping - Lines in Sea.jpg
My little blue lines drawn in the seas seem to do a pretty good job of covering the trade routes that are of primary importance to the US - trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic.
Nine global choke points are outside of US notional limits. Pts. 8, 7 & 6 (Channel-North Sea; the Med; and Suez-Arabian) are not reasonably controlled unless the controlling powers "own" the surrounding land; and 9 (the Cape) is an isolate.
So, 5 Asian choke points are material to China:
1. Japan-S Korea (which includes the major Asian routes to the US - in total, $900 billion of China's trade in 2010 including the US).
2. Taiwan (itself $150 billion in China's trade), but more importantly a bottleneck that would affect Japan-S. Korea if China blockaded the narrow Taiwan routes (e.g., in response to a full blockade of China as discussed in prior posts). US or Many defense of Taiwan would be hellish because it's too close to China (winning is no cinch). Thus, the question of whether alternate routes for Japan-S Korea are feasible.
3. The Chunk of SCS (not insular in any real sense, but an undefined linear zone drawn across the trade routes between Vietnam and the P.I.) interdicting Hongkong ($230 billion in China trade) and the Taiwan bottleneck.
4. Singapore, the Straits Spigot (with some naval power).
5. India, with lots of naval and nuclear power.
Here's a blowup of the SCS trade routes:
SCS MSRs.jpg
How much Japan-S. Korea and American trade runs through the SCS and how much can be diverted via other ASEAN routes ? I'd expect that, if there were a war in the SCS, Taiwan would become a part of the theatre of operations; as also Hongkong and the Chinese ports from there to include Shanghai. One way or another, alternative routes would probably be needed for Japan-S. Korea and American trade.
Regards
Mike
Last edited by jmm99; 02-06-2014 at 05:39 AM.
Mike:
Like I said, we are talking about two different things.
My opinion is that if they were able to pull it off, it would impact trade everywhere for the worse, especially over a period of years. Yours may be different.
That is a separate question from could they pull it off.
My point has more to do with why we should fight if it comes to that. I think yours is partially that but more along the lines of how we would fight.
And trade routes to and from the US are only one of the things of importance to US trade. The trade routes to and from our main trading partners and their suppliers are of as great an importance. If they ain't got the stuff to make it, they won't have it to sell to us. And they need trading partners other than the US in order to have money to conduct trade with us. Those routes are important too. It goes on and on. Whether we like it or not, I think freedom of navigation somewhere is not too useful unless there is freedom of navigation everywhere.
Last edited by carl; 02-06-2014 at 05:57 AM.
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
Carl:
I agree that we are talking about two different things, but I can't fathom what you are proposing in anything resembling concrete terms.
I look at this: "... we should fight if it comes to that ...", and try to understand it as a strategic plan:
1. "we" - based on your posts here: "we" = the US unilaterally, even if no other state supports us. That is correct, isn't it ?
2. "fight" - how hard ? - a shot over the bow of the first Chinese ship or more; how far would you be willing to go to protect world trade from devastating injury (as you allege; and I do not concede) "if they were able to pull it off" (see #3).
3. "if it comes to that" and "if they were able to pull it off" suggests to me a Chinese fleet and landing force sufficient to seize some rocks (that seems to be the game as previously played in the SCS). Am I roughly correct as to your meaning? In any case, when do we hit them and with what ? (back to #2).
To be frank, your message seems much like President Obama talking about red lines re: Syria and the gas attacks, without him having thought through what he could do if the red line were crossed.
For example, have you considered the fact that two nuclear powers would be squaring off - in an extremely asymmetric nuclear weapons balance, where one party (probably the stronger nuclear power) would be tempted to climb the "escalation ladder" - a Herman Kahn redux (in 29 pages):
Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (1960), pp. 144.Kahn noted first strike carries huge advantages in nuclear war:
In most postures that do not involve automatic mutual annihilation there will be an advantage in striking first.
More probable than an immediate nuclear "escalation ladder" would be inclusion of Taiwan in the theater of operations. That would open up all sorts of possible choices in "fights" - as to which, the wargaming is no slam dunk for the US; and where the effects on world trade could be quite disruptive. There are lots of studies on Taiwan.
FAS 2013 World Nuclear Forces.pdf is attached. For more detail on Chinese nukes, see Chinese nuclear forces, 2011.
Regards
Mike
Last edited by jmm99; 02-06-2014 at 07:59 AM.
Do you see no contradiction between this:
and this:
China is, of course, a maritime nation, and must by your own calculus have a global outlook. What you see as the US securing trade routes would appear to a Chinese perspective as a US capacity to cut off their economic lifeblood at any time, with them being unable to do anything about it. If you were in their shoes, would you be comfortable with a potential rival holding that power over you, even if they haven't chosen to use it yet?
Just out of curiosity, do you actually follow economic and political developments inside China at all?
They have to keep the economy moving; in fact they have to keep it growing, something that's not getting any easier. Internal stability is a serious concern and is likely to remain so.
The assumption that Chinese actions in the SCS are likely to degrade that system seems to me rather speculative.
Whether or not they have to "beat the USN" remains to be seen.
The questions is what would, in your mind, constitute "making it stick". If the Chinese, say, seized Second Thomas Shoal, would that be "making it stick"? If they took Second Thomas and Thitu Island? What if they took those and (Taiwanese-occupied) Taiping? What would you consider "making it stick", and at what point do you think the USN should or would get involved?
As is often the case, I'm not at all clear on what exactly you think the US should do.
Whatever they may be, they are not irrational, they have interests and vulnerabilities and will act according to them. It's very difficult to develop any sort of plan for managing the situation without some effort to assess the objectives and motivations on the other side. The maps cited above reinforce a point I made before: the vast majority of the maritime traffic in the area is moving in and out of Chinese ports. So what are you afraid they will do? Cut off their own trade?
What is the specific outcome we are trying to avoid?
Rising powers often step on people on their way up. The question is if, when, and to what extent the US should get involved in the process. Again, I'm not at all clear on what you want the US to do, and I think your fear of the "destruction of the system of free navigation" is... well, beyond speculative.
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
Concur in all with Dayuhan.
This is only a military problem because our Civilian leaders are not proactively dealing with the looming policy problem. The status quo formed with a powerful US and weak China is increasingly inappropriate and unsustainable. Thus the growing military challenge.
Is our plan to hold until China implodes or explodes? Seems a risky gambit that hardly serves our interests in the region.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Just some thoughts from the Chinese perspective:
1) The lifeblood of the Chinese economy, maritime trade, can indeed be veasily cut off by an US-led alliance with little risk (bar unlikely nuclear escalation) to the enemy naval assets. It can generally not be replaced by land-based trade.
2) In such an confrontation the own navy is not capable to do likewise, even remotely so, with the possible exception of Taiwan. In an isolated conflict against lesser powers like Vietnam the tables can be turned.
3) The big investment in 'sea-denial' weapons does mostly work in a possibly limited war against an opponent like Taiwan. Only sea-going assets like submarines are so far able to inflict a toll against more powerful naval forces playing the far-away blockade game or enemy maritime trade.*
4) A longterm and massive investment in a far more capable ocean-going navy is necessary to be able to protect the own trade agains the threat of a coalition of nearby minor naval powers. As a trade-off it might increase coalition-building on the other side and the risk of military confrontations.
5) A benevolent Chinese dictator might want to work hard for a far bigger stick and to speak a lot softer. However the current regime feels the need to speak harshly for internal politics and the want of status.
*That 'denial' strategy predates the great integration of the Chinese economy into the world economy.
... "We need officers capable of following systematically the path of logical argument to its conclusion, with disciplined intellect, strong in character and nerve to execute what the intellect dictates"
General Ludwig Beck (1880-1944);
Speech at the Kriegsakademie, 1935
@jmm99: The big shift from the the rural areas to the city has cause of course massive problems but has also been a mighty push for the Chinese economy as a whole. Basically cheap labor was streaming to the new factories with vast overall productivity increases for the China. The biggest problem for the newcomers has been the great difficulty to secure a secure new 'urban' legal status with all the benefits.
Interestingly in the past revolutions led by farmers were sometimes able to topple the leadership. In those days they were of course the vast majority of the population. In a couple of decades they might be almost as important as a guerilla pool as the current crop of hardy American farmers.
... "We need officers capable of following systematically the path of logical argument to its conclusion, with disciplined intellect, strong in character and nerve to execute what the intellect dictates"
General Ludwig Beck (1880-1944);
Speech at the Kriegsakademie, 1935
Ok, I got the concur part, but the rest of it seems more calculated to impress in a seminar than to communicate.
What did you say?
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
Carl et al:
This article's conclusions are not what I was seeking (nor do I expect Carl will like it any better), but it does explain what the “Century of Humiliation” was and its present impact, China Research Center » 2013: Vol. 12, No. 2 » The Clash of Historical Memory: The “Century of Humiliation” vs. the “Post-WWII Liberal World Order”. It concludes:
I'm shocked, just totally shocked, that anyone could consider China an adversary. Now, where are my winnings ?(a) American strategy, doctrine, and tactics should explicitly be planned with options that avoid humiliating the Chinese. Historical memory implies that any strike on Chinese territory is much more likely to lead to some type of escalation than to an end to conflict. U.S. military forces should develop doctrine and forces that give the president options that protect U.S. and allied interests without escalating to strikes on Chinese territory. If the U.S. military plans, trains, and exercises using Air-Sea battle strategy, we could be giving ourselves the stark choice between going to large-scale war with China or withdrawing from Asia.
(b) China needs to recognize that military forces that threaten U.S. Navy carriers can be interpreted by the U.S. not as a regional threat but as a challenge to freedom of the seas. Similarly, putting the U.S. in positions where its only choices are to U.S. military force or to ignore treaty commitments turns minor situations into threats to the U.S. global post-World War II strategy. This makes little strategic sense unless China has taken the huge decision to try to overturn the U.S.-led liberal world order. There is no evidence that such a strategic choice has been made at the high levels of the Chinese government. Furthermore, China has gained so much economically from the current world order that it could well be the biggest loser in such a change.
(c) Finally, there is little indication that either government is changing its behavior because it has made a deliberate grand strategic decision. If this is indeed the case, then each side should negotiate accordingly. If each side interprets each dispute as involving its core historical beliefs and strategy, compromise is impossible. It would be a great advancement if we could find a way to put a dollar (or RMB, or Yen) sign on the disputes.
...
If we are not careful, a situation will arise in which each side comes to view the other as an adversary.
Today's Googling did lead to three illustrative charts, material to the topics discussed here. First, a clean mapping of China's "Fishhook Claim" in the SCS:
Hammes SCS FMapDec12.jpg
Ref: Hammes, T.X., “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict,” National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Forum, No. 278. June 2012.
Next, China's Strike Capabilities (various delivery systems) against the ASEAN states - and elsewhere, not including its ICBM nuclear capabilities:
China Strike Capabilities Conventional.jpg
NB: the "Second Island Chain", which includes Guam.
And, finally, China's petroleum imports - NB: Singapore, traditionally something of a non-aligned nation viv-a-vis China and the US, is the major maritime choke point:
China Import Trade Routes.jpg
The last two charts are from DoD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013 (ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS - see also, prior for 2009-2012 at pubs).
I've saved the best for last: Xia Liping, Impacts of China’s Nuclear Doctrine on International Nuclear Disarmament (2012 Beijing Seminar)
So, is one of the leading figures in Chinese academia correct in his (implicit) premise that Americans have an absolute zero tolerance for sustaining casualties from a retaliatory nuclear attack ?Xia Liping is Dean and Professor of School of Political Science & International Relations at Tongji University and Vice President of Shanghai Institute for International Strategic Studies (SIISS).
...
Because the possibility of the U.S. being militarily involved an armed conflict between the two sides of Taiwan Strait exists--which could lead to further armed conflict, even Sino-U.S. nuclear conflict, China has to develop the capability to deter the U.S. from interfering militarily in an armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait. China is not a superpower and has a small number of nuclear weapons, so the model of MAD is not suitable for Sino-U.S. nuclear relations. China has some capability for nuclear retaliation. So long as China has the capability for one nuclear warhead to penetrate U.S. missile defense systems and hit American territory after a U.S. launched nuclear attacks against China, or so long as the U.S. cannot assure it could destroy all China’s strategic nuclear force after an American first strike against China, it will be very difficult for the U.S. to make the decision to launch nuclear attacks against China.
Or, as some used to say: "Better to be Red, than to be Dead. Disarm Our Nukes." Should we be listening more closely to the Chinese received wisdom, who last I heard from the USG are still our "pards" ?
Regards
Mike
Dayuhan:
Sorry, can't answer any of that string of "Dayuhan" questions. To do so would be to engaging in speculation which might incur "Dayuhan" disapprobation.
I will note one thing (I always do), Sweden has a global outlook and they haven't lately threatened to annex the Baltic Sea. Same thing for Britain and the North Sea. The Norwegians are great international sailors, and damned tough guys too, nor are they squaring off against the Danish over the North Sea. Let's see who else, India exports all over the world and they haven't proclaimed to the world that they aim to have the Indian Ocean, even though it is named after them. Japan and South Korea are both nations with a global outlook and they aren't squaring off over the Yellow Sea. So do I see no contradiction there? Nope. (no fair saying it is beyond speculative when I answer my own questions.)
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
Ok we start with 1. Yep. We as in we alone, if practicable. Now if we were to get to that point, all alone, the contest is probably already lost. That is because something or other or a string of something or others would have happened that would have knocked Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, India and Vietnam out of the potential fight. It would have to be a really big something to get the Viets out. Those guys ain't 'feared of nothin. If all that happened the USN would have been beat perhaps without a shot being fired. And since you can't fight at sea without bases and Guam is too little and far and Hawaii is to far to support an offensive. Poof! We lost and the system is ruined.
2. How hard? That would depend upon the circumstances. But ultimately you have to be prepared to sink ships and to lose ships, maybe a lot of ships if you mean to be taken seriously. The Red Chinese always have to be thinking that we are ready to do that. if a group of organized killers like that ever get the idea that you area bluffing, you lose. Then Poof! again.
3. Rocks don't matter. That would just be a precipitator (sic) for airplanes and ships. And 'pulling it off' means the USN backs down from a major provocation either because it won't fight or can't fight. The Poof! again.
Mr. Obama doesn't think things thru. i do, or try to. I know exactly what I am looking at and what the stakes are. The South China Sea stays international waters.
This is dealing with Red China, the CCP. Those boys have killed more innocent people than any other extant organization on the face of the planet. So big boy's rules apply. You can talk to those guys all you want but if they don't know that you'll kill them quick if you have to, then Poof! you lose. And losing to those boys ain't good.
I actually do realize that Red China has nukes. I also realize that if you absolutely refuse to accept the possibility that the nukes might fly and will not let it happen under any circumstances, you will lose in the end to a guy who just doesn't care that much about his population. The CCP has repeatedly shown it doesn't care too much about its population. This also is the problem the Israelis are staring in the face right now.
I also realize that if there was a sea fight, it would go wherever the ships could sail. It would probably be a one navy left standing kind of fight. Most fights between big navies in the past have left only one standing.
All this stuff is complicated and interconnected and all potentially very lethal. The CCP is playing a very dangerous game.
Last edited by carl; 02-07-2014 at 06:57 AM.
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
"Potential adversary" might be more useful. Assuming that a jump from potential to actual is necessary, ar pushing into that territory before we need to go there, is not necessarily a productive way to proceed.
The Strait of Malacca is not just Singapore, but also Malaysia and Indonesia. None of theem, of course, have much reason or desire to seek conflict with China or with the US. Equally important, of course, China's hydrocarbon imports and a very large amount of their merchandise exports have to pass through the Bay of Bangal and the Indian Ocean, an area where China is currently unable to project significant naval power. The US has the ability to completely choke Chinese trade. China has no such reciprocal ability; not even close.
"Absolute zero tolerance" might be an exaggeration, but this:
is certainly very true.it will be very difficult for the U.S. to make the decision to launch nuclear attacks against China.
I assume it would also be very difficult for China to make the decision to launch nuclear attacks against the US. That is as it should be: it's the entire point of MAD. Given that a full scale nuclear exchange is potentially an extinction event for the human race (nobody knows for sure, and ain't nobody itchin' to find out), that kind of decision should be and should remain very difficult.
There is a great deal that both parties can do to mess each other up without going to that extent, of course, though the US can certainly do a great deal more to China than China can to the US.
The full scale war scenarios are interesting, and of course have to be considered, but they remain a pretty unlikely eventuality. What is likely is a gradual escalation of pressure and brinksmanship, and I suspect that the policy conversation on the level where it matters should be (and hopefully is) focused on designing responses to the more probable evolutions.
I don't see how reluctance to use nukes translates to a preference to being red. One prefers to be neither dead nor red, and the choice between them is in no way inevitable.
Last edited by Dayuhan; 02-07-2014 at 07:24 AM.
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
What would you want to see the US do, in response to the situation as it currently stands?
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
It is at least a potential military problem, and the problem is not fully or even primarily responsive to US policy. We can certainly use the best policy we can come up with, but even that will not assure that there will be no escalation.
While the "full scale war" scenarios have to be considered, they are in no way inevitable and a more pressing question is how to prevent them from emerging. We have to recognize that while a full scale war could emerge, nobody in the picture wants one, and what we're more likely to see is a continuation of the so-called "salami strategy" or "cabbage strategy". How exactly we want to respond to that, and what is an appropriate US response to any particular level of pressure, is what needs to be determined.
I do not think that bluster or aggressive demands (for example, insisting that China drop the ADIZ or drop its "nine-dash line" claim) would be at all productive. They would refuse (they have to), and then we would do... what? I do think it makes sense to keep flying through and ignoring the ADIZ, keep sailing ships through the contested waters, maintain a high tempo of exercises and military to military exchanges with affected allies, keep developing relations with Vietnam, and all the other things that are already being done. In other words, to make sure the capacity to act is clear without committing to any specific response at any given point.
Over the last few years there has been an almost continuous USN presence in Subic. In particular there's been a continuing stream of sub visits, which used to be quite rare. I don't think that's at all coincidental.
How the US can or should respond to the likely eventualities (imposition of an ADIZ over the SCS, increased harassment of fishing boats by Chinese Coast Guard and Fisheries vessels, offering oil/gas exploration contracts in contested areas up to taking over Philippine-occupied rocks in the Spratys) is a more interesting question to me than how to respond to a very hypothetical large scale war. Not easy questions, though, with few good answers.
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
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