How soldiers deal with the job of killing

[Perpetual_Student]

Thank You JMA, I will be looking forward to the threads to the other videos.

I currently teach a class on Human Factors at the Infantry Officers Course in Quantico, VA. We base our classes mostly off of the works of Lt Col. Grossman as well as some articles that we have read. We constantly talk about the need for Officers to understand killing. They need to not only understand it but be capable of talking about it to their Marines. We also teach a follow on class called Human Factors II that deals with PTSD and combat stress. This class is based on personal experience and pulling some information from the Marine Corps reference publication.

I say all this to say that overall as a military community we do not discuss this enough. Like the podcasts talk about and it has been highlighted we often call it something different and fail to spend time understanding "killing."

I am very interested in learning more about this and developing a continuous dialogue about the topic. Thank You.

Has anyone every read the book mentioned in the podcast "An Intimate History of Killing"? Just wondering if it is a good read.

[JMA]

Thank You JMA, I will be looking forward to the threads to the other videos.

I currently teach a class on Human Factors at the Infantry Officers Course in Quantico, VA. We base our classes mostly off of the works of Lt Col. Grossman as well as some articles that we have read. We constantly talk about the need for Officers to understand killing. They need to not only understand it but be capable of talking about it to their Marines. We also teach a follow on class called Human Factors II that deals with PTSD and combat stress. This class is based on personal experience and pulling some information from the Marine Corps reference publication.

I say all this to say that overall as a military community we do not discuss this enough. Like the podcasts talk about and it has been highlighted we often call it something different and fail to spend time understanding "killing."

I am very interested in learning more about this and developing a continuous dialogue about the topic. Thank You.

Has anyone every read the book mentioned in the podcast "An Intimate History of Killing"? Just wondering if it is a good read.

While I am happy that close quarter killing is being studied for all the reasons Grossman states (I have his book on Kindle but have not studied it in detail yet) I await eagerly for such a study by someone who has actually killed themselves. He says that he and other writers on this subject Keegan, Holmes, Griffiths and I suspect neither Joanna Bourke (author of "An Intimate History of Killing" which you mentioned) have not killed in close combat. While I agree with training and preparation (with the rationale and emotional elements included) for killing at recruit and officer cadet levels followed by again a post "action" follow-up I tend to believe this issue is somewhat overblown.

By this I mean that I don't believe that for the majority the act of killing at close quarters (looking him in the eye and then shooting him) is as psychologically damaging as one is led to believe. If I had ten years I would wish to cooperate with combat experienced psychologists to attempt to establish how to test individuals as to who are likely to be affected by having personally killed to the extent that they at some point thereafter develop psychological "problems". This for selection and screening purposes. Those with a predisposition for developing "issues" should not be accepted in the military or at least not in the infantry (and maybe the armour - I don't know much about how their type of killing affects them when they get up close and personal).

There is a documentary that is fascinating and covers how and why (in their own words) why soldiers went beyond the accepted bounds in killing prisoners and wounded, mutilating bodies and regarding civilians as fair game when keeping the risk to themselves down. Hell in the Pacific is worth watching and probably can be turned into a teaching tool if presented with a prepared script to explain and expand upon the issues as they are raised. The full 4 part series is available on Youtube in about 10 minute segments. It is a mix of US and Brit experiences and includes some POW stuff. This documentary not to be confused with the Lee Marvin movie of the same name.

Having read only the reviews of "An Intimate History of Killing" I accept that there are those who enjoy killing (who when unchecked can get involved in some pretty bad stuff) but agree with critics that it is a small percentage but probably more than the 2% some suggest (I suggest around 5% from my experience). What do you suggest the % of those who feel nothing is? That is to kill without hesitation but with no enjoyment.

It is often the behaviour of the enemy that draws you in and tempts you to cross the line. For example the outrages carried out by the Japanese against POWs and civilians. Also take WW2 - Normandy where in the first days of the invasion 187 Canadians are said to have been executed by 12 SS. Little surprise then that certainly the Canadians (and other allies) responded with the "well if that's the way you want to play it" and they too entered the atrocity spiral - (D-Day by Antony Beevor). Beevor's book is a must read as are his Berlin and Stalingrad books.

In Beevor's book he deals with combat fatigue and makes mention of a neuro-psychiatrist, Major David Weintrob, who pioneered combat stress treatment there and also improved the manner in which "replacements" were introduced into front line units. You may have access to more records on Weintrob's work with Gen Gerhardt's 29th Infantry Division in Normandy.

Interestingly the comment is made that both Brit and US psychiatrists were struck by the few cases of psychoneurosis' among German POWs. This is an area which needs to be studied I suggest.

The officers role in preventing atrocities seems important and in both Hell in the Pacific and Beevor's book reference is made of officers stepping in to bring troops "under control" with pistols drawn. (Beevor reports an officer from The Canadian Regiment de la Chaudiere that after they had got to grips with 12 SS at Carpiquet that "no prisoners were taken this day on either side". Fascinating and horrifying stuff. How does one prepare young officers to exert the authority to bring matters back under control when they boil over (which they will and his sergeant is out there slitting throats and cutting ears off with the rest of them)?

Your subject seems to have more questions than answers. It seems that our job in this regard (30 years ago) was so much easier when we knew what was right and what was wrong (as taught by our mothers and not some military instruction) and did not have the type of politically imposed RoE soldiers have to live with today.

[Ken White]

Fascinating and horrifying stuff. How does one prepare young officers to exert the authority to bring matters back under control when they boil over (which they will and his sergeant is out there slitting throats and cutting ears off with the rest of them)?

Rank is generally a stabilizer but not always. There are also examples of Officers ordering, suggesting or implying such actions are acceptable. Or recall the notorious example of young LT Calley at My Lai in Viet Nam who participated in the shootings and whose Platoon Sergeant tried unsuccessfully to stop him and the men (personally, I'd have buttstroked the LT but that's just me... )...

...It seems that our job in this regard (30 years ago) was so much easier when we knew what was right and what was wrong (as taught by our mothers and not some military instruction) and did not have the type of politically imposed RoE soldiers have to live with today.

Quite true...

I agree BTW, with your 5% and think the percentage who can kill without hesitation and no enjoyment is really about 80 and of those at least 50%, probably most, will suffer little to no remorse or psychological damage. I suspect the total of those severely traumatized by actually killing is smaller than the number traumatized by seeing death and destruction but who have not killed or had to do so as I believe that action seems to perform a balancing act of sorts on the old psyche. I also believe both numbers combined will in truth average less than 10% of troops committed (METT-TC dependent, as always, obviously intensity of combat and / or length of time committed will have an effect... ).

I'd like, BTW, to know how much of that 'psychological damage' is induced by those who think there just must be some there and keep probing or pushing until some erupts...

(Those guesstimates are applicable to a generation now past, in or approaching their 60s but I suspect that the numbers are valid for the current generations as well.)

[JMA]

Rank is generally a stabilizer but not always. There are also examples of Officers ordering, suggesting or implying such actions are acceptable. Or recall the notorious example of young LT Calley at My Lai in Viet Nam who participated in the shootings and whose Platoon Sergeant tried unsuccessfully to stop him and the men (personally, I'd have buttstroked the LT but that's just me... )

I suggest just as officer training should cater for a worst case scenario so should (senior) NCO training cater for a situation when the officer loses it.

Buttstroke seems like the correct response under those circumstances to me. But that is when he has already crossed the line, you want to jerk his chain before he does though. I suggest the trick is to know when things are starting to come to the boil and defuse it then. I am reminded of the classic sergeant comment of "leave this to me Sir, I'll take it from here... while you report in by radio".

My experience tells me that a fatal combination is created when you end up with captures/wounded in a contact where you have taken casualties. A should have known better (for the officer and the sergeant) example was own forces took a casualty who was CASEVACED and a capture was put with the call-sign who had taken the casualty for the ride home as they had a spare seat now. Comes over the radio that the troopie did not make it. According to the corporal shortly thereafter the capture attempted to escape from the chopper flying at 80 knots at tree top level and disappeared into the trees.

Also the two recent courts-marshall of the Brits reported in the press relating to "assualt" of prisoners involved these prisoners being guarded by troopies from the contact (or being accessible to them) in which he was taken captive when recovered to base. The moral of that story is that even if you get a cook to guard him you need to put some distance between the capture and the troopies who bagged him. Officers and sergeants should be taught this stuff.

Here's a "what would you do" question for an officers or Snr NCOs course:

"Your platoon responds to support a call-sign reporting a contact. They report they have pulled back but can't account for one troopie. With the arrival of the choppers the enemy breaks contact and your platoon sweeps forward to locate the missing troopie. You find the body stripped of kit and mutilated (genitals removed) and with the amount of blood from the wound it was probably done when he was still alive. One of your troopies recognises the dead troopie as a friend from school days who he grew up with. At the same time your flank section/squad reports successful contact with enemy with a mix of enemy kills and captures."

What must you as platoon commander/platoon sergeant anticipate in terms of possible reprisal actions and how would you act to prevent the situation getting out of control?

Note: actual situation, mutilation post mortem (due to lack of bleeding), the company despite numerous contacts produced no captured enemy (on that day nor) for about the next month.

[JMA]

I agree BTW, with your 5% and think the percentage who can kill without hesitation and no enjoyment is really about 80 and of those at least 50%, probably most, will suffer little to no remorse or psychological damage. I suspect the total of those severely traumatized by actually killing is smaller than the number traumatized by seeing death and destruction but who have not killed or had to do so as I believe that action seems to perform a balancing act of sorts on the old psyche. I also believe both numbers combined will in truth average less than 10% of troops committed (METT-TC dependent, as always, obviously intensity of combat and / or length of time committed will have an effect... ).

Good, we agree on the 5% and I guess the give-a-way is their "eyes". You can see it in their eyes.

Again among this 5% there are there is a scale (from 1-10) from the nut case psychopath through to those who get a mild buzz from killing. The "mild buzz" troopies can be tolerated.

Yes, know of a doctor (Brit) who had to deal with a flood of very badly wounded soldiers and has never quite got over it. Then there was the pilot who arrived to carry out a BDA (bomb damage assessment) and just could not handle seeing the bits and pieces (bodyparts) lying around. The (18-19 year old) troopies seemed to take it in their stride.

A total of those who are traumatised by killing or witnessing the destruction and those who enjoy it being under 10%, I agree.

My war was a series of skirmishes rather than one or two really heavy set piece battles. "Throwing the dice" almost daily for months on end kind of wore one down but nowhere as traumatic as a Stalingrad or Okinawa. Maybe that's why the vast majority came through unscathed psychologically.

I'd like, BTW, to know how much of that 'psychological damage' is induced by those who think there just must be some there and keep probing or pushing until some erupts...

Yes, there seems to be an increasing assumption that if you have been in combat you must be screwed up to some extent. I'll agree with them only when they start to dish out healthy disability payments and pensions

(Those guesstimates are applicable to a generation now past, in or approaching their 60s but I suspect that the numbers are valid for the current generations as well.)

Agreed

[JMA]

Yesterday's part (2 of 3) Afghanistan: The Battle for Helmand by Mark Urban was aired on BBC2.
Can be found here in three segments:

1 of 3

2 of 3

3 of 3

enjoy

[JMA]

Here are the other two in the Our War series:

Our War : The Invisible Enemy

This clown (who filmed this) gives officers a bad name.

Our War: Caught in the Crossfire

Interesting comments on RoE

[JMA]

Finally got around to Section 1 of Grossman's book.

Grossman completes the first section as follows:

There can be no doubt that this resistance to killing one’s fellow man is there and that it exists as a result of a powerful combination of instinctive, rational, environmental, hereditary, cultural, and social factors.

Well yes, but does this resistance actually translate into refusing to kill under any circumstances?

There is surely a scale into which all people fall in this regard?

Say from a '10' where he will actively seek out opportunities to kill (the psychopath) to the '0' who will rather die himself than kill a human.

Its (IMHO) a bit like sex where the first attempt is hesitant/tentative/uncertain but it gets easier with experience.

So the statement in Grossman's book is meaningless other than to record that there will be a small percentage of soldiers who resist killing to the extent that they place their own life and those of their comrades at risk. I suggest that the majority of these will find a way to get themselves out of a combat role and thus avoid such a scenario developing.

There are of course a number of "inputs" which help to reduce this resistance to kill. For example the demonisation of the enemy through race/tribal/religious based propaganda and/or through the actions of the enemy (typically atrocities) to the extent where soldiers begin to believe that to kill them would be doing a service to humanity.

I will skip the non-firer aspect as this has been tainted by the SLA Marshall controversy.

[Chris jM]

Has anyone every read the book mentioned in the podcast "An Intimate History of Killing"? Just wondering if it is a good read.

I read Joanna Bourke's book (http://www.amazon.com/Intimate-Histo...9151474&sr=8-3) a while back, when I was a rather unimpressive and clueless cadet (in saying that, not much has changed...). I had read Grossman's On Killing immediately prior, and wanted more. My memory might be playing tricks on me, but I wouldn't bother reading it again. It had it some interest value but was very academic in argument and writing - it was very heavy on the old footnotes. If you can get yourself a copy easily a few hours scanning the book would do it justice. Some chapters might jump out, but a cover-to-cover read probably wouldn't be required.

One alternative I would suggest is J Glenn Gray's The Warrior - Reflections of Men in Battle (http://www.amazon.com/Warriors-Refle...9151855&sr=1-1). It's more an autobiography than a Grossman-like article (which is a good thing, IMHO) and thus is simply one man's perspective. It has some great sections you could use as discussion points or as quotes in lectures.

Ardent du Picq's work is supposed to be an interesting addition to the subject, too - I've had it on my kindle for a while now but haven't gotten round to reading it. I got my cope as a free e-book download (not linking here as I'm not sure about copyright rules - a google search will get it for you, though).

[JMA]

I read Joanna Bourke's book (http://www.amazon.com/Intimate-Histo...9151474&sr=8-3) a while back, when I was a rather unimpressive and clueless cadet (in saying that, not much has changed...). I had read Grossman's On Killing immediately prior, and wanted more. My memory might be playing tricks on me, but I wouldn't bother reading it again. It had it some interest value but was very academic in argument and writing - it was very heavy on the old footnotes. If you can get yourself a copy easily a few hours scanning the book would do it justice. Some chapters might jump out, but a cover-to-cover read probably wouldn't be required.

One alternative I would suggest is J Glenn Gray's The Warrior - Reflections of Men in Battle (http://www.amazon.com/Warriors-Refle...9151855&sr=1-1). It's more an autobiography than a Grossman-like article (which is a good thing, IMHO) and thus is simply one man's perspective. It has some great sections you could use as discussion points or as quotes in lectures.

Ardent du Picq's work is supposed to be an interesting addition to the subject, too - I've had it on my kindle for a while now but haven't gotten round to reading it. I got my cope as a free e-book download (not linking here as I'm not sure about copyright rules - a google search will get it for you, though).

It is noted that Chris jM sometime after this post found a peach of a Kiwi document. This from a post on the blog.

After SLAM released his controversial findings, one of NZ's Brigadiers from North Africa and Italy, Howard Kippenberger, conducted a review using the resources available to him as one of the head-sheds of the War History Branch. The resulting document, which I'll link to below, didn't substantiate SLAMs or subsequently Grossman's theory of combat reluctance.
Link: http://www.scribd.com/doc/26351328/Document-50
This was also discussed on SWC a while back: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...nberger&page=2

This is certainly the best document on this matter I have read and was produced (in 1949) before verbose authors and pseudo-intellectual wannabe academics (without combat experience) got hold of the subject and turned it into a circus. Good on the Kiwis!

I would quote two passages from this excellent document as follows:

The infantryman must therefore be taught from the start that his job is to kill, and must be encouraged to develop confidence in himself and his weapon to that end. His collective training must be made as realistic as possible, so that he will be prepared for the noises and mental strains of battle, and will go on with his job of killing when he meets enemy fire. Provided that such training is properly planned by officers who understand these human factors and take account of the national temperament, individual treatment should not be necessary. (In battle, individual treatment will frequently be required.) The infantryman, having been given every opportunity to anticipate and overcome his own mental reactions in battle must be taught to regard the enemy as his human, personal enemy, and to act aggressively to exterminate him.

‘We left good evidence of no hesitation to kill on the field at the Minq'ar Qaim breakthrough.’

and...

It is also fair to say that at the war's end the infantry soldier who played his full part emerged strengthened and enlivened by the experience of battle. Above all, he knew the true meaning and true value of comradeship. Fostered by unity of purpose, the team spirit of the New Zealand battalions was a force of great power, rarely encountered in other walks of life. The sense of comradeship and mutual reliance was new in degree to those who found themselves in the team, and in itself was enough to submerge much of the uncertainty and unpleasantness of war.

In addition the recent book by Karl Marlantes (Matterhorn) 'What it is like to go to war' at last provides a view on all these combat subjects - killing, violence, loyalty, heroism - from a man who has seen combat is a welcome counter balance to the gigabytes of speculative stuff produced by non-combatants and academics.

The down sides being the section on the almost uniquely American post (any) war 'guilt-tripping' and his slide into substance abuse and mental issues (the former probably leading to the latter rather than as a result of one tour in Vietnam).

[JMA]

In addition the recent book by Karl Marlantes (Matterhorn) 'What it is like to go to war' at last provides a view on all these combat subjects - killing, violence, loyalty, heroism - from a man who has seen combat is a welcome counter balance to the gigabytes of speculative stuff produced by non-combatants and academics.

Marlantes: 'What it is like to go to war', Chapter 2: Killing

His opening statement is:

Killing someone without splitting oneself from the feelings that the act engenders requires an effort of supreme consciousness that, quite frankly, is beyond most humans.

Not quite. He does not explain 'splitting' nor provides no definition of these 'feelings' nor the data to support the 'most'.

I have no personal feelings nor have I heard anyone I know express difficulty in dealing with having killed an enemy in a clean kill during a face to face engagement. (By clean kill I exclude the execution of a wounded enemy or prisoners - which I am prepared to accept could lead to pangs of conscience or worse.)

I have no scientifically collected data either but I suggest that as there are many thousands of soldiers and marines who have been exposed to close combat in both Iraq and Afghanistan from whom the definitive data can be collected. The first question they should be asked is whether they have read Grossman.

The Kiwi doc of 1949 states:

The average New Zealander on entering the Army has an aversion to killing a fellow man. This aversion will be partially overcome during the training period when he learns to fire automatically at enemy figure targets, and to use his longer range weapons with technical accuracy. This the aversion will survive into battle. Once he comes under fire, however, and especially when he has seen his comrades wounded or killed by enemy fire, it will be submerged by a desire to kill the enemy, if only to save himself. In hot blood, the average infantryman will kill without hesitation and without subsequent misgivings.

I have asked Chris jM if he can find the supporting data of this report to see how they arrived at this. I hope he can find it.

Back to Marlantes.

He has flashbacks and nightmares over a NVA soldier into whose eyes he looked before the NVA soldier was killed either by him or his radio operator - he is not sure. OK so he is having problems over the death of an enemy soldier he is not certain he killed. This is IMHO a little weird.

I wonder what sort of (if any) psychological testing formed part of the selection process Marlantes passed through en route to becoming a Marine officer. My gut feel tells me that the problem is personal and maybe ... just maybe ... he is projecting his 'issues' onto to 'most humans' because after-all he is a normal person right?

[Bill Moore]

You won't find the answer in a book, each individual and each situation can be a bit different. I have been disturbed, disinterested and excited depending on the mood and the context of the fight. I have seen others rejoice in it, and knew one soldier so disturbed by killing someone he eventually killed himself. I think the situation in a COIN/Stability situation is more complex than when you're involved in a battle, based on your interaction with the local community. When innocents you're trying protect are killed in a firefight with hostiles you're trying to kill, that can have a negative effect emotionally. Maybe that isn't what we're talking about here, but it is something that needs to be considered.

There is probably a sociological aspect to killing in combat that may point to norms, but ultimately it comes down to each individual's psychological make up, and how he judges each situation. I recall reading an article about a SF team Sergeant a few years back discussing the incident where he killed an insurgent in hand to hand combat and he was very concerned that his son would find out what he did. I can't speak for how he felt, but obviously he was a mature and moral individual who strived to teach and model values for his son, while in the same situation a 19 marine may rejoice and post pictures on the internet if he had them. It just depends on the person. I am happy to see some of the academic studies criticized, because they sure as heck didn't match up with my experiences.

[davidbfpo]

JMA posted a week ago this short paragraph:

In addition the recent book by Karl Marlantes (Matterhorn) 'What it is like to go to war' at last provides a view on all these combat subjects - killing, violence, loyalty, heroism - from a man who has seen combat is a welcome counter balance to the gigabytes of speculative stuff produced by non-combatants and academics.

Link to Amazon UK, with four reviews:http://www.amazon.co.uk/What-Like-Wa...7777808&sr=1-1

Link to Amazon.com, with 108 reviews:http://www.amazon.com/What-Like-Go-W...pr_product_top

Moderator's Note

If the discussion on the book accelerates I shall create a new thread.

[Ken White]

You won't find the answer in a book, each individual and each situation can be a bit different ... I am happy to see some of the academic studies criticized, because they sure as heck didn't match up with my experiences.

People differ. Armies should hire fewer sensitive souls and more minor sociopaths. It really isn't at all hard to spot those that will work out versus those that won't with 90% or better assurance.

As an aside on the subject of combat related books, there are of course exceptions but generally sensitive souls write and exorcise, sociopaths don't need to do so thus rarely bother.

Recall though that for small wars (or Armies...), while such selectivity can be employed, in larger ones the press for more people dictates mass hiring practices engendering an obvious loss of selectivity and thus the acquisition of more rather than fewer sensitive souls -- most of whom will go forth, do their job and be okay afterwards. Some will write books, a few good, some mediocre and some poor.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Ken,

Armies should hire fewer sensitive souls and more minor sociopaths.

I think the Army had that ratio about right when I entered. We probably had quite a few minor and not so minor sociopaths (I probably fell in that category myself at that time). These same individuals not only worked hard, they played hard and that was viewed as politically incorrect, so there was an asserted effort to reform the military and make it more politically correct.

The leaders pushed to have a greater percent of our soldiers married, and then they pushed Christian values on the force to the extreme, and after the Cold War the Army assumed the role of social engineer, and equally important when you add it all up we did everything possible minimize risk and started 15-6 investigations for every relatively minor incident.

Is it any wonder we're attracting more sensitive types?

The Army's core purpose is to win our country's land battles, or in more simple terms to be successful in combat. Everything else must secondary, and we risk an identity crisis if that isn't the case. Not every problem can be resolved with combat operations, but the Army's contribution is primarily combat, security operations, or helping others with that role.

If you recall the Army was considering giving an award for not shooting in OIF, fortunately that idea died. The intent was understandable, but good training and experience will enable soldiers to determine when to shoot and not shoot. Good training is the answer to 85% of our problems, it will also weed out those who aren't suitable.

[carl]

As an aside on the subject of combat related books, there are of course exceptions but generally sensitive souls write and exorcise, sociopaths don't need to do so thus rarely bother.

Darn you Ken. I was going through this thread and thought of something to say that something Paul Fussell wrote got me to thinking of. Then you went and said it first.

JMM99 mentioned something about fighter aces and the whys of their success somewhere in a post above. I read an article years ago that suggested it was far more useful to look at units rather than individuals when looking for the whys of success. That made a lot of sense to me at the time and I stopped thinking about the whys of acedom. I haven't researched lately but I seem to remember that aces weren't evenly distributed throughout fighter forces but were mostly in good units. The whys of successful units are very well known to guys like Ken, Bill, JMA etc. and they differ not at all between ground and air units. The general public loves aces though.

[JMA]

People differ. Armies should hire fewer sensitive souls and more minor sociopaths. It really isn't at all hard to spot those that will work out versus those that won't with 90% or better assurance.

As an aside on the subject of combat related books, there are of course exceptions but generally sensitive souls write and exorcise, sociopaths don't need to do so thus rarely bother.

Recall though that for small wars (or Armies...), while such selectivity can be employed, in larger ones the press for more people dictates mass hiring practices engendering an obvious loss of selectivity and thus the acquisition of more rather than fewer sensitive souls -- most of whom will go forth, do their job and be okay afterwards. Some will write books, a few good, some mediocre and some poor.

I believe I understand where you are coming from but would not use the word sociopath because of the potential for misunderstanding. ( See here )

Yes, when you add conscripts to the mix it gets massively more complicated unless there is an over-riding 'cause' which provides a strong unity of purpose.

See Kiwi doc again:

The New Zealand soldier will readily accept the sacrifice of war provided that he feels the national cause to be just. Belief in the cause may be largely inarticulate, perhaps achieved without a definite process of reasoning but it will underlie the actions of the average soldier and sustain his sense of purpose for the duration of the war. Belief in a common cause provides the initial cohesion among the individuals assembled to form a national army, and grows in time into the team spirit that I indispensable to really first class infantry formations and units.

This may well have been a factor in relation to Vietnam (for some during - "what are we doing here" - and after on return home being shunned by large sections of US citizens and collectively called 'baby killers'). Hard to cope if your support mechanism is not there (as it was for those returning to a heroes welcome from WW2).

In my war then we had little problem with conscripts especially in my unit (RLI) where they had taken a step up and volunteered for service in a unit which promised relentless action.

I would add that there was also a difference between the regular soldiers who had signed up before the war escalated and those who signed up because a nice little shooting war had developed. (Here I would discount those who had become ... shall we say 'fatigued' over time and needed a break.

To make things more complex insurgencies (where the war is generally conducted by small units) require higher levels of initiative and combat leadership skills at lower ranks levels than in more conventional settings were formations are the basic unit (other than special recce of course). By implication the individual skill of each soldier counts. In my war where we used 4-man 'sticks' across the board we could carry a 'passenger' as the 'fourth' man (a buckshee troopie) but in my unit it was rather a new troopie rather than a true 'passenger' who would be blooded in a short timeframe and move up to the position of gunner or stick medic and be replaced by another new troopie (and so on).

I would suggest that your problems in a platoon would be from those who joined the army as employment of last resort. What's that they say about 95% of the problems being caused by 5% of the troopies?

About 'sensitive souls'. In his wonderful book '18 Platoon' Sydney Jary about his time as a platoon commander in WW2 (as quoted here by Chris jM) states:

There is a mathematical formlua: aggression increases the further one goes behind the lines. Opposing infantry, with a few exceptions like the SS, are joined by a bond of mutual compassion which but few of the battlefield aristocracy can understand... Had I been asked at any time before August 1944 to list the personal characteristics which go to make a good infantry soldier, my reply would indeed have been wide of the mark.

Like most I would have suggested only masculine ones like aggression, physical stamina, a hunting instinct and a competitive nature. How wrong I would have been. I would now suggest the following. Firstly sufferance, without which one could not survive. Secondly, a quiet mind which enables a soldier to live in harmony with his fellows through all sorts of difficulties and sometimes under dreadful conditions. As in a closed monastic existence, there is no room for the assertive or acrimonious. Thirdly, but no less important, a sense of the ridiculous which helps a soldier surmount the unacceptable. Add to these a reasonable standard of fitness and a dedicated professional competence, and you have a soldier for all seasons. None of the NCOs or soldiers who made 18 Platoon what it was resembled the characters portrayed in most books and films about war. All were quiet, sensible and unassuming men and some, by any standard, were heroes.

If I now had to select a team for a dangerous mission and my choice was restricted to stars of the sportsfield or poets, I would unhesitatingly recruit from the latter.

These were conscripts and the experience was from D-Day to the end and I suppose they all wanted to survive the WW2.

Of course in a long war where the same soldiers are in it all the time most of your hard chargers would have a pretty restricted life expectancy. (Unlike these days where the Brits say "You pop over to Afghanistan for six months then its home for tea and medals".)

As Desiderata warns us:

"Avoid loud and aggressive persons, they are vexations to the spirit."

This, I have on good authority, is why they have only one sergeant major per infantry company

[kaur]

What goes on in the mind of a sniper?

25 January 2012

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-16544490