How soldiers deal with the job of killing

[JMA]

Thank You JMA, I will be looking forward to the threads to the other videos.

I currently teach a class on Human Factors at the Infantry Officers Course in Quantico, VA. We base our classes mostly off of the works of Lt Col. Grossman as well as some articles that we have read. We constantly talk about the need for Officers to understand killing. They need to not only understand it but be capable of talking about it to their Marines. We also teach a follow on class called Human Factors II that deals with PTSD and combat stress. This class is based on personal experience and pulling some information from the Marine Corps reference publication.

I say all this to say that overall as a military community we do not discuss this enough. Like the podcasts talk about and it has been highlighted we often call it something different and fail to spend time understanding "killing."

I am very interested in learning more about this and developing a continuous dialogue about the topic. Thank You.

Has anyone every read the book mentioned in the podcast "An Intimate History of Killing"? Just wondering if it is a good read.

While I am happy that close quarter killing is being studied for all the reasons Grossman states (I have his book on Kindle but have not studied it in detail yet) I await eagerly for such a study by someone who has actually killed themselves. He says that he and other writers on this subject Keegan, Holmes, Griffiths and I suspect neither Joanna Bourke (author of "An Intimate History of Killing" which you mentioned) have not killed in close combat. While I agree with training and preparation (with the rationale and emotional elements included) for killing at recruit and officer cadet levels followed by again a post "action" follow-up I tend to believe this issue is somewhat overblown.

By this I mean that I don't believe that for the majority the act of killing at close quarters (looking him in the eye and then shooting him) is as psychologically damaging as one is led to believe. If I had ten years I would wish to cooperate with combat experienced psychologists to attempt to establish how to test individuals as to who are likely to be affected by having personally killed to the extent that they at some point thereafter develop psychological "problems". This for selection and screening purposes. Those with a predisposition for developing "issues" should not be accepted in the military or at least not in the infantry (and maybe the armour - I don't know much about how their type of killing affects them when they get up close and personal).

There is a documentary that is fascinating and covers how and why (in their own words) why soldiers went beyond the accepted bounds in killing prisoners and wounded, mutilating bodies and regarding civilians as fair game when keeping the risk to themselves down. Hell in the Pacific is worth watching and probably can be turned into a teaching tool if presented with a prepared script to explain and expand upon the issues as they are raised. The full 4 part series is available on Youtube in about 10 minute segments. It is a mix of US and Brit experiences and includes some POW stuff. This documentary not to be confused with the Lee Marvin movie of the same name.

Having read only the reviews of "An Intimate History of Killing" I accept that there are those who enjoy killing (who when unchecked can get involved in some pretty bad stuff) but agree with critics that it is a small percentage but probably more than the 2% some suggest (I suggest around 5% from my experience). What do you suggest the % of those who feel nothing is? That is to kill without hesitation but with no enjoyment.

It is often the behaviour of the enemy that draws you in and tempts you to cross the line. For example the outrages carried out by the Japanese against POWs and civilians. Also take WW2 - Normandy where in the first days of the invasion 187 Canadians are said to have been executed by 12 SS. Little surprise then that certainly the Canadians (and other allies) responded with the "well if that's the way you want to play it" and they too entered the atrocity spiral - (D-Day by Antony Beevor). Beevor's book is a must read as are his Berlin and Stalingrad books.

In Beevor's book he deals with combat fatigue and makes mention of a neuro-psychiatrist, Major David Weintrob, who pioneered combat stress treatment there and also improved the manner in which "replacements" were introduced into front line units. You may have access to more records on Weintrob's work with Gen Gerhardt's 29th Infantry Division in Normandy.

Interestingly the comment is made that both Brit and US psychiatrists were struck by the few cases of psychoneurosis' among German POWs. This is an area which needs to be studied I suggest.

The officers role in preventing atrocities seems important and in both Hell in the Pacific and Beevor's book reference is made of officers stepping in to bring troops "under control" with pistols drawn. (Beevor reports an officer from The Canadian Regiment de la Chaudiere that after they had got to grips with 12 SS at Carpiquet that "no prisoners were taken this day on either side". Fascinating and horrifying stuff. How does one prepare young officers to exert the authority to bring matters back under control when they boil over (which they will and his sergeant is out there slitting throats and cutting ears off with the rest of them)?

Your subject seems to have more questions than answers. It seems that our job in this regard (30 years ago) was so much easier when we knew what was right and what was wrong (as taught by our mothers and not some military instruction) and did not have the type of politically imposed RoE soldiers have to live with today.

[Ken White]

Fascinating and horrifying stuff. How does one prepare young officers to exert the authority to bring matters back under control when they boil over (which they will and his sergeant is out there slitting throats and cutting ears off with the rest of them)?

Rank is generally a stabilizer but not always. There are also examples of Officers ordering, suggesting or implying such actions are acceptable. Or recall the notorious example of young LT Calley at My Lai in Viet Nam who participated in the shootings and whose Platoon Sergeant tried unsuccessfully to stop him and the men (personally, I'd have buttstroked the LT but that's just me... )...

...It seems that our job in this regard (30 years ago) was so much easier when we knew what was right and what was wrong (as taught by our mothers and not some military instruction) and did not have the type of politically imposed RoE soldiers have to live with today.

Quite true...

I agree BTW, with your 5% and think the percentage who can kill without hesitation and no enjoyment is really about 80 and of those at least 50%, probably most, will suffer little to no remorse or psychological damage. I suspect the total of those severely traumatized by actually killing is smaller than the number traumatized by seeing death and destruction but who have not killed or had to do so as I believe that action seems to perform a balancing act of sorts on the old psyche. I also believe both numbers combined will in truth average less than 10% of troops committed (METT-TC dependent, as always, obviously intensity of combat and / or length of time committed will have an effect... ).

I'd like, BTW, to know how much of that 'psychological damage' is induced by those who think there just must be some there and keep probing or pushing until some erupts...

(Those guesstimates are applicable to a generation now past, in or approaching their 60s but I suspect that the numbers are valid for the current generations as well.)

[JMA]

Rank is generally a stabilizer but not always. There are also examples of Officers ordering, suggesting or implying such actions are acceptable. Or recall the notorious example of young LT Calley at My Lai in Viet Nam who participated in the shootings and whose Platoon Sergeant tried unsuccessfully to stop him and the men (personally, I'd have buttstroked the LT but that's just me... )

I suggest just as officer training should cater for a worst case scenario so should (senior) NCO training cater for a situation when the officer loses it.

Buttstroke seems like the correct response under those circumstances to me. But that is when he has already crossed the line, you want to jerk his chain before he does though. I suggest the trick is to know when things are starting to come to the boil and defuse it then. I am reminded of the classic sergeant comment of "leave this to me Sir, I'll take it from here... while you report in by radio".

My experience tells me that a fatal combination is created when you end up with captures/wounded in a contact where you have taken casualties. A should have known better (for the officer and the sergeant) example was own forces took a casualty who was CASEVACED and a capture was put with the call-sign who had taken the casualty for the ride home as they had a spare seat now. Comes over the radio that the troopie did not make it. According to the corporal shortly thereafter the capture attempted to escape from the chopper flying at 80 knots at tree top level and disappeared into the trees.

Also the two recent courts-marshall of the Brits reported in the press relating to "assualt" of prisoners involved these prisoners being guarded by troopies from the contact (or being accessible to them) in which he was taken captive when recovered to base. The moral of that story is that even if you get a cook to guard him you need to put some distance between the capture and the troopies who bagged him. Officers and sergeants should be taught this stuff.

Here's a "what would you do" question for an officers or Snr NCOs course:

"Your platoon responds to support a call-sign reporting a contact. They report they have pulled back but can't account for one troopie. With the arrival of the choppers the enemy breaks contact and your platoon sweeps forward to locate the missing troopie. You find the body stripped of kit and mutilated (genitals removed) and with the amount of blood from the wound it was probably done when he was still alive. One of your troopies recognises the dead troopie as a friend from school days who he grew up with. At the same time your flank section/squad reports successful contact with enemy with a mix of enemy kills and captures."

What must you as platoon commander/platoon sergeant anticipate in terms of possible reprisal actions and how would you act to prevent the situation getting out of control?

Note: actual situation, mutilation post mortem (due to lack of bleeding), the company despite numerous contacts produced no captured enemy (on that day nor) for about the next month.

[JMA]

I agree BTW, with your 5% and think the percentage who can kill without hesitation and no enjoyment is really about 80 and of those at least 50%, probably most, will suffer little to no remorse or psychological damage. I suspect the total of those severely traumatized by actually killing is smaller than the number traumatized by seeing death and destruction but who have not killed or had to do so as I believe that action seems to perform a balancing act of sorts on the old psyche. I also believe both numbers combined will in truth average less than 10% of troops committed (METT-TC dependent, as always, obviously intensity of combat and / or length of time committed will have an effect... ).

Good, we agree on the 5% and I guess the give-a-way is their "eyes". You can see it in their eyes.

Again among this 5% there are there is a scale (from 1-10) from the nut case psychopath through to those who get a mild buzz from killing. The "mild buzz" troopies can be tolerated.

Yes, know of a doctor (Brit) who had to deal with a flood of very badly wounded soldiers and has never quite got over it. Then there was the pilot who arrived to carry out a BDA (bomb damage assessment) and just could not handle seeing the bits and pieces (bodyparts) lying around. The (18-19 year old) troopies seemed to take it in their stride.

A total of those who are traumatised by killing or witnessing the destruction and those who enjoy it being under 10%, I agree.

My war was a series of skirmishes rather than one or two really heavy set piece battles. "Throwing the dice" almost daily for months on end kind of wore one down but nowhere as traumatic as a Stalingrad or Okinawa. Maybe that's why the vast majority came through unscathed psychologically.

I'd like, BTW, to know how much of that 'psychological damage' is induced by those who think there just must be some there and keep probing or pushing until some erupts...

Yes, there seems to be an increasing assumption that if you have been in combat you must be screwed up to some extent. I'll agree with them only when they start to dish out healthy disability payments and pensions

(Those guesstimates are applicable to a generation now past, in or approaching their 60s but I suspect that the numbers are valid for the current generations as well.)

Agreed

[JMA]

Yesterday's part (2 of 3) Afghanistan: The Battle for Helmand by Mark Urban was aired on BBC2.
Can be found here in three segments:

1 of 3

2 of 3

3 of 3

enjoy

[JMA]

Here are the other two in the Our War series:

Our War : The Invisible Enemy

This clown (who filmed this) gives officers a bad name.

Our War: Caught in the Crossfire

Interesting comments on RoE

[JMA]

Finally got around to Section 1 of Grossman's book.

Grossman completes the first section as follows:

There can be no doubt that this resistance to killing one’s fellow man is there and that it exists as a result of a powerful combination of instinctive, rational, environmental, hereditary, cultural, and social factors.

Well yes, but does this resistance actually translate into refusing to kill under any circumstances?

There is surely a scale into which all people fall in this regard?

Say from a '10' where he will actively seek out opportunities to kill (the psychopath) to the '0' who will rather die himself than kill a human.

Its (IMHO) a bit like sex where the first attempt is hesitant/tentative/uncertain but it gets easier with experience.

So the statement in Grossman's book is meaningless other than to record that there will be a small percentage of soldiers who resist killing to the extent that they place their own life and those of their comrades at risk. I suggest that the majority of these will find a way to get themselves out of a combat role and thus avoid such a scenario developing.

There are of course a number of "inputs" which help to reduce this resistance to kill. For example the demonisation of the enemy through race/tribal/religious based propaganda and/or through the actions of the enemy (typically atrocities) to the extent where soldiers begin to believe that to kill them would be doing a service to humanity.

I will skip the non-firer aspect as this has been tainted by the SLA Marshall controversy.

[jmm99]

You might want to take a look at Lonnie Athens (Wiki - brief and incomplete outline of his theory of violence) - focused first on his research of violent criminals in American prisons. His general conclusion is that, to understand violence, experience is a more important factor than logic, ideology or genetics.

Athens' theory has been considered by Richard Rhodes - generally in Why They Kill: The Discoveries of a Maverick Criminologist (a brief review of Rhodes' book - but explaining Athens' four stages in a nutshell); and specifically with respect to the SS Einsatzgruppen (in one chapter of Masters of Death).

In both books, Rhodes concludes:

"He now firmly resolves to attack people physically with the serious intention of gravely harming or even killing them for the slightest or no provocation whatsoever. . . . He has suddenly been emboldened and made venomous at the same time. . . . The subject is ready to attack people physically with the serious intention of gravely harming or killing them with minimal or less than minimal provocation on their part." Says Rhodes, "that is, he is ready to become an ultraviolent criminal."

That is a valid comment re: genocides, serial killers, multiple killers and the "mind of the murderer" in general. As to genocides and Athens' theory, see Dimensions of Genocide: The Circumplex Model Meets Violentization Theory, by Mark A. Winton (2008, case study of Rwanda).

The bottom line is that Athens' theory generally holds up (although as Winton points out, it is non-exclusive and ties in with other approaches - including some of Grossman[*]) with respect to "bad guys".

However, if it is truly a "general theory", it should also hold up for "good guys" - with adjustments in terminology. Athens gets into that in Violent Encounters: Violent Engagements, Skirmishes, and Tiffs (Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 2005), in his Conclusion:

CONCLUSION

The interaction between perpetrators and victims when violent crimes are either attempted or completed can be best understood if it is seen as arising during social acts—activities that require the voluntary or involuntary participation of at least two parties for their completion. With the obvious exception of suicide, all violent crimes constitute social acts because there must be at least two parties for them to be committed—a perpetrator and a victim. Lawful violent acts constitute social acts just as much as unlawful violent acts do. In the cases of excused and justifiable homicides, as well as excused and justifiable batteries, there must also be at least two parties—a perpetrator and a victim. The same is also true in intergroup violent criminal and noncriminal violent action, except that in this case, the victims and perpetrators are collectivities rather than individuals. In collective social acts, it is groups rather than individuals who perform the separate roles, communicate through their spokespersons, assume each others’ attitudes, and try to work out a congruent social object or plan of action for carrying out the larger social act in which they are the acting agents (Blumer 1966, 540; 1969, 52, 55-56; 1981, 148).

As in the case of individual social acts, there are two kinds of collective social acts: cooperative and conflictive. Unlike in cooperative social acts, in conflictive ones, the acting agents, no matter whether they are individuals or groups, cannot form a congruent social object or plan of action because they cannot agree on who should perform the superordinate and subordinate roles in carrying out the social act. Unsurprisingly, violent encounters do not arise during individual or collective cooperative social acts but instead during conflictive ones. It may be speculated that the violent encounters that emerge during either individual or collective conflictive social acts fall into the same three basic subtypes that differ in terms of the number of the five stages of a violence encounter that are completed: (1) role claiming, (2) role rejection, (3) role sparring, (4) role enforcement, and (5) role determination. During a violence engagement, all five stages must be completed; during violent skirmishes, only the first four of these stages must be completed; and during violent tiffs, only the first three must be completed. Thus, despite the differences in legal status between lawful and unlawful violence and between individual and collective acting units, the grounded theory of violent criminal social acts that individuals perpetrate described here could be potentially applied to violent social acts that are both lawful and unlawful and that both groups and individuals perpetrate and, thereby, to all violent social action.

Before this extrapolation can be safely made, however, appropriate amendments would undoubtedly have to be made to the theory. Any general theory of violent social actswould have to take into account the added complexity that an increase in scale in the social act’s acting units would introduce into the proposed explanation (Blumer 1981, 148-149). Undoubtedly, the nature and size of the groups involved in a dominance encounter could significantly affect the actual social practices at work during the different stages.

As Blumer (1959, 129-30) pointedly observes, large and small groups must utilize different social mechanisms to perform their roles or “mobilize for action” in social acts:

“A. . . reflection of the collective factor in the case of large groups is the organization on which they must rely when mobilizing for action. A small group uses confined, simple and direct machinery. Corporate action in a large group requires the articulation of more units which are also likely to be more diverse, more removed from each other, and related through bridging links. . . . The mobilization of this extended, diversified, and indirectly connected organization requires forms of leadership, coordination, and control which again differ from those in small groups.”

Of course, a general theory of violent social action also could not ignore the state’s approval or disapproval of the use of violence. Obviously, this is a factor that could also significantly affect both individual and collective acting units’ performance of their roles in violent social acts. Thus, future research would be needed to determine the exact nature of the amendments that would need to be made in each of the stages through which violent engagements, skirmishes, and tiffs pass to accommodate all violent social acts rather than only the criminal ones that individuals commit.

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[*] I've read both of Grossman's books (On Combat and On Killing) - many parts of them more than once, since they obviously relate to actions that are in some cases "war crimes" and in other cases not. I believe Athens' theory is consistent with much of Gerossman's factual material - and also ties in with current training theories and practices for military and police.

Regards

Mike