How soldiers deal with the job of killing

[JMA]

Have you read Black Hearts? I'm pretty sure the reason why it's a favorite among young officers is because it is a remarkably sharp picture of how massive leadership failures at the battalion and company level, combined with lack of forces (reflecting a much broader leadership failure), led to an almost intolerable strain on the platoon in question. That strain led directly to the lack of supervision which allowed some soldiers to commit the atrocities they did. It's one of the best books about the dynamics of one platoon throughout the entirety of their tour to come out of the Iraq war. It's a good read for platoon and company leaders, and an even better one for NCOs.

It's clear from reading the book that most of the platoon are not "head jobs" - Green, the ringleader, who is a clear "head job" and regarded as such by most of the platoon, is not the focus of the book.

Read my comment again.

[tequila]

Read my comment again.

You appear to be characterizing the book as being about a bunch of nutjobs who raped and murdered an Iraqi girl. The book is not really about that at all, which is why it is one of the more popular books among junior officers (or at least those who read Company Command).

As a fellow Marine, I'm going to step up and defend Marlantes a little bit. Haven't read the second book, but have listened to a few interviews that he has given, so have heard some biographical information that you might not have. I'm not sure where you get the idea that Marlantes was a head case or an ineffective officer, but he did win the Navy Cross and numerous other medals in Vietnam. They don't give that first one out for just checking the box - his citation is here for those interested.

He also emerged from the rock 'n' roll Sixties with a Yale degree and became a Rhodes Scholar post-Vietnam, so maybe he didn't quite disintegrate to the extent you appear to be picturing? He did say that he never had any PTSD-type symptoms until after decades as a successful energy consultant in Asia.

[carl]

JMA:

When he used the term mercy killing, I didn't think of people, I thought of animals. You put down a horse or a dog when you have to. Maybe Marlantes meant people but what I got was animals and I think that viewpoint would be more helpful to some, not all.

You can't teach it and I don't think it may be all that relevant but if an occasional individual was troubled by something, a suggestion that he think of it that way may be of help.

Very young officers and NCOs was perhaps the best that could be done in Vietnam. As the war progressed the NCOs got younger and younger because IIRC all the older guys who started out weren't available anymore, many because they didn't want to face the prospect of deployment after deployment. Maybe the same thing with the officers. We had a lot of people over there for years. That added to the inequities of the draft system and there just wasn't that much to choose from.

Marlantes was young but he was a very effective combat officer. The choice wasn't really between a Marlantes and somebody better; at that time it was between a Marlantes and a Calley.

[JMA]

JMA:

When he used the term mercy killing, I didn't think of people, I thought of animals. You put down a horse or a dog when you have to. Maybe Marlantes meant people but what I got was animals and I think that viewpoint would be more helpful to some, not all.

Yes he spoke of two incidents. One where he saved an injured seagull from dogs then rung its neck and having to have his dog put down.

Let me repeat what I said earlier:

At the end of the chapter he sums it up like this:

We cannot expect normal eighteen year olds to kill someone and contain it in a healthy way. They must be helped to sort out what will be healthy grief about taking a life because it is part of the sorrow of war.

You see here we go in the direction of Grossman in the thinking that killing is somehow 'bad' and will inevitably lead to feelings of guilt and grief.

Not so. Combat killing in war is not murder, it is not a homicide, it is a justifiable killing. (I'm not talking atrocities here)

Very young officers and NCOs was perhaps the best that could be done in Vietnam. As the war progressed the NCOs got younger and younger because IIRC all the older guys who started out weren't available anymore, many because they didn't want to face the prospect of deployment after deployment. Maybe the same thing with the officers. We had a lot of people over there for years. That added to the inequities of the draft system and there just wasn't that much to choose from.

I seems to have turned into a Henry Ford type production line by the end.

Talking about the older NCOs I noted that where they had been in the service before the war (meaning they joined up in peacetime for peacetime) tended to fall out early (meaning leave the service or find less onerous posts from where to see out the war). The younger ones who joined up during the war (or for the war) seemed to last a lot better. Similar back then for the US maybe?

Marlantes was young but he was a very effective combat officer. The choice wasn't really between a Marlantes and somebody better; at that time it was between a Marlantes and a Calley.

Help me understand it. He did a year (?) tour of which how long was he a platoon commander? Raw soldiers and officers often do well but there is no substitute for experience.

I don't follow the link with Calley.

[carl]

You see here we go in the direction of Grossman in the thinking that killing is somehow 'bad' and will inevitably lead to feelings of guilt and grief.

Not so. Combat killing in war is not murder, it is not a homicide, it is a justifiable killing. (I'm not talking atrocities here)

I agree.

Talking about the older NCOs I noted that where they had been in the service before the war (meaning they joined up in peacetime for peacetime) tended to fall out early (meaning leave the service or find less onerous posts from where to see out the war). The younger ones who joined up during the war (or for the war) seemed to last a lot better. Similar back then for the US maybe?

Professor White is the man to ask. I only know what I read. Now if you want to know how to give soccer moms speeding tickets without them getting mad at you, I'm the guy to ask.

Help me understand it. He did a year (?) tour of which how long was he a platoon commander? Raw soldiers and officers often do well but there is no substitute for experience.

Again, refer to Prof. White. But from what I've read, that was a common pattern, at least with the Army. Six months with troops and then six months in some kind of staff position. Madness.

I don't follow the link with Calley.

I understood you to say that Marlantes had some weaknesses from your point of view. When I mentioned Calley, it was along the same lines as when Ken said demand exceeded supply. The choice we had wasn't between Marlantes and an officer who wouldn't have had the weaknesses you perceived. It was between him and a horror of an officer like Calley.

Mike: I read Aveni's critique of Grossman that was buried in the comments. Very good and I got to bed later than usual that night.

Thank you for providing the link to that MMRMA report. I will read it. That kind of thing still fascinates me.

[JMA]

I understood you to say that Marlantes had some weaknesses from your point of view. When I mentioned Calley, it was along the same lines as when Ken said demand exceeded supply. The choice we had wasn't between Marlantes and an officer who wouldn't have had the weaknesses you perceived. It was between him and a horror of an officer like Calley.

Marlantes' problems (thankfully for his troops) seemed to manifest themselves after his service in Vietnam. The fact that (by his own admission) he became barely functional for a period indicates that problem (rather than a weakness). So then by all accounts Marlantes' service in Vietnam was good.

So it all comes back to selection then. My point is that one needs to set minimum levels for intellectual capability (SAT, ACT) and physical ability and spend most of the time the leadership and performance under stress tests ... with the odd psych test thrown in.

The first prize is that nobody falls apart either during or after combat service.

Second prize is that the officer can hold himself and his men together during that combat service and face what the future brings thereafter.

An absolute no-no is for an officer himself to fall apart during a combat tour or prove to be unable to provide the necessary leadership to help his men keep it together when under the stress of combat. Officer selection should attempt to screen for this.

Where this selection and screening fails and the officer fails to perform in combat (and on operations in general) he should be relieved immediately.

[Fuchs]

An absolute no-no is for an officer himself to fall apart during a combat tour or prove to be unable to provide the necessary leadership to help his men keep it together when under the stress of combat. Officer selection should attempt to screen for this.

JMA, by your measure the Wehrmacht was a terrible military force.

Its officers were falling apart quite often, turned into walking dead, many became alcoholics (especially in rear or flying units).

They did send their officers into vacation, into especially healthy and relaxing Kurorte", sent them away from combat on staff or training assignments and so on or simply insisted that they recovered fully after injuries, requiring weeks of recovery from combat.

[ganulv]

We cannot expect normal eighteen year olds to kill someone and contain it in a healthy way. They must be helped to sort out what will be healthy grief about taking a life because it is part of the sorrow of war.

You see here we go in the direction of Grossman in the thinking that killing is somehow 'bad' and will inevitably lead to feelings of guilt and grief.

Not so. Combat killing in war is not murder, it is not a homicide, it is a justifiable killing. (I'm not talking atrocities here)

<Homicide> is a values-free descriptive term (homo- ‘human being’ + -cide ‘killing’) in most formal usages. I would assert that using the term in that way makes getting at the relevant factors much easier. Are (some) killers bothered because killing is inherently bad? Or because it has been drummed into their heads since birth that killing is inherently bad? What if someone is bothered because they were not bothered by ending a human life as they had been told their entire life that they would/should be?

It might be interesting to compare and contrast how soldiers deal with the job of killing with how medics deal with the job of preventing death.* For example, a reverse triage situation presents a particularly difficult combination of acts of omission and commission.

*As an aside, many career park rangers have come upon multiple mangled corpses and have unsuccessfully administered CPR multiple times over the courses of their careers. Killologists should really talk to them at length about these sorts of things.

[davidbfpo]

Following Ganulv's question above I have started a new thread 'How LE & others deal with the job of killing and death':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=15164

Two posts in response have been moved to the new thread.

[JMA]

Following Ganulv's question above I have started a new thread 'How LE & others deal with the job of killing and death':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=15164

Two posts in response have been moved to the new thread.

Good move.

I suggest that some of the current discussion around here may better belong in the 'Initial Officer Selection' thread.

[JMA]

What if someone is bothered because they were not bothered by ending a human life as they had been told their entire life that they would/should be?

Well there are (without doubt) quite a number of us out there who are not bothered. Yes, have thought about it... but on reflection am satisfied that the opinion of those who have never been in combat about how those of us who have should feel isn't worth a bucket of spit.

From John Keegan's book 'Face of Battle':

'Of course, killing people never bothered me,' I remember a grey haired infantry officer saying to me, by way of explaining how he had three times won the Military Cross in the Second World War. In black and white it looks a horrifying remark; but to the ear his tone implied, as it was meant to imply, not merely that the act of killing people might legitimately be expected to upset others but that it ought also to have upset him; that, through his failure to suffer immediate shock or lasting trauma, he was forced to recognised some deficiency in his own character or, if not that, then, regrettably, in human nature itself. Both were topics he was prepared to pursue, as we did then and many times afterwards.

If you work on even the most sane, well adjusted person long enough and hard enough then they may develop self doubts. What is in fact happening now is that prior to experiencing combat young soldiers are be 'conditioned' that they will develop significant psychological issues as a result not only of experiencing combat but from just thinking about being exposed to combat. So tell me who is the sick one in all this?

[ganulv]

Well there are (without doubt) quite a number of us out there who are not bothered. Yes, have thought about it... but on reflection am satisfied that the opinion of those who have never been in combat about how those of us who have should feel isn't worth a bucket of spit.

I know a fellow who had 90+ confirmed kills in Vietnam and told me he likely killed that many more. I won’t speak for him as to whether that fact ‘bothered’ him but he doesn’t hide the fact that it had everything to do with his later career as an RN. I also know a former state Supreme Court justice who helped send more than one 17–year–old boy to the gas chamber. I never associated with the old man outside of a work setting but my impression of him was that those decisions hadn‘t bothered him in the least over the years since he made them. I doubt either of them care very much at all of how I feel about them, but FWIW I’ve never spent a moment with the former that I didn’t thoroughly enjoy and I’ve never been slow to get out of the same room as the latter.

[JMA]

You appear to be characterizing the book as being about a bunch of nutjobs who raped and murdered an Iraqi girl. The book is not really about that at all, which is why it is one of the more popular books among junior officers (or at least those who read Company Command).

What I said was:

Yes but... I'll bet the book 'Black Hearts: One platoon's descent into madness in Iraq's triangle of death' will sell more copies than that book about normal, well adjusted soldiers (read boring) as opposed to a bunch of head-jobs.

No I have not read the book... but on the publicity in the media those involved in the rape and murders were indeed head-jobs. I mean does a sane person commit rape and murder? The death penalty should be obligatory in such cases.

Back to my point... my position is simply that books dealing with such horrific crimes will (sadly) attract more readers than one about the non headline grabbing exploits of an officer who led his troops carefully and courageously through some operational tour.

As a fellow Marine, I'm going to step up and defend Marlantes a little bit.

He needs no defence. He has chosen to go public with his thoughts on this (and other) matters. What he writes can this be debated without fear or favour.

My point relating to my joy at reading this book by Marlantes is that he has been there and done that (Navy Cross, Bronze Star and more). This makes what he writes more credible than Grossman, Beevor, Holmes, Bourke etc who appear not to have experienced combat.

That said it does not mean that what he says in incontestable or that his bravery awards should he held up to somehow excuse his self admitted 'issues'. Not so.

[jmm99]

Yes.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

Yes.

Regards

Mike

Don't agree

[Ken White]

JMA:

This asks big questions of the USMC of that era as to where were all the NCOs who are the backbone of the Corps?

Carl:

Very young officers and NCOs was perhaps the best that could be done in Vietnam. As the war progressed the NCOs got younger and younger because IIRC all the older guys who started out weren't available anymore, many because they didn't want to face the prospect of deployment after deployment. Maybe the same thing with the officers. We had a lot of people over there for years. That added to the inequities of the draft system and there just wasn't that much to choose from.

JMA:

Talking about the older NCOs I noted that where they had been in the service before the war (meaning they joined up in peacetime for peacetime) tended to fall out early (meaning leave the service or find less onerous posts from where to see out the war). The younger ones who joined up during the war (or for the war) seemed to last a lot better. Similar back then for the US maybe?

Those who served in WW II -- most of the senior NCOs in the Marines and the Army -- hit 20 years service and retirement eligibility in 1962. Some retired but most continued to serve, headed for 30 years. When the US committed to Viet Nam in large numbers, the relatively smaller pre-Viet Nam services had NCOs scattered around the world in jobs that ranged from non-essential to essential. The units that deployed to Viet Nam in 1965-66 took a slew of experienced senior NCOs and most did fairly well. Those NCOs finished their tours in 1966-67 and returned to CONUS. The 'second string' of NCOs culled from around the World went to VN in 1966-67 and they did less well but at least they were there. By 1968-69, it was time for the 'third string' -- except there was none. The stopgap was to send graduates of the Non-Commissioned Officers Candidate course as SGTs to VN plus some returning senior NCOs from the 1965-66 era and a second tour. Good kids, do anything you asked but they didn't know much...

In the meantime, the world wide commitments did not go away; they were culled and cut but there were still plenty of requirements. In 1969 I volunteered to go to VN for a third tour but they called me and said as I had two tours, I would instead go fill a shortfall at either SHAPE or in the MAAG in Iran, my choice -- but VN was out for me. What had also happened was the folks who had completed a second tour decided to depart as had some after a single tour. Most of the WW II folks had over 25 years by 1967 and decided that WWI, Korea and A VN tour were enough. Those of us who'd been in Korea but not WW II couldn't have retired if we wanted to but we were sent to fiull those other requirements so that folks who had been in those slots could get a tour in the SEA War Games.

It all boils down to numbers -- demand exceeded supply due to casualties and retirements and the Army and Marines were directed to not hold anyone over involuntarily to avoid upsetting Voters. Lyndon didn't want to do that. In 2004, Bush did it regardless...

[jmm99]

from you
The comments section in the Best Defense junior officer preferred reads list cited by JMA tore Grossman apart.

Buried in that comments section, is a link to Tom Aveni's critique of certain Grossman statements, The Dave Grossman Debate. Aveni is part of a larger LEO webpage, The Police Policy Council, which deals with the practical side (as well as the legal side) of LE use of deadly force - and of the various switches that flip or are flipped.

Aveni's work is well known in Michigan because of The MMRMA Deadly Force Project: A Critical Analysis of Police Shootings Under Ambiguous Circumstances (Thomas J. Aveni, MSFP; The Police Policy Studies Counci; February 9, 2008).

I discussed that report and its findings in the HVT thread, Back to the "Standard of Proof" .....

Regards

Mike