How soldiers deal with the job of killing

[Fuchs]

The system which I agreed with was based on three years as a platoon/troop commander and thereafter 18 months/two years per posting.

Let's assume a small platoon of 20 and 100% officer retention for 30 years. Plus: The entire army is made up of platoons and all-officers staffs, nothing else.

5% of the platoon force would be officers, and 100% of the rest.
With officers serving 1/10th of their career as Plt Ldr, this would mean that there are 9 times as many officers outside of the platoons than inside.
It would be a 2/3 platoon 1/3 staff force with a ratio of enlisted/NCO : officer of 19:10.


Reduce officer retention and the qty of needed Plts would rise, increase platoon size and the army size needed to train enough officers as preparation for worse times would rise. Add non-officers to staffs and staffs would be even more bloated.
Additional layers of command can for the sake of simple math be considered represented by the staff pool.


3 years Plt command for every officer is simply unacceptable. Feel free to calculate it with variables of your choice; you end up with the conclusion that there are simply not enough platoons.



It might be debatable to send a 2nd Lt to a Coy, then promote him to 1st Lt once accustomed with the Coy's mode of operation and assign him to a Plt command for a year. The feel free to extend this for the best 1st Lts - not as an arrested career, but as a distinction and preparation for higher commands.

3 years for all is too much.

[Ken White]

It is also possible to have NCO Platoon Leaders, thus capitalizing on experience and placing the most capable leader where he -- or she -- can be most effective. A Company commanded by a Major with a Captain Executive Officer / 2iC plus two Lieutenants as Company Officers with no permanent Platoon Assignments would be a far better approach.

The current process (and in the US, certain procedural efforts and requirements) produces too many Lieutenants. That is beneficial in producing a large pool of potential Company Commanders but it is costly way to achieve that minor advantage when better selection and initial entry training would negate that cost and the presumed advantage. When the 'requirement' to keep those excess Officers around for various reasons is considered, it is obvious that a 'requirement' for an excessive number of overly large Staff positions is a natural by product. A study to determine the number of excellent Officers driven out of the Armed Forces by this approach might be instructive.

The Lieutenants would be assigned all the myriad peacetime additional duties and for operations, to missions as needed. This would among other things accustom them to NOT working only with people they 'know' (no matter how cursorily or briefly) but with a changing number of persons, tasks and capabilities. It would build in a requirement for and training in flexibility and trust.

A beneficial side effect would almost certainly be insistence by all four of those officers and all their contemporaries that training be improved...

[JMA]

It is also possible to have NCO Platoon Leaders, thus capitalizing on experience and placing the most capable leader where he -- or she -- can be most effective.

It seems obvious that you commission them rather than mix say warrant officers with officers. One would need to look at their future utilisation after say a maximum of three years as a platoon commander. Training? Admin? Logistics? How many would make it to company commander?

I suggest if one worked the numbers carefully one would be able to calculate the minimum number of (direct entry) officers needed to fill the posts required above the rank of major... because IMHO they have had served their 'apprenticeship' as a platoon commander (preferably in a war).

A company commanded by a Major with a Captain Executive Officer / 2iC plus two Lieutenants as Company Officers with no permanent Platoon Assignments would be a far better approach.

This US business of having a captain command a company with less training/experience/whatever than a major seems strange when compared to the Brit (and probably others systems).

I don't think floating officers serve any real purpose nor does the time so served provide any real experience.

The platoon commanding phase must IMHO mean living with, fighting with and if necessary dying with the platoon. That is the required 'apprenticeship'.

The current process (and in the US, certain procedural efforts and requirements) produces too many Lieutenants.

Easy to fix. Make the selection more arduous.

That is beneficial in producing a large pool of potential Company Commanders but it is costly way to achieve that minor advantage when better selection and initial entry training would negate that cost and the presumed advantage.

Exactly!

When the 'requirement' to keep those excess Officers around for various reasons is considered, it is obvious that a 'requirement' for an excessive number of overly large Staff positions is a natural by product. A study to determine the number of excellent Officers driven out of the Armed Forces by this approach might be instructive.

Excellent officers would be driven out if their careers are being blacked by 'dead wood' blocking their route to command companies, battalions etc for a reasonable length of time (two years). There are also other reason why the retention of officers suffers and those are mainly not service related - wife pressure, chasing higher income etc - and the hidden one which none will admit being not wanting to be exposed to combat again (among those who had a bite of the cherry in Iraq or Afghanistan and found it sour to their taste).

The Lieutenants would be assigned all the myriad peacetime additional duties and for operations, to missions as needed. This would among other things accustom them to NOT working only with people they 'know' (no matter how cursorily or briefly) but with a changing number of persons, tasks and capabilities. It would build in a requirement for and training in flexibility and trust.

Ditch the surplus... don't accommodate them. *

A beneficial side effect would almost certainly be insistence by all four of those officers and all their contemporaries that training be improved...

Training for whom?

* In earlier posts I stated and still believe that young men who have given the best years of their life to the service should be able to exit it with dignity if the service no longer requires there service. This would entail funded study etc etc.

[Ken White]

It seems obvious that you commission them rather than mix say warrant officers with officers.

Why? they're thoroughly mixed currently...

One would need to look at their future utilisation after say a maximum of three years as a platoon commander. Training? Admin? Logistics? How many would make it to company commander?

Nominally about 50%. Far better than the current 80% +.

...because IMHO they have had served their 'apprenticeship' as a platoon commander (preferably in a war).

I'm not at all convinced that being a Platoon Commander is necessary or even all that beneficial. Does it work? Surely. Is it the current norm? Mostly (a very few slip through with little or no Platoon Leader time). The US norm is more nearly one year than three and I believe three would not be acceptable in the US for a number of reasons though I acknowledge it might work elsewhere.

This US business of having a captain command a company with less training/experience/whatever than a major seems strange when compared to the Brit (and probably others systems).

It worked well when we had people being promoted to Captain only after ten or more or more years service. Fairly well when that dropped to six or so years. It doesn't do as well with the Viet Nam and current abbreviated time of two to three years or thereabouts.

I don't think floating officers serve any real purpose nor does the time so served provide any real experience.

That depends entirely on how they are employed. I've seen it work well when units in combat were seriously short of LTs. That being short of them is also a concern in major high intensity conflict. Better to inculcate good practices then to have to do it ad-hoc.

The platoon commanding phase must IMHO mean living with, fighting with and if necessary dying with the platoon. That is the required 'apprenticeship'.

Sounds good but I disagree. It is one method, it worked for you -- has worked for many -- however, I'm unsure what Officer skill it imparts other than a slightly more all encompassing knowledge of how the Troops live and play. It's been my observation that only a few of them take that knowledge beyond Major, even fewer past LT Colonel and only a rare few past Colonel. That, in theory, is (in US usage and with which I disagree) why there are Sergeants Major, to remind those senior souls how the Enlisted Swine believe and feel...

Easy to fix. Make the selection more arduous.

Agree that is the fix; disagree that it is easy. Politicians can take umbrage at the slightest hint of 'unfairness' as they see it. In this politically correct era, worldwide, the slightest hint of the arduousity being 'discriminatory' would kill it.

Excellent officers would be driven out if their careers are being blacked by 'dead wood' blocking their route to command companies, battalions etc for a reasonable length of time (two years). There are also other reason why the retention of officers suffers and those are mainly not service related - wife pressure, chasing higher income etc - and the hidden one which none will admit being not wanting to be exposed to combat again (among those who had a bite of the cherry in Iraq or Afghanistan and found it sour to their taste).

All true, always a problem...

Ditch the surplus... don't accommodate them. *

You and I are in agreement. Unfortunately, the senior leadership of the US Army doesn't agree with us.

Training for whom?

Everyone. Our (US) 'training' succumbs to cost accountants, psychologists who are concerned with extraneous foolishness in some cases and political correctness. It will not be improved unless there is a grassroots swell of large amplitude or an existential war occurs.

* In earlier posts I stated and still believe that young men who have given the best years of their life to the service should be able to exit it with dignity if the service no longer requires there service. This would entail funded study etc etc.

Agree.

[JMA]

Ignoring the areas of agreement.

Why? they're thoroughly mixed currently...Nominally about 50%. Far better than the current 80% +.

Because that's the way it is now means that the right way?

Ever thought why some pilots are officers and other are warrant officers? It makes sense to you?

I'm not at all convinced that being a Platoon Commander is necessary or even all that beneficial.

Thanks like saying a sergeant doesn't need to have served as a troopie.

I'm totally flabbergasted at this comment of yours, to the extent, that being so far apart there is no point in proceeding with the discussion on this point.

It worked well when we had people being promoted to Captain only after ten or more or more years service. Fairly well when that dropped to six or so years. It doesn't do as well with the Viet Nam and current abbreviated time of two to three years or thereabouts.

It is how it is now that matters... and it is sub optimal now. It needs to be addressed.

But can it be addressed? Probably not as with West Point taking four years there is probably a demand by those graduates to make major after six years of commissioned service. The solution lies in questioning why West Point needs four years... because that four-year time at 'school' leads to a serious drop in experience and command competence at company commander level across the military as the demand for rapid advancement leads to competence and experience being sacrificed.

That depends entirely on how they are employed. I've seen it work well when units in combat were seriously short of LTs.

That is not the situation at the moment though is it?

That being short of them is also a concern in major high intensity conflict. Better to inculcate good practices then to have to do it ad-hoc.

I can see no point in pushing officers up the line so fast that they gain no practical experience along the way. Look at the career development of a civil engineer. Where does he start and how does he advance - the engineer/foreman/worker structure is similar to the military.

Sounds good but I disagree. It is one method, it worked for you -- has worked for many -- however, I'm unsure what Officer skill it imparts other than a slightly more all encompassing knowledge of how the Troops live and play. It's been my observation that only a few of them take that knowledge beyond Major, even fewer past LT Colonel and only a rare few past Colonel.

That's not my understanding. Perhaps here is an area for study. To see what value general staff place in their time and experienced gained at platoon commander level (with a comparison, say, between the Brits and the yanks).

That, in theory, is (in US usage and with which I disagree) why there are Sergeants Major, to remind those senior souls how the Enlisted Swine believe and feel...

Beyond battalion level that ceases to be that important as it is where the troops are that the finger needs to be kept on the pulse.

Agree that is the fix; disagree that it is easy. Politicians can take umbrage at the slightest hint of 'unfairness' as they see it. In this politically correct era, worldwide, the slightest hint of the arduousity being 'discriminatory' would kill it.

Ok so we accept the system is 'broken' but can't be fixed. Live with it maybe but know that it reduces the efficiency of the military.

All true, always a problem...You and I are in agreement. Unfortunately, the senior leadership of the US Army doesn't agree with us.Everyone. Our (US) 'training' succumbs to cost accountants, psychologists who are concerned with extraneous foolishness in some cases and political correctness. It will not be improved unless there is a grassroots swell of large amplitude or an existential war occurs.Agree.

Ok then never present to anyone (especially oneself) that any other way is acceptable and know that the effect of this is a disincentive for capable people to join in the first place or maybe why capable people don't stay in the service.

[Ken White]

Because that's the way it is now means that the right way?

Nope -- but your suggestion just continues what we are now doing.

It works, so will many other methods...

Ever thought why some pilots are officers and other are warrant officers? It makes sense to you?

Yep, it makes sense in that Aviation unit commanders should be officers, mostly but not all. I prefer NCO to the Warrant Officer usage so I'd say most Pilots should be NCOs and not Officers. Most everyone fell into Officers as pilots way back when due to the education variance. Those days are gone. As I've reminded you before, we used to ride to work on Elephants -- we quite and not just because the Parking Lot Attendants got upset...

Thanks like saying a sergeant doesn't need to have served as a troopie.

Not what I said and you know it -- I said it's not necessary for an Officer to serve as a Platoon Leader, not that he should not command troops on a mission basis and live with them for months at a time. We want to put them in the same environment and for some time, we just would do it slightly differently. Personally, I think all of 'em should serve as Troopies for a bit -- but that's another thread...

I'm totally flabbergasted at this comment of yours, to the extent, that being so far apart there is no point in proceeding with the discussion on this point.

Okay

It is how it is now that matters... and it is sub optimal now. It needs to be addressed...But can it be addressed? Probably not...as at company commander level across the military as the demand for rapid advancement leads to competence and experience being sacrificed...That is not the situation at the moment though is it?

Yes, yes, yes, No -- unfortunately.

I can see no point in pushing officers up the line so fast that they gain no practical experience along the way. Look at the career development of a civil engineer. Where does he start and how does he advance - the engineer/foreman/worker structure is similar to the military.

We agree on that, we just do not agree on how things should -- and could be -- done.

That's not my understanding. Perhaps here is an area for study. To see what value general staff place in their time and experienced gained at platoon commander level (with a comparison, say, between the Brits and the yanks).

I can understand your understanding - and I can agree with it from the standpoint of the Commonwealth Armies. From the standpoint of the US Army, time spent as a platoon leader is currently almost superficial, it is a way station and for many not a particularly enjoyable one (which is an absolute pity and an indictment of the way we do things here...). My comments re: the field Grades is based on the US model. I can't speak to SA or Rhodesia but I have worked with, seen and freely acknowledge the Strynes, Canadians and British do a better job -- that's mostly because they use their NCOs, particularly Sergeants Major (Co and higher...), correctly -- we too often do not.

Beyond battalion level that ceases to be that important as it is where the troops are that the finger needs to be kept on the pulse.

In many respects but not totally...

Ok so we accept the system is 'broken' but can't be fixed. Live with it maybe but know that it reduces the efficiency of the military...maybe why capable people don't stay in the service.

Sadly correct...

[JMA]

Yep, it makes sense in that Aviation unit commanders should be officers, mostly but not all. I prefer NCO to the Warrant Officer usage so I'd say most Pilots should be NCOs and not Officers. Most everyone fell into Officers as pilots way back when due to the education variance. Those days are gone. As I've reminded you before, we used to ride to work on Elephants -- we quite and not just because the Parking Lot Attendants got upset...

Most armies live with the archaic remnants of a class system as reflected in their rank structure. In many cases it has become so ingrained that it has become accepted by all. The Israelis have made an effort to produce a more egalitarian approach which works for them under their circumstances.

In the British military the significantly reduced numbers of the in-bred upper class no longer find the military and attractive option due to the presence of significant numbers of middle-class 'usurpers' and the requirement to actually spend more time soldiering than on 'hunting, shooting and fishing' (and the pay is not good).

Most armies need to use a flame thrower to clean out their systems and shake off these relics of a past social order.

Not what I said and you know it -- I said it's not necessary for an Officer to serve as a Platoon Leader, not that he should not command troops on a mission basis and live with them for months at a time. We want to put them in the same environment and for some time, we just would do it slightly differently. Personally, I think all of 'em should serve as Troopies for a bit -- but that's another thread...

This butterfly approach that the US military seem to apply to officer postings where they flit from one post to the next without spending enough time in any one to benefit significantly from the experience.

On a 'mission basis'? How would that work? What period are we talking about here? Why this sub-optimal solution when the obvious one stares you in the face?

I went the route of first serving in the ranks. First did my conscript training in SA, followed by full recruit training (20 weeks) followed by six months operational, followed by full 12 month officers course (then some years later was myself course officer on a 12 month officers course). I believe I understand the process differences in the training approach.

As stated before elsewhere on SWC time in an officers career is precious. Recruit training teaches one to be a rifleman in an infantry platoon. Recruits re not taught section and platoon level tactics and platoon weapons employment. Officer cadets are and their training in this aspect is totally from the perspective of commanding. That they will during the training take part in section and platoon attacks in probably close to all the possible positions from basic rifleman to platoon commander is essential in the training of young officers. It is for this main reason (as I stated before) that one can not reduce officer training courses by the length of a recruit course where candidates have been through that mill already.

My personal experience (of first doing a recruit course and then serving some operational time) was such that I would make it an essential route to a commission if I were so able. The minimum of a year is well spent in that. Is there a maximum? Probably three years where the entry age was 18.

I can understand your understanding - and I can agree with it from the standpoint of the Commonwealth Armies. From the standpoint of the US Army, time spent as a platoon leader is currently almost superficial, it is a way station and for many not a particularly enjoyable one (which is an absolute pity and an indictment of the way we do things here...). My comments re: the field Grades is based on the US model. I can't speak to SA or Rhodesia but I have worked with, seen and freely acknowledge the Strynes, Canadians and British do a better job -- that's mostly because they use their NCOs, particularly Sergeants Major (Co and higher...), correctly -- we too often do not.

First of all the South African military organisation was a complete shambles. Luckily it never had to deploy in any sizable numbers. Based on National Servicemen (all white males were conscripted for two years) with total reliance on reservists (the Citizen Force and Commandos) as commanded by bureaucratic Permanent Force (no troopies just what they called a 'leader group' most no better than your average civil servant) one can be grateful that the war in SWA/Namibia and in Angola required a relative few competent officers to prosecute. And yes there were the required number of skilled and competent officers and SNCOs to drive the war using reserve and conscript troops. Grateful too that the enemy was low grade local riff-raff with slightly better but very poor quality Cubans. Probably the best out of the South Africans were the artillery who with their G5/G6 guns were magnificent.

Rhodesia worked pretty much according to the British system but had much more flexibility to adapt to the developing war situation as it was unencumbered by suffocating tradition and bureaucratic restraint. There were still many problems some of which were adequately addressed (some not).

Now because the majority of young US officers have a superficial platoon commanding experience that does not mean that this experience (certainly in the war environments recently and currently available) is not without value. If nobody has it then you are in no position to miss it. To agree that it has value would imply that the US officer corps is somehow lacking which is not about to be acknowledged anytime soon.

[JMA]

Let's assume a small platoon of 20 and 100% officer retention for 30 years. Plus: The entire army is made up of platoons and all-officers staffs, nothing else.

5% of the platoon force would be officers, and 100% of the rest.
With officers serving 1/10th of their career as Plt Ldr, this would mean that there are 9 times as many officers outside of the platoons than inside.
It would be a 2/3 platoon 1/3 staff force with a ratio of enlisted/NCO : officer of 19:10.

Reduce officer retention and the qty of needed Plts would rise, increase platoon size and the army size needed to train enough officers as preparation for worse times would rise. Add non-officers to staffs and staffs would be even more bloated.
Additional layers of command can for the sake of simple math be considered represented by the staff pool.

3 years Plt command for every officer is simply unacceptable. Feel free to calculate it with variables of your choice; you end up with the conclusion that there are simply not enough platoons.

It might be debatable to send a 2nd Lt to a Coy, then promote him to 1st Lt once accustomed with the Coy's mode of operation and assign him to a Plt command for a year. The feel free to extend this for the best 1st Lts - not as an arrested career, but as a distinction and preparation for higher commands.

3 years for all is too much.

Sorry, don't follow your reasoning.

First I speak only of the infantry here (as high command usually falls to those from the infantry or armour with rare exceptions of course).

Getting to major is usually by time served. In my system it was normally nine years from commissioning to major (making it ten years with one year officer training included).

So we start with three years as a platoon commander, followed by two years (during which the Lt to Captain promotion exams must be completed). This could be as a support platoon commander, Bn Intelligence Officer, Regimental Signals Officer, or at some training establishment.

That brings you to acting-captain. Then follows four years to major in two two year stints. Probably one as a staff officer and one as a company 2IC (or possibly one in training) and during which the 'Company Commanders' course (or later termed the Combat Team Commanders course) would have to be completed. Then the best get command of a company in their parent regiment (don't think the US use this in the manner of the Brits?). The also rans may get posted to other regiments/battalions where there are vacancies and some may not get given command of an infantry company at all.

So some basic math.

12 rifle platoons = 12 subalterns. A rotation of four per year. By a simple projection 5 of the eight would likely return to command a company. The other three might have left the military, died, fired/court marshalled, failed their promotion exams, not deemed suitable to command a company or given command of a company where there is a vacancy.

So of the company commanders only one out of five would go on to command the battalion. Of the others some will have left the service, some fired, died, failed staff course, not deemed the best of the 'vintage' available to be given the command (and get streamed into staff forever).

And so on.

You follow my drift?