How soldiers deal with the job of killing

[jmm99]

that ties in more with the separate Grossman-Athens, etc., discussion:

from JMA
Well this would bring us onto another point and that is the apparent requirement a nation and its military has to have a military which is cerebral and socially well-behaved yet can be unleashed at a moments notice to inflict unspeakable violence on an enemy and immediately thereafter return to the default position as if nothing has happened.

From a conversation with Cavguy a couple of years ago (in response to my question, which was generated by a comment from Ken White on shifting violence levels[*]):

from Cavguy

Originally Posted by jmm99
Whether a soldier doing COIN for a year has less killer instinct than one doing CONV for a year is outside my experience. I'm being observational of possible issues and disconnects - not judgmental.

I would argue that there is no loss of "killer instinct" from performing COIN missions based off of my personal experiences and observations.

My unit in OIF 1 spent a year in an area of virtually no contact in SE Baghdad. On April 4, 2004, the Sadr uprising began, and overnight formerly peaceful Shia areas became free-fire zones. My Armor BN (and many others) were thrown into instant high intensity urban combat. For an overview of what happened in Sadr City that day, you can read Martha Radditz's account here. The company commander's account of the assault into Sadr City and my BN CDR's account of the following two months in Najaf are in the ARMOR COIN issue. (Sadr City: The Armor Pure Assault in Urban Terrain by Captain John C. Moore & Task Force Iron Dukes Campaign for Najaf by Lieutenant Colonel Pat White)

The men instantly "flipped switches". No retraining on the "killer instinct" was needed. It doesn't take much of a switch to shoot back at those shooting at you.

Same observation over 15 months in the second tour. I have never seen anyone need retraining on "killer instinct" in today's military. The reverse, however, is not true to the same level. Learning to switch it on and off is the challenge when you have to return to "soft".

Tactical proficiency between HIC and COIN missions is a different matter, but I haven't sensed a psychological one.

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[*] Ken's original comment related more to training for low intensity vs high intensity - so, any "disconnect" between what Niel said above and what Ken said, may be more apparent than real:

from Ken
The downshift to COIN will come with excess violence in the COIN role but it can be done quickly with good well trained leadership who know the basics so that excess violence need not last nearly as long as it did in the downshift in Iraq in some units -- the good ones adapted fairly rapidly. I'd also point out we are and have long been remiss in the basics, so the leadership gets an Attaboy for doing good job qith less than ideal material.

Upshifting, on the other hand requires developing the habit of violence which takes a bit -- it can be done, just takes longer. Thus, to me adapting (nominally at the leader and commander levels) is only part of the problem. Training and inculcating the killer instinct in all the troops is a necessary change and it is more than an adaptation, it is a philosophical and practical change of significant impact and importance. Required also almost always will be a tedious refresher in critical combat skill not require or used in COIN efforts.

and Ken's response to Cavguy's comment:

People who need people...

Originally Posted by Cavguy
...The reverse, however, is not true to the same level. Learning to switch it on and off is the challenge when you have to return to "soft".

My observation is that varies with people. The "Kill 'em all and let god sort 'em out" types will use any excuse to pop a cap...

There is a gear down pause and hiccup, no question but firm leadership can usually handle it. However, my observation has also been -- and folks who are out there now confirm it's still a big problem -- that the small arms fire discipline in the US Army (and the Marines) is, uh, less than stellar. That contributes to shifting problems both ways. It's because we don't train 'em well in IET.

Though that may be changing, the use of Outcome Based Training in Basic and at OSUT is producing better trained, more capable and disciplined shooters so we may get rid of a problem that's been around in US forces since WW II.

Leaving aside psychopaths, sociopaths and the "kill 'em all and let God sort 'em out" group, what is the nature of the "switch" that allows folks (normally of a non-virulent disposition) to engage in a high level of violence, but under both constraints and restraints so that their violence is defined within limits and can be switched off ?

These "normal" folks have to be able to operate (at the least) at as high a level of violence as the psychopaths, sociopaths and the "kill 'em all and let God sort 'em out" group - since they have to expect the latter will make up the OPFOR in at least some situations.

Regards

Mike