While I was and remain impressed with Dower's work, I also agree with John Shy's assessment that:Citation from: John Shy, "The Cultural Approach to the History of War," Proceedings of the Symposium on "The History of War as Part of General History", 12-13 March 1993, The Journal of Military History, 57:5 (special issue) (October 1993): 15. Shy recommends the book that was published after his presentation Craig Cameron, American Samurai: Myth and Imagination in the Conduct of Battle in the First Marine Division 1941-1951 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). I have not yet gotten around to reading this book--which I may or may not own.the actual links between thought and action are more often assumed in [Dower's] book than explored.
With respect, I think you're taking lightly the debate that has caused an extraordinary degree of intellectual, political, and personal conflict among professional academic historians over the past two decades. While some historians are comfortable with a formulation in which the relationship between the 'base' and the 'superstructure' is much more dynamic than initially thought, American social and cultural historians are still slugging it out--to the unending sorrow of those who don't have tenure, to say nothing of a tenure-track job, in the Ivory Tower.
IMO, the historiographical debate is much more nuanced than you present in this summary. Yes, the Nazis viewed the conflict with Bolshevism as existential. However, this mortal struggle contained a racial component that was unrecoverable. Moreover, a number of historians including Peter Fritzsche, Peter Longerich, Wolfram Wette, Alan E. Steinweis, and Stephen G. Fritz (who has sparred with Bartov over an unfavorable review) have provided compelling arguments that rank and file Germans (both civilians and soldiers) had a higher level of 'buy in' to this component of Nazi ideology than previously thought.
Here, you present an interesting linkage between the American soldier (broadly conceived) and his/her former life as a civilian. If your interpretation is correct, what does it say of the efficacy of the training and indoctrination of American servicemen? Are they provided the technical expertise to kill while relying more on their social and cultural upbringing rather than the ethos of professional soldiers? If such is the case, can the "warrior spirit" be learned (much less taught)? Or, as many of the QPs at PS.COM aver, are warriors born and not made--and thus individual differences trump social and cultural backgrounds?
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