How soldiers deal with the job of killing

[JMA]

You might want to take a look at Lonnie Athens (Wiki - brief and incomplete outline of his theory of violence) - focused first on his research of violent criminals in American prisons. His general conclusion is that, to understand violence, experience is a more important factor than logic, ideology or genetics.

Athens' theory has been considered by Richard Rhodes - generally in Why They Kill: The Discoveries of a Maverick Criminologist (a brief review of Rhodes' book - but explaining Athens' four stages in a nutshell); and specifically with respect to the SS Einsatzgruppen (in one chapter of Masters of Death).

In both books, Rhodes concludes:

That is a valid comment re: genocides, serial killers, multiple killers and the "mind of the murderer" in general. As to genocides and Athens' theory, see Dimensions of Genocide: The Circumplex Model Meets Violentization Theory, by Mark A. Winton (2008, case study of Rwanda).

The bottom line is that Athens' theory generally holds up (although as Winton points out, it is non-exclusive and ties in with other approaches - including some of Grossman[*]) with respect to "bad guys".

However, if it is truly a "general theory", it should also hold up for "good guys" - with adjustments in terminology. Athens gets into that in Violent Encounters: Violent Engagements, Skirmishes, and Tiffs (Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 2005), in his Conclusion:

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[*] I've read both of Grossman's books (On Combat and On Killing) - many parts of them more than once, since they obviously relate to actions that are in some cases "war crimes" and in other cases not. I believe Athens' theory is consistent with much of Gerossman's factual material - and also ties in with current training theories and practices for military and police.

Regards

Mike

Thanks for posting that as I had not looked at the matter from that direction before. That being from the direction of those entering the service having already killed or needing little provocation to unleash vicious violence (and here I speak of gang members and the like). In a war time situation these people may in fact be drawn to the military in the hope of finding themselves in a position to kill (this would include your average psychopath). These people tend to gravitate towards each other and when they achieve critical mass it is perhaps when the atrocities and massacres happen. (Grossman believes they tend to gravitate to Special Forces).

It would be helpful if these people could be identified in advance (during recruit training) and either got rid of or consciously keep separate. (I must speak to those I served with who were involved with recruit training in this regard).

My approach had been from the point of departure of a middle class boy who grew up in a very non-violent environment and assumed that the vast majority would need some conditioning and motivation to kill in combat. I am correct in that but ignored the dangerous minority who need very little if any provocation to kill. So thank you or adding another dimension to my thinking on this.

Back to Grossman and Section One of his book.

I remain in disagreement with his position that the majority of soldiers will either be non-firers in combat and/or refuse to kill the enemy and as such do not believe that this should be taught as the default position to officer cadets.

I said in post earlier post that killing becomes easier with repetition and notice the following in your Athen's source:

"Prisoner Jean-Baptiste described his first kill.
The crowd had grown. I seized the machete, I struck a first blow. When I
saw the blood bubble up, I jumped back a step. Someone blocked me from
behind and shoved me forward by both elbows. I closed my eyes in the
brouhaha and I delivered a second blow like the first. It was done, people
approved, they were satisfied and moved away. I drew back…Later on we
got used to killing without so much dodging around. (Hatzfeld, 2003, p.
23)"

and

" The killers described becoming crueler with time. They also described that
there were no negative consequences for killing and that there might be
negative consequences for failing to kill."

It is the second part that worries me. I noted the clinical lack of emotion in the killing process among the troopies (some 18-19 year olds) with the repetition. Scary... the more I think about it.

[jmm99]

from JMA
My approach had been from the point of departure of a middle class boy who grew up in a very non-violent environment and assumed that the vast majority would need some conditioning and motivation to kill in combat. I am correct in that but ignored the dangerous minority who need very little if any provocation to kill. So thank you for adding another dimension to my thinking on this.

I'd like the dimension (of Athens-Grossman) to be expanded so as to consider not only the psychopaths, sociopaths and the "kill 'em all and let God sort 'em out" group, but also the "normal kid" who becomes capable of the same or even higher level of violence than the folks who commit "war crimes" (tying into this post).

In connection with that, Grossman, in "On Combat", has some interesting factual material in Section Three, Chapter One (starting at p.125) "Killing Machines: The Impact of a Handful of True Warriors". He starts with "Commando" Kelly and includes Audie Murphy; but the statistics for Allied and German fighter pilots show much more quantitatively that a relatively small percentage of pilots racked up a very large number of kills.

I'd not be surprised at that result if we were talking about hunting. In any decent sample of hunters, one or more will stand out on a consistent basis for a larger percentage of kills than the others. As to combat, I've no experience to judge. I'd suspect that the "normal kid" (who becomes an "Audie Murphy") has learned somewhere along the line to reject a subordinate role and to achieve a superordinate role by taking on the "playground bully" - reaching at least Athens' third stage in violence development.

Athens gets into that (where the "victim" reacts with dominating violence), to some extent, in Violent Encounters: Violent Engagements, Skirmishes, and Tiffs (Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 2005) (pdf pp.19-40 spell out Athens' construct).

If so, that "normal kid" could become one of Grossman's "sheepdogs", who has to be able to take on wolves; and is a "killing machine", but for societally-acceptable reasons and within societally-acceptable limits.

Regards

Mike

[Steve Blair]

In connection with that, Grossman, in "On Combat", has some interesting factual material in Section Three, Chapter One (starting at p.125) "Killing Machines: The Impact of a Handful of True Warriors". He starts with "Commando" Kelly and includes Audie Murphy; but the statistics for Allied and German fighter pilots show much more quantitatively that a relatively small percentage of pilots racked up a very large number of kills.

Of course one must also understand that in many cases fighter pilot tactics were designed to effectively "feed" targets to those superior performers. In this I'm referring to the US practice of having wingmen mainly concerned with keeping lead's backside clear. German tactics were slightly different, but still scaled toward protecting the lead pilot.

[jmm99]

that's well outside of any expertise I have.

Grossman, in "On Killing" (p.182), offers this "tease bit" - the context is his discussion of the statistic (apparently from Gwynne Dyer) that 1% of Army Air Corps fighter pilots had 40% of the kills:

Several senior U.S. Air Force officers have told me that when the U.S. Air Force tried to preselect fighter pilots after World War II, the only common denominator they could find among their World War II aces was that they had been involved in a lot of fights as children.

That piece of hearsay upon hearsay is, of course, consistent with Athens' construct in Violent Encounters. I looked briefly for an AF source, but came up empty.

BTW: Accepting what you say as fact ("feeding" the enemy to selected pilots), two questions: (1) what % of kills came from "feeding" vs individual hunting; and (2) the selected shooters were selected by what criteria ?

More broadly, is the same phenom observed in infantry combat ?

Regards

Mike

[ganulv]

Would any light be thrown on the issues under discussion here by looking at HRT-type units and the individuals working within them? Correct me if I am wrong, but I assume that the mix of ability and willingness to unblinkingly kill in the context of a situation where the very purpose is to save the lives of most of the individuals involved must bring certain things to the fore in a pronounced if not necessarily unique fashion.

[JMA]

Would any light be thrown on the issues under discussion here by looking at HRT-type units and the individuals working within them? Correct me if I am wrong, but I assume that the mix of ability and willingness to unblinkingly kill in the context of a situation where the very purpose is to save the lives of most of the individuals involved must bring certain things to the fore in a pronounced if not necessarily unique fashion.

IMHO these guys have a more difficult juggling act (meaning switching on and off) than most soldiers have who go off to war for a period then come back home. These guys do it on an almost daily basis.

In addition their actions need to be more controlled and selective to avoid collateral damage. Adds to the level of stress I'm sure. I couldn't do that stuff. In my war you didn't want to get caught in front of an RLI or SAS assault line (sweep line as we called it) as if anything moved it got "smoked" (don't you just love that American expression).

Why I say this because is because when contact is made that tight spring gets to unwind (for soldiers) but for the police and SWAT etc they can virtually never just "let rip". Their coiled spring remain tight all the time (until they put their weapons back in the armoury).

So these guys have to go home in the evening after a "busy day at the office" and switch off and revert to husband and daddy mode most often without time to "chill out" (as they call it nowdays).

I wonder what the divorce rate in these units is?

[kaur]

Israeli snipers in the Al-Aqsa intifada:
killing, humanity and lived experience
NETA BAR & EYAL BEN-ARI

This article is an analysis of Israeli military snipers who served
during the Al-Aqsa intifada. It takes issue with the scholarly consensus that, for
such acts to take place, perpetrators have to somehow dehumanise their
enemies. Based on interviews with 30 individuals, it shows that snipers do not
always need to dehumanise their targets and that they experience killing in
conflicting ways, both as pleasurable and as disturbing. The snipers
simultaneously deploy distancing mechanisms aimed at dehumanising enemies
and constantly recognise their basic humanity. The article ends on a cautionary
note: violence should not be seen as only belonging to the realm of the
pathological. Rather we must be aware of rules of legitimate violence, the
culturally specific ideology of violence at work in specific cases. This kind of
ideology may ‘humanse’ enemies but still classify them as opponents against
which violence may be legitimately used.

http://lib.ruppin.ac.il/multimedia/PDF/25258.pdf