How soldiers deal with the job of killing

[JMA]

I read Joanna Bourke's book (http://www.amazon.com/Intimate-Histo...9151474&sr=8-3) a while back, when I was a rather unimpressive and clueless cadet (in saying that, not much has changed...). I had read Grossman's On Killing immediately prior, and wanted more. My memory might be playing tricks on me, but I wouldn't bother reading it again. It had it some interest value but was very academic in argument and writing - it was very heavy on the old footnotes. If you can get yourself a copy easily a few hours scanning the book would do it justice. Some chapters might jump out, but a cover-to-cover read probably wouldn't be required.

One alternative I would suggest is J Glenn Gray's The Warrior - Reflections of Men in Battle (http://www.amazon.com/Warriors-Refle...9151855&sr=1-1). It's more an autobiography than a Grossman-like article (which is a good thing, IMHO) and thus is simply one man's perspective. It has some great sections you could use as discussion points or as quotes in lectures.

Ardent du Picq's work is supposed to be an interesting addition to the subject, too - I've had it on my kindle for a while now but haven't gotten round to reading it. I got my cope as a free e-book download (not linking here as I'm not sure about copyright rules - a google search will get it for you, though).

It is noted that Chris jM sometime after this post found a peach of a Kiwi document. This from a post on the blog.

After SLAM released his controversial findings, one of NZ's Brigadiers from North Africa and Italy, Howard Kippenberger, conducted a review using the resources available to him as one of the head-sheds of the War History Branch. The resulting document, which I'll link to below, didn't substantiate SLAMs or subsequently Grossman's theory of combat reluctance.
Link: http://www.scribd.com/doc/26351328/Document-50
This was also discussed on SWC a while back: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...nberger&page=2

This is certainly the best document on this matter I have read and was produced (in 1949) before verbose authors and pseudo-intellectual wannabe academics (without combat experience) got hold of the subject and turned it into a circus. Good on the Kiwis!

I would quote two passages from this excellent document as follows:

The infantryman must therefore be taught from the start that his job is to kill, and must be encouraged to develop confidence in himself and his weapon to that end. His collective training must be made as realistic as possible, so that he will be prepared for the noises and mental strains of battle, and will go on with his job of killing when he meets enemy fire. Provided that such training is properly planned by officers who understand these human factors and take account of the national temperament, individual treatment should not be necessary. (In battle, individual treatment will frequently be required.) The infantryman, having been given every opportunity to anticipate and overcome his own mental reactions in battle must be taught to regard the enemy as his human, personal enemy, and to act aggressively to exterminate him.

‘We left good evidence of no hesitation to kill on the field at the Minq'ar Qaim breakthrough.’

and...

It is also fair to say that at the war's end the infantry soldier who played his full part emerged strengthened and enlivened by the experience of battle. Above all, he knew the true meaning and true value of comradeship. Fostered by unity of purpose, the team spirit of the New Zealand battalions was a force of great power, rarely encountered in other walks of life. The sense of comradeship and mutual reliance was new in degree to those who found themselves in the team, and in itself was enough to submerge much of the uncertainty and unpleasantness of war.

In addition the recent book by Karl Marlantes (Matterhorn) 'What it is like to go to war' at last provides a view on all these combat subjects - killing, violence, loyalty, heroism - from a man who has seen combat is a welcome counter balance to the gigabytes of speculative stuff produced by non-combatants and academics.

The down sides being the section on the almost uniquely American post (any) war 'guilt-tripping' and his slide into substance abuse and mental issues (the former probably leading to the latter rather than as a result of one tour in Vietnam).

[JMA]

In addition the recent book by Karl Marlantes (Matterhorn) 'What it is like to go to war' at last provides a view on all these combat subjects - killing, violence, loyalty, heroism - from a man who has seen combat is a welcome counter balance to the gigabytes of speculative stuff produced by non-combatants and academics.

Marlantes: 'What it is like to go to war', Chapter 2: Killing

His opening statement is:

Killing someone without splitting oneself from the feelings that the act engenders requires an effort of supreme consciousness that, quite frankly, is beyond most humans.

Not quite. He does not explain 'splitting' nor provides no definition of these 'feelings' nor the data to support the 'most'.

I have no personal feelings nor have I heard anyone I know express difficulty in dealing with having killed an enemy in a clean kill during a face to face engagement. (By clean kill I exclude the execution of a wounded enemy or prisoners - which I am prepared to accept could lead to pangs of conscience or worse.)

I have no scientifically collected data either but I suggest that as there are many thousands of soldiers and marines who have been exposed to close combat in both Iraq and Afghanistan from whom the definitive data can be collected. The first question they should be asked is whether they have read Grossman.

The Kiwi doc of 1949 states:

The average New Zealander on entering the Army has an aversion to killing a fellow man. This aversion will be partially overcome during the training period when he learns to fire automatically at enemy figure targets, and to use his longer range weapons with technical accuracy. This the aversion will survive into battle. Once he comes under fire, however, and especially when he has seen his comrades wounded or killed by enemy fire, it will be submerged by a desire to kill the enemy, if only to save himself. In hot blood, the average infantryman will kill without hesitation and without subsequent misgivings.

I have asked Chris jM if he can find the supporting data of this report to see how they arrived at this. I hope he can find it.

Back to Marlantes.

He has flashbacks and nightmares over a NVA soldier into whose eyes he looked before the NVA soldier was killed either by him or his radio operator - he is not sure. OK so he is having problems over the death of an enemy soldier he is not certain he killed. This is IMHO a little weird.

I wonder what sort of (if any) psychological testing formed part of the selection process Marlantes passed through en route to becoming a Marine officer. My gut feel tells me that the problem is personal and maybe ... just maybe ... he is projecting his 'issues' onto to 'most humans' because after-all he is a normal person right?

[Bill Moore]

You won't find the answer in a book, each individual and each situation can be a bit different. I have been disturbed, disinterested and excited depending on the mood and the context of the fight. I have seen others rejoice in it, and knew one soldier so disturbed by killing someone he eventually killed himself. I think the situation in a COIN/Stability situation is more complex than when you're involved in a battle, based on your interaction with the local community. When innocents you're trying protect are killed in a firefight with hostiles you're trying to kill, that can have a negative effect emotionally. Maybe that isn't what we're talking about here, but it is something that needs to be considered.

There is probably a sociological aspect to killing in combat that may point to norms, but ultimately it comes down to each individual's psychological make up, and how he judges each situation. I recall reading an article about a SF team Sergeant a few years back discussing the incident where he killed an insurgent in hand to hand combat and he was very concerned that his son would find out what he did. I can't speak for how he felt, but obviously he was a mature and moral individual who strived to teach and model values for his son, while in the same situation a 19 marine may rejoice and post pictures on the internet if he had them. It just depends on the person. I am happy to see some of the academic studies criticized, because they sure as heck didn't match up with my experiences.

[jmm99]

that ties in more with the separate Grossman-Athens, etc., discussion:

from JMA
Well this would bring us onto another point and that is the apparent requirement a nation and its military has to have a military which is cerebral and socially well-behaved yet can be unleashed at a moments notice to inflict unspeakable violence on an enemy and immediately thereafter return to the default position as if nothing has happened.

From a conversation with Cavguy a couple of years ago (in response to my question, which was generated by a comment from Ken White on shifting violence levels[*]):

from Cavguy

Originally Posted by jmm99
Whether a soldier doing COIN for a year has less killer instinct than one doing CONV for a year is outside my experience. I'm being observational of possible issues and disconnects - not judgmental.

I would argue that there is no loss of "killer instinct" from performing COIN missions based off of my personal experiences and observations.

My unit in OIF 1 spent a year in an area of virtually no contact in SE Baghdad. On April 4, 2004, the Sadr uprising began, and overnight formerly peaceful Shia areas became free-fire zones. My Armor BN (and many others) were thrown into instant high intensity urban combat. For an overview of what happened in Sadr City that day, you can read Martha Radditz's account here. The company commander's account of the assault into Sadr City and my BN CDR's account of the following two months in Najaf are in the ARMOR COIN issue. (Sadr City: The Armor Pure Assault in Urban Terrain by Captain John C. Moore & Task Force Iron Dukes Campaign for Najaf by Lieutenant Colonel Pat White)

The men instantly "flipped switches". No retraining on the "killer instinct" was needed. It doesn't take much of a switch to shoot back at those shooting at you.

Same observation over 15 months in the second tour. I have never seen anyone need retraining on "killer instinct" in today's military. The reverse, however, is not true to the same level. Learning to switch it on and off is the challenge when you have to return to "soft".

Tactical proficiency between HIC and COIN missions is a different matter, but I haven't sensed a psychological one.

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[*] Ken's original comment related more to training for low intensity vs high intensity - so, any "disconnect" between what Niel said above and what Ken said, may be more apparent than real:

from Ken
The downshift to COIN will come with excess violence in the COIN role but it can be done quickly with good well trained leadership who know the basics so that excess violence need not last nearly as long as it did in the downshift in Iraq in some units -- the good ones adapted fairly rapidly. I'd also point out we are and have long been remiss in the basics, so the leadership gets an Attaboy for doing good job qith less than ideal material.

Upshifting, on the other hand requires developing the habit of violence which takes a bit -- it can be done, just takes longer. Thus, to me adapting (nominally at the leader and commander levels) is only part of the problem. Training and inculcating the killer instinct in all the troops is a necessary change and it is more than an adaptation, it is a philosophical and practical change of significant impact and importance. Required also almost always will be a tedious refresher in critical combat skill not require or used in COIN efforts.

and Ken's response to Cavguy's comment:

People who need people...

Originally Posted by Cavguy
...The reverse, however, is not true to the same level. Learning to switch it on and off is the challenge when you have to return to "soft".

My observation is that varies with people. The "Kill 'em all and let god sort 'em out" types will use any excuse to pop a cap...

There is a gear down pause and hiccup, no question but firm leadership can usually handle it. However, my observation has also been -- and folks who are out there now confirm it's still a big problem -- that the small arms fire discipline in the US Army (and the Marines) is, uh, less than stellar. That contributes to shifting problems both ways. It's because we don't train 'em well in IET.

Though that may be changing, the use of Outcome Based Training in Basic and at OSUT is producing better trained, more capable and disciplined shooters so we may get rid of a problem that's been around in US forces since WW II.

Leaving aside psychopaths, sociopaths and the "kill 'em all and let God sort 'em out" group, what is the nature of the "switch" that allows folks (normally of a non-virulent disposition) to engage in a high level of violence, but under both constraints and restraints so that their violence is defined within limits and can be switched off ?

These "normal" folks have to be able to operate (at the least) at as high a level of violence as the psychopaths, sociopaths and the "kill 'em all and let God sort 'em out" group - since they have to expect the latter will make up the OPFOR in at least some situations.

Regards

Mike

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Killing for their Country: A New Look at “Killology”

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