The Way Of War

[Fuchs]

Primarily warfare at the operational level, specifically the time/space/assets it takes to break the will of the opposing forces to fight eg: cabinet warfare->napoleonic warfare->nuclear warfare->sub-state warfare etc.

I'm still not sure I know what you mean, and my time is short now.

I advise you to read

"Blitzkrieg: The Myth of Blitz"
by (then) Captain Thomas T. Smith
Infantry (Journal) July/August 1990

It should be accessible online. In worst case PM me, I obviously have a copy.

[Taiko]

In short, World War 2 lasted from September 18 1931 to September 2 1945. At the peak of the Cold War it would have taken less than a day to destroy the entire planet. This is what I mean by the compression of time and space in warfare and its impact on the level and intensity of violence during and between war.

One of the main selling points of network centric warfare was the ability to compress time and space via the use of technology, it was also described as a 'force multiplyer'. The same with over the horizon technology, it provided a means to compress time and space. It gave the user the ability to process threat information at a speed that was not available before the technology was developed.

It is the same with the development of cyberwarfare and drone technology, for example. I'm trying to gauge how this can further compress time and space, the tempo of warfare if you will, and what impact this will have, if any, on the level and intensity of violence in future wars. A cyber attack on a countries main infrastructure is all but instantaneous eg: Russia and Georgia War is a clear example of the use of cyberwarfare to compress time and space.

Thanks for the blitzkrieg article, what I am trying to get my head around is a little different to the decisive battle theory, from what I can work out the concept is closer to deterrence. I'll keep researching. I can understand what it is that I am looking at, it's just a matter of finding the right definition/terminology/conceptual framework to better explain it to others. This is made even more difficult when trying to analyse war/warfare 20-40 years in the future, as there are no readily available conceptual frameworks to explain what is to come eg: singularity.

[Taiko]

The future signal to noise ratio: compression of time and space/drones/cyberwarfare/sub-orbital space warfare/human biomechanical evolution/human biological evolution/targeted assassination/deterrence/taking a state whole/singularity/total war/GOES solar x-ray flux weaponisation/spectrum

The frustrating thing is that I can see it and understand it, but not in a way that can be readily or easily translated into current conceptual frameworks. I neither have the time nor finances to try and separate the signal from the noise anymore.

[Fuchs]

In short, World War 2 lasted from September 18 1931 to September 2 1945. At the peak of the Cold War it would have taken less than a day to destroy the entire planet. This is what I mean by the compression of time and space in warfare and its impact on the level and intensity of violence during and between war.

WW3 is theory, not warfare. Even if practice, it would not have been warfare, but top-down suicide.

One of the main selling points of network centric warfare was the ability to compress time and space via the use of technology,

alleged ability at most.
Seriously, nobody can compress time or space. What you're talking about is being quicker. The article I supposed and the clumsy Western staffs should make quite clear that quickness is hardly a chief advance.

it was also described as a 'force multiplyer'.

Yeah, almost everything was already. Even canteen designs.

The same with over the horizon technology, it provided a means to compress time and space.

Nope. There would be lots of physics Nobel prizes awarded for it if that ability was ever available.

It gave the user the ability to process threat information at a speed that was not available before the technology was developed.

First and foremost, it multiplied the ability of users to drown in data and yawn in meetings. There are some nice cases of theoretical or even practical acceleration of processes, but I doubt the overall effect has been such.
Radio nets have grown and been digitised and traffic increased. The ability to process data with technical means has increased exponentially, the ability to understand twhat the data means did not evolve a bit.
Humans are psychologically very defective and often outright stupid.
We cannot cope with the growth of technical performance, and as a consequence cannot exploit the technical potential at all.

It is the same with the development of cyberwarfare and drone technology, for example. I'm trying to gauge how this can further compress time and space, the tempo of warfare if you will, and what impact this will have, if any, on the level and intensity of violence in future wars. A cyber attack on a countries main infrastructure is all but instantaneous eg: Russia and Georgia War is a clear example of the use of cyberwarfare to compress time and space.

It's educating about such grandiose effect ideas to look at the history of air warfare in WW2 and the history of the EMP fear since the 70's. The Y2K story should also help.
Generally I would advice to take it seriously, to expect people/institutions to adapt rather well and to keep friction and generally imperfections in mind. Nobody is going to shut down th electrical grid for more than once for two days with mere software, for example. The sum of undetected, unspectacular efforts are much more likely to be reqally influential (this being essentially an application of Luttwak).

Thanks for the blitzkrieg article, what I am trying to get my head around is a little different to the decisive battle theory, from what I can work out the concept is closer to deterrence. I'll keep researching. I can understand what it is that I am looking at, it's just a matter of finding the right definition/terminology/conceptual framework to better explain it to others. This is made even more difficult when trying to analyse war/warfare 20-40 years in the future, as there are no readily available conceptual frameworks to explain what is to come eg: singularity.

I suppose our take on an interest in military theory is so much different I won't be any more helpful to your effort.
To me, technological change isn't what determines military performance, but something which provokes adaptations - and I appear to assume a much lesser degree of exploitation of technical potential than you do.
Take the article as an example; compare the cruise speed of a horse with the cruise speed of a WW2 tank (~20-30 kph) and imagine what you would have written about the increase of operational advance speeds thanks to mechanisation. Then compare with what really happened (the article misses Manstein's dash to the Duna river, though).

The future signal to noise ratio: compression of time and space/drones/cyberwarfare/sub-orbital space warfare/human biomechanical evolution/human biological evolution/targeted assassination/deterrence/taking a state whole/singularity/total war/GOES solar x-ray flux weaponisation/spectrum

Also, you should raise your awareness for how easily people stop listening or reading when they encounter a shipload of buzzwords.
At times, I was considering you're trying to prank us with your buzzword avalanches.

In case you're really into buzzwords; maybe I can help you with an observation about what seems to turn into a buzzword these days: "clandestine".

[Bob's World]

Clearly the ability to deliver a massive, punishing attack has become faster and easier with nuclear weapons, and now the growth of reliance on vulnerable cyber-based systems.

But how does that change the speed of war?

To attack an opponent is not to defeat an opponent. One must still occupy and hold ground and the skies above that ground. One must secure passage across the seas and skies to reach that ground. And even if one accomplishes all of those things, one must then force the people living on that ground to submit to their newly imposed system of governance.

As the US has demonstrated (too often of late), if one has the relative advantage of resources and technology, yes, the initial aspects of that can be fairly quick and easy. But forcing a people to submit? The only "easy" way is genocide, coupled with the destruction and replacement of the existing culture with that of the invader. Plenty of historic examples of that, some fairly recent. Are nuclear weapons spread across a populace faster than a Sharps rifle directed at the primary source of food and culture? No, not if one takes into account how soon that place is occupiable by the invading element.

But yes, punitive attacks are easier, faster, and now something that individuals and non-state actors can conduct at levels once the sole realm of powerful states (with far less risk of consequence, and thus outside our current concepts of deterrence). But to conduct an act of war is different than waging war, just as throwing a punch is different than a fight.

Countries such as the US will increasingly need to absorb the occasional sucker punch and not be distracted from the business of being a powerful state. Retaliation and prevention cannot be an all-consuming extravaganza such as we have put on for the past decade or so, but rather must be a small, quiet, but deadly certain capability. No massive deployments, no public chest-thumping when enemies fall, just cold hard business of being a state in the modern age.

[Taiko]

Reality is the best measuring stick for theory.

Seriously, nobody can compress time or space. What you're talking about is being quicker.

In a sense that is partly what I'm talking about. I appreciate that to literally compress time and space is still a concept in words only, however, CERN/Hadron Collider Project is taking humanity closer to the point where compressing time and space could very well become a reality. What implications that has is still an unknown.

'Compressing' may be the wrong conceptual framework to use in this instance. I am trying to get a sense of what has changed, if anything, in how strategists view/understand time and space over the history of warfare. From set field battles of the Cabinet warfare era to nuclear warfare to decentralized networks of sub-state actors. Our understanding of the role time and space plays in war has changed.

Nobody is going to shut down th electrical grid for more than once for two days with mere software

True, however, in 2011 a group of amateurs shut down a major service carriage provider for seven million users over a three month period without interruption. The political and economic implications alone give pause for thought. Modern siege warfare (cyberwarfare) target sets are as diverse as they are detrimental to a states ability to claim a monopoly on force/security.

We cannot cope with the growth of technical performance, and as a consequence cannot exploit the technical potential at all.

This is my concern as well, adapt or perish. By 'we' who do you mean? This is my other concern, whoever has the ability to adapt and exploit the technical potential will have a clear advantage over the next 20-40 years. We all saw that happen in 2001.

Take the article as an example; compare the cruise speed of a horse with the cruise speed of a WW2 tank (~20-30 kph) and imagine what you would have written about the increase of operational advance speeds thanks to mechanisation. Then compare with what really happened (the article misses Manstein's dash to the Duna river, though).

I agree, friction, chance and probability, human fallibility etc will always have to be taken into consideration no matter the technical advances made.

Also, you should raise your awareness for how easily people stop listening or reading when they encounter a shipload of buzzwords.
At times, I was considering you're trying to prank us with your buzzword avalanches.

Thank you for the advise. I am also very cautious when a strategic theorists puts the word 'new' into a sentence, especially when it is in front of the words idea/warfighting concept/strategy, because more often than not the 'new' they are talking about is either old, or old dressed up as new. I generally agree and loath the use of buzzwords and I am not trying to prank. I've been around this council long enough to know you all have excellent BS detectors

My problem is if I am to try and at least theory craft what warfare will be in 20-40 years time how would be the best way to go about it? I do not want to sensationalize nor over/underestimate what is to come, but try to present a picture of the various potential realities that could be probable. I am not about selling books nor promoting myself, but I have a genuine interest in future forecasting/foresight and how it can be used to better equip policy makers to head off potential pitfalls/threats.

But yes, punitive attacks are easier, faster, and now something that individuals and non-state actors can conduct at levels once the sole realm of powerful states (with far less risk of consequence, and thus outside our current concepts of deterrence). But to conduct an act of war is different than waging war, just as throwing a punch is different than a fight.

Agreed, this is an area I need to work on. The principles of war as set out by CvC, ST etc are more or less universal. I am well versed in those principals and confident that my theoretical model on war is rock solid. Warfare, however, is constantly changing. That change can and does influence how policy is made and politics is conducted. It is this subject matter that I am now trying to better understand. Hence the preoccupation with the figurative compression of time and space (I'll have to find a better conceptual framework), as a general principle or basic conceptual framework that can be used to explain the advances in warfare over past history and into the future.

In short, my argument is: to understand the utilization/exploitation of time and space is to understand the general principles of the ephemeral/ever changing nature of warfare from the operational to tactical level of analysis.

Countries such as the US will increasingly need to absorb the occasional sucker punch and not be distracted from the business of being a powerful state. Retaliation and prevention cannot be an all-consuming extravaganza such as we have put on for the past decade or so, but rather must be a small, quiet, but deadly certain capability. No massive deployments, no public chest-thumping when enemies fall, just cold hard business of being a state in the modern age.

That is worth repeating! Speak quietly and carry a big stick.

As always, great to get a response from you Bob's World, nothing like a reality check to help me keep my head in the game

[Fuchs]

My problem is if I am to try and at least theory craft what warfare will be in 20-40 years time how would be the best way to go about it?

Why bother?

There have been so few tests for doctrine during the last 60 years there's not even a solid foundation for guessing right how certain conflicts would look if they turned into hot war this or next year.
We're military theory-wise in a similar situation as our forefathers were around 1900-1912. We've seen lots of small wars not telling us much about inter-state warfare, very partial glimpses of modern inter-state warfare and there were huge technological and society changes over the course of the last generations.

Basically 'we' have little clue about modern inter-state warfare; lots of opinions, theories and assertions - but almost no real knowledge.


I for one would not have guessed the Russians would be capable to rush two division equivalents through a tunnel on short notice, overwhelm Georgian forces in a brief hasty attack on terrain which benefited the defence and have a flag rank officer WIA while he lead an advance party. It was totally not Russian in my opinion, but it happened. And this wasn't even about new technologies.

[Dayuhan]

To attack an opponent is not to defeat an opponent. One must still occupy and hold ground and the skies above that ground. One must secure passage across the seas and skies to reach that ground. And even if one accomplishes all of those things, one must then force the people living on that ground to submit to their newly imposed system of governance.

As the US has demonstrated (too often of late), if one has the relative advantage of resources and technology, yes, the initial aspects of that can be fairly quick and easy. But forcing a people to submit?

I don't think that submission or occupation should be presumed necessary: that would depend on the political objectives being pursued. Entering a conflict with clear objectives and refusing to expand those objectives can often (not always, but often) free us from the assumption that we "must" occupy territory and impose systems of governance.

Countries such as the US will increasingly need to absorb the occasional sucker punch and not be distracted from the business of being a powerful state. Retaliation and prevention cannot be an all-consuming extravaganza such as we have put on for the past decade or so, but rather must be a small, quiet, but deadly certain capability. No massive deployments, no public chest-thumping when enemies fall, just cold hard business of being a state in the modern age.

Well I'll be damned, we agree on something...

[davidbfpo]

I suggest you have a look at the new, free e-journal following the model of Wilf Owen's 'Infinity Journal'. Journal of Military Operations (JOMO) is dedicated to military operations as well as tactics. Registration is free: https://www.tjomo.com

Secondly the Editor is Dr. Jim Storr, a.k.a Colonel Storr, author of 'The Human Face of War', now republished in paperback, which might help too.