The Way Of War

[Taiko]

Reality is the best measuring stick for theory.

Seriously, nobody can compress time or space. What you're talking about is being quicker.

In a sense that is partly what I'm talking about. I appreciate that to literally compress time and space is still a concept in words only, however, CERN/Hadron Collider Project is taking humanity closer to the point where compressing time and space could very well become a reality. What implications that has is still an unknown.

'Compressing' may be the wrong conceptual framework to use in this instance. I am trying to get a sense of what has changed, if anything, in how strategists view/understand time and space over the history of warfare. From set field battles of the Cabinet warfare era to nuclear warfare to decentralized networks of sub-state actors. Our understanding of the role time and space plays in war has changed.

Nobody is going to shut down th electrical grid for more than once for two days with mere software

True, however, in 2011 a group of amateurs shut down a major service carriage provider for seven million users over a three month period without interruption. The political and economic implications alone give pause for thought. Modern siege warfare (cyberwarfare) target sets are as diverse as they are detrimental to a states ability to claim a monopoly on force/security.

We cannot cope with the growth of technical performance, and as a consequence cannot exploit the technical potential at all.

This is my concern as well, adapt or perish. By 'we' who do you mean? This is my other concern, whoever has the ability to adapt and exploit the technical potential will have a clear advantage over the next 20-40 years. We all saw that happen in 2001.

Take the article as an example; compare the cruise speed of a horse with the cruise speed of a WW2 tank (~20-30 kph) and imagine what you would have written about the increase of operational advance speeds thanks to mechanisation. Then compare with what really happened (the article misses Manstein's dash to the Duna river, though).

I agree, friction, chance and probability, human fallibility etc will always have to be taken into consideration no matter the technical advances made.

Also, you should raise your awareness for how easily people stop listening or reading when they encounter a shipload of buzzwords.
At times, I was considering you're trying to prank us with your buzzword avalanches.

Thank you for the advise. I am also very cautious when a strategic theorists puts the word 'new' into a sentence, especially when it is in front of the words idea/warfighting concept/strategy, because more often than not the 'new' they are talking about is either old, or old dressed up as new. I generally agree and loath the use of buzzwords and I am not trying to prank. I've been around this council long enough to know you all have excellent BS detectors

My problem is if I am to try and at least theory craft what warfare will be in 20-40 years time how would be the best way to go about it? I do not want to sensationalize nor over/underestimate what is to come, but try to present a picture of the various potential realities that could be probable. I am not about selling books nor promoting myself, but I have a genuine interest in future forecasting/foresight and how it can be used to better equip policy makers to head off potential pitfalls/threats.

But yes, punitive attacks are easier, faster, and now something that individuals and non-state actors can conduct at levels once the sole realm of powerful states (with far less risk of consequence, and thus outside our current concepts of deterrence). But to conduct an act of war is different than waging war, just as throwing a punch is different than a fight.

Agreed, this is an area I need to work on. The principles of war as set out by CvC, ST etc are more or less universal. I am well versed in those principals and confident that my theoretical model on war is rock solid. Warfare, however, is constantly changing. That change can and does influence how policy is made and politics is conducted. It is this subject matter that I am now trying to better understand. Hence the preoccupation with the figurative compression of time and space (I'll have to find a better conceptual framework), as a general principle or basic conceptual framework that can be used to explain the advances in warfare over past history and into the future.

In short, my argument is: to understand the utilization/exploitation of time and space is to understand the general principles of the ephemeral/ever changing nature of warfare from the operational to tactical level of analysis.

Countries such as the US will increasingly need to absorb the occasional sucker punch and not be distracted from the business of being a powerful state. Retaliation and prevention cannot be an all-consuming extravaganza such as we have put on for the past decade or so, but rather must be a small, quiet, but deadly certain capability. No massive deployments, no public chest-thumping when enemies fall, just cold hard business of being a state in the modern age.

That is worth repeating! Speak quietly and carry a big stick.

As always, great to get a response from you Bob's World, nothing like a reality check to help me keep my head in the game