China’s View of South Asia and the Indian Ocean

[davidbfpo]

Thanks to a "lurker" for this pointer an article by a Pakistani on a Chinese website that advocates Gwadar port become a Chinese responsibility:

Pakistan is under pressure to take the port back from SPA (Singapore Ports Authority) owing to the fact that it has not fulfilled its commitments, despite all the concessions made to it. The Singaporean company has failed to make the requisite investments ($550m) in proportion as required and 3 years have already gone by.

(later)...There is a growing consensus in Pakistan that China should be given the operational charge of Gwadar Port. This stance has taken on added momentum against the backdrop of emerging strategic concerns, including an increasing US interest in this Port. There seems to be growing evidence that the American interests would be served by blocking the development of Gwadar, especially as an energy hub and corridor to Central Asia and China.

Unlike earlier times, when China kept in the background to allay US suspicions about its strategic intent in Gwadar, this time round China has tacitly agreed to accept charge of the facility offered by Pakistan.

Link:http://www.youlinmagazine.com/articl...=#.UPr1AKF-xEA

Given the geographical position of Gwadar, still developing transport links to the hinterland, I am surprised anyone wnats to invest there. Perhaps the SPA realised that?

[Ray]

Thanks to a "lurker" for this pointer an article by a Pakistani on a Chinese website that advocates Gwadar port become a Chinese responsibility:

Link:http://www.youlinmagazine.com/articl...=#.UPr1AKF-xEA

Given the geographical position of Gwadar, still developing transport links to the hinterland, I am surprised anyone wnats to invest there. Perhaps the SPA realised that?

Pakistan's oil, gas and most natural resources are in Balochistan and Gwadar is Balochistan's port.

) Coal

2) Chromate

3) Barytes

4) Sulphur

5) Marble

6) Iron Ore

7) Quartzite

8)Limestone

Revenue of mineral is $1.5 billion per annum; we know that more than 50 metallic and non-metallic minerals have been discovered in Balochistan. Metallic ores are chromites, copper, gold, silver, iron ore, lead and zinc, while the non-metallic include barite, marble, granite, gypsum, limestone, coal, dolomite, calcite, silica sand.


Revenue of gas is $42 billion per year; According to the Geological Survey of Pakistan (GSP) there are reserves of 19 trillion cubic feet of gas and 6 trillion barrels of oil.

http://bolanvoice.wordpress.com/2012...esources-land/

[bourbon]

A great game begins as China takes control of Gwadar port, by Syed Fazl-e-Haider. The National (UAE), Oct 7, 2012.

Gwadar port, through the proposed energy and trade corridors, gives western China access to the sea. Crude oil imports from Iran, the Arab Gulf states and Africa could be transported overland to north-west China through the port.

China considers Gwadar very important for its oil trade, as the present choke point is the Strait of Hormuz, which is becoming congested. In particular, a strategic pipeline from Gwadar to China's borders enables Beijing to import oil from Saudi Arabia. In 2006, King Abdullah reportedly asked Islamabad to help Saudi Arabia to extend oil exports to China.

China is the world's second largest importer of oil, with 80 per cent of imports going through the unsafe Strait of Malacca. A railroad and oil pipeline linking Gwadar with Kashi in western China provides Beijing with the shortest possible route to the oil-rich Middle East, avoiding the Strait of Malacca and the dangerous maritime routes through the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea. Chinese engineers have already completed a feasibility study for a railroad and oil pipeline, which would enable Gwadar to handle most of the oil tankers headed to China.

[Dayuhan]

I wouldn't call it insignificant, but there is a tendency in many quarters to overrate the significance of these developments, as in the hyperventilating about "great games" and the occasionally seen references to strategic game-changers. An example would be the cited items...

China considers Gwadar very important for its oil trade, as the present choke point is the Strait of Hormuz, which is becoming congested.

Gwadar doesn't circumvent the Strait of Hormuz. Gwadar is still outside the strait, the oil is still inside. A Gwadar-China pipeline could allow China to import oil from Iran without passing through the Strait if an additional pipeline from Iran's oil fields to Gwadar. The degree of protection from a potential closure of the strait is limited. By far the most likely scenario for closure of the strait is a conflict involving Iran, in which event pipelines leaving Iran would almost certainly be targeted.

In particular, a strategic pipeline from Gwadar to China's borders enables Beijing to import oil from Saudi Arabia. In 2006, King Abdullah reportedly asked Islamabad to help Saudi Arabia to extend oil exports to China.

Beijing already imports oil from Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is Beijing's leading supplier of oil. Oil moving from Saudi Arabia to China via Gwadar would still transit the Strait of Hormuz.

China is the world's second largest importer of oil, with 80 per cent of imports going through the unsafe Strait of Malacca. A railroad and oil pipeline linking Gwadar with Kashi in western China provides Beijing with the shortest possible route to the oil-rich Middle East, avoiding the Strait of Malacca and the dangerous maritime routes through the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea.

A pipeline would circumvent the Straits of Malacca, but the strategic significance of this, especially in the event of a conflict with the US, is questionable. If conflict reached a point severe enough that the US was closing the Straits of Malacca to China-bound shipping, the US could just as easily (probably more easily) close a Gwadar-China pipeline through air attack, sabotage, or simply by preventing oil from reaching Gwadar. There would be some degree of protection from purely regional conflict involving the Straits of Malacca, but not much change in the ability of the US (or India) to control the flow of oil from the Middle East to China.

Chinese engineers have already completed a feasibility study for a railroad and oil pipeline, which would enable Gwadar to handle most of the oil tankers headed to China.

This is simply wrong. Even a very large capacity pipeline would handle only a fraction of China's oil import needs. Some of the oil tankers headed to China, yes, but a long way from "most".

[omarali50]

It is sometimes alleged (and i have done it myself) that most of this "strategic" stuff must be cover for some person's shortcut to immediate monetary rewards, or some institution's ticket to greater relevance (and a larger share of the pie).
I dont just mean outside commentators.. I am guessing there are Chinese "think-tankers" who go around saying stuff about the urgent need to invest in Gwadar or to blow it up or whatever. Can we ascribe all of it to institutional interests (more money for the PLA or the think tank or Sinopec?)? or to personal interests (even something as small as annual paid visits to a conference in Hainan?)?
Or could it be that a lot of things really happen due to misunderstanding? they are in someone's interest eventually, or they hurt someone eventually, but mostly by accident. Neither gainer nor loser made the plans. Just took advantage of someone else's attempt at thinking strategically. Or suffered because of someone else's notion of strategic depth (see pakistani people for details).
Its not a rhetorical question. I am genuinely curious.

[davidbfpo]

An Australian review of an Indian analyst's book 'Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific' by C. Raja Mohan:http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?284514

A few passages:

This book is as much about China’s historic turn to the sea and America’s challenge in mainta#ining stability as it is about the maritime challenge for a rising India. For it will be the complex ballet among the strategic and economic interests of these three powers that determines, above all else, if the so-called Asian Century will be domina#ted by coexistence and cooperation, or by competition and conflict.

(Later) More than anything else, it is China’s acute dependence on energy imp##orts across the Indian Ocean that means Beijing—like India—has no cho#ice but to accept that it is a quintessentially Indo-Pacific nation, not purely an Asian one.

[Backwards Observer]

As charming as it is to be treated once again to an article tossing down the “Indo-Pacific” concept like a rattle from a think tank high-chair, the colicky deployment of fabulist buzzwords is neither a remedy for a dearth of grounded regional insight nor a substitute for adult diplomacy by any of the relevant stakeholders. Presumably this includes the Indo-Australian region. Other than that, it would seem that a positive economic climate would indeed suit all parties, including the gentlemen formerly known as the East India Company . Conversely, it could be ventured that the so-called "9 dotted line" is likewise an inappropriate and outdated bargaining position that is based on an outmoded (self)-perception that detracts from sensible negotiations.

The normalization process is proceeding well. As I wrote earlier too, 2012 has been a truly transformative year and our policymakers have done exceedingly well. As recently as in 2006-2007, we were marvelling at the idea of a quadripartite alliance of Asian democracies under the US’s mentorship; as recently as in 2009, we were contemplating how to fasten the ‘global commons’. (Robert Kaplan wrote a full book on it.)

Indeed, both were geopolitical projects with a barely hidden ‘anti-China’ bias. We have come a long way from there, thanks largely to fortuitous circumstances. Yet, some of our pundits conceive the ‘Indo-Pacific’ as our country’s ’sphere of influence’. The doctrine of ‘Indo-Pacific’ — comprising the swathe of the globe stretching from the Strait of Hormuz to Vanuatu — is probably intended as a red herring to China. Shibboleths don’t dissipate easily. We hardly jettisoned one — ’string of pearls’ — with great hesitation. (by M K Bhadrakumar - Indian Punchline)

India-China shibboleths take time to dissipate - M K Bhadrakumar - Indian Punchline - 3.5.2013

[Bill Moore]

An Australian review of an Indian analyst's book 'Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific' by C. Raja Mohan:http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?284514

A few passages:

Good article, and especially liked this portion:

But these old-fashioned critiques miss the point that the Indo-Pacific idea derives overwhelmingly from economics, energy and seaborne globalisation. More than anything else, it is China’s acute dependence on energy imports across the Indian Ocean that means Beijing—like India—has no choice but to accept that it is a quintessentially Indo-Pacific nation, not purely an Asian one.

Of course this is true for many powers who want to maintain access to the world's largest markets. China and India are emerging sea powers that can help contribute to maritime security, or interact in a way that threatens maritime security and consequently global trade and regional security. Not surprising, we're at a time where Naval power is becoming increasingly relevant, and yet we have one of the smallest Navies we had in decades.

[Dayuhan]

Of course this is true for many powers who want to maintain access to the world's largest markets. China and India are emerging sea powers that can help contribute to maritime security, or interact in a way that threatens maritime security and consequently global trade and regional security. Not surprising, we're at a time where Naval power is becoming increasingly relevant, and yet we have one of the smallest Navies we had in decades.

It's also true that China and India desperately need access to the world's most prosperous markets. GDP per capita has a lot more to do with disposable income and actual purchasing power than raw GDP.

I do not think naval strength will be what keeps access to markets open: if you have to shoot your way into a market, there's a war going on, and that's generally not much good for trade.

The US Navy may be smaller than it has been in decades, but it is still very very large relative to those of peer competitors, and significantly enhanced by the presence of allies such as Japan. I do not buy the idea that emerging Asia demands a larger Navy. The reduced number of ships in the Navy is a necessary result of the enormously increased cost per ship, and trying to resurrect a Navy with the same number of ships featured in Navies past would simply be unaffordable at today's prices.