China’s View of South Asia and the Indian Ocean

[Dayuhan]

And some feel that US is a dithering nation with no short term, medium term or long term policy to remain relevant and be the Number Uno!

Yes, some feel that way. Ask JMA, he'll tell you all about it.

The US has always dithered; it's the nature of the system. That dithering is somewhat reduced when the nation perceives an existential threat, but it's always there. It might be seen as odd that the US has achieved substantial stature despite that, and that nations with a far greater capacity for decisive action and long term planning have fallen by the wayside. The answer is simply that the same system that produces that frustration tendency to dither also provides a very substantial resilience. They go together.

As far as being "Numero Uno" goes, there are two questions there. One is whether it is in the US interest to try to be "Numero Uno", given the enormous costs involved in trying to meddle in everybody else's business and maintaining a military force capable of meddling in everybody else's business.

The other question is whether engagements such as the one in Afghanistan actually build American influence and strengthen America's position. I would suggest that they do not. If preserving great power status is the issue, it's worth noting that great powers have often fallen because they overextended themselves and devoted excessive resources to unnecessary efforts where benefit failed to justify cost. What great power has ever fallen because it failed to impose itself in the irrelevant backwaters of the world?

[B]But what surprises me is the contention that policies of the Govt, Congressional Hearings, commentaries, news reports are to be taken as bogus, fantasies, and fables and hence cannot be relied upon.

Not all of them are, but most are. Everything has to be read with skepticism, and every contention reviewed to see if it actually makes sense. If you look at the root of the various claims about strategic and economic reasons for the US to be in Afghanistan, they just don't make sense. They don't hold up to scrutiny. Sure, there are lots and lots of people with vested interests in claiming that they do make sense... but they still don't.

And then comes the hedging when it becomes sticky!

If that is so, what can be relied upon so that we have a bottom line for discussion.

That which stands up to skeptical scrutiny. That which makes sense.

Meanderings of the self acclaimed KNOWALLS?

Nobody knows it all, but some of us try to know BS when we see it. Given the amount of it around, if you don't know it when you see it you're likely to drown in it.

[Ray]

Nobody knows it all, but some of us try to know BS when we see it. Given the amount of it around, if you don't know it when you see it you're likely to drown in it.

Indeed, lots of BS one sees!

[davidbfpo]

Thanks to a "lurker" for this pointer an article by a Pakistani on a Chinese website that advocates Gwadar port become a Chinese responsibility:

Pakistan is under pressure to take the port back from SPA (Singapore Ports Authority) owing to the fact that it has not fulfilled its commitments, despite all the concessions made to it. The Singaporean company has failed to make the requisite investments ($550m) in proportion as required and 3 years have already gone by.

(later)...There is a growing consensus in Pakistan that China should be given the operational charge of Gwadar Port. This stance has taken on added momentum against the backdrop of emerging strategic concerns, including an increasing US interest in this Port. There seems to be growing evidence that the American interests would be served by blocking the development of Gwadar, especially as an energy hub and corridor to Central Asia and China.

Unlike earlier times, when China kept in the background to allay US suspicions about its strategic intent in Gwadar, this time round China has tacitly agreed to accept charge of the facility offered by Pakistan.

Link:http://www.youlinmagazine.com/articl...=#.UPr1AKF-xEA

Given the geographical position of Gwadar, still developing transport links to the hinterland, I am surprised anyone wnats to invest there. Perhaps the SPA realised that?

[Ray]

Thanks to a "lurker" for this pointer an article by a Pakistani on a Chinese website that advocates Gwadar port become a Chinese responsibility:

Link:http://www.youlinmagazine.com/articl...=#.UPr1AKF-xEA

Given the geographical position of Gwadar, still developing transport links to the hinterland, I am surprised anyone wnats to invest there. Perhaps the SPA realised that?

Pakistan's oil, gas and most natural resources are in Balochistan and Gwadar is Balochistan's port.

) Coal

2) Chromate

3) Barytes

4) Sulphur

5) Marble

6) Iron Ore

7) Quartzite

8)Limestone

Revenue of mineral is $1.5 billion per annum; we know that more than 50 metallic and non-metallic minerals have been discovered in Balochistan. Metallic ores are chromites, copper, gold, silver, iron ore, lead and zinc, while the non-metallic include barite, marble, granite, gypsum, limestone, coal, dolomite, calcite, silica sand.


Revenue of gas is $42 billion per year; According to the Geological Survey of Pakistan (GSP) there are reserves of 19 trillion cubic feet of gas and 6 trillion barrels of oil.

http://bolanvoice.wordpress.com/2012...esources-land/

[bourbon]

A great game begins as China takes control of Gwadar port, by Syed Fazl-e-Haider. The National (UAE), Oct 7, 2012.

Gwadar port, through the proposed energy and trade corridors, gives western China access to the sea. Crude oil imports from Iran, the Arab Gulf states and Africa could be transported overland to north-west China through the port.

China considers Gwadar very important for its oil trade, as the present choke point is the Strait of Hormuz, which is becoming congested. In particular, a strategic pipeline from Gwadar to China's borders enables Beijing to import oil from Saudi Arabia. In 2006, King Abdullah reportedly asked Islamabad to help Saudi Arabia to extend oil exports to China.

China is the world's second largest importer of oil, with 80 per cent of imports going through the unsafe Strait of Malacca. A railroad and oil pipeline linking Gwadar with Kashi in western China provides Beijing with the shortest possible route to the oil-rich Middle East, avoiding the Strait of Malacca and the dangerous maritime routes through the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea. Chinese engineers have already completed a feasibility study for a railroad and oil pipeline, which would enable Gwadar to handle most of the oil tankers headed to China.

[Dayuhan]

I wouldn't call it insignificant, but there is a tendency in many quarters to overrate the significance of these developments, as in the hyperventilating about "great games" and the occasionally seen references to strategic game-changers. An example would be the cited items...

China considers Gwadar very important for its oil trade, as the present choke point is the Strait of Hormuz, which is becoming congested.

Gwadar doesn't circumvent the Strait of Hormuz. Gwadar is still outside the strait, the oil is still inside. A Gwadar-China pipeline could allow China to import oil from Iran without passing through the Strait if an additional pipeline from Iran's oil fields to Gwadar. The degree of protection from a potential closure of the strait is limited. By far the most likely scenario for closure of the strait is a conflict involving Iran, in which event pipelines leaving Iran would almost certainly be targeted.

In particular, a strategic pipeline from Gwadar to China's borders enables Beijing to import oil from Saudi Arabia. In 2006, King Abdullah reportedly asked Islamabad to help Saudi Arabia to extend oil exports to China.

Beijing already imports oil from Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is Beijing's leading supplier of oil. Oil moving from Saudi Arabia to China via Gwadar would still transit the Strait of Hormuz.

China is the world's second largest importer of oil, with 80 per cent of imports going through the unsafe Strait of Malacca. A railroad and oil pipeline linking Gwadar with Kashi in western China provides Beijing with the shortest possible route to the oil-rich Middle East, avoiding the Strait of Malacca and the dangerous maritime routes through the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea.

A pipeline would circumvent the Straits of Malacca, but the strategic significance of this, especially in the event of a conflict with the US, is questionable. If conflict reached a point severe enough that the US was closing the Straits of Malacca to China-bound shipping, the US could just as easily (probably more easily) close a Gwadar-China pipeline through air attack, sabotage, or simply by preventing oil from reaching Gwadar. There would be some degree of protection from purely regional conflict involving the Straits of Malacca, but not much change in the ability of the US (or India) to control the flow of oil from the Middle East to China.

Chinese engineers have already completed a feasibility study for a railroad and oil pipeline, which would enable Gwadar to handle most of the oil tankers headed to China.

This is simply wrong. Even a very large capacity pipeline would handle only a fraction of China's oil import needs. Some of the oil tankers headed to China, yes, but a long way from "most".

[omarali50]

It is sometimes alleged (and i have done it myself) that most of this "strategic" stuff must be cover for some person's shortcut to immediate monetary rewards, or some institution's ticket to greater relevance (and a larger share of the pie).
I dont just mean outside commentators.. I am guessing there are Chinese "think-tankers" who go around saying stuff about the urgent need to invest in Gwadar or to blow it up or whatever. Can we ascribe all of it to institutional interests (more money for the PLA or the think tank or Sinopec?)? or to personal interests (even something as small as annual paid visits to a conference in Hainan?)?
Or could it be that a lot of things really happen due to misunderstanding? they are in someone's interest eventually, or they hurt someone eventually, but mostly by accident. Neither gainer nor loser made the plans. Just took advantage of someone else's attempt at thinking strategically. Or suffered because of someone else's notion of strategic depth (see pakistani people for details).
Its not a rhetorical question. I am genuinely curious.

[davidbfpo]

An Australian review of an Indian analyst's book 'Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific' by C. Raja Mohan:http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?284514

A few passages:

This book is as much about China’s historic turn to the sea and America’s challenge in mainta#ining stability as it is about the maritime challenge for a rising India. For it will be the complex ballet among the strategic and economic interests of these three powers that determines, above all else, if the so-called Asian Century will be domina#ted by coexistence and cooperation, or by competition and conflict.

(Later) More than anything else, it is China’s acute dependence on energy imp##orts across the Indian Ocean that means Beijing—like India—has no cho#ice but to accept that it is a quintessentially Indo-Pacific nation, not purely an Asian one.