I wouldn't call it insignificant, but there is a tendency in many quarters to overrate the significance of these developments, as in the hyperventilating about "great games" and the occasionally seen references to strategic game-changers. An example would be the cited items...

China considers Gwadar very important for its oil trade, as the present choke point is the Strait of Hormuz, which is becoming congested.
Gwadar doesn't circumvent the Strait of Hormuz. Gwadar is still outside the strait, the oil is still inside. A Gwadar-China pipeline could allow China to import oil from Iran without passing through the Strait if an additional pipeline from Iran's oil fields to Gwadar. The degree of protection from a potential closure of the strait is limited. By far the most likely scenario for closure of the strait is a conflict involving Iran, in which event pipelines leaving Iran would almost certainly be targeted.

In particular, a strategic pipeline from Gwadar to China's borders enables Beijing to import oil from Saudi Arabia. In 2006, King Abdullah reportedly asked Islamabad to help Saudi Arabia to extend oil exports to China.
Beijing already imports oil from Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is Beijing's leading supplier of oil. Oil moving from Saudi Arabia to China via Gwadar would still transit the Strait of Hormuz.
China is the world's second largest importer of oil, with 80 per cent of imports going through the unsafe Strait of Malacca. A railroad and oil pipeline linking Gwadar with Kashi in western China provides Beijing with the shortest possible route to the oil-rich Middle East, avoiding the Strait of Malacca and the dangerous maritime routes through the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea.
A pipeline would circumvent the Straits of Malacca, but the strategic significance of this, especially in the event of a conflict with the US, is questionable. If conflict reached a point severe enough that the US was closing the Straits of Malacca to China-bound shipping, the US could just as easily (probably more easily) close a Gwadar-China pipeline through air attack, sabotage, or simply by preventing oil from reaching Gwadar. There would be some degree of protection from purely regional conflict involving the Straits of Malacca, but not much change in the ability of the US (or India) to control the flow of oil from the Middle East to China.

Chinese engineers have already completed a feasibility study for a railroad and oil pipeline, which would enable Gwadar to handle most of the oil tankers headed to China.
This is simply wrong. Even a very large capacity pipeline would handle only a fraction of China's oil import needs. Some of the oil tankers headed to China, yes, but a long way from "most".