DCGS-A : US Army spent $2.7 billion on a battlefield computer that doesn’t work

[Jason Port]

From my experiences with DCGS, there are several issues, but overall it has the right chops. The article's inadvertent advertising of Palantir aside, DCGS is not without flaws.

You cannot sustain a modern day data solution that resides on a non-standard method of sharing data. DCGS uses a framework that requires a significant learning curve, if you want to contribute or extract data into other solutions. However, because the model behind DCGS-A is more of a backbone through which data travels, and less of a repository, this unique method of data entry and exit seems to be a necessary evil derived from the timing of the solutions development.

It also suffers from evolutionary development - Because the requirements drove DCGS-A to spider in its requirements, everything became important, and therefore the overall strategy was constantly pushed in various directions. I would suspect now that the 2.7B (A lot of which was likely fielding), could be rebuilt better for significantly less. There is an old software development adage that says "Be prepared to throw out version 1.0", and this may be the case here - Because Agile development in the combat conditions in which our systems are forged drives us to make immediate decisions, without knowing what is around the corner, DCGS-A may suffer from those decisions today.

The other issue, which is not inherent in DCGS-A, but rather our approach to intelligence data proliferation, is that DCGS-A is an island in the archipelago of DCGS systems - There are several systems in DoD and throughout the IC that bear the DCGS moniker, but they fail to share data across this or even use the same development and production tools. In turn, you have a set of islands, and no real interisland travel. This is policy and not technology, but a serious flaw nonetheless.

On the other hand, DCGS-A has taken a complex requirement - storing and management of intel data - and made some sense out of it. They have provided tools (which take a Master's understanding to use IMHO), and given them to Intel analysts to make some sense with. Unfortunately, because they require advanced training, the operational world is reliant upon the Intel team to make the analysis happen.

My suggestion for them would be to make a simplified access medium so that in today's data and tool-rich environment, an Analyst could plug in Palantir straight into the DCGS-A backbone, and an Company Commander could dump a query into Excel or some other simple reporting tool. In addition, we should plug our other C2 systems straight into DCGS-A so tools like CPOF and others are contributing directly and benefitting immediately from others using the DCGS solution.

[WanderingAnalyst]

DCGS-A may be filed under the old axiom: "No plan survives first contact with the enemy..."

Seriously, each system has its strengths and limitations, and while LTG Flynn has a point, like his article "Fixing Intel", he may have applied a bit of drama to influence policymakers.

To me, the issue revolves around bandwidth and accessibility. There is a great deal of data in numerous locations in and out of the AOR, but when you have a dedicated T-line in the States (FBI/CIA), as well as a focused objective, it becomes easy to have a system perform beyond expectations.

However, when you start moving further and further into the hinterlands of Afghanistan and Iraq, bandwidth becomes a challenge. Compound that with trying to access numerous password-protected databases (thanks again, PVT Manning and fellow ilk)as well as poor utilization of in-theater common databases , it becomes an almost-insurmountable task.

Add in the issue of training, sometimes training hinders folks since the schoolhouse is usually the last to get the current version of a software/ system. It forces analysts and other users to only use the part of the training that carries over to the newer version, which becomes its own barricade to full utilization.

Just a thought or two.

[AdamG]

The idea was simple enough: Create a cloud-based software tool that can comb through the entire universe of military intelligence reports for a given region, group, or individual and come back with actionable intel that battlefield commanders can use on the ground, and do it in realtime.

But analysts that have used the system, as well as documentation obtained by Politico, show that the tool is hurting more than it is helping because it doesn't work properly. And that's when it works at all.

Read more: http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2011/...#ixzz1RSvoUeKP