DCGS-A : US Army spent $2.7 billion on a battlefield computer that doesn’t work

[WanderingAnalyst]

DCGS-A may be filed under the old axiom: "No plan survives first contact with the enemy..."

Seriously, each system has its strengths and limitations, and while LTG Flynn has a point, like his article "Fixing Intel", he may have applied a bit of drama to influence policymakers.

To me, the issue revolves around bandwidth and accessibility. There is a great deal of data in numerous locations in and out of the AOR, but when you have a dedicated T-line in the States (FBI/CIA), as well as a focused objective, it becomes easy to have a system perform beyond expectations.

However, when you start moving further and further into the hinterlands of Afghanistan and Iraq, bandwidth becomes a challenge. Compound that with trying to access numerous password-protected databases (thanks again, PVT Manning and fellow ilk)as well as poor utilization of in-theater common databases , it becomes an almost-insurmountable task.

Add in the issue of training, sometimes training hinders folks since the schoolhouse is usually the last to get the current version of a software/ system. It forces analysts and other users to only use the part of the training that carries over to the newer version, which becomes its own barricade to full utilization.

Just a thought or two.

[AdamG]

The idea was simple enough: Create a cloud-based software tool that can comb through the entire universe of military intelligence reports for a given region, group, or individual and come back with actionable intel that battlefield commanders can use on the ground, and do it in realtime.

But analysts that have used the system, as well as documentation obtained by Politico, show that the tool is hurting more than it is helping because it doesn't work properly. And that's when it works at all.

Read more: http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2011/...#ixzz1RSvoUeKP