New Rules for New Enemies

[marct]

Hi Tom,

Although I agree that a ROTC approach to the Foreign Service would have benefits, I will say that barring a fundamental shift (akin to California opening new waterfront properties adjacent to Ft Irwin after the rest falls into the sea) in the way the Foreign Service approaches life. It remains in its heart an organization founded on Ivy league elitism and it maintains a caste system that would make sense in old school S Africa or India.

I have a suspicion that the closest paralel for the current US Foreign Service lies in the Byzantine Empire of the 11th century. The same is probably true of the Canadian civil service as well. Hmmm, maybe that's why Byzantine history isn't really taught in North America...

We are going through the transformation of Civil Service. A larger goal and one easier to manage due to its lesser size should have been creating a National Security Corps that draws all foreign relations oriented organizations into a central being, like we were supposed to have done with Homeland Security.

Maybe I'm being cynical, Tom, but from what I have seen, creating "super-bureaucracies" merely expands bureaucratic empires while reducing the efficiency of individual units operating within them and making them less accountable to the supposed "rulers" of their society (doesn't seem to matter if they are "the People" or an absolute monarch). Consider, by way of an historical example, the ratio of Colonial Office bureacrats in the UK to the population they supposedly "govern" and look at how it has changed since 1850.

I have often thought that it would be a great idea to adapt Roman engineering quality control traditions to bureacratic initiatives...

Marc

[marct]

What I would like to see ROTC do is shift away from its heavy emphasis on technical majors and move more into a dynamic form of officer entry.

....What ROTC COULD be used for is to draw in more people with a liberal arts background (anthro and history, to name two examples) and then allow them (in fact encourage them) to take a semester or two overseas (through the university's exchange program). This would give them a leg up in terms of real skills and cultural exposure when they go on active duty.

That would certainly be a help, Steve. A lot of this goes back to career path rewards, so it would also be useful to consider cross-departmental placements as well. For example, someone who is on an MP/CID career path could be cross-placed into the FBI for a year, or someone who would be commanding a foreign deployable company could be sent to work for State for a year.

Even if it wasn't done after graduation, having a summer internship placing a cadet with different groups could be useful.

ROTC also has the advantage of being able to bring in students who are older than those allowed into the academies. We really should look at this program as a way to bring more mature, balanced officers into the service and to take full advantage of the study programs offered by the various universities.

Sometime in the late '80 or early '90's, McMaster University in Hamilton Ontario totally changed their entrance requirements to their medical school. They were less concerned with "traditional" academic markers and more with individuals perceptions and life experience. They revamped their entire medical program and their application process and ended up with a lot of "intentional healers" - people who really wanted to be doctors and had the ability but, for one reason or another, never made it through the "traditional" selection methods (usually funding). Think of it as an intensive OCS for civilian mustangs (if that isn't a contradiction in terms). The McMaster model may well be worth looking at.

Marc

[Rob Thornton]

Our problem is not limited to questions of potential resources, but extends to the inability to identify requirements for a mission set, and in the greater sense requirements for a long term strategy. In this thread we have identified the critical need for FS types who can partner with the military in the exectuion of a strategy designed to meet the emerging (and recently identified) needs of GWOT. We recognized in the last QDR that this slice of the pie was the most likely, and that it will be with us for the long term.

Resourcing:

We have Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines leaving Active duty for various reasons. The Navy and Air Force have recently partnered with the Army for the Blue to Green program which offers military members a chance to latterally X-fer vs. total seperation (many will seperate howver). We have 20 year mark members retiring for various reasons. We have members who just decided to leave after their inital obligation is expired. These people are potential resources, that could help increase the numbers of FS types.

However, it goes back to incentives (such as waiving some requirements in lieu of other qualities, entry level positions, opportunities unavailable in their military job, etc.), and it requires a plan to market, identify, recruit and train those who would transition. Having spent a few years working in embassies as a Marine prior to going to college and becoming a Soldier, I can identify with what Tom said, however, I have also known some real team players in the FS who really impressed me (so much that I almost went FS as a career). Active recruiting of prior military service members to the FS would equip it with people who had a much more acute perspective about how big policy actions shake out on the ground. It would strengthen their gene pool, and assist with inter-agency cooperation.

Recognition:

However, it still goes back to recognition of the need, and a desire to meet that need in a timely manner. In keeping with the theme of the thread, these new challenges call for us to either innovate within our resources, or adapt existing resources. I hope we (the big we at the "all the institutions of the United States" level are not so rigid that we will try to make the problem fit our desired solutions in order to preserve the status quo vs. doing good problem/mission analysis and making the needed changes to be successful.

[Tom Odom]

Maybe I'm being cynical, Tom, but from what I have seen, creating "super-bureaucracies" merely expands bureaucratic empires while reducing the efficiency of individual units operating within them and making them less accountable to the supposed "rulers" of their society (doesn't seem to matter if they are "the People" or an absolute monarch). Consider, by way of an historical example, the ratio of Colonial Office bureacrats in the UK to the population they supposedly "govern" and look at how it has changed since 1850.

If the model is Homeland Security as it stands, I agree. I would advocate however a blend of the Roman with the modern. Consolidation should not add layers; it should blend and streamline along functional lines. DHS did not do that; it merely added levels of C3 to an already confused system.

The need for transformation has in my mind been largely misdirected; it targeted the force, not the bureacracy that wields it and that is where transformation is needed.

We need another Key West and a simultaneous transformation decisionmaking and policy apparatus. Getting beyond PPT bullet or bumper sticker thinking however seems unlikely.

Best
tom

[marct]

If the model is Homeland Security as it stands, I agree. I would advocate however a blend of the Roman with the modern. Consolidation should not add layers; it should blend and streamline along functional lines. DHS did not do that; it merely added levels of C3 to an already confused system.

What, restore the Office of Barbarians ?????

Actually, I agree that a restructuring should streamline rather than expand. Maybe the civil service should look ar bringing in some people from the private sector (not Enron!).

Marc

[selil]

ROTC also has the advantage of being able to bring in students who are older than those allowed into the academies. We really should look at this program as a way to bring more mature, balanced officers into the service and to take full advantage of the study programs offered by the various universities.

Look at myself as an example. I'm a single enlistment former Marine. I've worked at Cheyenne, Space Command, law enforcement and a variety of other places. I would consider taking a reserve commission if for no other reason than the retirement benefits. As an academic I could use service of that type within my discipline and serve the military in a variety of ways. Further I spend three months each summer sunning myself on a high mountain lake so I'm available a quarter of the year guaranteed.

But, I'm not going to enter the service as an 0-1 lieuey, and I'm never going to command troops (nor should I). Now I teach members of the military and ROTC. There is no mechanism for me to get involved nor would most military branches take a 40+ academic even if I could pass a PFT. So, a background in information assurance, crypto, and analysis will be used 9 months out of the year. But, I get to do a lot of fishing.

[cmetcalf82]

What I would like to see ROTC do is shift away from its heavy emphasis on technical majors and move more into a dynamic form of officer entry.

Currently there are SOME language-type programs available for our cadets, either in the form of advanced language training or cultural immersion (basically a semester or two spent overseas). However, there is no direct link between this system and the university's relations with overseas universities (the school I work for has exchange programs with universities in a number of places, including Egypt and Morocco ). What ROTC COULD be used for is to draw in more people with a liberal arts background (anthro and history, to name two examples) and then allow them (in fact encourage them) to take a semester or two overseas (through the university's exchange program). This would give them a leg up in terms of real skills and cultural exposure when they go on active duty. Currently ROTC does not really tolerate time "away from the unit," which prevents us from making the best use of our students and the programs that are available for them.

Mr. Blair,

I agree that we could utilize ROTC to better prepare future officers. As a product of ROTC I agree that it currently fails to reward future officers who wish to do a year abroad or other forms of immersion study. Without any consideration for cost a way to generate better more rounded officers would be to extend the top 10-20% of ROTC cadets and give them the opportunity for a fifth year of education in return for a longer commitment. They could utilize this fifth year to begin graduate work or allow them to spend a year abroad in some sort of immersion study program. This would expose them to a wider range of experiences and help them better understand the cultural nuisances of living and communicating with other peoples.

[Rob Thornton]

Originally posted by Tom Odom , The need for transformation has in my mind been largely misdirected; it targeted the force, not the bureacracy that wields it and that is where transformation is needed.

Tom, Did you mean in the context of HQs such as JFTs, or Unified Commands, or higher? Is it a matter of the execution of good policy, or is it a lack of defined strategy that makes for an inadequate policy? Is it a failure to understand the need for the required command relationships and structures which would reduce friction?
Rob

[Steve Blair]

Mr. Blair,

I agree that we could utilize ROTC to better prepare future officers. As a product of ROTC I agree that it currently fails to reward future officers who wish to do a year abroad or other forms of immersion study. Without any consideration for cost a way to generate better more rounded officers would be to extend the top 10-20% of ROTC cadets and give them the opportunity for a fifth year of education in return for a longer commitment. They could utilize this fifth year to begin graduate work or allow them to spend a year abroad in some sort of immersion study program. This would expose them to a wider range of experiences and help them better understand the cultural nuisances of living and communicating with other peoples.

Within AFROTC there are five-year majors, although those are currently restricted to technical fields. Their commitment isn't any longer than people in four year programs. Grades do not matter in this case, only the major selected by the cadet. It wouldn't be at all difficult to expand this program, and it doesn't really entail much in the way of additional expense.

Another good way to improve the quality of ROTC would be to increase the number of scholarships available to students who are already in college. AFROTC currently targets high school seniors for the majority of its scholarships, and as a result tends to draw in people who may be more interested in the money than serving. Granted this is anecdotal based on what I've seen at my detachment, but kids coming out of high school often don't really know what they want to major in, and the scholarship program makes them declare a major right out of the gate.

There are already a fair number of rewards (outside scholarships and so on) for the top 10%-20% of cadets. Being able to target majors other than tech for extended ROTC time might be a better way to increase the quality and depth of our ROTC-produced officer corps.

[Rob Thornton]

On another thread on SWJ entitled "Provincial Reconstruction Teams" there is a link to a good down and dirty on the PRTs. Here is the link to the report

They have some of the same problems other types of Transition teams do, but as mentioned in the report they should be given credit for getting themselves up and running in the midst of ownership/responsibility issues (which are probabloy getting worked through). The intent is that the PRTs will continue until the criteria is met for a transition to a US AID program

Several themes in the report stuck out:

- A lack of non-military personnel to fill out slots designated for civilians due to some physical risk concerns, or availabilty (rolled up into human resources) - this one ties back into the need for either a larger pool of resources, or cross training military personnel to fill the billets. The report mentions DoD filling the CA slots, but in the future if PRTs (or something of like composition) become a part of a preventive strategy "such as using them in the Horn of Africa", then other slots will have to be filled as well. A friend of mine just returning from R&R says the PRTs are advertising in the El Paso Job Fair (starting at 125K) for certain skill sets. I think this emphasizes that in unstable, immature security environments, either the military is going to have to accept the burden, or the FS is going to have adapt.

-Another issue highlighted Unity of Command. On pg. 14 of the report's main body, it recommended that the PRTs be the agent for the management, auditing, and coordination of all US Govt. reconstruction funds available in the region (this includes CERP and other military funds) under the guidance of the chief of mission. While I can see the need for clarity, and the desire to mass effects, and prevent duplication of effort, I have a problem with that. It seems to uncouple security from stability. I think another alternative would be to subordinate the PRT to the military (no higher then the DIV level, no lower then the BCT) in order to get the unity of command and maintain the simbiotic relationship between security and stability, you get unity of command, and you have the feed back mecahanisms (the patrols and HUMINT collectors) to gauge the effect of the projects, and you have the agility to redirect based on what is having the most effect.

The report is an easy read, and sheds some light on the PRTs activities and issues. It also gives a good look into future problems where military and OGAs and maybe NGAs will interact. We could be talking about disaster relief, Homeland Security, or early civil/military intervention where a combination of TTs under a JTF HQs were deployed to prevent a more serious problem

[Tom Odom]

Tom, Did you mean in the context of HQs such as JFTs, or Unified Commands, or higher? Is it a matter of the execution of good policy, or is it a lack of defined strategy that makes for an inadequate policy? Is it a failure to understand the need for the required command relationships and structures which would reduce friction?
Rob

Rob,

I mean all of the above. The Unified Command Plan, the Dept of State Embassy and Bureau system, the divisions between State, DoD, CIA, AID, FBI etc etc etc are all based on 19th century information flow and management processes. Our decision-making process is like a mental version of trial by combat; the "pure" is proven virtuous by winning.

The Unified Command Plan and the Embassy system are built on the assumption that instantaneous communications do not exist. So we need distant embassies and commands to make decisions--that they no longer make because those instantaneous communications do exist.

I fully realize that these comments are akin to telling a drowning man he needs to learn to swim. I don't have a hip pocket plan to fix this; I do believe we will not go forward unless we begin to talk about it in a meaningful way.

best
tom

[marct]

Hi Rob,

Just a couple of comments on the points you raised.

- A lack of non-military personnel to fill out slots designated for civilians due to some physical risk concerns, or availabilty (rolled up into human resources)
- this one ties back into the need for either a larger pool of resources, or cross training military personnel to fill the billets. The report mentions DoD filling the CA slots, but in the future if PRTs (or something of like composition) become a part of a preventive strategy "such as using them in the Horn of Africa", then other slots will have to be filled as well. A friend of mine just returning from R&R says the PRTs are advertising in the El Paso Job Fair (starting at 125K) for certain skill sets. I think this emphasizes that in unstable, immature security environments, either the military is going to have to accept the burden, or the FS is going to have adapt.

One other option available would be rasing dedicated PRT units either via a National Guard model or internally. One of the things that bothers me is that there is going to be some serious culture conflict internally if, for no other reason, than the salaries.

-Another issue highlighted Unity of Command. On pg. 14 of the report's main body, it recommended that the PRTs be the agent for the management, auditing, and coordination of all US Govt. reconstruction funds available in the region (this includes CERP and other military funds) under the guidance of the chief of mission. While I can see the need for clarity, and the desire to mass effects, and prevent duplication of effort, I have a problem with that. It seems to uncouple security from stability. I think another alternative would be to subordinate the PRT to the military (no higher then the DIV level, no lower then the BCT) in order to get the unity of command and maintain the simbiotic relationship between security and stability, you get unity of command, and you have the feed back mecahanisms (the patrols and HUMINT collectors) to gauge the effect of the projects, and you have the agility to redirect based on what is having the most effect.

Some type of matrix leadership would have to be worked out with very clear guidelines. I can certainly see why you would argue for a sub-ordination of the PRTs and, in some ways, I agree with you. I think, however, that there would be significant problems with a straight subordinant position.

The report is an easy read, and sheds some light on the PRTs activities and issues. It also gives a good look into future problems where military and OGAs and maybe NGAs will interact. We could be talking about disaster relief, Homeland Security, or early civil/military intervention where a combination of TTs under a JTF HQs were deployed to prevent a more serious problem

One of the reasons why I am suggesting a matrix leadership has to do with the international scope of many of the future operations. I think it makes more sense to set up a process that is organizationally flexible so that we don't have to recreate the wheel in the future.

Let me give you one example where this might come into play. Currently, German troops in Afghanistan are restricted in their operations to the equivalent of PRTs. This was a political decision on the part of the German government. This allows me to envision a scenario where you might have an American Battalion with an "embedded" German company that has different rules of engagement. This type of scenario highlights an increased flexibility vs. the current deployment options.

Marc

[Rob Thornton]

Marc,
I'd like to explore the concept of this type of coalition partnership:

Originally posted by Marc - Let me give you one example where this might come into play. Currently, German troops in Afghanistan are restricted in their operations to the equivalent of PRTs. This was a political decision on the part of the German government. This allows me to envision a scenario where you might have an American Battalion with an "embedded" German company that has different rules of engagement. This type of scenario highlights an increased flexibility vs. the current deployment options.

I think that the idea of plugging in CF partners in roles that fit with their capabilities, constraints, etc. is a great idea. I think to have the analysis done up front and the composition of those elements with the decision points as to when they are activated is key. However, it could make for some muddy command relationships along the way as issues such as funding and support are hashed out.

We'd looked at a planning model that used a reverse order sequence (PH IV S&RO, PH III MCO, PH II Condition Setting/Staging & Reception, PH I Deployment) to identify desired end states and work backwards. This led to a better understanding of where decision points could become unhinged by examination of more then just military actions.

While we've done well at adapting to working through an extended PH IV, I think it worthwhile to consider that a political decision point which injected a PH IV Stability & Reconstruction into a failing state right from the start might omit the need for a PH III MCO and be far more cost effective (resources, unneeded deaths and suffering, etc) then waiting until the state fails.

We have full time partnerships such as NATO, but are we really talking about (Tom I think had mentioned way back in the thread) a standing or rotational Combined Multinational JTF? If so, we (the US) and other like minded states would need to synchronize and codify a few things. Truly there are transcendent threats that would seem to only get more dangerous in the future. Tom had mentioned a Key West, maybe we also need a Malta?

Regards, Rob

[marct]

Hi Rob,

I think that the idea of plugging in CF partners in roles that fit with their capabilities, constraints, etc. is a great idea. I think to have the analysis done up front and the composition of those elements with the decision points as to when they are activated is key. However, it could make for some muddy command relationships along the way as issues such as funding and support are hashed out.

I agree. I think this is one of the key problems with any type of alliance structure but, politically, we are in a situation where we have to have them. I do agree with you about the pitential for confusion in command relatioships but, in all honesty, I think that every nation involved in one of these coalition forces should already be thinking in terms of ways to get around the organizational problems.

BTW, in addition to the potential command, funding and support problems, I would also add in a serious media component. If we assume that the majority of conflicts for the next 10-15 years are going to be of a state (or co-alition) vs. non-state form, then the primary battlefield will be in various mediaspaces - at least in terms of achieving ultimate political goals.

We also need to consider developing a serious coalition legal structure, along with a coalition level LE system. One of the key mediaspace issues that has led to a degradation of support for both Afghanistan and Iraq has been questions about the legality of detentions and interrogations, and there should be ways to avoid this. Probably the best way to do so, would be to have a multi-national LE system.

We'd looked at a planning model that used a reverse order sequence (PH IV S&RO, PH III MCO, PH II Condition Setting/Staging & Reception, PH I Deployment) to identify desired end states and work backwards. This led to a better understanding of where decision points could become unhinged by examination of more then just military actions.

Rob, on the whole I think that is probably a good system. It might be even better if it was extended into a Phase V: Successful state reconstruction. As I envision this phase, it would be primarily political, at least in the sense of laying out a general blueprint for a variety of final forms. I do realize that this certainly extends the planning process .

Let me give you one example. In Afghanistan, before the 2003 Loya Jirga, there was a strong move to restore the monarchy. When the Loya Jirga met, however, there was a fairly common perception that even the idea of the monarchy was anathema to the US and that Karzai had enough backing from outside Afghanistan that he could twist the monarch to support him. I remember in the weeks leading up to the Loya Jirga and during it, hearing rumours from a friend (who had a number of family members as delegates). She would complain about outside interference and, after a while, I started to hear about how some of the Pashtun elders were getting very ansy about the process. I have a suspicion that those rumours, whether true or not, account for some of the Taliban support in Waziristan.

The point was that there was an appearance that the final form of the new state was already decided externally rather than internally. This perception, in turn, created a reduced legitimacy for the new government. If there had been a clear statement at the outset that the specific form of the new government was irrellevant, but still accepted certain basic principles, I suspect that the operations would have gone a lot better.

While we've done well at adapting to working through an extended PH IV, I think it worthwhile to consider that a political decision point which injected a PH IV Stability & Reconstruction into a failing state right from the start might omit the need for a PH III MCO and be far more cost effective (resources, unneeded deaths and suffering, etc) then waiting until the state fails.

I agree totally. This is, however, an exceedingly tricky situation under international law and, also, from a PR angle. Even in the current situation in and around Darfur, we can see problems with the concept - i.e. who is going to be willing to admit that their sovereignty is less than total?

We have full time partnerships such as NATO, but are we really talking about (Tom I think had mentioned way back in the thread) a standing or rotational Combined Multinational JTF? If so, we (the US) and other like minded states would need to synchronize and codify a few things. Truly there are transcendent threats that would seem to only get more dangerous in the future. Tom had mentioned a Key West, maybe we also need a Malta?

I think we do need a combined multinational JTF, and NATO may be the organizational framework to try it out in, although there would have to be provisions made for non-NATO members to be part of any specific operation. Certainly the UN has been less than useful or successfull in such endevours .

While I can see any number of short, medium and long term problems with such a combined JTF, I think that most of them could be overcome with sufficient advanced planning.

Marc

[Rob Thornton]

You know, the U.S. could also wind up being the supporting effort / PRT provider for a ally led military effort. We need to consider that we may not be asked to provide what we are comfortable providing because of local /regional / inter-national perceptions.

This would make a great excercise concept for flushing out the linkages.

[marct]

You know, the U.S. could also wind up being the supporting effort / PRT provider for a ally led military effort. We need to consider that we may not be asked to provide what we are comfortable providing because of local /regional / inter-national perceptions.

This would make a great excercise concept for flushing out the linkages.

That's a really good point, Rob. I think something like this would have worked well in Kosovo, and may work well if we ever get more troops in Darfur. It would certainly have the advantage of not requiring a major combat troop commitment while, at the same time, possibly go a fair ways to imporving the US' image worldwide.

Marc

[Rob Thornton]

Strategically what are our imperatives in this face of New Rules and New Enemies?

What are the instruments of policy outside of the application of force that we can use to mitigate our reliance on it? We've talked allot about Inter-Agency, FS, OGAs, Revamping our OES and NCOES, restructuring our organizational and bureaucratic structures, but what about the ideas that would change the causes and supporting causes (real or perceived) about how choose to involve ourselves abroad?

Awhile back there was an article in either Parameters or JFQ (sorry I cannot recall which) that called for a Manhattan Project for alternative energy. In my mind this type of thinking challenges our strategic thinking and provides options to policy.

I also recall reading an article that discussed how many states have skipped a generation of technology (such as going straight to a wireless communications infrastructure), or how some states such as India have based large portions of their economy on IT service communities.

These are just examples, but I think if we do not look forward and examine the impact of supporting causes for intervention (could be commitment of military forces, could be a trade agreement), we will find ourselves potentially committing the inappropriate resources to a problem or problem set. Politically this can be difficult because their is often an expiration date associated with a decision due to elections ( I think this has been a fact of life since the first polis), but it is one that craft a long term sustainable strategy that allows for a state to wisely apply its valued resources, preserve and improve itself, and gain the long term strength of the moral position.

History and examination of how others wield their influence can provide some valuable insights.

[marct]

Hi Rob,

Strategically what are our imperatives in this face of New Rules and New Enemies?

This is, of course, the $64,000 question.

One of the things I find both intensely interesting and, at the same time, intensely frustrating, is how the very debate is constructed. Specifically, the debate appears to take, as an axiomatic assumption, the idea that the only reorganization that matters is within the US.

Now I may be biased, being a Canadian nationalist, but it does strike me that we are not dealing with a situation of present and future conflicts on a State vs. State model. Occasionally, it is a State vs. non-State (e.g. Israel vs. Hezbollah) but, most of the time, it is an alliance of States vs. an alliance of one or more States and non-State actors (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq). I stress the alliance aspect because I believe that it is one of the two centers of gravity used to defeat US / Coalition forces: the first is to break allies away from the US and the second is to increase popular US dissent against US political and military operations.

What are the instruments of policy outside of the application of force that we can use to mitigate our reliance on it? We've talked allot about Inter-Agency, FS, OGAs, Revamping our OES and NCOES, restructuring our organizational and bureaucratic structures, but what about the ideas that would change the causes and supporting causes (real or perceived) about how choose to involve ourselves abroad?

Absolutely crucial. Okay, I am probably going to get dumped on by a lot of people, but I feel I really need to say this. Right now, many people outside the US (including a large number of Canadians and Europeans) view the US as a rather uncivilized and sometimes obnoxious teenager playing on the international stage. While this was something of a problem during the Cold War, it could be tolerated and accepted. With the rise of the EU and China, and the US left as the only "superpower" (hmmpf, it isn't, but that is another rant), anti-American attitudes are "hardening" amongst many current and former allies.

I think the first President Bush understood this, but I don't think the second does and I will point to his unilateral by-passing of the UN debates to get a clear mandate for the invasion of Iraq as a good example of that. BTW, for those of you who don't know this, many Canadians felt insulted by his unilateral rejection of our UN motion in support of a coalition attack on Iraq - that is the political reason why Canada doesn't have troops in Iraq. The entire handling of the UN debate just reinforced the image that the US would do whatever it felt like doing with very little regard for any other nation.

I apologize if I have infuriated anyone by what I have just said but, as someone who is outside the US, I think it needed to be said for one simple reason: one of the keys to defeating any US led coalition is to break away US allies. More importantly, in the case of OIF and the current war in Iraq, I believe that this type of unilateral action gave fuel to local US anti-war protests by concentrating way too much of the debate on whether or not the war was justified as opposed to a debate on how to win it.

Rob, you asked what I consider to be an absolutely crucial question - "What are the instruments of policy outside of the application of force that we can use to mitigate our reliance on it?" I would have to say that one of the policy instruments must be a reliance on the establishment of international support and by-in, and a key component of this must be a respect for other nations and a willingness to moderate positions based on what other nations say. On the bright side, I would have to say that the current Presidents' reliance upon China in the ongoing North Korean situation is, to my mind, a very possitive sign.

End of rant....

Awhile back there was an article in either Parameters or JFQ (sorry I cannot recall which) that called for a Manhattan Project for alternative energy. In my mind this type of thinking challenges our strategic thinking and provides options to policy.

How about an SWJ seminar? I'd be happy to come down and make unpopular comments <wry grin>.

I also recall reading an article that discussed how many states have skipped a generation of technology (such as going straight to a wireless communications infrastructure), or how some states such as India have based large portions of their economy on IT service communities.

Yeah, it's a fairly well known phenomenon in development work. Possibly the best example is the communications development in the Sultinate of Brunei where you actually had neo-lithic villages in the jungle with radio phones. Afghanistan is another example on the communications end. I have a whole bunch of lectures on how societies / cultures adopt and adapt differing technologies and how that plays back into modifying their actions and, eventually, their structures.

These are just examples, but I think if we do not look forward and examine the impact of supporting causes for intervention (could be commitment of military forces, could be a trade agreement), we will find ourselves potentially committing the inappropriate resources to a problem or problem set. Politically this can be difficult because their is often an expiration date associated with a decision due to elections ( I think this has been a fact of life since the first polis), but it is one that craft a long term sustainable strategy that allows for a state to wisely apply its valued resources, preserve and improve itself, and gain the long term strength of the moral position.

I totally agree. I think it is also important to note that nation states themselves are changing. "Sovereignty", for the individual nation state, has been progressively eroding for the past 100 years or so as a result of inter-state agreements (e.g. WTO, GATT, etc.), economic globalization and the rise of regional inter-state "polities" (e.g. the EU, ASEAN, etc.). In effect, individual states actually have less control over their resources due to large numbers of "binding" inter-state commitments.

At the same time, for the past 150 or so years, we have seen an increasing rise in global, non-state actors whether they are multinational corporations, supra-governmental bodies (e.g. the WTO or World Bank), or terrorist groups. This type of shift was quite predictable; for example, George Grant talked about it in Technology and Empire in the 1950's, and most of this trend can be directly corrrelated with increased communicative bandwidth and the development of rapid transportation technologies (if anyone wants the references, I'll be glad to post them).

So we are living in "interesting times". On the one hand, nations states have been systematically eroding their sovereignty through inter-state agreements while, on the other hand non-state actors of all sorts have been coming into existence obtaining some components of sovereignty. On the third hand, individuals are forming their own multi-national "communities" that transcend national boundaries and some of these communities are operating politically and militarily.

History and examination of how others wield their influence can provide some valuable insights.

Too true! Then again, I think we have another thread (or two) that have noted this

Marc

[slapout9]

Rob, I think this is the paper your are talking about. Very good idea. The link is posted below.


http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1339.pdf

[Rob Thornton]

Marc - still thinking about your reply
Slapout - Rgr - thanks - right article - I had lost it back when my laptop crashed

I wanted to post something we had touched on earlier in the thread (I have some time on my hands as its a quiet day here - curfew because of the verdict)

I had written a post on the Advisor's Log I keep on CC.mil for folks coming out on this duty about discussing morals and ethics with their counterparts. A friend of mine who has done some great work on the ethics and morality of killing followed up on it, and I wrote back. The letter is from an email where we are discussing leader development. Any strategy will only take you as far as those who are responsible for executing are prepared to do so. I'll post the letter first then the piece of discussing morals and ethics below that.

From the email

"Pete,
Please feel free to use whatever you think will help develop the evolving skill sets and personality traits we require in our leaders. I've had some interesting thoughts lately about what challenges and demands await the next generation of leaders. I believe it goes far beyond what can be encapsulated on an OER duty and description block. I used to watch with amazement the episodes of the recent Star Trek series where these multi-faceted leaders dealt simultaneously with both their command and responsibilities, and with the problems of being expeditionary (to boldly go....). I did some digging about America's past (an easy read it Max Boot's Savage Wars of Peace, but there are allot of others which are good also) and found that Naval Captains have always had to play part military leader, part ambassador because they were often isolated and with very slow communications back to the US to ask for guidance. I think British Colonial forces may have been required to operate with similar autonomy as well - however their policy goals would have reflect colonial ambitions. To some degree you might also look to frontier America.
So I'm intrigued by what the nature of our strategy for next 20 years (as considered in light of today's expectations) means in terms of requirements for leader development. With the exception of the example of the "Naval Ambassador", the other examples are still somewhat narrow in scope - nobody was really worried about offending Indigenous American Indian tribes unless it meant sacrificing local tactical advantages. When you consider the nature of actions today which make for a kind of interwoven local, regional, domestic and global tapestry of primary, secondary and tertiary effects you wonder if you can afford not having the leaders who are well developed (maybe better developed?) in their emotional and intellectual characteristics.
When you look back at men like Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Lewis and Clarke, and even many of the Civil War officers, you see men who were well versed in many areas from Shakespeare to Smith to Thucydides to Copernicus. They were trained in Engineering, well versed in Humanities, and aware of a wide range of political thought. Their own works bear this out, and cause me to wonder if they were the exception to the exception, or have we become culturally so focused that we have surrendered diversity in favor of narrow development?
Consider our own OES and where the emphasis is given the limited amount of time and the avalanche of requirements (both identified and desired). Since once in the pipe officers are going to be limited to available time, mentor development (still somewhat arbitrary and inconsistent) and self development (desirable but not mandatory), the only place where the exposure to ideas not directly related to military science is during the cadet phase. I am unfamiliar with the requirements at USMA, but I can tell you at ROTC if a cadet wished to pursue a strictly technical degree such as business, or sports medicine or the like, there was no requirement other then the basic core level courses (1000 level) in terms of diversity. While the content of those classes is often solid, the context is mainly subject to students taking a class because it’s a requirement and the discussion of ideas is unfortunately shelved.
Maybe what we could introduce are classes inside the ROTC curricula where these complex ideas as contemplated by great minds are discussed in the context of the challenges these leaders will face abroad. I’m not talking about vignettes for 350-1 requirements, but the discussion of the nature of those ideas and where/why they originated. Its important because many places our officers will go have either never been exposed to those ideas, or culturally see them very different (for example Iraq has suffered under a brutal dictator for a couple of generations – they have adapted their perspective as a result and it will take more then a few years to develop a new perspective). Other then changing the public educations system to acknowledge that there are more life skills needed then just hard math and science, the injection of these ideas into a cadet pedagogy is the only place I see available. I have been far enough removed from ROTC that I no longer am sure what they are teaching.
I’ve recently been in contact with a former squad leader who has finished his 4 year degree and now is seeking a commission in the Army. He was asking for advice on commissioning sources. I explained to him that in my mind the best thing he could do was to spend and additional two years working on his masters’ and attend the 2 years of ROTC. He was not exactly keen on the masters’ part (he’d just been saturated by school). I explained to him the relevance on today and tomorrow’s mission. I told him about the things that I was doing in my current job and what I expected for tomorrow’s leaders.
We are in a time in our military history where we have an opportunity to identify early how to improve our most important resource –people. We need to devote just as much time to investing in them the skills and traits they will need as providing them with the proper hardware. While machines and technology are seldom as good for other tasks as the one they were primarily designed for, people are the most adaptable, agile, tool we have. Machines are not innovative, people are. The leader must be jut as capable of negotiating Human Terrain as physical terrain." - end of email - the Discussion post will follow
?