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  1. #1
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Yes, Marc. In the early days of the American Army it was organized as combined arms legions. This didn't last more than a few years before it was replaced. During the Seven-Years period there were some units that were sort of combined arms, but it was more typical to see them style themselves that way but in practice be light infantry.

    And Tom, I tend to feel that the ACR in either its more current or (preferably) its Vietnam TOE would be outstanding for this type of warfare.

  2. #2
    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Steve Blair View Post
    Yes, Marc. In the early days of the American Army it was organized as combined arms legions. This didn't last more than a few years before it was replaced. During the Seven-Years period there were some units that were sort of combined arms, but it was more typical to see them style themselves that way but in practice be light infantry.
    Thanks, Steve. I sort of remembered that from reading one of my ancestors journals. Okay, that gives a career re-organization an historical basis that can be sold as a "return to traditional values".

    To win the Long War, the Army must change its culture to one that demands and rewards adaptation. This cultural change will serve as the catalyst for a comprehensive redesign of doctrine, organizations, training, leader education, material development and soldier recruitment.

    To win the Long War, the Army must develop a more adaptive organizational culture. To create such a culture, the Army must change its focus from a centralized, specialized focus on major conventional wars to a more decentralized and less specialized focus on full-spectrum operations. This shift in organizational culture cannot occur within existing organizations — indeed these organizations can be an impediment to change. The best way to change the organizational culture of the Army is to change the pathways for professional advancement within the officer corps. The Army will become more adaptive only when being adaptive offers the surest path to promotion.
    The problem with this recomendation is how to actually get it implemented politically. A "return to traditional value" argument is one way to do that.

    The proposal to abolish branch affiliations after the rank of Captain seems interesting, but I would have to question whether or not that would work without fairly extensive retraining. Also, I expect that there is no way it could be implemented without grandfathering everyone who holds higher rank so that they don't have to meet the new requirements <wry grin>.

    In some ways, the proposal reminds me of Heinlein's organization of the Mobile Infantry in Starship Troopers. I wonder if that is where they got the idea from?

    Marc
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

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    Council Member zenpundit's Avatar
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    Default Legion units

    I believe the Civil War saw a revival of "combined arms" units among the volunteers of certain northern States, early in the war.

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    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by zenpundit View Post
    I believe the Civil War saw a revival of "combined arms" units among the volunteers of certain northern States, early in the war.
    It was also very popular in the South. Wade Hampton's Legion springs first to mind, but there were other examples as well. These efforts tended to die out within the first year of the conflict, as the issues of equipment and replacements came to dominate matters.

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