New Rules for New Enemies

[cmetcalf82]

What I would like to see ROTC do is shift away from its heavy emphasis on technical majors and move more into a dynamic form of officer entry.

Currently there are SOME language-type programs available for our cadets, either in the form of advanced language training or cultural immersion (basically a semester or two spent overseas). However, there is no direct link between this system and the university's relations with overseas universities (the school I work for has exchange programs with universities in a number of places, including Egypt and Morocco ). What ROTC COULD be used for is to draw in more people with a liberal arts background (anthro and history, to name two examples) and then allow them (in fact encourage them) to take a semester or two overseas (through the university's exchange program). This would give them a leg up in terms of real skills and cultural exposure when they go on active duty. Currently ROTC does not really tolerate time "away from the unit," which prevents us from making the best use of our students and the programs that are available for them.

Mr. Blair,

I agree that we could utilize ROTC to better prepare future officers. As a product of ROTC I agree that it currently fails to reward future officers who wish to do a year abroad or other forms of immersion study. Without any consideration for cost a way to generate better more rounded officers would be to extend the top 10-20% of ROTC cadets and give them the opportunity for a fifth year of education in return for a longer commitment. They could utilize this fifth year to begin graduate work or allow them to spend a year abroad in some sort of immersion study program. This would expose them to a wider range of experiences and help them better understand the cultural nuisances of living and communicating with other peoples.

[Rob Thornton]

Originally posted by Tom Odom , The need for transformation has in my mind been largely misdirected; it targeted the force, not the bureacracy that wields it and that is where transformation is needed.

Tom, Did you mean in the context of HQs such as JFTs, or Unified Commands, or higher? Is it a matter of the execution of good policy, or is it a lack of defined strategy that makes for an inadequate policy? Is it a failure to understand the need for the required command relationships and structures which would reduce friction?
Rob

[Tom Odom]

Tom, Did you mean in the context of HQs such as JFTs, or Unified Commands, or higher? Is it a matter of the execution of good policy, or is it a lack of defined strategy that makes for an inadequate policy? Is it a failure to understand the need for the required command relationships and structures which would reduce friction?
Rob

Rob,

I mean all of the above. The Unified Command Plan, the Dept of State Embassy and Bureau system, the divisions between State, DoD, CIA, AID, FBI etc etc etc are all based on 19th century information flow and management processes. Our decision-making process is like a mental version of trial by combat; the "pure" is proven virtuous by winning.

The Unified Command Plan and the Embassy system are built on the assumption that instantaneous communications do not exist. So we need distant embassies and commands to make decisions--that they no longer make because those instantaneous communications do exist.

I fully realize that these comments are akin to telling a drowning man he needs to learn to swim. I don't have a hip pocket plan to fix this; I do believe we will not go forward unless we begin to talk about it in a meaningful way.

best
tom

[Steve Blair]

Mr. Blair,

I agree that we could utilize ROTC to better prepare future officers. As a product of ROTC I agree that it currently fails to reward future officers who wish to do a year abroad or other forms of immersion study. Without any consideration for cost a way to generate better more rounded officers would be to extend the top 10-20% of ROTC cadets and give them the opportunity for a fifth year of education in return for a longer commitment. They could utilize this fifth year to begin graduate work or allow them to spend a year abroad in some sort of immersion study program. This would expose them to a wider range of experiences and help them better understand the cultural nuisances of living and communicating with other peoples.

Within AFROTC there are five-year majors, although those are currently restricted to technical fields. Their commitment isn't any longer than people in four year programs. Grades do not matter in this case, only the major selected by the cadet. It wouldn't be at all difficult to expand this program, and it doesn't really entail much in the way of additional expense.

Another good way to improve the quality of ROTC would be to increase the number of scholarships available to students who are already in college. AFROTC currently targets high school seniors for the majority of its scholarships, and as a result tends to draw in people who may be more interested in the money than serving. Granted this is anecdotal based on what I've seen at my detachment, but kids coming out of high school often don't really know what they want to major in, and the scholarship program makes them declare a major right out of the gate.

There are already a fair number of rewards (outside scholarships and so on) for the top 10%-20% of cadets. Being able to target majors other than tech for extended ROTC time might be a better way to increase the quality and depth of our ROTC-produced officer corps.

[Rob Thornton]

On another thread on SWJ entitled "Provincial Reconstruction Teams" there is a link to a good down and dirty on the PRTs. Here is the link to the report

They have some of the same problems other types of Transition teams do, but as mentioned in the report they should be given credit for getting themselves up and running in the midst of ownership/responsibility issues (which are probabloy getting worked through). The intent is that the PRTs will continue until the criteria is met for a transition to a US AID program

Several themes in the report stuck out:

- A lack of non-military personnel to fill out slots designated for civilians due to some physical risk concerns, or availabilty (rolled up into human resources) - this one ties back into the need for either a larger pool of resources, or cross training military personnel to fill the billets. The report mentions DoD filling the CA slots, but in the future if PRTs (or something of like composition) become a part of a preventive strategy "such as using them in the Horn of Africa", then other slots will have to be filled as well. A friend of mine just returning from R&R says the PRTs are advertising in the El Paso Job Fair (starting at 125K) for certain skill sets. I think this emphasizes that in unstable, immature security environments, either the military is going to have to accept the burden, or the FS is going to have adapt.

-Another issue highlighted Unity of Command. On pg. 14 of the report's main body, it recommended that the PRTs be the agent for the management, auditing, and coordination of all US Govt. reconstruction funds available in the region (this includes CERP and other military funds) under the guidance of the chief of mission. While I can see the need for clarity, and the desire to mass effects, and prevent duplication of effort, I have a problem with that. It seems to uncouple security from stability. I think another alternative would be to subordinate the PRT to the military (no higher then the DIV level, no lower then the BCT) in order to get the unity of command and maintain the simbiotic relationship between security and stability, you get unity of command, and you have the feed back mecahanisms (the patrols and HUMINT collectors) to gauge the effect of the projects, and you have the agility to redirect based on what is having the most effect.

The report is an easy read, and sheds some light on the PRTs activities and issues. It also gives a good look into future problems where military and OGAs and maybe NGAs will interact. We could be talking about disaster relief, Homeland Security, or early civil/military intervention where a combination of TTs under a JTF HQs were deployed to prevent a more serious problem

[marct]

Hi Rob,

Just a couple of comments on the points you raised.

- A lack of non-military personnel to fill out slots designated for civilians due to some physical risk concerns, or availabilty (rolled up into human resources)
- this one ties back into the need for either a larger pool of resources, or cross training military personnel to fill the billets. The report mentions DoD filling the CA slots, but in the future if PRTs (or something of like composition) become a part of a preventive strategy "such as using them in the Horn of Africa", then other slots will have to be filled as well. A friend of mine just returning from R&R says the PRTs are advertising in the El Paso Job Fair (starting at 125K) for certain skill sets. I think this emphasizes that in unstable, immature security environments, either the military is going to have to accept the burden, or the FS is going to have adapt.

One other option available would be rasing dedicated PRT units either via a National Guard model or internally. One of the things that bothers me is that there is going to be some serious culture conflict internally if, for no other reason, than the salaries.

-Another issue highlighted Unity of Command. On pg. 14 of the report's main body, it recommended that the PRTs be the agent for the management, auditing, and coordination of all US Govt. reconstruction funds available in the region (this includes CERP and other military funds) under the guidance of the chief of mission. While I can see the need for clarity, and the desire to mass effects, and prevent duplication of effort, I have a problem with that. It seems to uncouple security from stability. I think another alternative would be to subordinate the PRT to the military (no higher then the DIV level, no lower then the BCT) in order to get the unity of command and maintain the simbiotic relationship between security and stability, you get unity of command, and you have the feed back mecahanisms (the patrols and HUMINT collectors) to gauge the effect of the projects, and you have the agility to redirect based on what is having the most effect.

Some type of matrix leadership would have to be worked out with very clear guidelines. I can certainly see why you would argue for a sub-ordination of the PRTs and, in some ways, I agree with you. I think, however, that there would be significant problems with a straight subordinant position.

The report is an easy read, and sheds some light on the PRTs activities and issues. It also gives a good look into future problems where military and OGAs and maybe NGAs will interact. We could be talking about disaster relief, Homeland Security, or early civil/military intervention where a combination of TTs under a JTF HQs were deployed to prevent a more serious problem

One of the reasons why I am suggesting a matrix leadership has to do with the international scope of many of the future operations. I think it makes more sense to set up a process that is organizationally flexible so that we don't have to recreate the wheel in the future.

Let me give you one example where this might come into play. Currently, German troops in Afghanistan are restricted in their operations to the equivalent of PRTs. This was a political decision on the part of the German government. This allows me to envision a scenario where you might have an American Battalion with an "embedded" German company that has different rules of engagement. This type of scenario highlights an increased flexibility vs. the current deployment options.

Marc

[Rob Thornton]

Marc,
I'd like to explore the concept of this type of coalition partnership:

Originally posted by Marc - Let me give you one example where this might come into play. Currently, German troops in Afghanistan are restricted in their operations to the equivalent of PRTs. This was a political decision on the part of the German government. This allows me to envision a scenario where you might have an American Battalion with an "embedded" German company that has different rules of engagement. This type of scenario highlights an increased flexibility vs. the current deployment options.

I think that the idea of plugging in CF partners in roles that fit with their capabilities, constraints, etc. is a great idea. I think to have the analysis done up front and the composition of those elements with the decision points as to when they are activated is key. However, it could make for some muddy command relationships along the way as issues such as funding and support are hashed out.

We'd looked at a planning model that used a reverse order sequence (PH IV S&RO, PH III MCO, PH II Condition Setting/Staging & Reception, PH I Deployment) to identify desired end states and work backwards. This led to a better understanding of where decision points could become unhinged by examination of more then just military actions.

While we've done well at adapting to working through an extended PH IV, I think it worthwhile to consider that a political decision point which injected a PH IV Stability & Reconstruction into a failing state right from the start might omit the need for a PH III MCO and be far more cost effective (resources, unneeded deaths and suffering, etc) then waiting until the state fails.

We have full time partnerships such as NATO, but are we really talking about (Tom I think had mentioned way back in the thread) a standing or rotational Combined Multinational JTF? If so, we (the US) and other like minded states would need to synchronize and codify a few things. Truly there are transcendent threats that would seem to only get more dangerous in the future. Tom had mentioned a Key West, maybe we also need a Malta?

Regards, Rob

[marct]

Hi Rob,

I think that the idea of plugging in CF partners in roles that fit with their capabilities, constraints, etc. is a great idea. I think to have the analysis done up front and the composition of those elements with the decision points as to when they are activated is key. However, it could make for some muddy command relationships along the way as issues such as funding and support are hashed out.

I agree. I think this is one of the key problems with any type of alliance structure but, politically, we are in a situation where we have to have them. I do agree with you about the pitential for confusion in command relatioships but, in all honesty, I think that every nation involved in one of these coalition forces should already be thinking in terms of ways to get around the organizational problems.

BTW, in addition to the potential command, funding and support problems, I would also add in a serious media component. If we assume that the majority of conflicts for the next 10-15 years are going to be of a state (or co-alition) vs. non-state form, then the primary battlefield will be in various mediaspaces - at least in terms of achieving ultimate political goals.

We also need to consider developing a serious coalition legal structure, along with a coalition level LE system. One of the key mediaspace issues that has led to a degradation of support for both Afghanistan and Iraq has been questions about the legality of detentions and interrogations, and there should be ways to avoid this. Probably the best way to do so, would be to have a multi-national LE system.

We'd looked at a planning model that used a reverse order sequence (PH IV S&RO, PH III MCO, PH II Condition Setting/Staging & Reception, PH I Deployment) to identify desired end states and work backwards. This led to a better understanding of where decision points could become unhinged by examination of more then just military actions.

Rob, on the whole I think that is probably a good system. It might be even better if it was extended into a Phase V: Successful state reconstruction. As I envision this phase, it would be primarily political, at least in the sense of laying out a general blueprint for a variety of final forms. I do realize that this certainly extends the planning process .

Let me give you one example. In Afghanistan, before the 2003 Loya Jirga, there was a strong move to restore the monarchy. When the Loya Jirga met, however, there was a fairly common perception that even the idea of the monarchy was anathema to the US and that Karzai had enough backing from outside Afghanistan that he could twist the monarch to support him. I remember in the weeks leading up to the Loya Jirga and during it, hearing rumours from a friend (who had a number of family members as delegates). She would complain about outside interference and, after a while, I started to hear about how some of the Pashtun elders were getting very ansy about the process. I have a suspicion that those rumours, whether true or not, account for some of the Taliban support in Waziristan.

The point was that there was an appearance that the final form of the new state was already decided externally rather than internally. This perception, in turn, created a reduced legitimacy for the new government. If there had been a clear statement at the outset that the specific form of the new government was irrellevant, but still accepted certain basic principles, I suspect that the operations would have gone a lot better.

While we've done well at adapting to working through an extended PH IV, I think it worthwhile to consider that a political decision point which injected a PH IV Stability & Reconstruction into a failing state right from the start might omit the need for a PH III MCO and be far more cost effective (resources, unneeded deaths and suffering, etc) then waiting until the state fails.

I agree totally. This is, however, an exceedingly tricky situation under international law and, also, from a PR angle. Even in the current situation in and around Darfur, we can see problems with the concept - i.e. who is going to be willing to admit that their sovereignty is less than total?

We have full time partnerships such as NATO, but are we really talking about (Tom I think had mentioned way back in the thread) a standing or rotational Combined Multinational JTF? If so, we (the US) and other like minded states would need to synchronize and codify a few things. Truly there are transcendent threats that would seem to only get more dangerous in the future. Tom had mentioned a Key West, maybe we also need a Malta?

I think we do need a combined multinational JTF, and NATO may be the organizational framework to try it out in, although there would have to be provisions made for non-NATO members to be part of any specific operation. Certainly the UN has been less than useful or successfull in such endevours .

While I can see any number of short, medium and long term problems with such a combined JTF, I think that most of them could be overcome with sufficient advanced planning.

Marc

[Rob Thornton]

You know, the U.S. could also wind up being the supporting effort / PRT provider for a ally led military effort. We need to consider that we may not be asked to provide what we are comfortable providing because of local /regional / inter-national perceptions.

This would make a great excercise concept for flushing out the linkages.