Turkey: what is going on?

[tequila]

I am only suggesting they be shown some serious disrespect. This Armenian debate business is a polite slap with a glove on. They are much like dogs in the proverbial manger. Their old animosity towards the Kurds appears to have blinded them and they could not see much beyond the inevitable Kurdish gain they knew would accompany the toppling of Saddam Hussein, so they sat smug and complacent forbidding the 3rd ID their Northern egress after assurances had been given.

Do you think disrespecting a proud ally is a good way to make them do what you want them to do? Sounds like an excellent way to convince them that your friendship isn't worth anything at all and that perhaps they should find better allies, like the Chinese or the Iranians. If you read the Turkish press, you'll find that many Turks already think like this due to reports of American weapons and advisors in PKK camps.

They will sit smug and complacent when the sparks fly in Iran, and they will fly there, in part because they share Kurdish animosity with the Persians. This to me is the Islamic imprint on strategic thinking that is creeping in on them, nothing more.

You're going to have to decipher this one for me, I have no idea what you mean here.

[Surferbeetle]

From today's Bloomberg news

Turkey is playing hardball in the geopolitical struggle over an $8 billion pipeline at the center of Europe's efforts to cut dependence on Russian natural gas.

The nation, which bridges Europe and Central Asia, is trying to profit from its strategic location and become a key part of Europe's energy plan. This might bolster its push to join the European Union -- if its negotiating tactics don't exhaust Europe's patience.

Europe wants Turkey to be a transit corridor along the Nabucco pipeline's 3,300-kilometer (2,062-mile) route from the Caspian Sea region to Austria. Turkey wants more control: acting as a regional energy hub, collecting gas from the east, buying some domestically at below-market prices and passing on the rest to Europe for a variable fee.

In January 2006, Nabucco catapulted to the top of the EU's agenda after Russia briefly cut gas deliveries to Ukraine over a price dispute, blocking flows to Europe. Although Nabucco's capacity of 31 billion cubic meters would account for only 5 percent of the EU's 2020 gas needs, it would provide competition and may help lower prices, the EU says.

``The Nabucco pipeline is a clear economic and political necessity,'' said EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs in a March 2006 interview.

Gas-Rich Regions

Turkey, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and an EU candidate since 2005, has long aspired to link the oil-and gas-rich regions of Central Asia with Europe. Its port city of Ceyhan receives 1 million barrels daily of Azerbaijani oil through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.

[Ron Humphrey]

From today's Bloomberg news

I would hope this one is looked at long and hard before being jumped into.

You know like the difference between the different vendors in a flea market selling the same thing and the guy standing in between you and the very same product he's selling but for much less somewhere behind him. Sure I'll let you pass but you have to buy this first

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 6 Jun 08: Turkey's Shifting Dynamics: Implications for US-Turkey Relations

Turkey remains a pivotal actor in many important dimensions of U.S. foreign, national security, and economic policy. For more than half a century, a sound relationship with Turkey has been central to advancing U.S. interests in Eurasia and the Middle East and to creating new strategic opportunities for the United States and its other NATO allies. Yet, fundamental changes in their country and neighborhood have altered how Turks view and pursue their interests. The governing Justice and Development Party (AKP), supported by a new middle class from the Anatolian heartland that has emerged amidst growing prosperity, has eclipsed traditional secularist parties. Many Turks now favor more freedom of religious expression in public life. However, the AKP’s moves to reduce some of the strictures of state-enforced secularism have raised fears of creeping Islamization among the old elite and the military guardians of Atatürk’s republic and triggered a Constitutional Court case seeking to ban AKP and a number of its leaders from politics. Turkish politics are poised to enter a period of turbulence and unpredictability.....

RAND, 11 Jun 08: The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey

This monograph describes the politico-religious landscape in Turkey and the relationship between the state and religion, and it evaluates how the balance between secular and religious forces—and between the Kemalist elites and new emerging social groups—has changed over the past decade, particularly since the AKP came to power in 2002. The study also assesses the new challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy in the changed Turkish political environment and identifies specific actions that the United States may undertake to advance the U.S. interest in a stable, democratic, and friendly Turkey and, more broadly, in the worldwide dissemination of liberal and pluralistic interpretations of Islam.....

Complete 135 page study at the link.

[Rex Brynen]

As the RAND report correctly notes, Turkey is at a turning point:

The real threat confronting the AKP at the onset of Prime Minister
Erdoğan’s second term is not a direct intervention by the military, but
rather a decision by the judiciary to close down the party.

..and very likely to turn in the wrong direction, with the secular-Atatürkist "deep state" apparatus banning the party and its key leaders. Given the AKP's relatively impressive record of governance (better than any other Turkish party in decades, I would argue), and its very moderate and democratic Islamism, this is indeed a depressing possibility.

It also has broader implications: radical Islamist movements are likely to point to the AKP's fate as proof that electoral participation and moderation are pointless. Even when you win elections, increase your vote share in subsequent elections, promote foreign investment, improve human rights, participate in NATO (and send forces to ISAF), try to join the EU, and mediate Israeli-Syrian peace.... you still aren't allowed to stay in power. Why not then turn to violence?

I've yet to hear Western governments weigh in on this in any significant way. Certainly, EU leverage has declined as EU accession looks increasingly unlikely. It is also hard for outsiders to comment on internal Turkish judicial processes without raising nationalist hackles. Still, it would be a tragedy if the remarkable democratic transition in Turkey was reversed.

[MattC86]

As the RAND report correctly notes, Turkey is at a turning point:





It also has broader implications: radical Islamist movements are likely to point to the AKP's fate as proof that electoral participation and moderation are pointless. Even when you win elections, increase your vote share in subsequent elections, promote foreign investment, improve human rights, participate in NATO (and send forces to ISAF), try to join the EU, and mediate Israeli-Syrian peace.... you still aren't allowed to stay in power. Why not then turn to violence?

I've yet to hear Western governments weigh in on this in any significant way. Certainly, EU leverage has declined as EU accession looks increasingly unlikely. It is also hard for outsiders to comment on internal Turkish judicial processes without raising nationalist hackles. Still, it would be a tragedy if the remarkable democratic transition in Turkey was reversed.

The (potential) parallels here with Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt are interesting. I heard a former DoS official once say, "we really have no idea what the hell they'd be about if they were in power. There's a strong chance that they'd be moderate Islamists, along the lines of the AKP, but no one really knows," and that we should try to find out and then when Mubarak dies press for the whole crappy system (really vestigial Nasserism) to fall on the scrap heap.

I believe that may have some merit - in the long run I just don't see secular moderates winning in the ME, let alone secular liberals. Moderate Islamist groups may be the least indigestible solution; but as the DoS official says, someone needs to figure out what the heck some of these groups would be like in power.

I agree also a military coup is highly unlikely - for one, the recent Islamization of the officer corps (no longer highly secular) and the fact that a move against the AKP and another coup would end Turkey's Europe aspirations forever, as well as damage its status as the reliable and stable ME country. . .

Regards,

Matt

[davidbfpo]

A minor point for this thread. The chances of Turkey joining the EU fully are slim, whatever the diplomats say. Leaving aside Greek and Cypriot objections, there is no public support for this extension (not that the public has much impact on the EU) and the EU has got enough to do without adding a huge member.

I am not convinced accession to full EU membership is what AKP seeks, but the reassurance for maintaining democracy or having a political "comfort blanket" that being part of Europe provides. Very different from the economic aspects.

davidbfpo

[Jedburgh]

I agree also a military coup is highly unlikely - for one, the recent Islamization of the officer corps (no longer highly secular). . .

I concur that a military coup is unlikely - the pending coup is judicial in nature. However, I believe that you overstate the "Islamization" of the officer corps. Not only do overtly Islamist officers continue to be purged, but as a group the Turkish officer corps remains almost virulently secular, and Kemalist ideology continues to be drilled into them from their earliest days to the end of their careers. That doesn't mean that there aren't such elements within the military - but I feel that that those elements are a very long way from having the power to exert any significant influence over internal or external military decision-making.

....and the fact that a move against the AKP and another coup would end Turkey's Europe aspirations forever, as well as damage its status as the reliable and stable ME country.

Here I believe that you understate the determination of the elite secular Turks to preserve their Kemalist ethno-nationalist identity. This would not be the first time that they've cut off their nose to spite their face (refer to issues related to Armenia, Cyprus, the Kurds, etc.). The move against the AKP is ongoing; it is unlikely to be halted at this point. But, as stated above, it is not the Turkish military that will ultimately remove them from power, but the Turkish judicial system.

The supreme irony is that the threat of radical Islam in Turkey will likely increase due to the secularists' attack on the moderate and reformist AKP.