"Standards of Excellence"

[bumperplate]

I do not have the book mentioned above, although I am going to order it right now. There is a Stackpole edition out with the same authors/editors, copyright 2009, that seems to be much cheaper, so I'll probably order that one.

However, from the passages listed above, it seems this book attacks the subjects of command & leadership solely from a combat perspective and that seems to be line in the sand on these threads about excellence, leadership, and so forth. There is garrison management and combat leadership, but unfortunately our garrison managers are wearing the rank that takes them to combat in leadership positions. That is our problem. Seems to me the Germans had a different system whereby their Army was recruited from districts which were overseen by separate commanders that were either not deemed to be combat leaders or were injured or in some other way should not be at the front, and if I remember correctly they employed a similar system for the logistical resupply and garrison/refit environments. But, once they deployed to combat, the combat leaders were in charge.

Perhaps that is a model our military should begin following.

[Pete]

If I could modify my previous post in this thread (Post 20) I would, but I can't. Therefore this clarification of what I mean to say.

Most of the successful leaders in the U.S. armed forces are a combination of being showboats and down-and-dirty people who get things done. It's not quite as binary as my previous message implied. It's sort of a spectrum between the two extremes, and most men and women who wear the green suit fall somewhere in the middle between those two poles.

Many of the leadership essays and textbooks say there is an element of showmanship about leadership. It's a matter of projecting self-confidence and charisma in front of others. It could be when you're addressing your company or battery or it could be while you're giving a briefing in the Pentagon.

Then there is the nuts-and-bolts stuff of being a soldier -- leadership, weapons, tactics, and solving practical problems. You've got to know your stuff, and if you don't the others will know it.

For better or for worse I've known good officers who are a combination of these two types of soldier. On one hand they can be inspiring leaders who get things done in the field or office, but on the other they are military politicians who suck up and brown-nose to their superiors.

In 1994 as a contractor I worked for a young major like that who is now an O-6. He got the operational job done when we were overseas, but some of the PowerPoint briefings he gave about the excellence of the things he was doing were flagrantly dishonest.

It seems to me that many people in the Army think they have to play the politics and appearance-versus-reality game even when they are competent soldiers who know their trade. I suspect that during the last 20 years this syndrome has infected the senior NCO corps as well.

In things like this it's hard to sort out who are the heroes and who are the villains. Nuances and shades of gray.

[bumperplate]

I think Pete's last comment is probably at the 99% solution. I know my biggest struggle is that I keep seeking to be honest in my assessments and messages. I've grown tired of reading OERs and seeing briefings that are gross exaggerations if not lies.

I do what I can in front of my Soldiers to portray the confidence, but more than confidence, I think passion carries a larger effect. When your troops see that you're passionate about the mission and about taking care of them, that carries a lot of weight. Passion is much more durable than mere confidence.

In the end analysis, I have come to the conclusion that I will never make it to the top shelf ranks in the Army. I am not a self-promoter and cannot keep my mouth shut when I see crap going on. It will probably cut my career short but so be it. All else that we do pales in comparison to combat and that's my focus - training for and leading in combat.

I do wonder though, it seems like the people with the best handle on military/combat leadership are those on this and similar sites, while those with the real power in the military just don't pay attention. I'm not totally ignorant to the time demands our senior leaders have. And I don't think I'd have a problem if they just took over the garrison and admin stuff and then let the real combat leaders take over once they're wheels up and leaving CONUS.

[Fuchs]

Don Vandergriff and others wrote a lot about that problem and possible solutions.

[Tyree]

And so did Doug Macgregor. They are both now on the outside looking in. Both were men of great talent. Both had something vital to say. But both proved once again it is not what you say, the validity of your message, but how you say it and to whom.

[Ulenspiegel]

What would be the problem to implement an officer training/education program as it existed in the German Reichswehr 1920-1932?

IMHO a good reading in respect to different leadership and different approaches to officer candidates selection is Jörg Muth's book "Command Culture" published in June 2011, it is the book version of the author's dissertation.

[JMA]

What would be the problem to implement an officer training/education program as it existed in the German Reichswehr 1920-1932?

IMHO a good reading in respect to different leadership and different approaches to officer candidates selection is Jörg Muth's book "Command Culture" published in June 2011, it is the book version of the author's dissertation.

Muth's book at £25 is expensive to buy but should be very educational.

In the meantime here is a US document from 1942 on the broader subject of German Army training.

German Military Training

Given the economic condition of Germany after Versailles and the restrictions on the military the methods used to build that war machine should indeed be studied as there must be lessons for other nations in there somewhere.

[Fuchs]

I'd rather look at the Foreign Military Studies series of documents than those wartime intelligence briefs, which were ridden with mistakes.

For example, Hitler did not solve the problem how to create an officer corps for a 300 division force; even counting Luftwaffe divisions, there were only about half that many, and army officers were always short in supply.
A 300 division force with a (normal) divisional slice of 50k personnel would have been a force of 15 million men; it would have required French- or Soviet-style mobilization to come even close!

Another example is the SA, which became quite irrelevant in 1934 and was certainly not the kind of important organisation in 39/40 as described in that 1942 document.

[ganulv]

Given the economic condition of Germany after Versailles and the restrictions on the military the methods used to build that war machine should indeed be studied as there must be lessons for other nations in there somewhere.

Have you seen Triumph of the Will? I watched it for the first time recently. My mouth might literally have hung open during the initial footage featuring units from the National Work Service.

[ganulv]

I've grown tired of reading OERs and seeing briefings that are gross exaggerations if not lies. […] I am not a self-promoter and cannot keep my mouth shut when I see crap going on. It will probably cut my career short but so be it.

A friend told me that her grandfather (a career state legislator) once said to her that an important part of being an effective politician was never loosing a grip on the difference between what he told everyone he was convinced was the truth and what he himself was convinced was the truth. I don't know how many people in positions of power think like that. I kind of suspect that a great many of them don't even rise to that level morally, but maybe I am just being cynical.

[Pete]

I am not a self-promoter and cannot keep my mouth shut when I see crap going on. It will probably cut my career short but so be it.

After the Mexican War U.S. Grant had a big Report of Survey against him when he had been the Quartermaster Officer of his regiment when it was in the Midwest during an extremely severe winter. The regiment was spread out all across the land in detachments, companies and battalions. Grant did all he could to keep them fed, with firewood and forage. When spring came Grant had to face the Report of Survey, and afterwards he had to go about a year without pay to pay it off.

When he was the senior officer of a group sent to California around 1850 the people were hit with a cholera epidemic when they crossed Panama. Men and women, officers and enlisted, children too were shi**ing themselves to death. Grant said it was the worst thing he saw during his military service, war or peace. When Grant got the group to San Francisco he get no credit from his regiment or the Army for his leadership during the affair.

After Grant got the old heave-ho from the Army his wife left him and moved back in with her father. Everyone thought U.S. Grant was an alcholohic loser.

Perceptions changed after he captured Vicksburg. In 1864 Lincoln decided he needed a real soldier in command of the Army of the Potomac, not a showboat, a prancer and dancer, or someone who would juggle the books to cover up a supply discrepancy on the property book. Grant's tactics were crude and bloody in '64-'65 but he got the job done. He was never a showboat and he was wearing a mud-splattered private's tunic when Lee surrendered to him.

[bumperplate]

I wonder if our Army/Society/Current operational environment would ever allow for a repeat of Grant's story as told above. I suspect it could not happen. We are too worried about metrics with regard to leadership, rather than mission results.

[Steve Blair]

After Grant got the old heave-ho from the Army his wife left him and moved back in with her father. Everyone thought U.S. Grant was an alcholohic loser.

Perceptions changed after he captured Vicksburg. In 1864 Lincoln decided he needed a real soldier in command of the Army of the Potomac, not a showboat, a prancer and dancer, or someone who would juggle the books to cover up a supply discrepancy on the property book. Grant's tactics were crude and bloody in '64-'65 but he got the job done. He was never a showboat and he was wearing a mud-splattered private's tunic when Lee surrendered to him.

Grant's wife didn't leave him. She'd periodically lived with her family, as was quite common during this time. And Grant's star began to rise with Lincoln during the Donelson period, with more motion coming in the aftermath of Shiloh. But that's just the historian talking. Carry on...

To address bumperplate's comment, Grant was in many ways an exception even during his day. Many officers in the pre-Civil War army would look very familiar to us today. Drones and careerists were just as common then in terms of the overall force (remember that we're talking about an army that didn't often clear 20,000 total strength and was often under 15,000). For every Civil War success we remember, there were at least 5 duds from the Regular ranks.

[Pete]

... Grant was in many ways an exception even during his day. Many officers in the pre-Civil War army would look very familiar to us today. Drones and careerists ...

What was exceptional about Grant was that he made it to the top and won the war nobody else could. The problem with this precedent from history is that America won't put a guy like him in charge until it's 5 or 10 minutes until Midnight and the end of the world as we know it is impending. As Churchill said, America can always be relied upon to do the right thing after it has exhausted all of the other alternatives.

[Steve Blair]

What was exceptional about Grant was that he made it to the top and won the war nobody else could. The problem with this precedent from history is that America won't put a guy like him in charge until it's 5 or 10 minutes until Midnight and the end of the world as we know it is impending. As Churchill said, America can always be relied upon to do the right thing after it has exhausted all of the other alternatives.

It's the nature of the system, Pete, and I think you'll find that the US is not alone in this respect. We just talk about our failings more than most other nations do.

[JMA]

I do not have the book mentioned above, although I am going to order it right now. There is a Stackpole edition out with the same authors/editors, copyright 2009, that seems to be much cheaper, so I'll probably order that one.

This book is the pre WW2 German Army doctrine.

A quote from the foreword:

Despite the evil nature of the regime it served, it must be admitted that the German Army of World War II was, man for man, one of the most effective fighting forces ever seen.

A valuable reference work to have on a soldiers bookshelf.