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Thread: Command Responsibility and War Crimes: general discussion

  1. #61
    Council Member Polarbear1605's Avatar
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    Default I don't think we are really for pistols and ten paces

    Quote Originally Posted by davidbfpo View Post
    I am not sure what happened in a number of recent posts, but we meandered away from our normal high standards of respect for each other.
    Thank you, now please carry on.
    Standard US Civil War Tactics…find a good piece of high ground (terrain or moral; either works), dig in and let’em come (Fredericksburg, Gettysburg). It is one of those wait until you see the whites of their eyes things.
    "If you want a new idea, look in an old book"

  2. #62
    Council Member Polarbear1605's Avatar
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    Default Yep!

    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    James Spaight contended in 1911 that:

    My conclusion is that nothing has changed in a century; the international laws of war are a minimal topic with little value added for most people; and that topic is probably better left to specialized sites such as Lawfare and Opinio Juris, where there is peer review. If I'm wrong, please tell me why.

    Regards

    Mike
    Could not agree more...SECDEF recently ask the Defense Legal Policy Board for an investigation into six questions:

    http://www.caaflog.com/wp-content/up...1-May-13-2.pdf

    An unsolicited critique recommending that Combat Commanders should follow the LOW vs whatever they are doing now starts with:

    "One flaw that manifests itself early in the investigation is the board’s definition of “civilian casualties” defined as “the death, serious injury or abuse of a local national civilian due to the action of US or Coalition forces in a combat environment”. We believe that this definition is entirely too broad and distracts from the LOW (Laws of War) protected status of combatants and noncombatants. In addition, this definition entirely ignores non-combatant casualties caused by enemy actions. Because the SECDEF specifically establishes the scope of this investigation to “military justice in combat zones” that should immediately mean that all definitions should be based on the LOW.
    The LOW presents a number of rules and definitions for personnel present in a combat zone. The two main categories are combatants and non-combatants with categories defined for prisoners of war, wounded, spies and others. We must remember that the LOW state:
    “Civilian immunity carries with a strict obligation on the part of civilians not to take a direct part in hostilities--they must not become combatants. Taking a direct part in hostilities means engaging in acts of war directed toward enemy personnel or materiel. Civilians who take part in fighting (whether singly or as a member of a group) become combatants and lose their personal immunity.”
    The panel’s definition of civilian casualties, therefore, actually extends civilian immunity to enemy combatants (and terrorist) and, as the panel repeatedly states, “especially in COIN operations”. We believe that much of the controversy ricocheting from many of these high profile combat operational death cases is rooted in DOD’s non-adherence to the LOW definitions."
    "If you want a new idea, look in an old book"

  3. #63
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    Default Bear Post 1: Full Agreement;

    no one in this thread has the slightest reason to apologize or make nice for anything. Repeat: no one in this thread has the slightest reason to apologize or make nice for anything.

    Bear Post 2: Response (if any) only after reading the 217 page report - and you gripe about me giving you long assignments. But first I have to look at a 2-hour movie on Waterloo - "pitched battles" and all that, old boy.

    Regards

    Mike

  4. #64
    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    Kant's Perpetual Peace - better watch it; when you get to "Heaven", Lieber will nip at your ankles for being a "closet pacifist".

    Regards

    Mike
    I acknowledge the strength of your title's "perhaps"
    As to Kant and Perpetual Peace:
    One thing in Kant that I like a lot is his notion of a regulative ideal. It is something we probably cannot attain, but ought to strive for anyway. I think Perpetual Peace is such a regulative ideal.
    And my reason for posting my comment may well be summed up in the following short poem from the Danish polymath who was the inventor of the SOMA Cube

    Quote Originally Posted by Piet Hein
    Only hoping

    Only hoping isn't what
    Gives us strength to cope
    Let us only hope; but not
    only only hope.
    Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
    The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris

  5. #65
    Council Member Polarbear1605's Avatar
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    Default But the font is so big

    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    no one in this thread has the slightest reason to apologize or make nice for anything. Repeat: no one in this thread has the slightest reason to apologize or make nice for anything.

    Bear Post 2: Response (if any) only after reading the 217 page report - and you gripe about me giving you long assignments. But first I have to look at a 2-hour movie on Waterloo - "pitched battles" and all that, old boy.

    Regards

    Mike
    and when you get done with that I will send you our 36 page critique
    "If you want a new idea, look in an old book"

  6. #66
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Dayuhan View Post
    I would be interested to see a serious study comparing attitudes toward these matters in "peer conflicts" such as the civil war and in wars fought against "savages", widely viewed at the time as being essentially members of another species. From the US perspective that would mean the Native American wars and the Philippine-American War... maybe Steve Blair could provide some cases from he former. Certainly any such examination could also look at Europe, and compare attitudes and practices prevalent in conflicts among Europeans with those pitting Europeans against Kipling's "lesser breeds without the law".
    You can also find some examples from the U.S. interventions in the Caribbean during the inter-war period. Haiti springs most quickly to mind, but there are others.

    Dealing with the Indian Wars, there are a number of factors that come into play. Chivington was never held to account for a number of reasons, one of which was his status as an officer of volunteers (putting him beyond the reach of military justice). That was actually one of the arguments against using those troops on the frontier (made before the Civil War, so it wasn't a result of post-War second thoughts). The Marias River massacre in 1870 was another example...one that effectively destroyed the plan to shift control of the reservations to the Army and led to Grant's "Peace Policy." Major Baker, commander of the forces that attacked a Piegan band camped near the river, was a known drunkard but was never charged. There is also the strong possibility that the camp he attacked was intentionally misidentified as hostile by a scout who had connections to the band Baker was supposed to be hunting. A final example is the Camp Grant Massacre, carried out by both natives and citizens in 1871 near Tucson, AZ. No real charges resulted from Camp Grant, even though it sparked a major Indian war in the area. Territorial politics played a role, of course, but it should also stand as a stain on George Crook (often proclaimed as the Indian's one true friend) that he did nothing to bring the perpetrators of the attack to justice and instead worked indirectly with them to discredit the officer (a Lieutenant Whitman) who had established the camp and was trying desperately to keep the peace in the area.

    The attitudes of Army officers towards the Indians is a fairly complex question, and varies greatly depending on which officer you're considering. Some were realistic enough to understand what was happening, some hated the Indians, others were indifferent. Many blamed the Indian Bureau and local civilians for Indian troubles. I don't know that there was one overall "view" held by Army officers of their opponents.

    An interesting point of comparison might come from looking at the conduct of volunteer forces in places like Eastern Kentucky or the Kansas-Missouri border region during the Civil War. Clearly peer-on-peer, and at times kin-on-kin, but the fighting there was often far more ruthless than that encountered on the plains. Some of the Indian conflicts (such as the Army's prolonged pursuit of the Nez Perce in 1877) were almost conventional affairs, and certainly more "civilized" than what went on in western Missouri and parts of Eastern Kansas during the Civil War and before.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

  7. #67
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    Default Bear: Large Fonts; Large Rhetoric

    The following excerpt is lovely, ironic black humor (to my now admittedly warped sensibilities):

    p.131, fn 170

    One issue that the Subcommittee discussed was whether the Article 32 investigating officer should be a judge advocate or other officer. ... GEN Chiarelli referenced investigative efforts after Haditha: “in order to understand why we shot and why we didn’t shoot, you got to have somebody down there to understand what it’s like to have to make those decisions, and not all our lawyers have had to make those decisions, but I think it was absolutely critical that that individual ha[s] a bevy of lawyers that he could call on to give him recommendations and make sure he was straight.” DLPB Public Meeting, 15 February 2013, Transcript, at 183.
    Thus, GEN Chiarelli, I'm sure that you'll recommend that each Marine "Strategic Corporal", who has to make the actual command decision to order "the shoot" and probably do some of the actual shooting, shall have his own "bevy of lawyers". And, also that bevy will covey and come up not only with the appropriate weaselly, lawyerly language for the order, but also the appropriate weaselly, lawyerly language for his after-action report to render him impervious to prosecution. Ah, yes, Gen. Large Rhetoric; what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.

    Now, I'm warmed up for the 36-page critique.

    You could send it email; or if you think it's fit for publication, save it as a .pdf file and attach it to a post here.

    Regards

    Mike

  8. #68
    Council Member TheCurmudgeon's Avatar
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    Default A recent example...

    An Oklahoma Army lieutenant has been found guilty of two counts of murder in connection with a series of shootings in Afghanistan.

    A jury at Fort Bragg delivered the verdict against Clint Lorance, an 82nd Airborne Division lieutenant, on Thursday evening and he was sentenced to 20 years in prison, forfeiture of all pay and dismissal from the U.S. Army. Lorance, 28, was found not guilty of making a false official statement.

    Prosecutors said Lorance recklessly ordered his men to open fire immediately, after three men on a motorcycle approached his patrol in southern Afghanistan in July 2012. They said this was in violation of the military's rules of engagement, which requires soldiers to hold fire unless they have evidence of hostile action or hostile intent.

    ...The two soldiers who fired the shots have been reprimanded but won't have to go through a full court martial.


    One of them, Private David Shilo, testified at Lorance's court martial: 'I was given a lawful order. My life wasn't threatened at the time.'
    http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/arti...fghan-men.html
    Last edited by TheCurmudgeon; 08-06-2013 at 02:52 PM.
    "I can change almost anything ... but I can't change human nature."

    Jon Osterman/Dr. Manhattan
    ---

  9. #69
    Council Member Polarbear1605's Avatar
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    Default but of course it is fit for publishing...lol

    We found out about the Defense Legal Policy Board as they concluded their investigation public hearings on the SECNAV questions from a press story. We missed the hearings but we were able to submit the "critique" and have it entered as part of the record. Needless to say, we were pressed for time and "way behind", hence, the heavy use of enclosures. When I tried to upload I got this message: "Your file of 533.0 KB bytes exceeds the forum's limit of 195.3 KB for this filetype." I will have to email it to you. ...maybe the SWJ will publish it...ewwww...I like that idea.
    "If you want a new idea, look in an old book"

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    Default Bear's Critique - Attachments

    Any errors in translating from Arctic Ursian to English are mine.

    Two attachments to the Critical Critique were image files which I couldn't convert. One of them is a letter re: 1stLt. Andrew Grayson (one of the Haditha Marines - acquitted), which exists somewhere in Defend Our Marines. The other is the "Flag Officer Amici Brief" filed in the SCOTUS Behenna case (docket record).

    01 Bear is the Critical Critique; 02 & 03 Bear are the Attachments.

    Regards

    Mike
    Attached Files Attached Files

  11. #71
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    Default Who Has The Strategic Corporal's Back ?

    From 01 Bear, p.3:

    We were also surprised that the panel did nothing to address or even discuss the issue often called the “double standard” (See Attachment 3: Double Standard). This ad hoc standard can be viewed in two different perspectives. The first situation is we seem to be holding our infantry small unit leaders [to] a very tight standard when compared to strategic military operations. Civilian casualties due to air, drone, and Special Forces strikes seem to be easily accepted, yet small unit actions causing fewer casualties can easily result in a court martial action. In addition, we now have a public relations situation with something called the “Leavenworth Ten”. These are Soldiers and Marines serving lengthy sentences when enemy terrorist[s] convicted of murdering US Service Men in Iraq and Afghanistan have longed been turned over to the host nation and released (See Attachment 4: “Heroes, Shame and Tarnish Brass”).

    Another concern is expressed in the following questions. Who on the panel represents the enlisted Marines and Soldiers? Was there someone specifically appointed to look out for the best interest of the military enlisted personnel and junior officers? Do any of the panel’s recommendations impede a combat Marine’s or Soldier’s right to self-defense? Do any of the panel’s recommendations disrupt or impede the combat trust relationship between military leaders and their subordinates that is considered essential for successful combat operations?

    We would expect to see a number of Sergeant Majors and Master Chiefs and a set of former civilian defense councils as panel participants. The pool of experienced civilian defense councils in this country, dealing with these high profile cases, has certainly grown since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The expansion of experienced civilian defense councils can partially be attributed to the accused and their families who have absolutely no trust and confidence in the military court martial system. The distrust, in part, comes from the military persecutors and service chiefs manipulations; both fair and unfair, and both perceived and real.
    This complex of issues has little to do with bevies of lawyers. It has a great deal to do with Command Responsibility and Responsible Command. What do others feel about these issues ?

    Regards

    Mike
    Last edited by jmm99; 08-07-2013 at 03:57 AM.

  12. #72
    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    This complex of issues has little to do with bevies of lawyers. It has a great deal to do with Command Responsibility and Responsible Command. What do others feel about these issues ?
    I suspect it has as much to do with personal risk aversion and personnel risk aversion.

    By this, I mean we tend to use stand off weaponry to lessen the risk of having to put troops in direct combat (personnel risk aversion). However, when we are required, for whatever reason, to get up close and personnel with enemy combatants, we must take significant personal risk to protect those who have not given up their privilege not to be killed without good reason (the innocent civilians). Commanders should have high levels of personnel risk aversion and so tend to use stand off weapons. Since using these kinds of weapons reduces the risk to the troops, folks are probably more likely to look the other way when collateral damage (not the kind excusable under the doctrine of double effect by the way) occurs. When troops do have to get involved directly, the personnel risk aversion is still there and is compounded by personal risk aversion. But, to outsiders, personal risk aversion is not permissible; for them a "you knew the job was dangerous when you took it" attitude prevails. Thus, collateral damage that occurs as a result of limiting personal risk (I'll just pick off the guy on the motorcycle from here rather than put myself at more risk by getting close enough to a see if he is armed) is just not as acceptable.

    BTW dealing with personnel risk aversion instantiates aspects of both Command Responsibility and Responsible Command while personal risk aversion relates almost exclusively to Command Responsibility in my view.
    Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
    The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris

  13. #73
    Council Member Polarbear1605's Avatar
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    Default Reply to WM

    Understand what you are says about risk aversion…but I honestly do not believe that our general officers are applying any type of risk analysis or matrix to these situations. I do believe that the “double standard” is now dogma and an indicator of bad strategy. For example, and I have used this one frequently because the world watched this event on their TVs. When we got al-Zarqari in Iraq, we dropped two 500 LB bombs on the house he occupied. There was collateral because among the multiple bodies was a woman and probably a child. We also know that Special Forces had eyes on target because when they got to Zarqari to confirm his death, he was still alive. This attack is easily justified under the laws of war based on the principle of military necessity.
    When we look at Lt Lorance's case, as an example (I say example, because our military leadership has gotten so confidently numb with this dogma, they no longer leak the investigations and we only have these passing lines in short news articles), he was not convicted of violating the laws of war. He was convicted of murder. When two “civilians” are dogging you on motor cycles on a counter insurgency battlefield, calling them civilians and charging you with the Rule of Law crime of murder, avoids the issue that they may have been acting like recon. Acting as recon moves them into the Laws of War category of “Enemy Combatants”. What this legal case does (and many others) is to extend the right of civilians to enemy combatants and denies the rights of combatants (and self-defense) to Soldiers and Marines in combat.
    "If you want a new idea, look in an old book"

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    Default wm: it's a start

    I understand the catagories:

    1. Personnel Risk Aversion, involves both Command Responsibility and Responsible Command.

    2. Personal Risk Aversion, involves almost exclusively Command Responsibility (perhaps ?)

    but I think the construct needs more development.

    I'd suggest a distinction between "personal risk aversion" and "unit risk aversion" (which I'd distinguish from "personnel risk aversion"). E.g., under one set of facts which could be argued in the Behenna case (which involved multiple, variant and contradictory sets of facts and "facts"), with respect to a specific individual (say, a unit commander), personal self-defense would be not justified to him, whereas unit self-defense would be justified to him - all under the same set of posited facts (or "facts"). In short, a unit commander in killing a person could be unjustified with respect to the concepts underlying personal self-defense (variable), but justified with respect to the concepts underlying unit self-defense (absolute).

    More broadly, we have the concepts underlying "individual" and "collective" self-defense; as well as the concepts underlying "individual" and "collective" offense against what is perceived or defined as "evil". I'd argue that both Command Responsibility and Responsible Command are involved as soon as a "unit" (e.g., a 4-man fireteam) enters the picture. So, the "Strategic Lance Corporal".

    Thus, the focus should be focused on what I'd call "Comparative Combat Philosophies and Policies", driving "Comparative Combat Law" (not Google categories) - a very non-objective topic, subject to biases and emotions (and rightly so, I'd argue).

    While the "laws of war regulating combat" (jus in bello) have been discussed ad nauseum (at least to me presently), discussion of their underlying philosophies and policies is less frequent. Perhaps, I've missed some things.

    Gabriella Blum is one who has discussed this topic in two recent articles (abstracted below).

    For an introduction to her, see these videos (less than 10 min each): Gabriella Blum, Tomorrow 2008 (JMM comment: Focus is on the future of International and Regional Organizations - "coalitions of the willing" vs "coalitions of the pi$$ed"); and Gabriella Blum, Tomorrow 2009 (JMM comment: Focus is on Liberal Arts Education vs "Trade Schools", to include law schools; "a collection of slaves").

    Besides being interesting (much more so than Michael Walzer), she has great methodology and depth, as exemplified in the following:

    Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers (2009)

    Abstract:

    Why are all soldiers fair game in war? The laws of war, under their current interpretation, divide up populations into two classes – that of civilians and that of combatants – and accord each its own set of privileges and obligations. Taken together, the legal principles of military necessity and distinction strike up a bargain by which combatants are to be sacrificed for the protection of civilians. Under this bargain, all soldiers are fair game, regardless of their role, function, or the degree of threat they pose at any particular moment. Consequently, the killing of retreating soldiers in Iraq, the attack on officials meeting in Korea or shooting soldiers playing soccer in Bosnia – are all legitimate military operations.

    This paper challenges the status-based distinction of the laws of war, which has so far been widely accepted by international law scholars, calling instead for revised targeting doctrines that would place further limits on the killing of enemy soldiers. My argument stems from a recognition of the value of all human life, including that of enemy soldiers. I argue that the changing nature of wars – the decline in the importance of any generic ‘combatant,’ the growing civilianization of the armed forces, and the advance in technology – casts doubts on the necessity of killing all enemy soldiers indiscriminately.

    I offer two amendments: The first is a reinterpretation of the principle of distinction, suggesting that the status-based classification be complemented by a test of threat. Consequently, combatants who pose no real threat would be spared from direct attack. The second is a reinterpretation of the principle of military necessity, introducing a least-harmful-means test, under which an alternative of capture or disabling of the enemy would be preferred to killing whenever feasible.

    I discuss the practical and normative implications of adopting these amendments, suggesting some possible legal strategies of bringing them about.
    Gabriella Blum, The Individualization of War: From Collectivism to Individualism in the Regulation of Armed Conflicts (2013)

    Abstract:

    In a celebrated humanitarian move, wartime regulation has evolved from a predominantly state-oriented set of obligations — which viewed war as an inter-collective effort — to a more individual-focused regime. In fact, the regulation of armed conflict increasingly resembles, at least in aspiration, the regulation of police activities, in which it is the welfare of individuals, rather than the collective interest of the state, that takes center stage.

    I demonstrate that many contemporary debates over the laws of war, including the distinction between the jus ad bellum and jus in bello, proportionality, detention of combatants, and reparations for victims implicate exactly the tension between collectivism and individualism in the regulation of armed conflict.

    I further argue that notwithstanding the humanitarian benefits of the move to greater concern over the human rights of those affected by war, reimagining war as a policing operation harbors real dangers that must not be overlooked. These include imagining more of policing as war, inhibiting military action for the protection of others, and inviting more aggressive acts “short of war” against targets around the world.
    Her subject matter choices (from the 2009 article) are mine also:

    The article proceeds as follows. Part 2 offers an overview of the general principles of the laws of war, as they pertain to the permissible targeting of combatants on the battlefield. Part 3 summarizes the mainstream philosophical justifications for subjecting combatants to deliberate targeting and the dissenters’ voices in challenging them. Part 4 fleshes out three fundamental strategic changes in the nature of wars and combatants, namely the declining value in killing generic combatants in modern
    conflicts, the civilianization of the armed forces, and the technological sophistication of at least some militaries. In Part 5, I propose possible alternative doctrines, which aim at limiting the legitimate targeting of combatants. I discuss the practical implications of this amended reading and the possible legal strategies for bringing it about.
    All that being said, for the most part, I strongly disagree with much that she opines as a recipe for the future. But, that is a matter of variant philosophies and policies - which proves my point (at least to myself ).

    Where we end up on these issues of "Comparative Combat Philosophies and Policies", driving "Comparative Combat Law", hinges little on dry reason, but rather on our experiences and our concepts of integrity, moral courage, loyalty and accountability - see 1993 Krulak USNA, pt.1 and pt.2 (about an hour total); and Hugh Thompson at My Lai (USNA, 5 videos, about 1 hour).

    Regards

    Mike

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    Default The Naked Soldier, Robert Graves and Risk

    Some (Gabriella Blum not among them) cite the following incident (mentioned in Blum's 2009 article as quoted below) as evidence of an enemy spared by the humanitarian instincts of the poet and mythologist Robert Graves (one of my favorite authors on myths):

    In Just and Unjust Wars , Michael Walzer ([1977] 2006, 143) famously takes on the question of the Naked Soldier, first raised by Robert Graves (1929) in his memoir Good-bye to All That : Is a soldier stripped naked and swimming in the lake a legitimate target during an armed conflict? The answer, says an uncomfortable Walzer, is unequivocally “yes.”
    My recollection of Graves WWI memoirs, Good-bye to All That, was that the event was less than humanitarian. Lo and behold (at p.132) we find it - and a discussion of individual and collective risk:

    Like everyone else, I had a carefully worked out formula for taking risks. In principle, we would all take any risk, even the certainty of death, to save life [of a comrade] or to maintain an important position. To take life we would run, say, a one-in-five risk, particularly if there was some wider object than merely reducing the enemy's manpower; for instance, picking off a well-known sniper, or getting fire ascendency in trenches where the lines came dangerously close. I only once refrained from shooting a German I saw, and that was at Cuinchy, about three weeks after this. While sniping from a knoll in the support line, where we had a concealed loop-hole, I saw a German, about seven hundred yards away, through my telescopic sights. He was taking a bath in the German third line. I disliked the idea of shooting a naked man, so I handed the rifle to the sergeant with me, 'Here, take this. You're a better shot than I am.' He got him; but I had not stayed to watch.
    Whatever this might be, humanitarianism it was not.

    Graves was one of four Royal Welch Fusilers who wrote WWI memoirs of note. The others were Siegfried Sassoon (3 vols.), Frank Richards (2 vols.) and J.C. Dunn (a thick Bn history). The last includes extensive excerpts by Clifton Stockwell aka "Buffalo Bill", who was the "officer in charge" of the RWF's segment of the 1914 "Christmas Truce". Stockwell was a fine soldier (a coy, bn and bde commander), who went to bat for his men with higher commands; but who had an abrasive personality - e.g., "I never remember him having any favorites: he treated all the men the same way - like dirt"; and "... an absolute pig if you got the wrong side of him."

    Regards

    Mike

  16. #76
    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Polarbear1605 View Post
    I honestly do not believe that our general officers are applying any type of risk analysis or matrix to these situations. I do believe that the “double standard” is now dogma and an indicator of bad strategy.
    Bear,
    You may be right that no deliberate application of risk analysis is being applied. However,I am not so sure that what is happening is dogmatic. I believe (and am supported by a fair amount of research reported in the safety engineering literature) that each individual has a different level of risk tolerance/risk aversion. (I do not really want to get sidetracked into a nature/nurture argument and discuss whether this is innate or acquired.) Having differing levels of risk tolerance suggests we also have different needs and, therefore, techniques for risk mitigation. Compare, for example, Montgomery's and Patton's campaigns in N. Africa and the WWII ETO. I submit the action to mitigate risk occurs almost reflexively rather than deliberately and, therefore, is not dogmatic.

    Quote Originally Posted by JMM
    I'd suggest a distinction between "personal risk aversion" and "unit risk aversion" (which I'd distinguish from "personnel risk aversion").
    Works for me. I was trying to make a distinction between the individual (a natural person, by the way) and the collective (an artificial person). However, I do have some qualms about what to make of the status of that artificial person. I find it hard to cash out exactly what those qualms are and why they bother me, but for starters, I question the applicability of the analogy found in St. Augustine that takes the acceptability of personal self defense and maps it to national self defense. I think that much of my concern stems from two sources: the concept of a moral agent and the notion that praiseworthiness/blameworthiness requires some ability to act after deliberation. Artificial persons are not able to deliberate in my worldview and are not "really" moral agents as a result.

    On a different tack, I think the distinction between command responsibility and responsible command is tied to the difference between positional (public) rights/duties/morality and personal (or private) rights/duties/morality.
    Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
    The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris

  17. #77
    Council Member ganulv's Avatar
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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by wm View Post
    On a different tack, I think the distinction between command responsibility and responsible command is tied to the difference between positional (public) rights/duties/morality and personal (or private) rights/duties/morality.
    Every subject’s duty is the king’s but every subject’s soul is his own?
    If you don’t read the newspaper, you are uninformed; if you do read the newspaper, you are misinformed. – Mark Twain (attributed)

  18. #78
    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    Some (Gabriella Blum not among them) cite the following incident (mentioned in Blum's 2009 article as quoted below) as evidence of an enemy spared by the humanitarian instincts of the poet and mythologist Robert Graves (one of my favorite authors on myths)
    I had forgotten about Walzer's Naked Soldier. Thanks for reminding me. The key difference in the account you then quoted from Good-Bye to All That is that Graves refers to the target as a naked man, not a naked soldier. The passage in Walzer is meant, I think to highlight the tension thast exists in the fact that a soldier is also a human being. Some of us (Americans at least) are stuck with words from the Declaration of Independence (all men are created equal) that make it hard for us to separate the soldier from the human being. I do not think that Graves had the same problem, as you note by saying the act was less than humanitarian--the sergeant was a better shot after all.
    Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
    The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris

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    Default Enemy Sensibilities

    My dad was nailed by a German mortar while traveling between the latrine slit trench and his foxhole. He thought the Germans showed decency in not nailing him while he was astraddle the slit trench.

    Regards

    Mike

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    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    My dad was nailed by a German mortar while traveling between the latrine slit trench and his foxhole. He thought the Germans showed decency in not nailing him while he was astraddle the slit trench.

    Regards

    Mike
    In a prior post you mentioned memoirs from Welch Fusiliers. With the German Guns by Herbert Sulzbach is also a rather genteel WWI memoir. For an interesting German counterpoint to Graves, Sulzbach, Sasson et.al., you might take a peek at Ernest Junger's Storm of Steel

    BTW Sulzbach also served in the British Army, eventually getting a commission during WWII.
    Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
    The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris

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