The new Libya: various aspects

[CrowBat]

I thought that the GNA only existed on paper, and that the squabble remains between the original GNC and the CoD?

The GNA remains relevant: Haftar is never going to be recognized by the UN, and thus not by Western powers either - and he knows that.

But, meanwhile he's in a position where without him, there's no Libyan state.

At any rate, I prefer Haftar and the influence of the Jordanians, Egyptians and Emiratis to Islamists and the influence of the Turks and Qataris.

'Problems':

- a) One third of Haftar's LNA are Salafists. In comparison, and no matter how much declared 'Islamist', the GNA forces are none of that.

- b) Egypt is a military dictatorship; Jordan is a 'royal' dictatorship (no matter how much nice-talked because its a US ally); and UAE is a dictatorship too.

Any idea what three dictatorships are likely to do with a military dictator in Libya? For example, how likely are they to install a pluralist democracy...?

Obama made many rookie mistakes in his first term. From the standpoint of US national security, I would say that Operation Odyssey Dawn was worse than Operation Iraqi Freedom, despite the difference in casualties, especially American. Why?

• Libya had agreed in 2003 to abandon its WMD programs in return for a resumption in normal relations with the West
• China and Russia were under the impression that the NFZ would not be a cover for intervening on behalf of the rebels, which the British, French and Qataris did; the latter on the ground, in contravention of the UNSCR
• Iran and North Korea regarded OOD as a betrayal of Libya's abandonment of WMDs
• Between OOD and the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, rogue nuclear states observed that no gentleman's agreement or guarantee could substitute for the deterrence of nuclear weapons
• Nuclear proliferation by North Korea and Pakistan, as well as potentially by Iran and others is more of a national security threat than the ongoing mess created by OEF

Aha. An imposing list of arguments.

BTW, have you ever heard of some human beings called 'Libyans'? If you have, what's with their rights and interests? Is it so these don't matter because they are 3-5 million of predominantly Moslem Arabs and Berbers? Or shall I conclude you're one of those advocating retention of oppressive dictatorships in interest of Western-centric POVs...?

[Azor]

The GNA remains relevant: Haftar is never going to be recognized by the UN, and thus not by Western powers either - and he knows that. But, meanwhile he's in a position where without him, there's no Libyan state.

Then there has to be an accommodation made.

a) One third of Haftar's LNA are Salafists. In comparison, and no matter how much declared 'Islamist', the GNA forces are none of that.

None? The GNC did not have any Muslim Brotherhood elements? Ankara and Doha are both supporting secularists, deviating from their usual policy of supporting the MB?

b) Egypt is a military dictatorship; Jordan is a 'royal' dictatorship (no matter how much nice-talked because its a US ally); and UAE is a dictatorship too.

So? Qatar is a dictatorship and Turkey is transforming itself into one as well. So much for the "model" Muslim country...

Any idea what three dictatorships are likely to do with a military dictator in Libya? For example, how likely are they to install a pluralist democracy...?

So the Turks and Qataris want pluralist democracy? Not the MB in power?

Aha. An imposing list of arguments.

BTW, have you ever heard of some human beings called 'Libyans'? If you have, what's with their rights and interests? Is it so these don't matter because they are 3-5 million of predominantly Moslem Arabs and Berbers? Or shall I conclude you're one of those advocating retention of oppressive dictatorships in interest of Western-centric POVs...?

I was arguing why intervention in Libya was a strategic mistake, not that the people of Libya don't deserve liberal democracy.

I can think of many peoples deserving of Western protection from domestic and foreign oppression, where intervention would have caused a greater disaster, namely nuclear war.

After the ousting of Qaddafi and the annexation of Crimea, how can any state possessing or developing nuclear weapons see any benefit in dismantling their weapons or programs? For guarantees that can be breached? For a few years of sanctions relief?

In the Arab Muslim world there are few successes when it comes to freedom and democracy. However, Tunisia comes to mind as the only one of these countries ranked as "free" (FH) or as a democracy, albeit a "flawed" one (EIU). Behind Tunisia is Morocco (hybrid government, partly free) and Lebanon, but the latter is over 40% Christian, and the Muslims are evenly divided between Sunni and Shia.

As in Africa, energy resources have proven to be a curse, as can be seen in Libya, Algeria and the Gulf Arab states, with the wealth acting as more of a hindrance than help as far as liberal democracy is concerned.

Tunisia is an interesting case, as in the aftermath of the Revolution, Islamist parties only received 37% of the vote, compared to 65% for Egypt. Whereas Tunisia's parliament elected an interim president who was a secularist and the subsequent 2014 race was between two secularists, Egypt narrowly elected an Islamist president (Morsi).

Of all the countries caught up in the Arab Spring, Tunisia's Revolution seemed to involve the least foreign interference, in stark contrast to Libya, Syria and to a lesser extent Egypt. Even Tunisia's version of the Muslim Brotherhood seems closer to the Christian Democratic parties of Europe, than its sister organizations in Turkey and Egypt.

[CrowBat]

None? The GNC did not have any Muslim Brotherhood elements?

The GNC - not.

It was the pre-GNC government (which was never recognized interntionally, and which quit once the UN-supported government arrived in Tripoli) that was 'MB-influenced'.

Ankara and Doha are both supporting secularists, deviating from their usual policy of supporting the MB?

Irrelevant - because, and as described above: they're out of the game. Not only that even Ansar ash-Sharia was destroyed, but after all experiences of the last two years, nobody is going to listen to them any more. Which means they have no meaningful 'proxies' in Libya.

I was arguing why intervention in Libya was a strategic mistake, not that the people of Libya don't deserve liberal democracy.

You're arguing in US/Western-centric style - while entirely ignoring the core reason for the situation.

Time and again, you come to post about something like 'historian approach to monitoring the situation' etc. But, when it comes to apply your studies of history, you seem unable to do so. Why?

If you check the British history: the country began making giant leaps forward the moment it started sorting out its human-rights-related issues - and it grew as powerful precisely because it did so centuries ahead of anybody else. The Netherlands - ditto. If you check the US history: even more so (although the time-lapse was measured by decades, rather than by centuries).

But, in the case of countries like Libya, and just like the entire 'establishment' (whether political or academic) you're approaching the topic from the tail first: correspondingly, it's 'all about intervention'...

...and 'not the least about Libyans'...?

Sorry, but such discussions are meanwhile getting boring.

Thus, and excuse me, please, but I'll reply only to what I find interesting:

Tunisia is an interesting case, as in the aftermath of the Revolution, Islamist parties only received 37% of the vote, compared to 65% for Egypt.

Sigh... as if it would be that much different anywhere else (than it turned out in Tunisia)...

And re. Egypt: Egypt is no example for anything at all. The country is such an utter chaos and wishful thinking that nobody understands it - especially not Egyptians (indeed, Egyptians can't even agree with themselves if they are Egyptians or Arabs, just for the start).

At most, one can say that Egyptians made a mistake during their elections - and elected by heart, not by reason. Then they realized they made a mistake - and corrected it, but in wrong fashion: instead of giving it a second chance and waiting for next elections, they all (including most of MBs) supported a military coup. Obviously, that was their next mistake, and now they have to wait for the next opportunity to correct it.

Of all the countries caught up in the Arab Spring, Tunisia's Revolution seemed to involve the least foreign interference, in stark contrast to Libya, Syria and to a lesser extent Egypt.

Oh, really...?

The only difference between Tunisia and all the other 'caught in the Arab Spring' was that Tunisia was over very quickly - and then because Ben Ali was a man enough to admit to himself that people don't want him, and to go.

That's something that 'can't happen' to such megalomaniacs like Q, like Assad, or quite a few others.

[Azor]

I'm glad to see that Ankara and Doha are "out of the game" and have "no meaningful proxies" in Libya. Hopefully the situation winds down, as the country has more than enough oil and gas revenue potential to support its population decently. Yet Libya's black gold and small population as been about as much benefit to the average Libyan as Equatorial Guinea's has. Hopefully the unity government, when it is finally established, can be prevailed upon to follow the Norwegian model. After supporting the rebellion, the least that London and Paris can do is midwife a better future than the past under Qaddafi.

You're arguing in US/Western-centric style - while entirely ignoring the core reason for the situation. Time and again, you come to post about something like 'historian approach to monitoring the situation' etc. But, when it comes to apply your studies of history, you seem unable to do so. Why? If you check the British history: the country began making giant leaps forward the moment it started sorting out its human-rights-related issues - and it grew as powerful precisely because it did so centuries ahead of anybody else. The Netherlands - ditto. If you check the US history: even more so (although the time-lapse was measured by decades, rather than by centuries). But, in the case of countries like Libya, and just like the entire 'establishment' (whether political or academic) you're approaching the topic from the tail first: correspondingly, it's 'all about intervention'...

I would say that economic advancement led to political advancement, as greater income and wealth as well as the greater diffusion of both, produced a middle class upon whose acquiescence the rule of the <1% rested.

As for humanitarian intervention, I would start with Sudan and the Congos first...

And re. Egypt: Egypt is no example for anything at all. The country is such an utter chaos and wishful thinking that nobody understands it - especially not Egyptians (indeed, Egyptians can't even agree with themselves if they are Egyptians or Arabs, just for the start). At most, one can say that Egyptians made a mistake during their elections - and elected by heart, not by reason. Then they realized they made a mistake - and corrected it, but in wrong fashion: instead of giving it a second chance and waiting for next elections, they all (including most of MBs) supported a military coup. Obviously, that was their next mistake, and now they have to wait for the next opportunity to correct it.

The only difference between Tunisia and all the other 'caught in the Arab Spring' was that Tunisia was over very quickly - and then because Ben Ali was a man enough to admit to himself that people don't want him, and to go. That's something that 'can't happen' to such megalomaniacs like Q, like Assad, or quite a few others.

The Egyptian military has its hooks in the economy in the way that the Revolutionary Guards do in Iran. It didn't appear the Tunisia had the same situation...

Subsequent violence aside, the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia lasted for the same duration and inflicted the same number of fatalities, irrespective of post-revolutionary violence.

It seems that the moderate opposition in Tunisia was stronger than it was in Egypt, and that the Muslim Brotherhood in the latter was decidedly Islamist, anti-Western and anti-GCC.

As for Bashar al-Assad's personality, I don't find him on the same plane as Hussein in terms of brutality. I also believe that Syrian regime activities are more dictated by Iran and Assad's inner circle than him personally...

But, we will know more when the dust finally settles.

[CrowBat]

I would say that economic advancement led to political advancement, as greater income and wealth as well as the greater diffusion of both, produced a middle class upon whose acquiescence the rule of the <1% rested.

Along the theory about the 'China prototype'...?

That's plain silly: it's not really working even in China - at least not without another oppressive dictatorship.

I do not understand why is it so hard to understand that it works only the other way around: give people the freedoms, keep them safe from terror, then let them develop - and they'll manage it. I do not recall a single example of where this didn't work.

It seems that the moderate opposition in Tunisia was stronger than it was in Egypt, and that the Muslim Brotherhood in the latter was decidedly Islamist, anti-Western and anti-GCC.

'Moderate opposition'... sigh: with very few exceptions (and most of these would certainly surprise you), 99% of people are always 'moderate', no matter what country, ethnic group or religion. Question is always what is done to support one or the other side.

Thanks whoever, Tunisia was left on its own - by supporters of pluralism and by those of extremism.

As for Bashar al-Assad's personality, I don't find him on the same plane as Hussein in terms of brutality.

Such standpoints are simply based on lack of knowledge about Assadist regime.

Here a few examples of what is going on in their prisons, every single day, since nearly 50 years (warning: GRAFFIC, not recommended for consumption after breakfast): Assadist regime in 30 seconds.