The new Libya: various aspects

[davidbfpo]

A rare report on this urban conflict, now in it's sixth month:http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-lib...-idUKKBN13D226

Not encouraging for other cities.

[Bill Moore]

The article points out two things. The first, which most ground troops already know is that urban warfare is a slow and messy fight that produces high casualties. The second, known by some, is that ISIL is producing some top rate fighters that are not only tenacious, but highly skilled in both conventional and unconventional warfare. Whether you want to refer to Mao's phases of guerrilla warfare, or just use common sense, this article points out how these conflicts ebb and flow in intensity.

Those are the knowns. The unknowns, are where the fighters that escaped this particular battle (but also others such as Mosul) will go next? Will they be able to generate another 5th column in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, or even Europe? Will they be able to convert this 5th column into a conventional like force that hold ground? Will they able to transfer the skills they have learned and procure the necessary military materials to create major havoc elsewhere? Will western nation police forces be able to cope with this threat? Regarding the material aspect, I think that will be their major challenge. These violent movements have made substantial progress in war torn areas where military and munitions were readily available (Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, Somalia). That isn't the case in most of the West, so logistic challenges may limit the major threat to what many refer to as the arc of instability. However, that doesn't prevent them from conducting simple or sophisticated terrorist attacks in the West.

While the through, by, and with approach has it merits, if we're honest with ourselves, we must admit it also has its shortfalls. When the West chooses to depend upon surrogates or partner nation (if you can call Libya a nation anymore) forces they have opted to take a slow approach. This often based on the perception that it reduces risk to Western forces, but it doesn't take into account risk to achieving the mission.

Increasingly time matters. Time creates opportunities for adversaries, whether it is Russia in Syria, Iran in Iraq, or the weakening of a coalition before the conventional clearing operations are over. When we consider whether to use a unilateral, combined, or enabled (working through partners) approach, we shouldn't automatically default to one approach is better than the other, or that effective COIN efforts take 10 or more years. We need to consider what our aims strategic aims are, and assess the merit of each course of action, to include mixed approaches, to achieve that aim.

[CrowBat]

Well, it's certainly so that the Daesh is 'producing' some 'tenacious, highly skilled in both conventional and unconventional warfare' fighters. But, it seems nobody said so to the fighters of the GNA in Libya.

What's the point? I think the situation should be put within its context - which is: developments in Libya of the last four months ('or so').

As should be known by now, Haftar's forces ('LNA') - supported by Emiratis, Egypt, and Jordan - are on something like advance. That is: depends on what part of Libya are we talking about, and against what kind of opponents too.

Let's start with the start.

It all began with above-reported establishment of the UN-supported GNA government in Tripoli - which is a de-facto Misuratan government. While this kicked Turkey and Qatar out of the overall game, it also offended Haftar - plus his Emirati, Egyptian, and Jordanian supporters - and then so much so, the LNA launched an all-out attack on the Ansar ash-Sharia in Benghazi area.

To keep a long story a short one, the LNA advance in Benghazi area literally destroyed Ansar ash-Sharia. And when I say 'destroyed', I really mean that: for all practical purposes, this group is out of the war. On 7 October, a LNA/AF air strike on one of their remaining positions near Benghazi has killed their last leader, Mukhtar Burezeiza (he took over from Zahawi, two years ago).

After that, Haftar - who's playing the game of relevancy with the UN, knowing there is going to be some sort of a cease-fire, sooner or later, and the power is going to be distributed rather by force than by diplomacy - turned on that 'Petroleum Security Force' (or whatever is the designation).

Namely, this militia - led by the 'Libyan Oil King', Ibrahim Jathran - switched sides to the GNA, back in September. This created a weird situation where the GNA controlled export terminals while Haftar controlled oilfields (except in Ubari area, where the oil terminal was controlled by the local Toubou militia). Obviously, that was bad for business ('spice must flow', after all), so Haftar launched a 'major military campaign': his forces advanced on Agedabia and arrested Jathran's brother - mayor of Agedabia - thus forcing his tribe to switch sides. Then Haftar signed a death warrant for Jathran, in turn forcing him to start supporting the Saraya militia (led by Sadeq Ghariyani)...

The last anybody heard about Jathran is that he got seriously wounded during one of many LNA/AF air strikes in Syrte area...

With this, Jathran's Petroleum Force was out of the war, and Haftar is ever since in control of most of Libya's oil.

Meanwhile, Haftar & Consorts (i.e. Emiratis, Egyptians and Jordanians), bribed Farej Again - GNA's defence minister - and Abdulrahman Swehli, to change to his side. They pocketed the money, but didn't like the idea. Instead, they defected - but not to Haftar: they established their own (third in total) government of Libya (and all three are still active), back in October:

Rump of GNC and Ghwell stage coup, declaring themselves back in power

In a dramatic turn of events, a handful of members of the former General National Council and the former Tripoli “prime minister” have staged an apparent coup in Tripoli, taking over the#the GNC’s old premises next to Tripoli’s Rixos Hotel and declaring themselves in power again.

This evening Ghwell issued a statement from the GNC’s old premises next to Tripoli’s Rixos Hotel, declaring a state of emergency and what he called it an “historical initiative to rescue Libya”.
The Rixos conference centre, which previously served as the GNC’s chamber, and the “Hospitality Palaces” across the road were taken over six months ago by the State Council headed by Abdulrahman Sewehli, but it pulled out a couple of days ago, citing security issues.

Today’s takeover followed a stand-off#in the area since early morning between gunmen supporting the former GNC and those linked to Sewehli. It ended with the latter withdrawing. Disgruntled over unpaid salaries, their commitment was already weakened. It is believed they had already threatened to quit and were in contact with Ghwell supporters – which was why the State Council decided to withdraw.
...

Not that this third government has any kind of power, or political or military relevance: even the UN told them to, essentially, f..k off... and Italians, who actually work with all sides at the same time (i.e. at least with the LNA and the GNA at the same time), are ignoring them too... but one can't but love it when people blame the NATO for all of this....

Anyway, while Haftar was cleaning up all the way between Benghazi and Agedabia, he (and the USA, and the British, and French, and Italians) has left the GNA - i.e. Misuratans - bleed themselves to death against the Daesh in Syrte.

Namely, he and his LNA - the famed 'fighters against jihadists and Islamist terrorism' (while at least one third of the LNA consists of Libyan Salafists) - did not assault Syrte: they've left Misuratans do so, with US help of course.

And Misuratans, as naive as they are, did it with such gusto - and so much support from the USN (and USMC's Harriers and combat helicopters) - that they not only destroyed the Daesh, but also themselves. Namely, the Daesh has so heavily mined that city, that Misuratans are suffering terrible losses. Word has it they're losing 4 own combatants for every 1 Daesh they kill. Total of their KIA was well over 1,000 back in early October, and might have reached 2,000 by now. That's approximately seven times more losses than they suffered while assaulting Syrte back in 2011; certainly several times more than Haftar suffered in two years of fighting for Benghazi.

Keep in mind that Misurata is a city of about 500,000. Which in turn means: they cannot sustain such losses. In essence, after this battle - and no matter if 'right' or 'wrong' in general context - they'll be out of this war, too.

...while at the same time, the LNA is not only getting aircraft and helicopters from Egypt, or air support from the UAEAF, but now also has the money to hire Il-18 transports of the Molovan company Renan Air to haul cargo and troops from it, as seen at these photos found by Arnaud, yesterday.

With other words: I would say that the civil war in Libya is entering its closing phase. One in which the UN-supported government in Tripoli remains where it is, but its military forces (GNA) are out of condition to continue fighting. Which means that everything is going to be decided by military dictatorship of Haftar, supported by Emiratis, Egyptians, and Jordanians...

EDIT: forgot to add my usual, 'Congratulations Oblabla', fantastic foreign policy...

[Azor]

With other words: I would say that the civil war in Libya is entering its closing phase. One in which the UN-supported government in Tripoli remains where it is, but its military forces (GNA) are out of condition to continue fighting. Which means that everything is going to be decided by military dictatorship of Haftar, supported by Emiratis, Egyptians, and Jordanians...

EDIT: forgot to add my usual, 'Congratulations Oblabla', fantastic foreign policy...

I thought that the GNA only existed on paper, and that the squabble remains between the original GNC and the CoD?

At any rate, I prefer Haftar and the influence of the Jordanians, Egyptians and Emiratis to Islamists and the influence of the Turks and Qataris.

As for Obama, the sooner that the war ends, the sooner he can declare the past 5+ years of chaos as worth the NFZ and ousting of Qaddafi.

Obama made many rookie mistakes in his first term. From the standpoint of US national security, I would say that Operation Odyssey Dawn was worse than Operation Iraqi Freedom, despite the difference in casualties, especially American. Why?

• Libya had agreed in 2003 to abandon its WMD programs in return for a resumption in normal relations with the West
• China and Russia were under the impression that the NFZ would not be a cover for intervening on behalf of the rebels, which the British, French and Qataris did; the latter on the ground, in contravention of the UNSCR
• Iran and North Korea regarded OOD as a betrayal of Libya's abandonment of WMDs
• Between OOD and the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, rogue nuclear states observed that no gentleman's agreement or guarantee could substitute for the deterrence of nuclear weapons
• Nuclear proliferation by North Korea and Pakistan, as well as potentially by Iran and others is more of a national security threat than the ongoing mess created by OEF

[CrowBat]

I thought that the GNA only existed on paper, and that the squabble remains between the original GNC and the CoD?

The GNA remains relevant: Haftar is never going to be recognized by the UN, and thus not by Western powers either - and he knows that.

But, meanwhile he's in a position where without him, there's no Libyan state.

At any rate, I prefer Haftar and the influence of the Jordanians, Egyptians and Emiratis to Islamists and the influence of the Turks and Qataris.

'Problems':

- a) One third of Haftar's LNA are Salafists. In comparison, and no matter how much declared 'Islamist', the GNA forces are none of that.

- b) Egypt is a military dictatorship; Jordan is a 'royal' dictatorship (no matter how much nice-talked because its a US ally); and UAE is a dictatorship too.

Any idea what three dictatorships are likely to do with a military dictator in Libya? For example, how likely are they to install a pluralist democracy...?

Obama made many rookie mistakes in his first term. From the standpoint of US national security, I would say that Operation Odyssey Dawn was worse than Operation Iraqi Freedom, despite the difference in casualties, especially American. Why?

• Libya had agreed in 2003 to abandon its WMD programs in return for a resumption in normal relations with the West
• China and Russia were under the impression that the NFZ would not be a cover for intervening on behalf of the rebels, which the British, French and Qataris did; the latter on the ground, in contravention of the UNSCR
• Iran and North Korea regarded OOD as a betrayal of Libya's abandonment of WMDs
• Between OOD and the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, rogue nuclear states observed that no gentleman's agreement or guarantee could substitute for the deterrence of nuclear weapons
• Nuclear proliferation by North Korea and Pakistan, as well as potentially by Iran and others is more of a national security threat than the ongoing mess created by OEF

Aha. An imposing list of arguments.

BTW, have you ever heard of some human beings called 'Libyans'? If you have, what's with their rights and interests? Is it so these don't matter because they are 3-5 million of predominantly Moslem Arabs and Berbers? Or shall I conclude you're one of those advocating retention of oppressive dictatorships in interest of Western-centric POVs...?

[Azor]

The GNA remains relevant: Haftar is never going to be recognized by the UN, and thus not by Western powers either - and he knows that. But, meanwhile he's in a position where without him, there's no Libyan state.

Then there has to be an accommodation made.

a) One third of Haftar's LNA are Salafists. In comparison, and no matter how much declared 'Islamist', the GNA forces are none of that.

None? The GNC did not have any Muslim Brotherhood elements? Ankara and Doha are both supporting secularists, deviating from their usual policy of supporting the MB?

b) Egypt is a military dictatorship; Jordan is a 'royal' dictatorship (no matter how much nice-talked because its a US ally); and UAE is a dictatorship too.

So? Qatar is a dictatorship and Turkey is transforming itself into one as well. So much for the "model" Muslim country...

Any idea what three dictatorships are likely to do with a military dictator in Libya? For example, how likely are they to install a pluralist democracy...?

So the Turks and Qataris want pluralist democracy? Not the MB in power?

Aha. An imposing list of arguments.

BTW, have you ever heard of some human beings called 'Libyans'? If you have, what's with their rights and interests? Is it so these don't matter because they are 3-5 million of predominantly Moslem Arabs and Berbers? Or shall I conclude you're one of those advocating retention of oppressive dictatorships in interest of Western-centric POVs...?

I was arguing why intervention in Libya was a strategic mistake, not that the people of Libya don't deserve liberal democracy.

I can think of many peoples deserving of Western protection from domestic and foreign oppression, where intervention would have caused a greater disaster, namely nuclear war.

After the ousting of Qaddafi and the annexation of Crimea, how can any state possessing or developing nuclear weapons see any benefit in dismantling their weapons or programs? For guarantees that can be breached? For a few years of sanctions relief?

In the Arab Muslim world there are few successes when it comes to freedom and democracy. However, Tunisia comes to mind as the only one of these countries ranked as "free" (FH) or as a democracy, albeit a "flawed" one (EIU). Behind Tunisia is Morocco (hybrid government, partly free) and Lebanon, but the latter is over 40% Christian, and the Muslims are evenly divided between Sunni and Shia.

As in Africa, energy resources have proven to be a curse, as can be seen in Libya, Algeria and the Gulf Arab states, with the wealth acting as more of a hindrance than help as far as liberal democracy is concerned.

Tunisia is an interesting case, as in the aftermath of the Revolution, Islamist parties only received 37% of the vote, compared to 65% for Egypt. Whereas Tunisia's parliament elected an interim president who was a secularist and the subsequent 2014 race was between two secularists, Egypt narrowly elected an Islamist president (Morsi).

Of all the countries caught up in the Arab Spring, Tunisia's Revolution seemed to involve the least foreign interference, in stark contrast to Libya, Syria and to a lesser extent Egypt. Even Tunisia's version of the Muslim Brotherhood seems closer to the Christian Democratic parties of Europe, than its sister organizations in Turkey and Egypt.

[CrowBat]

None? The GNC did not have any Muslim Brotherhood elements?

The GNC - not.

It was the pre-GNC government (which was never recognized interntionally, and which quit once the UN-supported government arrived in Tripoli) that was 'MB-influenced'.

Ankara and Doha are both supporting secularists, deviating from their usual policy of supporting the MB?

Irrelevant - because, and as described above: they're out of the game. Not only that even Ansar ash-Sharia was destroyed, but after all experiences of the last two years, nobody is going to listen to them any more. Which means they have no meaningful 'proxies' in Libya.

I was arguing why intervention in Libya was a strategic mistake, not that the people of Libya don't deserve liberal democracy.

You're arguing in US/Western-centric style - while entirely ignoring the core reason for the situation.

Time and again, you come to post about something like 'historian approach to monitoring the situation' etc. But, when it comes to apply your studies of history, you seem unable to do so. Why?

If you check the British history: the country began making giant leaps forward the moment it started sorting out its human-rights-related issues - and it grew as powerful precisely because it did so centuries ahead of anybody else. The Netherlands - ditto. If you check the US history: even more so (although the time-lapse was measured by decades, rather than by centuries).

But, in the case of countries like Libya, and just like the entire 'establishment' (whether political or academic) you're approaching the topic from the tail first: correspondingly, it's 'all about intervention'...

...and 'not the least about Libyans'...?

Sorry, but such discussions are meanwhile getting boring.

Thus, and excuse me, please, but I'll reply only to what I find interesting:

Tunisia is an interesting case, as in the aftermath of the Revolution, Islamist parties only received 37% of the vote, compared to 65% for Egypt.

Sigh... as if it would be that much different anywhere else (than it turned out in Tunisia)...

And re. Egypt: Egypt is no example for anything at all. The country is such an utter chaos and wishful thinking that nobody understands it - especially not Egyptians (indeed, Egyptians can't even agree with themselves if they are Egyptians or Arabs, just for the start).

At most, one can say that Egyptians made a mistake during their elections - and elected by heart, not by reason. Then they realized they made a mistake - and corrected it, but in wrong fashion: instead of giving it a second chance and waiting for next elections, they all (including most of MBs) supported a military coup. Obviously, that was their next mistake, and now they have to wait for the next opportunity to correct it.

Of all the countries caught up in the Arab Spring, Tunisia's Revolution seemed to involve the least foreign interference, in stark contrast to Libya, Syria and to a lesser extent Egypt.

Oh, really...?

The only difference between Tunisia and all the other 'caught in the Arab Spring' was that Tunisia was over very quickly - and then because Ben Ali was a man enough to admit to himself that people don't want him, and to go.

That's something that 'can't happen' to such megalomaniacs like Q, like Assad, or quite a few others.