The article points out two things. The first, which most ground troops already know is that urban warfare is a slow and messy fight that produces high casualties. The second, known by some, is that ISIL is producing some top rate fighters that are not only tenacious, but highly skilled in both conventional and unconventional warfare. Whether you want to refer to Mao's phases of guerrilla warfare, or just use common sense, this article points out how these conflicts ebb and flow in intensity.

Those are the knowns. The unknowns, are where the fighters that escaped this particular battle (but also others such as Mosul) will go next? Will they be able to generate another 5th column in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, or even Europe? Will they be able to convert this 5th column into a conventional like force that hold ground? Will they able to transfer the skills they have learned and procure the necessary military materials to create major havoc elsewhere? Will western nation police forces be able to cope with this threat? Regarding the material aspect, I think that will be their major challenge. These violent movements have made substantial progress in war torn areas where military and munitions were readily available (Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, Somalia). That isn't the case in most of the West, so logistic challenges may limit the major threat to what many refer to as the arc of instability. However, that doesn't prevent them from conducting simple or sophisticated terrorist attacks in the West.

While the through, by, and with approach has it merits, if we're honest with ourselves, we must admit it also has its shortfalls. When the West chooses to depend upon surrogates or partner nation (if you can call Libya a nation anymore) forces they have opted to take a slow approach. This often based on the perception that it reduces risk to Western forces, but it doesn't take into account risk to achieving the mission.

Increasingly time matters. Time creates opportunities for adversaries, whether it is Russia in Syria, Iran in Iraq, or the weakening of a coalition before the conventional clearing operations are over. When we consider whether to use a unilateral, combined, or enabled (working through partners) approach, we shouldn't automatically default to one approach is better than the other, or that effective COIN efforts take 10 or more years. We need to consider what our aims strategic aims are, and assess the merit of each course of action, to include mixed approaches, to achieve that aim.