U.S. alpine warfare capabilities?

[Rifleman]

I don't know why the US Army hasn't embraced the idea of a true alpine unit. Perhaps it wouldn't need to be a division but at least a brigade. Basing such a unit at Ft. Carson is usually mentioned but Ft. Huachuca would be another possibility. The desert mountains of the southwest might serve as a good substitute for parts of Afghanistan.

My unit conducted annual winter training in the Italian Alps, but that's just what it was: winter training in an alpine environment, not training as true alpinists. We spent a lot of time on snow shoes pulling the ahkio around, setting up the arctic tent, and firing up the Yukon stove but we did no technical climbing or rope work. I suppose it was good toughness training but it sure wasn't technical training.

On a historical note, I'm aware of three technical climbs by US units in WWII: Riva Ridge by elements of 10th Mtn Div, Pointe du Hoc by 2d Ranger Bn, and Monte la Difensa by First Special Service Force. And although I said US units, I haven't forgot that FSSF was half Canadian.

Not sure about the Dieppe raid. I know 4 Commando with some 1st Ranger Bn attached made a climb there to attack a battery but I'm not sure if it was a technical climb or a scramble of sorts.

[jmm99]

can handle making molehills into mountains. Look at what the Delaware Finns (the first Finns in the US in the 1600s) did to West Virginia - and that was by long-distance sorcery.

Seriously, a major Russian problem (leading to ceasefires in the Winter and Continuation Wars) was not just the Finnish capability to inflict casualties, but also the Finnish capability to accept casualties. Let's look at some KIA comparisons.

In the Vietnam War, the USA had ~58,200 KIA, as compared to a 1970 pop. of ~203,000,000. That works out to .287 KIA per 1000 pop.

South Boston (per Jim Webb) had 25 KIA, as compared to a pop. of ~34,000. That works out to .735 KIA per 1000 pop.

Our "Copper Country" area (4-county totals; specifics in the Vietnam Wall.pdf attached to this post) was between the USA and South Boston - 29 KIA, 1970 pop. 55,253; .525 KIA per 1000 pop.; although Ontonagon County exceeded South Boston - 9 KIA, 1970 pop. 10,548; .853 KIA per 1000 pop.

Before we hit the next paragraph, one should reflect on the fact that the Vietnam War was not an "existential war" to the USA.

My grandfather was born in the village of Pörtom (Pirttakylä), Finland. During the Winter & Continuation Wars, the Pörtombor sustained 75 KIA, from a 1940 pop. of 3,324. That computes to 22.563 KIA per 1000 pop. For a pop. of 203,000,000 (USA 1970), equivalence would require 4,580,300 KIA !!! The two Finnish wars were more "existential" than not.

The Pörtombor have no particular claim to fame, but were simply representative (Finland for both wars: ~88,000 KIA & MIA, 1940 pop. ~ 4,000,000; 22.0 KIA & MIA per 1000 pop.).

A possibly substantive factoid (from my cousin whose ancestry is Pörtombor, but who grew up in another nearby community) is that young, male Pörtombor have a reputation for cruising around in neighboring communities looking for festivities (e.g., wedding receptions) and picking group brawls. Cf., Dave Grossman's and Lonnie Athens' theories on violence.

Regards

Mike (and from Mannerheim the Dog )

PS: just for the sake of the record (from AGF No. 23 cited in post #14 above):

... As American newspaper readers became bored with the war in December 1939 a new conflict broke out between small Finland and the giant Soviet Union. The Finns, instead of being overwhelmed as most observers expected, surprised the world with the tenacity and effectiveness of their resistance. Ski troops, clothed in white to mask their moves' disrupted Russian Supply columns and won victory after victory.

Those initial victories of the highly Specialized Finnish winter troops aroused the interest of American political and military leaders. On 6 January 1940, Louis Johnson, the Assistant Secretary of War, asked General Marshall what consideration the General Staff had given to the subject of special clothing, equipment' food, transportation and other essentials necessary for an effective field force under conditions approximating those of the campaigns in Finland and Northern Russia.[1]

Three weeks later The Chief of Staff replied that operations of this nature had been under continuous study in connection with the problem of the defense of Alaska. Winter training had also been conducted annually by troops stationed in severe climate and had been especial y successful at Fort Snelling, Minnesota, where some of the men had become highly skilled in the use of skis. "It is my intention," General Marshall added' "to continue, accelerating where practicable, tests of food, clothing, equipment and transportation in order to standardize for the purpose the types best suited to operations under severe winter conditions. The campaign in Finland is being studied and should be of considerable assistance. Winter maneuvers, on a larger scale than yet attempted are desirable, but to date funds for this purpose have not been available."[2]

1. Memo of Mr. Louis Johnson, ASW, for the CofS, USA, no file, 6 Jan 40, sub: Campaign under Extreme Conditions of Weather. In AGO 370.22 (1-6-40)

2. Memo of the CofS, USA, G-4/31624, 24 Jan 40, sub as above. Ibid.

So, blame the Finnish link on Louis A. Johnson (a resident of West Virginia).

[Pete]

This place is named for a kinsman of mine. Around 1900 Gus Eisen gave the testimony to U.S. Congress that caused Sequoia National Park to be founded right before the logging companies got in there and turned the trees into picnic tables.

[Firn]

I don't know why the US Army hasn't embraced the idea of a true alpine unit. Perhaps it wouldn't need to be a division but at least a brigade. Basing such a unit at Ft. Carson is usually mentioned but Ft. Huachuca would be another possibility. The desert mountains of the southwest might serve as a good substitute for parts of Afghanistan.

My unit conducted annual winter training in the Italian Alps, but that's just what it was: winter training in an alpine environment, not training as true alpinists. We spent a lot of time on snow shoes pulling the ahkio around, setting up the arctic tent, and firing up the Yukon stove but we did no technical climbing or rope work. I suppose it was good toughness training but it sure wasn't technical training.

Training individuals is certainly no proper way to make a true mountain brigade, as especially on high altitudes and very difficult terrain and weather every untrained or unfit person becomes a liability to your squad/platoon. To pull off combined arms under such circumstances training needs, well, to train that.

Ciaspole/Snowshoes with ski poles and akhios are an excellent way to help non-skiier to move through high snow, and are superior in very steep slopes or difficult terrain but are of course inferior in not so dense vegetation, roads, and generally open terrain. Sadly with the abolition of the "leva" the Alpini have no longer a very large pool of good skiiers among the rank, as the volunteers are no longer from the local valleys and regions but mostly, roughly 70% from southern Italy (Puglia, Campania, ...). You also no longer find nowhere as easily recruits with already considerable technical or Alpine climbing or mountaineering experience which could be prime material for guides. It is a bit sad to hear instead of furlan, piemontèis, lumbard, now the napoletano or other southern dialects, but the forces are not attractive enough for men and women from the wealthy regions.

Of course the regional character has thus been greatly weakened and the connection between the brigades and the locals can no longer be as strong as they used to be. Also you no longer have a fair rappresentation of all the population, and the low pay and not so good education does very little to attract certain members of our society.

Anyway I still believe that proper leadership, discipline and training are more important and the increased time of service should in theory compensate the weaknesses of the new ways. New times, new ways. Let us just hope that this concept won't get tested too severly.

[blueblood]

US Army often send some troops to India for some mountain warfare training. But AFAIK they conduct these exercises on HAWS, Gulmarg instead of Parvat Ghatak school, Tawang.

Royal Marines also came for the joint exercise few years back and didn't fair well. Most of the contingent failed to cope up with the altitude.

[Fuchs]

It takes six weeks to acclimatise in high mountains. Few exercises are along enough for that - and even if they are, the first 4-6 weeks are going to be ####ty.

[ganulv]

I lived at 2350 meters for a year in Central America. A couple of days after my arrival I was invited in on a game of pick-up football with the members of a catechism class. Despite being in reasonable condition, about five minutes later I was feeling a kind of pain I had never known before. And 2350 meters isn’t really that high!

Acetazolamide can help acclimatization but it isn’t a Golden Hammer. Being in Royal Marine condition at sea level would certainly speed acclimatization but no more than that. Seems a lot of time and money to spend on an exercise which was bound to fail.

[blueblood]

Well, the Royal Marines were on their way home from Astan when this exercise happened and IIRC Marines train in Norway for arctic warfare but then Snowy plains of Norway are no Himalayas. I agree with Fuchs, not sure about 6 weeks though. During Kargil, Indian Army's non mountain infantry were acclimatized for 15 days. Brig Ray may know better.

[Firn]

Altitude sickness is one of the reasons why India has such a high number of troops stationed high up in the Himalaya. As Ganulv worte, the thin air doesn't care how tough and mentally strong you are.

Every decent alpinist who has climbed in the Himalaya or other really high mountains (should) know the various procedures. The usually tight schedules of tourists for climbs like the Kilimanjaro are not quite ideal, and many suffer accordingly. IIRC in the Kargil conflict some Indian units suffered due to military necessity a quick rush up from the plains to the higher regions, with similar results. Every rushed meter of altitude increases the pain and the risks.

As usual it all depends on context, training and then especially one the T's of METT-TC. Maybe it should be spelled out fully as METWTS-TC, as the importance of weather and support is great indeed, as the mountain warfare has shown in the last hundred years.

[blueblood]

Altitude sickness is one of the reasons why India has such a high number of troops stationed high up in the Himalaya. As Ganulv worte, the thin air doesn't care how tough and mentally strong you are.

Every decent alpinist who has climbed in the Himalaya or other really high mountains (should) know the various procedures. The usually tight schedules of tourists for climbs like the Kilimanjaro are not quite ideal, and many suffer accordingly. IIRC in the Kargil conflict some Indian units suffered due to military necessity a quick rush up from the plains to the higher regions, with similar results.

As usual it all depends on context, training and then especially one the T's of METT-TC. Maybe it should be spelled out METWTS-TC, as the importance of weather and support is especially great, as the mountain warfare has shown in the last hundred years.

Yes, initially when the mobilization was not fully completed IA units from plains were called in since most mountain units were engaged on the eastern border with China. Thus, they suffered from altitude sickness and other problems but as soon as the brass realized this, they initiated acclimatization program for the rest of the troops. So, now Indian Army has a policy to impart mountain warfare training to every infantry soldier, mountain unit or not. My cousin is a Major in artillery regiment and his first posting after his commission was to man a post at 3000m on LOC.

Most western armies don't need to emphasize on mountain warfare as it does not fit the criteria for their area of operations. Like Indian Army and Navy were never too interested in raising a Marine divison.

[ganulv]

I agree with Fuchs, not sure about 6 weeks though. During Kargil, Indian Army's non mountain infantry were acclimatized for 15 days. Brig Ray may know better.

I guess it may be an issue of semantics. Does ‘acclimatize’ imply nothing beyond “no more altitude sickness at a given altitude” or does it imply “optimized for a given altitude”?

From Zubieta-Calleja, et al.’s article “Altitude adaptation through hematocrit change”:

Adaptation = Time/Altitude, where High altitude adaptation factor = Time at altitude (days)/Altitude in kilometers (km). The time in days required to achieve full adaptation to any altitude, ascending from sea level, can be calculated by multiplying the adaptation factor of 11.4 times the altitude in km.