Initial Officer Selection

[Ken White]

We are collectively forgetting basics... then not bothering to supervise our representatives or their shadowy financial patrons (and when did that last bit become desirable or legal?)...

All sadly true.

Unfortunately i don't see the majority of those in charge - the elites, boomers (my bunch - i am on the tail end), or older folks (present company very much excluded, no disrespect intended) as really being engaged/committed to changing things...

I think perhaps a degree of tiredness enters into that. After beating one's head against the wall, stopping feels less bad...

Daily servings of ice cream, air conditioning, and big screen flat panels, in the field of all places...

Superb succinct summary. .

...the only thing i could possibly add is to echo your observation that we are out of balance...

Unbalanced is good. Well, it isn't good but that's an accurate call...

It feels like a storm is about to break...and while it is my sense that we will successfully get through it... it is also my hope that some of the nastiness and stupidity prominently on display throughout the world of late will not...

So as usual i guess, we are on our own and we will have to continue to make positive things happen within our small spheres of influence.

My grandparents on both sides of the family made it through the depression and the war...good people, good memories...my take away is that hard times don't last and friends and family make the tough times bearable and the fun times, of course, even better...

Yes. Yes...

[Fuchs]

Two more cents;

I like the idea of having specialised NCOs (junior NCOs still learning on the job, senior NCOs expected to be the mainstay of training, motivation and supervision) which are practically bound to their branch and accumulate lots of specialised expertise*.

I also like the idea of having the officer corps divided into staff (planning, management) and combat (leadership, combined arms tactics proficiency, independent of branch) careers.


Many armies are close to this, but it appears to me that they somehow lost focus of it or forgot the purpose of their designs and allowed it to rot away.

It's an indication of 'rottenness' if rank inflation (or trust in junior leaders) has eroded so much that a LtCol leads a platoon-sized checkpoint, if you need to be a NCO to become an AFV driver or if even a company leading-captain isn't trusted in his small unit tactics proficiency (much less in understanding the co-operation of a combined arms formation).


This is not only about the initial selection of officers (or NCOs). It's about how they are being used, about getting rid of discovered duds- it's first and foremost about high expectations and the energy to pursue them.
An army is a bureaucracy and as such by default satisfied with its performance, unsatisfied with its size and budget.
This is what needs to be broken; we cannot cure the basic principal-agent problem of a bureaucracy, but we can make it critical of its own performance and institutionalise dissatisfaction with its own performance.

There's always a reason for being dissatisfied; this reason needs to be exposed and utilised. Free-play adversarial (similar or dissimilar) challenges should be the rule and be used to make shortcomings obvious. Persistent failure in getting rid of problems should not only end careers, but end careers in dishonour, with public exposure.



How could we expect that the bureaucracy correctly identifies the duds in a few days right at the beginning if it allows duds to serve and be promoted to high ranks?



*: Believe it or not, the Bundeswehr is nowadays crazy enough that a navy NCO can serve as tank driver instructor.

[JMA]

Two more cents;

I like the idea of having specialised NCOs (junior NCOs still learning on the job, senior NCOs expected to be the mainstay of training, motivation and supervision) which are practically bound to their branch and accumulate lots of specialised expertise*.

*: Believe it or not, the Bundeswehr is nowadays crazy enough that a navy NCO can serve as tank driver instructor.

In peacetime the incentive to properly prepare for war is soon lost.

Can we please differentiate between individuals on training courses and where units are being exercised.

Here lies the fundamental I believe and that is unless skills (command or otherwise) are exercised in the unit context of the now course qualified individual (be it weapons or tactics) the training is incomplete.

I also like the idea of having the officer corps divided into staff (planning, management) and combat (leadership, combined arms tactics proficiency, independent of branch) careers.

There is a natural shake out process that takes place in the first seven years or so where those with command potential separate from those with staff prospects. This is why I maintain (from my own experience) that the first three years after commissioning must concentrate on active (if there is a war on) platoon commanding. It is a mutual learning experience where the individual learns much about himself and the army and the army learns much about that individual.

[JMA]

In another thread some discussion has taken place which is germane to this thread.

My view remains that the direct entry of young officers halfway up the rank structure can only be justified on the basis that the maximum age of generals in war is within the bracket of 45-50 and as such it would take too long for all soldiers to enter at the ground level.

The practice of producing thousands of young officers most of whom will not progress beyond major appears not only misguided but a massive unnecessary expense. The (only) benefit of maintaining such an officer production line is that in the event of a war requiring national mobilisation the structures are in place to churn out officers by the thousand.

It is obvious that the natural career progression for a platoon sergeant is to the position of platoon commander. Those capable would then progress upward according to their abilities and as limited by their age in later years. With obvious exceptions the natural settling point for those who have ‘risen through the ranks’ will be in training establishments probably at the ranks of captain or major.

This approach is a radical shift from current practice and would require a massive change in NCO staffing and career planning. Perhaps the major change that would be the most difficult to achieve is that of ‘mindset’.

Under such a system the pressure would then be off to continue with a Henry Ford style production line for direct entry officers. The numbers of such direct entry officers required would then be governed by the numbers of generals required some 25-30 into the future rather than filling the ‘black hole’ of junior officer positions with all the current retention concerns. The other officer ‘black hole’ is that of so-called staff officer positions. A delightful spin-off of a radical change in direct entry officer policy I suggest will be that there will be increasingly fewer ‘surplus’ officers where a position for them will have to be found. Many of such largely superfluous staff positions would fall away.

Once the numbers of direct entry officers required has been calculated the selection, training and career path aspect can be covered.

Officer selection in the US military remains controversial through its emphasis on academic ability over leadership and character related attributes. This would need to be redressed as with the current mass production system it appears that sufficient quality people manage to rise within the military despite the flawed system. A system focussed on producing future generals will be forced to alter the emphasis on certain aspects of its selection criteria. Major rectification work will be required in this area in the US military while in militaries with adequate selection systems changes on a lesser scale will be required. The British for example will have records of full career performance from officer cadet to general for the last forty years which should allow them to adjust their OSB (Officer Selection Board) selection criteria to screen for potential generals mainly.

Training will have to be adjusted to provide a more personalised approach. A production run of officers by company lots must give way to a low instructor : student ratio with highly individualised training with an individual focus. A review of when degree education needs to be undertaken. As a significant cost of officer education this should be undertaken only once the initial selection decision has been confirmed after, say, a minimum of four years service (being officer training and three years commissioned service). It is assessed that the Command and Staff Course will be the major mid career selection mechanism. Some will not have produced a service record to allow attendance on the Staff course while others may fail the course. The course itself would allow the military to place the officers in a order of merit with regard to future career prospects. These individual prospects would once again be confirmed or adjusted through the attendance on a Senior Command and Staff Course.

The current US promotion flow for officers of 3:9:16:22 years commissioned service to Captain:Major:Lt Colonel:Colonel appears on the face of it to be adequate with the proviso of the almost obscene haste to captain appears to be driven by the length of the USMA training. With the US system of captains commanding companies there remains the great danger that captains in the early phase of the their service at that rank will be given command of a company while hopelessly under qualified and lacking in the necessary experience.

A quick calculation so as not to interfere with critical military experience building postings and training that any baccalaureate degree study should take place between the 5-11 years of commissioned service. This allows for the officer to experience command of a platoon (or service equivalent), undergo specialised corps/service training and at least one other posting – at staff or training – where he can be assessed as to the officer’s continued suitability before the cost of a baccalaureate degree is incurred.

While the assessment of the officers continued suitability is continuous there would be specific milestones of assessment during a career. Starting with a careful, detailed and arduous initial selection process the one year officer training course (comprising military subjects only) will further screen out those assessed to lack the potential for senior command or displayed some disqualifying personal characteristic under the stress of training.

The next assessment stage will be prior attending baccalaureate degree which would immediately be followed by the main anticipated career opt out time for officers who after the period of study have no enthusiasm for a return to the regimented life in the military. The next two stages are pre and post Staff Courses.

It appears that instead of officers spending enough time in a post to gain the necessary experience the ‘more is better’ approach, where quantity trumps quality, has been adopted where officers, like butterflies, flit from on post to the next without gaining sufficient experience and through the lack of continuity in these posts reducing the stability of the military as a whole.

Can anything be changed? Will anything be changed? Will it even be discussed? Nah.

If the military were a business it would fail and have to be redesigned. A pity it is not.