In another thread some discussion has taken place which is germane to this thread.

My view remains that the direct entry of young officers halfway up the rank structure can only be justified on the basis that the maximum age of generals in war is within the bracket of 45-50 and as such it would take too long for all soldiers to enter at the ground level.

The practice of producing thousands of young officers most of whom will not progress beyond major appears not only misguided but a massive unnecessary expense. The (only) benefit of maintaining such an officer production line is that in the event of a war requiring national mobilisation the structures are in place to churn out officers by the thousand.

It is obvious that the natural career progression for a platoon sergeant is to the position of platoon commander. Those capable would then progress upward according to their abilities and as limited by their age in later years. With obvious exceptions the natural settling point for those who have ‘risen through the ranks’ will be in training establishments probably at the ranks of captain or major.

This approach is a radical shift from current practice and would require a massive change in NCO staffing and career planning. Perhaps the major change that would be the most difficult to achieve is that of ‘mindset’.

Under such a system the pressure would then be off to continue with a Henry Ford style production line for direct entry officers. The numbers of such direct entry officers required would then be governed by the numbers of generals required some 25-30 into the future rather than filling the ‘black hole’ of junior officer positions with all the current retention concerns. The other officer ‘black hole’ is that of so-called staff officer positions. A delightful spin-off of a radical change in direct entry officer policy I suggest will be that there will be increasingly fewer ‘surplus’ officers where a position for them will have to be found. Many of such largely superfluous staff positions would fall away.

Once the numbers of direct entry officers required has been calculated the selection, training and career path aspect can be covered.

Officer selection in the US military remains controversial through its emphasis on academic ability over leadership and character related attributes. This would need to be redressed as with the current mass production system it appears that sufficient quality people manage to rise within the military despite the flawed system. A system focussed on producing future generals will be forced to alter the emphasis on certain aspects of its selection criteria. Major rectification work will be required in this area in the US military while in militaries with adequate selection systems changes on a lesser scale will be required. The British for example will have records of full career performance from officer cadet to general for the last forty years which should allow them to adjust their OSB (Officer Selection Board) selection criteria to screen for potential generals mainly.

Training will have to be adjusted to provide a more personalised approach. A production run of officers by company lots must give way to a low instructor : student ratio with highly individualised training with an individual focus. A review of when degree education needs to be undertaken. As a significant cost of officer education this should be undertaken only once the initial selection decision has been confirmed after, say, a minimum of four years service (being officer training and three years commissioned service). It is assessed that the Command and Staff Course will be the major mid career selection mechanism. Some will not have produced a service record to allow attendance on the Staff course while others may fail the course. The course itself would allow the military to place the officers in a order of merit with regard to future career prospects. These individual prospects would once again be confirmed or adjusted through the attendance on a Senior Command and Staff Course.

The current US promotion flow for officers of 3:9:16:22 years commissioned service to Captain:Major:Lt Colonel:Colonel appears on the face of it to be adequate with the proviso of the almost obscene haste to captain appears to be driven by the length of the USMA training. With the US system of captains commanding companies there remains the great danger that captains in the early phase of the their service at that rank will be given command of a company while hopelessly under qualified and lacking in the necessary experience.

A quick calculation so as not to interfere with critical military experience building postings and training that any baccalaureate degree study should take place between the 5-11 years of commissioned service. This allows for the officer to experience command of a platoon (or service equivalent), undergo specialised corps/service training and at least one other posting – at staff or training – where he can be assessed as to the officer’s continued suitability before the cost of a baccalaureate degree is incurred.

While the assessment of the officers continued suitability is continuous there would be specific milestones of assessment during a career. Starting with a careful, detailed and arduous initial selection process the one year officer training course (comprising military subjects only) will further screen out those assessed to lack the potential for senior command or displayed some disqualifying personal characteristic under the stress of training.

The next assessment stage will be prior attending baccalaureate degree which would immediately be followed by the main anticipated career opt out time for officers who after the period of study have no enthusiasm for a return to the regimented life in the military. The next two stages are pre and post Staff Courses.

It appears that instead of officers spending enough time in a post to gain the necessary experience the ‘more is better’ approach, where quantity trumps quality, has been adopted where officers, like butterflies, flit from on post to the next without gaining sufficient experience and through the lack of continuity in these posts reducing the stability of the military as a whole.

Can anything be changed? Will anything be changed? Will it even be discussed? Nah.

If the military were a business it would fail and have to be redesigned. A pity it is not.