Initial Officer Selection

[jpk]

Up front let me say that this obviously works for the marines (and that's really all that counts).

My initial focus was upon the initial pre-course selection process because it is the quality of which informs as to how many (what percentage) pass in the end. The attrition rate I experienced was similar to the 50% you speak of. I am now questioning this in the light of the quality of the initial pre-course selection process.

What happens to the 50% who fail? What is the cost of training those who don't make it? What psychological impact does this (largely avoidable failure) have on these individuals? Are they lost to the service? Is there not some room for improvement in the initial selection process?

Initial selection is... not very valuable. It certainly dismays those who are not determined (it takes about a year from the day you walk into a recruiters office to OCS), but leadership cannot be screened for.
My OCS class started with 128, only 87 commissioned as 2lt's. Many of those would did not make it went to good schools, got good grades had fine jobs ect.
Our distinguished leader grad failed out of college the first time and finished at some tec school no one has never heard of. But I would follow him into anything. That just goes to prove being a leader is completely different than the resume padding kids do now a days.
I have a masters in Middle eastern studies and know arabic, does that make me a good officer? No. Does charisma matter? No.
IMHO It all comes down to two things. 1st. I am willing to suffer for those around me. 2nd can I make the hard decision at the right time.
Few have it. After 12 weeks you know who do.

Now to adress your other question, what happens to those who fail. In most cases you get recycled and can class up with another company. Some chapter out of the army, some go AIT. If you cannot get through OCS the second time you need to be let go. It is just not that hard of a course. I am sure it is crushing to fail.

The Initial selection needs to be tighter. But by what metrics?

Also think of the needs of the Army - does that reserve quartermaster need to be a stud?

[JMA]

Some friendly questions for clarity... not to be seen as provocative please.

Initial selection is... not very valuable.

Lets call it initial pre-course selection.

This is my point of this thread. IMHO it should be valuable. Otherwise you waste time, money and effort on people who have no chance of making it.

It certainly dismays those who are not determined (it takes about a year from the day you walk into a recruiters office to OCS),...

That then is a self inflicted wound. Why not put them through a normal recruits course and then some time with the trained soldiers (while waiting for OCS)... and maybe a quick trip to the rockpile? (You learn a lot about a person by observing him under fire)

... but leadership cannot be screened for.

Not sure about that. Maybe not if all one has to go on are reports school teachers etc. I believe the idea of the Brit AOSB is to create situations where the leadership ability and or potential of candidates can be observed. (See Youtube videos posted above in post #4 to this thread)

My OCS class started with 128, only 87 commissioned as 2lt's. Many of those would did not make it went to good schools, got good grades had fine jobs ect.
Our distinguished leader grad failed out of college the first time and finished at some tec school no one has never heard of. But I would follow him into anything. That just goes to prove being a leader is completely different than the resume padding kids do now a days.
I have a masters in Middle eastern studies and know arabic, does that make me a good officer? No. Does charisma matter? No.
IMHO It all comes down to two things. 1st. I am willing to suffer for those around me. 2nd can I make the hard decision at the right time.
Few have it. After 12 weeks you know who do.

Now to adress your other question, what happens to those who fail. In most cases you get recycled and can class up with another company. Some chapter out of the army, some go AIT. If you cannot get through OCS the second time you need to be let go. It is just not that hard of a course. I am sure it is crushing to fail.

30 odd years ago this would not have caused me to raise an eyebrow.

But now consider this. That a third failed would indicate that the initial selection could be improved, yes? This third indicates a wate of time, money and effort IMHO.

Well as to the academic qualifcations. How much is enough? I would settle for a set minimum standard for acceptance. The same for the physical. He/she either can or they can't... a pass or fail situation. Has he/she met the academic requirements? And more than the requirement is a bonus. Is he/she pshysically able to carry out the duties of an officer? Any bigger, stronger, fitter is a bonus.

That said I question the 60:30:10 breakdown of the 'whole person' grading sustem. In my humble opinion the academic (60%) and the physical (10%) should be pass or fail. I would also question the vality of the 30% allocated to leadership potential as measured by high school sports participation and high school teacher recommendations.

So what I am suggesting is that phase on is to ascertain whether he/she meets the academic and physical standards required. If yes then a process run by the military (like the Brit AOSB) should select for leadership potential as a second stage. Proof positive of leadership qualities are essential if the candidate is to progress to the training IMHO.

The Initial selection needs to be tighter. But by what metrics?

Think I have covered that above.

Also think of the needs of the Army - does that reserve quartermaster need to be a stud?

You get your reserve quartermasters out of direct entry OCS courses?

I would have thought that the best candidates for this type of position would be seasoned and experienced NCOs with 15 plus years of experience, yes?
(T&A Commissions (technical and administrative) are/were a Brit method of promoting NCOs with the ability, service and experience from warrant officer to commissioned officer. Worked well.)

[Granite_State]

I can speak at some length about USMC OCS, having graduated just over two years ago. It was pretty selective when I went through, and has gotten dramatically more so in the last two years. Potential candidates go through a selection board, where Physical Fitness Test (PFT), college grades, recommendations, interview with your recruiter, and a host of other factors weigh in. The Marine Corps takes recruiting very seriously BTW.

OCS itself is a ten week officer boot camp (vice 13 on the enlisted side), with a little less of the mind games but a much larger leadership screening component. The latter is based on many factors, but one of the biggest ones are billets in small unit blank fire tactical scenarios (fire team and squad sized) and some fire team leadership puzzles (get this barrel over this 20 meter water obstacle using only a rope, pipes, and each other, in five minutes, etc.). I think the latter idea was borrowed from the Reichswehr.

Attrition in my platoon was pretty low, around 25-30%. Should have been a little higher.

[JMA]

I can speak at some length about USMC OCS, having graduated just over two years ago. It was pretty selective when I went through, and has gotten dramatically more so in the last two years. Potential candidates go through a selection board, where Physical Fitness Test (PFT), college grades, recommendations, interview with your recruiter, and a host of other factors weigh in. The Marine Corps takes recruiting very seriously BTW.

OCS itself is a ten week officer boot camp (vice 13 on the enlisted side), with a little less of the mind games but a much larger leadership screening component. The latter is based on many factors, but one of the biggest ones are billets in small unit blank fire tactical scenarios (fire team and squad sized) and some fire team leadership puzzles (get this barrel over this 20 meter water obstacle using only a rope, pipes, and each other, in five minutes, etc.). I think the latter idea was borrowed from the Reichswehr.

Attrition in my platoon was pretty low, around 25-30%. Should have been a little higher.

As a young officer IMHO it is important to analyse everything around him and constantly try to figure out how the aim can be achieved in a better, quicker, more effective manner. I still do this 40 years later and I still see things which we/I did wrong or could have done better or more effectively.

BTW the barrel, ropes, pipes and a box full of stones is one of the AOSB group exercises. Watching that exercise is very revealing (and often hilarious) if you are a DS (directing staff). Who says the military is not fun

[Ken White]

I still do this 40 years later and I still see things which we/I did wrong or could have done better or more effectively.

Me too on the first. On the latter, too many in my case...

Who says the military is not fun

Not I. My errors were fortunately mostly harmless and I certainly had a ball for 30 years (and almost as much fun for another 18 as a silly-villian employeeeek).

[Pete]

I believe there is a series of U.S. Army Regulations that describe the proccesses and steps required to be selected for pre-commissioning training. I'm positive that they spell out in very specific detail what is required, be it for USMA, ROTC, or OCS. For a select few there are also direct commissions and battlefield commissions.

There is a smoke-in-the-wind aspect about this thread about what should be or could be, rather than what is. Check the regulations and see what they say.

By and large our personnel system is set up for rapid mobilization during times of national (or Personnel Command numbers-crunch) emergency, not for a more methodical selection process during peacetime or low-intensity war. Perhaps in a better world there could be a greater depth of analysis the lower the threat level to the country is. Even then it's a crap-shoot because sometimes the maniacs with obvious flaws make better combat leaders than their more restrained and low-key peers.

NCO Promotion Boards have been known to reject guys who never received an Article 15, like they must be rule-abiding sissies, wimps or something worse. No guts no glory.

[SethB]

NCO Promotion Boards have been known to reject guys who never received an Article 15, like they must be rule-abiding sissies, wimps or something worse. No guts no glory.

I assure you that we (the Army) no longer have that mindset.

As far as mass mobilization, I'm not very worried about having to do it. I think we will fight with what we have, and it will be small enough to not require mobilization, or it will be over before we could set up a draft anyway.

[JMA]

Interesting short article by a journalist who covered an ASOB 30 years after he attended one (and failed).

Donkin on Work - Leadership

I quote:

A popular misconception about the board is that it is looking for future generals. This is not the case. The selection board for the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, is looking for those who have the potential to be a second lieutenant leading a platoon or a troop.

I question this as if all you are looking for is someone to command a platoon most armies have an amazing number competent and experienced NCOs who can do that with ease.

This narrow view and concentration on the first step of the officer ladder may be one of the reasons why officer retention beyond subaltern is becoming a problem in many militaries. We may differ in this view.

[Ken White]

SethB:

As far as mass mobilization, I'm not very worried about having to do it. I think we will fight with what we have, and it will be small enough to not require mobilization, or it will be over before we could set up a draft anyway.

You may or may not be right. FWIW, roughly the same prediction was made by many in the 20s, the late 40s and again in the 50s and 70s. I don't think you are correct but what you or I think is immaterial, The Army and the Nation cannot afford to and will not operate on that premise. Like it or not, we're big and have to be prepared to be far bigger.

JMA:

I question this as if all you are looking for is someone to command a platoon most armies have an amazing number competent and experienced NCOs who can do that with ease.

This narrow view and concentration on the first step of the officer ladder may be one of the reasons why officer retention beyond subaltern is becoming a problem in many militaries. We may differ in this view.

No differing by me for one, I think you're spot on. The French, by tradition have two Lieutenants commanding Platoons and the other two are commanded by NCOs. Seems a sensible way to provide experience for a select few who are being groomed to do Officer stuff at echelons above company...

We say we're training future Commanders and Leaders and then we place most in an environment where they are charged with rote operations of questionable value while their drive and initiative gets trampled by set piece training and operations -- that drives many to depart after five years or so and the Army accepts that because a big war will see them called back.

The selection comments you made above are correct IMO. Pete is also mostly correct on why we do what we do. What we have done to pad the mobilization roster is to significantly 'over Officer' US Forces. We have a veritable horde of Generals; same rough number we had at the end of WW II and in the 80s with an almost 800K Army (and we were over officered than; we still have the same rough numbers with about 250-300k fewer troops). We're not approaching USSR norms yet but we do seem headed that way.

Those charged with selecting and training future Officers are generally doing the best they can with the hand they've been dealt and the products are generally really pretty good (there are always going to be a few less than stellar slip-throughs...) -- the real problem is that our Personnel system does not support the Army, it drives it...

[Red Rat]

There is no requirement to have a degree in order to get commissioned in the British Armed Forces, although the majority do now have a degree.

6-10% of British Army officers have now come from the ranks, having served as a soldier or NCO and then applied for a Direct Entry commission (this is in addition to the Late Entry process whereby soldiers who have made it to Warrant Officer Class 1 (Command Segeant Major equiv) can apply for a commission.

[Pete]

There is no requirement to have a degree in order to get commissioned in the British Armed Forces, although the majority do now have a degree.

During the 1990s in the U.S. Army having a master's degree seemed to be a prerequisite for being promoted to major. I don't know whether the same thing is true today.

The thing I can't understand about this situation is that there seems to be an inverse relationship between the number of people having advanced degrees in a specialty or profession and the quality of that particular career field in the U.S. today. The quality of American industries and businesses seems to have gotten worse with every MBA that is awarded to an individual who is then hired. Our kids in school seem to get dumber and even more stupider as the number of teachers having master's degrees in education increases.

I don't know, maybe it's just me.

[ganulv]

There is no requirement to have a degree in order to get commissioned in the British Armed Forces, although the majority do now have a degree.

6-10% of British Army officers have now come from the ranks, having served as a soldier or NCO and then applied for a Direct Entry commission (this is in addition to the Late Entry process whereby soldiers who have made it to Warrant Officer Class 1 (Command Segeant Major equiv) can apply for a commission.

During the run-up to the recent Royal Wedding I was doing background reading and was introduced to the existence of the RMAS. Am I correct in my understanding that an important difference between the U.S. and British systems is the lack of a similar institution in the U.S.?

[JMA]

There is no requirement to have a degree in order to get commissioned in the British Armed Forces, although the majority do now have a degree.

What range of degrees? I wonder apart from the added maturity and life skills and generally improved education level how this all helps the young infantry officer comply with his role... which is to close with and kill the enemy?

(You know my position is that it would serve the military better to send the officers with long term potential off to a civilian university around the rank of major to study something of military value (that said I accept that in some of the technical corps earlier study by an officer would be advantageous).

6-10% of British Army officers have now come from the ranks, having served as a soldier or NCO and then applied for a Direct Entry commission (this is in addition to the Late Entry process whereby soldiers who have made it to Warrant Officer Class 1 (Command Segeant Major equiv) can apply for a commission.

It would be interesting to establish the ages and ranks of the 6-10% who enter Sandhurst from the ranks (with 29 years being the cut off I understand).

[Pete]

SethB: We have a veritable horde of Generals; same rough number we had at the end of WW II and in the 80s with an almost 800K Army ...

Part of the reason for that is not the personnel guys' fault; rather it is the perverse logic of the TDA Army, in which nobody will treat you seriously unless the CO of your organization is of equivalent rank to that of my CO or my staff-weenie boss in Washington. It turns into "my Dad can beat up your Dad" situations. Thus we have TDA organizations that could be ably commanded by lieutenant colonels which instead have one- or two-stars in charge.

If we ever decide to trim back the Army we should take a serious look at the vast TDA organization empires that have grown up since 1945. Many of them would function more smoothly with less people.

[JMA]

JMA:No differing by me for one, I think you're spot on. The French, by tradition have two Lieutenants commanding Platoons and the other two are commanded by NCOs. Seems a sensible way to provide experience for a select few who are being groomed to do Officer stuff at echelons above company...

Having arrived at the School of Infantry directly off ops it was like entering another world. In that environment there was a disconnect between what was happening on the ground in the war and in that august training establishment. In wartime one tends to address the immediate issues and let the future look after itself (however that turns out). To their credit there was no necessity to lower the standards to get more junior officers into the field as it was understood that where there was no platoon commander (officer) the platoon sergeant would (and could) do the job.

We say we're training future Commanders and Leaders and then we place most in an environment where they are charged with rote operations of questionable value while their drive and initiative gets trampled by set piece training and operations -- that drives many to depart after five years or so and the Army accepts that because a big war will see them called back.

The tend does tend to get lost over time unless ever new idea is tested against the stated aim and intension before being adopted. You are old enough to remember the Peter Principle. What I remember best from it was this as quoted in an artile:

In the chapter `Follower and Leaders', Peter points out the hierarchiological fallacies. He cites the example of the mother of George Washington who, when asked how her son was so accomplished as a General, answered: "I taught him to obey." Peter asks how the ability to lead depends on the ability to follow, as though the ability to float depends on the ability to sink.

We know you can't herd cats so the tendency is to adapt and apply spin to make the crushing of initiative and spirit sound almost noble.

Yes, and the wasted investment when so many leave after five years is justified as you say. They will be available for a future 'big' war through the Reserve. How many people do you think actually believe this?

It takes a pretty mature group of people (or desperate circumstances) for the ‘sacred cows’ to be tackled and revised. Constant review and constant change must be encouraged (unless it will lead to a loss in the annual Army Navy sports competitions that is )

[JMA]

I stated in post #7 to this thread:

..., I am still not sure why there is a need for a degree before commissioning when there is plenty of time in a 25-30 year career to take three or so years for the purpose (around the senior Capt/Maj level for the infantry). Too much time and money (again IMHO) is invested in training of officers the majority of whom (it seems) will leave the service before they have justified the initial expense.

It seems from the private messages and off board conversations I have had recently that this remains and issue.

One normally serves 15-20 years from commissioning to Lt Col. There is sufficient time there to fit in a degree and the command and staff course.

My contention is that it is not just a question of a degree but what degree that is important and this must be in the hands of the military.

I would suggest that the academic equivalent of a military MBA must be considered and take place over two years and must be completed before promotion to Lt Col. Probably the best time is after the age of 30.

Initial officer selection can accept SAT/ACT results. This is all that is needed to assess future likelihood of academic success. It is a pass or a fail.

To go a step further the same should apply to the physical assessment at initial selection. A pass or a fail. It is ridiculous to believe that a stronger man will make a better officer than one of adequate physical ability.

Also when the physical and the academic are weighted it tends to diminish the importance of leadership qualities that are required and need to be selected for. The leadership qualities requirement should be absolute and not part of a balancing act with weighted scores from SATS/ACT results and a physical rating.

Sadly the US seems to have bought into the 'whole person' stuff when selecting potential officers.

From the document OFFICER SELECTION (RTO HFM 023 – RSG 31):

All three service academies use the “whole person” concept for evaluating applicants. At West Point, a “whole person score” (WPS) is derived from weighting three factors: academic aptitude, which combines SAT or ACT scores with high school rank (60 percent); leadership potential, which is estimated from athletic participation in high school and high school teacher recommendations (30 percent); and physical aptitude, which is measured with the Academy’s Physical Aptitude Examination (10 percent).

What seems bizarre is that the most crucial aspect being the leadership potential is relegated to a mere 30% and based on a school teachers assessment. Can't be right can it?

[JMA]

I had read the following quote before but not read that it had activiely been used in the lead up to WW2:

I divide officers into four classes -- the clever, the lazy, the stupid and the industrious. Each officer possesses at least two of these qualities. Those who are clever and industrious are fitted for the high staff appointments. Use can be made of those who are stupid and lazy. The man who is clever and lazy is fit for the very highest commands. He has the temperament and the requisite nerves to deal with all situations. But whoever is stupid and industrious must be removed immediately."

Attributed, circa 1933
General Baron Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord (1878-1943)
German Chief of Army Command (1930-33)

Then we have the following explanation which does not seem to have the proper attributes but nevertheless makes interesting reading:

German Army officer selection

If there is more detail on this out there it would be appreciated...

[Ulenspiegel]

Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord also made the following statement:

"Vorschriften sind für die Dummen"

Rules are for the fools. :-)

[JMA]

Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord also made the following statement:

"Vorschriften sind fr die Dummen"

Rules are for the fools. :-)

Yes, I wonder what a world with no rules would be like?

Clearly he had a clear thinking mind like another of that era being von Lettow-Vorbeck.

Have you read his My reminiscences of East Africa? He certainly gave the Brits and South Africans the run around in East Africa 1914-18. A guerilla war genius. I wonder why he is not studied more widely?

[davidbfpo]

JMA you asked:

...von Lettow-Vorbeck....Have you read his My reminiscences of East Africa? He certainly gave the Brits and South Africans the run around in East Africa 1914-18. A guerilla war genius. I wonder why he is not studied more widely?

The WW1 German General von Lettow-Vorbeck has appeared before on SWC IIRC, although not sure whether in any depth. Added:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...read.php?t=651

My response to why is he not studied more widely: the campaign however skilled was a faraway sideshow and he was a mere nuisance to the Allied effort (mainly British Empire) on the main front. Secondly he lost and in the inter-war years any information gathering and writing outside Germany was focussed on the main front(s). I also wonder if his reliance on African soldiers (Askari's) had an impact, especially in South Africa. Perhaps his prowess as a guerilla has outweighed his skill as a leader?