Initial Officer Selection

[SethB]

The USMC uses a board to select applicants. It is highly selective.

Then they go to ten or twelve weeks of OCS, where 50% pass.

There is no emphasis on training, just selection.

Then they go to The Basic Course for six months of training in the basics, followed by an MOS course (Infantry, Artillery, etc).

It's a good system. I like working with Marines. Very professional and well educated. A far cry from the Army system.

60% of Marines come from OCS. 30% come from USNA, where there is less selection. The two groups don't always get along at first...

[stanleywinthrop]

The USMC uses a board to select applicants. It is highly selective.

Then they go to ten or twelve weeks of OCS, where 50% pass.

There is no emphasis on training, just selection.

Then they go to The Basic Course for six months of training in the basics, followed by an MOS course (Infantry, Artillery, etc).

It's a good system. I like working with Marines. Very professional and well educated. A far cry from the Army system.

60% of Marines come from OCS. 30% come from USNA, where there is less selection. The two groups don't always get along at first...

To emphasis this point the entire OCS course is an evaluation and selection process and candidates are told this from the very beginning. The only actual skills learned there are drill, basic weapons handling (but no live-fire), and fire team and squad tactics. Thats it. The learning takes place at TBS.

[JMA]

The USMC uses a board to select applicants. It is highly selective.

Then they go to ten or twelve weeks of OCS, where 50% pass.

There is no emphasis on training, just selection.

Then they go to The Basic Course for six months of training in the basics, followed by an MOS course (Infantry, Artillery, etc).

It's a good system. I like working with Marines. Very professional and well educated. A far cry from the Army system.

60% of Marines come from OCS. 30% come from USNA, where there is less selection. The two groups don't always get along at first...

Up front let me say that this obviously works for the marines (and that's really all that counts).

My initial focus was upon the initial pre-course selection process because it is the quality of which informs as to how many (what percentage) pass in the end. The attrition rate I experienced was similar to the 50% you speak of. I am now questioning this in the light of the quality of the initial pre-course selection process.

What happens to the 50% who fail? What is the cost of training those who don't make it? What psychological impact does this (largely avoidable failure) have on these individuals? Are they lost to the service? Is there not some room for improvement in the initial selection process?

[jpk]

Up front let me say that this obviously works for the marines (and that's really all that counts).

My initial focus was upon the initial pre-course selection process because it is the quality of which informs as to how many (what percentage) pass in the end. The attrition rate I experienced was similar to the 50% you speak of. I am now questioning this in the light of the quality of the initial pre-course selection process.

What happens to the 50% who fail? What is the cost of training those who don't make it? What psychological impact does this (largely avoidable failure) have on these individuals? Are they lost to the service? Is there not some room for improvement in the initial selection process?

Initial selection is... not very valuable. It certainly dismays those who are not determined (it takes about a year from the day you walk into a recruiters office to OCS), but leadership cannot be screened for.
My OCS class started with 128, only 87 commissioned as 2lt's. Many of those would did not make it went to good schools, got good grades had fine jobs ect.
Our distinguished leader grad failed out of college the first time and finished at some tec school no one has never heard of. But I would follow him into anything. That just goes to prove being a leader is completely different than the resume padding kids do now a days.
I have a masters in Middle eastern studies and know arabic, does that make me a good officer? No. Does charisma matter? No.
IMHO It all comes down to two things. 1st. I am willing to suffer for those around me. 2nd can I make the hard decision at the right time.
Few have it. After 12 weeks you know who do.

Now to adress your other question, what happens to those who fail. In most cases you get recycled and can class up with another company. Some chapter out of the army, some go AIT. If you cannot get through OCS the second time you need to be let go. It is just not that hard of a course. I am sure it is crushing to fail.

The Initial selection needs to be tighter. But by what metrics?

Also think of the needs of the Army - does that reserve quartermaster need to be a stud?

[JMA]

Some friendly questions for clarity... not to be seen as provocative please.

Initial selection is... not very valuable.

Lets call it initial pre-course selection.

This is my point of this thread. IMHO it should be valuable. Otherwise you waste time, money and effort on people who have no chance of making it.

It certainly dismays those who are not determined (it takes about a year from the day you walk into a recruiters office to OCS),...

That then is a self inflicted wound. Why not put them through a normal recruits course and then some time with the trained soldiers (while waiting for OCS)... and maybe a quick trip to the rockpile? (You learn a lot about a person by observing him under fire)

... but leadership cannot be screened for.

Not sure about that. Maybe not if all one has to go on are reports school teachers etc. I believe the idea of the Brit AOSB is to create situations where the leadership ability and or potential of candidates can be observed. (See Youtube videos posted above in post #4 to this thread)

My OCS class started with 128, only 87 commissioned as 2lt's. Many of those would did not make it went to good schools, got good grades had fine jobs ect.
Our distinguished leader grad failed out of college the first time and finished at some tec school no one has never heard of. But I would follow him into anything. That just goes to prove being a leader is completely different than the resume padding kids do now a days.
I have a masters in Middle eastern studies and know arabic, does that make me a good officer? No. Does charisma matter? No.
IMHO It all comes down to two things. 1st. I am willing to suffer for those around me. 2nd can I make the hard decision at the right time.
Few have it. After 12 weeks you know who do.

Now to adress your other question, what happens to those who fail. In most cases you get recycled and can class up with another company. Some chapter out of the army, some go AIT. If you cannot get through OCS the second time you need to be let go. It is just not that hard of a course. I am sure it is crushing to fail.

30 odd years ago this would not have caused me to raise an eyebrow.

But now consider this. That a third failed would indicate that the initial selection could be improved, yes? This third indicates a wate of time, money and effort IMHO.

Well as to the academic qualifcations. How much is enough? I would settle for a set minimum standard for acceptance. The same for the physical. He/she either can or they can't... a pass or fail situation. Has he/she met the academic requirements? And more than the requirement is a bonus. Is he/she pshysically able to carry out the duties of an officer? Any bigger, stronger, fitter is a bonus.

That said I question the 60:30:10 breakdown of the 'whole person' grading sustem. In my humble opinion the academic (60%) and the physical (10%) should be pass or fail. I would also question the vality of the 30% allocated to leadership potential as measured by high school sports participation and high school teacher recommendations.

So what I am suggesting is that phase on is to ascertain whether he/she meets the academic and physical standards required. If yes then a process run by the military (like the Brit AOSB) should select for leadership potential as a second stage. Proof positive of leadership qualities are essential if the candidate is to progress to the training IMHO.

The Initial selection needs to be tighter. But by what metrics?

Think I have covered that above.

Also think of the needs of the Army - does that reserve quartermaster need to be a stud?

You get your reserve quartermasters out of direct entry OCS courses?

I would have thought that the best candidates for this type of position would be seasoned and experienced NCOs with 15 plus years of experience, yes?
(T&A Commissions (technical and administrative) are/were a Brit method of promoting NCOs with the ability, service and experience from warrant officer to commissioned officer. Worked well.)

[Granite_State]

I can speak at some length about USMC OCS, having graduated just over two years ago. It was pretty selective when I went through, and has gotten dramatically more so in the last two years. Potential candidates go through a selection board, where Physical Fitness Test (PFT), college grades, recommendations, interview with your recruiter, and a host of other factors weigh in. The Marine Corps takes recruiting very seriously BTW.

OCS itself is a ten week officer boot camp (vice 13 on the enlisted side), with a little less of the mind games but a much larger leadership screening component. The latter is based on many factors, but one of the biggest ones are billets in small unit blank fire tactical scenarios (fire team and squad sized) and some fire team leadership puzzles (get this barrel over this 20 meter water obstacle using only a rope, pipes, and each other, in five minutes, etc.). I think the latter idea was borrowed from the Reichswehr.

Attrition in my platoon was pretty low, around 25-30%. Should have been a little higher.

[JMA]

I can speak at some length about USMC OCS, having graduated just over two years ago. It was pretty selective when I went through, and has gotten dramatically more so in the last two years. Potential candidates go through a selection board, where Physical Fitness Test (PFT), college grades, recommendations, interview with your recruiter, and a host of other factors weigh in. The Marine Corps takes recruiting very seriously BTW.

OCS itself is a ten week officer boot camp (vice 13 on the enlisted side), with a little less of the mind games but a much larger leadership screening component. The latter is based on many factors, but one of the biggest ones are billets in small unit blank fire tactical scenarios (fire team and squad sized) and some fire team leadership puzzles (get this barrel over this 20 meter water obstacle using only a rope, pipes, and each other, in five minutes, etc.). I think the latter idea was borrowed from the Reichswehr.

Attrition in my platoon was pretty low, around 25-30%. Should have been a little higher.

As a young officer IMHO it is important to analyse everything around him and constantly try to figure out how the aim can be achieved in a better, quicker, more effective manner. I still do this 40 years later and I still see things which we/I did wrong or could have done better or more effectively.

BTW the barrel, ropes, pipes and a box full of stones is one of the AOSB group exercises. Watching that exercise is very revealing (and often hilarious) if you are a DS (directing staff). Who says the military is not fun

[Ken White]

I still do this 40 years later and I still see things which we/I did wrong or could have done better or more effectively.

Me too on the first. On the latter, too many in my case...

Who says the military is not fun

Not I. My errors were fortunately mostly harmless and I certainly had a ball for 30 years (and almost as much fun for another 18 as a silly-villian employeeeek).

[Pete]

I believe there is a series of U.S. Army Regulations that describe the proccesses and steps required to be selected for pre-commissioning training. I'm positive that they spell out in very specific detail what is required, be it for USMA, ROTC, or OCS. For a select few there are also direct commissions and battlefield commissions.

There is a smoke-in-the-wind aspect about this thread about what should be or could be, rather than what is. Check the regulations and see what they say.

By and large our personnel system is set up for rapid mobilization during times of national (or Personnel Command numbers-crunch) emergency, not for a more methodical selection process during peacetime or low-intensity war. Perhaps in a better world there could be a greater depth of analysis the lower the threat level to the country is. Even then it's a crap-shoot because sometimes the maniacs with obvious flaws make better combat leaders than their more restrained and low-key peers.

NCO Promotion Boards have been known to reject guys who never received an Article 15, like they must be rule-abiding sissies, wimps or something worse. No guts no glory.

[SethB]

NCO Promotion Boards have been known to reject guys who never received an Article 15, like they must be rule-abiding sissies, wimps or something worse. No guts no glory.

I assure you that we (the Army) no longer have that mindset.

As far as mass mobilization, I'm not very worried about having to do it. I think we will fight with what we have, and it will be small enough to not require mobilization, or it will be over before we could set up a draft anyway.

[JMA]

Interesting short article by a journalist who covered an ASOB 30 years after he attended one (and failed).

Donkin on Work - Leadership

I quote:

A popular misconception about the board is that it is looking for future generals. This is not the case. The selection board for the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, is looking for those who have the potential to be a second lieutenant leading a platoon or a troop.

I question this as if all you are looking for is someone to command a platoon most armies have an amazing number competent and experienced NCOs who can do that with ease.

This narrow view and concentration on the first step of the officer ladder may be one of the reasons why officer retention beyond subaltern is becoming a problem in many militaries. We may differ in this view.

[Ken White]

SethB:

As far as mass mobilization, I'm not very worried about having to do it. I think we will fight with what we have, and it will be small enough to not require mobilization, or it will be over before we could set up a draft anyway.

You may or may not be right. FWIW, roughly the same prediction was made by many in the 20s, the late 40s and again in the 50s and 70s. I don't think you are correct but what you or I think is immaterial, The Army and the Nation cannot afford to and will not operate on that premise. Like it or not, we're big and have to be prepared to be far bigger.

JMA:

I question this as if all you are looking for is someone to command a platoon most armies have an amazing number competent and experienced NCOs who can do that with ease.

This narrow view and concentration on the first step of the officer ladder may be one of the reasons why officer retention beyond subaltern is becoming a problem in many militaries. We may differ in this view.

No differing by me for one, I think you're spot on. The French, by tradition have two Lieutenants commanding Platoons and the other two are commanded by NCOs. Seems a sensible way to provide experience for a select few who are being groomed to do Officer stuff at echelons above company...

We say we're training future Commanders and Leaders and then we place most in an environment where they are charged with rote operations of questionable value while their drive and initiative gets trampled by set piece training and operations -- that drives many to depart after five years or so and the Army accepts that because a big war will see them called back.

The selection comments you made above are correct IMO. Pete is also mostly correct on why we do what we do. What we have done to pad the mobilization roster is to significantly 'over Officer' US Forces. We have a veritable horde of Generals; same rough number we had at the end of WW II and in the 80s with an almost 800K Army (and we were over officered than; we still have the same rough numbers with about 250-300k fewer troops). We're not approaching USSR norms yet but we do seem headed that way.

Those charged with selecting and training future Officers are generally doing the best they can with the hand they've been dealt and the products are generally really pretty good (there are always going to be a few less than stellar slip-throughs...) -- the real problem is that our Personnel system does not support the Army, it drives it...

[JMA]

I stated in post #7 to this thread:

..., I am still not sure why there is a need for a degree before commissioning when there is plenty of time in a 25-30 year career to take three or so years for the purpose (around the senior Capt/Maj level for the infantry). Too much time and money (again IMHO) is invested in training of officers the majority of whom (it seems) will leave the service before they have justified the initial expense.

It seems from the private messages and off board conversations I have had recently that this remains and issue.

One normally serves 15-20 years from commissioning to Lt Col. There is sufficient time there to fit in a degree and the command and staff course.

My contention is that it is not just a question of a degree but what degree that is important and this must be in the hands of the military.

I would suggest that the academic equivalent of a military MBA must be considered and take place over two years and must be completed before promotion to Lt Col. Probably the best time is after the age of 30.

Initial officer selection can accept SAT/ACT results. This is all that is needed to assess future likelihood of academic success. It is a pass or a fail.

To go a step further the same should apply to the physical assessment at initial selection. A pass or a fail. It is ridiculous to believe that a stronger man will make a better officer than one of adequate physical ability.

Also when the physical and the academic are weighted it tends to diminish the importance of leadership qualities that are required and need to be selected for. The leadership qualities requirement should be absolute and not part of a balancing act with weighted scores from SATS/ACT results and a physical rating.

Sadly the US seems to have bought into the 'whole person' stuff when selecting potential officers.

From the document OFFICER SELECTION (RTO HFM 023 – RSG 31):

All three service academies use the “whole person” concept for evaluating applicants. At West Point, a “whole person score” (WPS) is derived from weighting three factors: academic aptitude, which combines SAT or ACT scores with high school rank (60 percent); leadership potential, which is estimated from athletic participation in high school and high school teacher recommendations (30 percent); and physical aptitude, which is measured with the Academy’s Physical Aptitude Examination (10 percent).

What seems bizarre is that the most crucial aspect being the leadership potential is relegated to a mere 30% and based on a school teachers assessment. Can't be right can it?

[JMA]

I had read the following quote before but not read that it had activiely been used in the lead up to WW2:

I divide officers into four classes -- the clever, the lazy, the stupid and the industrious. Each officer possesses at least two of these qualities. Those who are clever and industrious are fitted for the high staff appointments. Use can be made of those who are stupid and lazy. The man who is clever and lazy is fit for the very highest commands. He has the temperament and the requisite nerves to deal with all situations. But whoever is stupid and industrious must be removed immediately."

Attributed, circa 1933
General Baron Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord (1878-1943)
German Chief of Army Command (1930-33)

Then we have the following explanation which does not seem to have the proper attributes but nevertheless makes interesting reading:

German Army officer selection

If there is more detail on this out there it would be appreciated...

[Ulenspiegel]

Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord also made the following statement:

"Vorschriften sind für die Dummen"

Rules are for the fools. :-)

[JMA]

Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord also made the following statement:

"Vorschriften sind fr die Dummen"

Rules are for the fools. :-)

Yes, I wonder what a world with no rules would be like?

Clearly he had a clear thinking mind like another of that era being von Lettow-Vorbeck.

Have you read his My reminiscences of East Africa? He certainly gave the Brits and South Africans the run around in East Africa 1914-18. A guerilla war genius. I wonder why he is not studied more widely?

[Boondoggle]

I've had that quote on the wall behind me in my office for years. First remember hearing it (of all places) when I was a 2ndLt at The Basic School.

[JMA]

Moving right along to officer development...

The paper Officer Development : A Contemporary Roadmap by Maj William D Linn, II is an intelligent contribution to this matter. In the paper Maj Linn provides a comparison with the systems used by US allies.

FWIW I agree with much of what he writes... but obviously not all.

One example of an area of agreement is:

Officers should select degrees that have applicability to their profession, but not all will lie within the traditional confines of military-related fields. The Army should recognize that both the degree and the environment in which the officer earns his degree are of equal importance.

[ganulv]

Also when the physical and the academic are weighted it tends to diminish the importance of leadership qualities that are required and need to be selected for. The leadership qualities requirement should be absolute and not part of a balancing act with weighted scores from SATS/ACT results and a physical rating.

Sadly the US seems to have bought into the 'whole person' stuff when selecting potential officers. […] What seems bizarre is that the most crucial aspect being the leadership potential is relegated to a mere 30% and based on a school teachers assessment. Can't be right can it?

I have an acquaintance who taught at West Point immediately prior to her retirement from the Army a couple of years ago and the next time I have a chance I will try and remember to ask her about the logic of the application process. But at first blush I wonder if the criteria may be geared toward selecting those individuals most likely to see the West Point experience through to its conclusion rather than toward selecting those individuals most likely to be good officers. From afar my impression is that the right to wear a class ring from a U.S. Service academy is a first rate achievement. But I also have the impression that a lot of the tasks mastered (or at least borne) do not necessarily have anything to do with the training of a good officer. I am sure some reading the above will say, “What the hell does this guy know?” while others will say, “That’s putting it politely.”

For what it is worth, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy is the most difficult of the Service academies to gain admittance to, as well as one of the most difficult of all undergraduate institutions in the United States for the same.

[JMA]

I have an acquaintance who taught at West Point immediately prior to her retirement from the Army a couple of years ago and the next time I have a chance I will try and remember to ask her about the logic of the application process. But at first blush I wonder if the criteria may be geared toward selecting those individuals most likely to see the West Point experience through to its conclusion rather than toward selecting those individuals most likely to be good officers. From afar my impression is that the right to wear a class ring from a U.S. Service academy is a first rate achievement. But I also have the impression that a lot of the tasks mastered (or at least borne) do not necessarily have anything to do with the training of a good officer. I am sure some reading the above will say, “What the hell does this guy know?” while others will say, “That’s putting it politely.”

For what it is worth, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy is the most difficult of the Service academies to gain admittance to, as well as one of the most difficult of all undergraduate institutions in the United States for the same.

I am sure that every aspect of human endeavor can be improved upon and at least refined.

My first question is whether the aim of the officer training is to produce future generals or to produce thousands of officers who then make their way in the military on an 'up or out' basis. In just about every case it is the latter... but the question needs to be asked, is this the right way?

Then based on the above and other considerations how important is it to throughly test and screen potential officers before they are taken into service and start training? We have variations from the five day British (and other) AOSB (Army Officer Selection Board) to a paper assessment with an interview (and then use the training course itself as the main selection mechanism).

The next aspect is the weighting of the selection criteria for admission to the training. Is the 60:30:10 (academic:leadership: physical) weighting correct or should a specific SAT/ACT score be a pass without weighting. The same with the physical should an assessment be made as to the physical health and potential of an individual be made on a pass or fail basis (and as the kid will be between 18-22 one would take into account how much the individual will 'fill out' over the training period). Next, should the military rely on the leadership assessments of high school teachers? I suggest not. So here we have a major issue which (will not be changed anytime soon but) deserves some thought.

Then there is the issue of the timing and composition of the degree course which officers (undoubtedly) require. Sandhurst nowadays takes in cadets 80%+ of which have degrees (of their own choosing). The US seems to have different models but effectively demand a degree before promotion to the rank of captain. Or is the trick to get them bright eyed and bushy tailed between 18-22 and select and filter carefully (with an eye on identifying those with general staff potential) then taking them through company level command before assessing whether there is a long career ahead. If yes then you sit individually with each officer and plan his future (subject of course to his achieving certain laid down milestones along the way) and send him off to university (on full pay) for a few years to prepare him for the future. Attendance on the Command and Staff Course and the degree wiuld be required before promotion to Lt Col. (which would be after 15-20 years of commissioned service).

Now rather than the rather brutal 'up or out' policy those who are not considered to have general staff potential are offered a 'low road' career option or an exit from the service. The exit process would involve attendance at a university on full pay to enable the person to obtain a degree to prepare him for a second career after the military. It is important that young men who have given the best years of their lives to the service are not discarded but treated with dignity and respect.

There is another side to this and it is that if the selection process was more focussed on the long term potential of potential officers it would mean that a greater reliance would fall on creating platoon and other company level officers from the ranks. This would lead to marked reduction in the quality of company level NCOs if the 'best' were commissioned (or made platoon commanders) unless a serious leadership and NCO development programme was developed concurrently.

It is really all about thinking. The current systems 'work' for most countries but outsider logic and clarity often helps with the process of improvement. If you can ask people in the service the 'why' question and they can't answer the problem lies with them and not you.

Remember too: The Mind Is Like A Parachute, It Only Works When It's Open