Initial Officer Selection

[JMA]

The training level of most German divisions was poor in 1939, improved during the winter1939/40; equipment was often WW1 stuff and all the main issues were, when we use the assessment of the Wehrmacht, only solved around May 1941. Of course, the propaganda photos in 1939/40 showed a "reality" that was only true for 25% of the German divisions.

IIRC the German Auftragstaktik became part of the regulations in 1888.
This concept only worked when leaders were able to clearly understand the intentions of their superiors. Therefore, we found quite early a tendency in the Imperial German army to train leaders who were able to command one or two levels above their paygrade.

Interesting is that the entrance exam for the war academy - the candidate was usually Leutnant or Oberleutnant - comprised applied tactics of combined regiments at the beginning of the 1920ies. My understanding is, that the long service time as Leutnant was used quite efficiently and was not lost time.

The experiences of WWI were brought to paper in the 1920ies and practical conclusions published as Truppenführung around 1934. So I do not have evidence that the leadership principles (for officers) were a result of the small Reichswehr and a planned expansion of the ground forces, but often were in place pre-WW1 and were only refined in the interwar period.

To win in war all you have to be is better 'prepared' than your enemy. This does not mean you need to be 100% prepared as preparation is a journey and not a destination.

Google Books allows one to browse The Blitzkrieg legend: the 1940 campaign in the West to an extent, which is useful.

I have a copy of On the German Art of War: Truppenfuhrung.

The concept of combat power (or fighting power) - Kampfkraft is worthy of greater study in terms of reaching a greater understanding of the role of leadership in this and how to select officers who have the required characteristics to enhance this. Kampfkraft is without doubt a critical force multiplier.