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Thread: Initial Officer Selection

  1. #101
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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Found the book here: The Blitzkrieg Legend: The Campaign in the West, 1940

    I must find a copy and read it to improve my knowledge of that era.

    Prepared does not necessarily mean more tanks or planes. From my knowledge of that era I am aware that German officers were trained at a tactical level 'two-up' which would have prepared them for the mssive growth of the army after 1939 and it was probably a contributing factor to their tactical superiority at the outbreak of the war.
    The training level of most German divisions was poor in 1939, improved during the winter1939/40; equipment was often WW1 stuff and all the main issues were, when we use the assessment of the Wehrmacht, only solved around May 1941. Of course, the propaganda photos in 1939/40 showed a "reality" that was only true for 25% of the German divisions.

    IIRC the German Auftragstaktik became part of the regulations in 1888.
    This concept only worked when leaders were able to clearly understand the intentions of their superiors. Therefore, we found quite early a tendency in the Imperial German army to train leaders who were able to command one or two levels above their paygrade.

    Interesting is that the entrance exam for the war academy - the candidate was usually Leutnant or Oberleutnant - comprised applied tactics of combined regiments at the beginning of the 1920ies. My understanding is, that the long service time as Leutnant was used quite efficiently and was not lost time.

    The experiences of WWI were brought to paper in the 1920ies and practical conclusions published as Truppenführung around 1934. So I do not have evidence that the leadership principles (for officers) were a result of the small Reichswehr and a planned expansion of the ground forces, but often were in place pre-WW1 and were only refined in the interwar period.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ulenspiegel View Post
    The training level of most German divisions was poor in 1939, improved during the winter1939/40; equipment was often WW1 stuff and all the main issues were, when we use the assessment of the Wehrmacht, only solved around May 1941. Of course, the propaganda photos in 1939/40 showed a "reality" that was only true for 25% of the German divisions.

    IIRC the German Auftragstaktik became part of the regulations in 1888.
    This concept only worked when leaders were able to clearly understand the intentions of their superiors. Therefore, we found quite early a tendency in the Imperial German army to train leaders who were able to command one or two levels above their paygrade.

    Interesting is that the entrance exam for the war academy - the candidate was usually Leutnant or Oberleutnant - comprised applied tactics of combined regiments at the beginning of the 1920ies. My understanding is, that the long service time as Leutnant was used quite efficiently and was not lost time.

    The experiences of WWI were brought to paper in the 1920ies and practical conclusions published as Truppenführung around 1934. So I do not have evidence that the leadership principles (for officers) were a result of the small Reichswehr and a planned expansion of the ground forces, but often were in place pre-WW1 and were only refined in the interwar period.
    To win in war all you have to be is better 'prepared' than your enemy. This does not mean you need to be 100% prepared as preparation is a journey and not a destination.

    Google Books allows one to browse The Blitzkrieg legend: the 1940 campaign in the West to an extent, which is useful.

    I have a copy of On the German Art of War: Truppenfuhrung.

    The concept of combat power (or fighting power) - Kampfkraft is worthy of greater study in terms of reaching a greater understanding of the role of leadership in this and how to select officers who have the required characteristics to enhance this. Kampfkraft is without doubt a critical force multiplier.

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    Default The Perfect Officer - Henrik Bering

    The article The Perfect Officer - by Henrik Bering contains enough to keep an enquiring intellect busy for months.

    The key element of fighting power is leadership. In screening for officer material, the German emphasis was on all-around personality, rather than on intelligence and education alone. Intelligence is important, but even more important is character. A man can be clever and a coward. Or he can be indecisive. What the Germans were looking for was determination, the individual’s willingness to assume responsibility, and his ability to handle adversity. Here van Creveld uses the German word: the officer had to be Krisenfest, “crisisproof,” i.e., steady in emergencies.

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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    The article The Perfect Officer - by Henrik Bering contains enough to keep an enquiring intellect busy for months.
    Here H. Bering put van Creveld's statement which is found in "Fighting Power" a little bit out of context.

    The search for candidates with character was the central piece in the Prussian army's selection process, here the regimental commander did most of the work. Therefore my question how he could do this even after decadeds of peace.

    Formal education was secondary, sometimes trouble in school or family indicated an independent personality which was preferred. See Jörg Muth "Command Culture". However, the Reichswehr increased the educational requirements 1920 as von Seeckt felt that modern warfare requires an sharp intellect.

    Kriesenfest as important filter was only added in the last two years of WW2 and not found earlier.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ulenspiegel View Post
    Here H. Bering put van Creveld's statement which is found in "Fighting Power" a little bit out of context.
    From the article:

    The Israeli military analyst Martin van Creveld attributes the Wehrmacht’s frighteningly effective performance during World War II to its fighting power, or Kampfkraft, which he defines as “the sum total of mental qualities that makes armies fight.” As he notes in his book, Fighting Power, while weaponry and tactics undergo changes due to the advance of technology, the nature of fighting power remains constant. Thus, according to his equation, “within the limits of its size, the military worth of an army equals the quantity and quality of its equipment multiplied by its fighting power.”
    And from On the German Art of War: Truppenfuhrung:

    The caliber of a leader and of the men determines the combat power (Kampfkraft) of a unit, which is augmented by the quantity, care, and maintenance of their weapons and equipment.

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    Default Real life AOSB...

    OK you get to a Board member on an AOSB.

    Task: Leaderless group activity.

    Scenario: Motor accident, biker trapped under vehicle and bike on fire. Save him.

    Biker pulled from blazing crash scene by random bystanders in Logan, Utah

    Spot the natural leaders...

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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    From the article:



    And from On the German Art of War: Truppenfuhrung:
    Sorry for the confusion, I was refering to the "kriesenfest" attribute of officer candidates which was a new invention in 1944 and indicated a deteriorating situation of the German ground forces. It does not play a major role in van Crefeld's argumentation and in the Prussian/German officer selction. Bering gives it more importance than van Crefeld and other.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    There's no perfect model in existence (it was, but times and demands were different then).

    We have too many conflicts:

    (1) officers who leave after x years - officers who serve till retirement
    This is no problem if those who leave and those who stay are in keeping with the needs of the army. Its a problem if the best and the brightest leave and the army is left with the dross.

    (2) officers to lead men in combat - offers who lead support people - officers who do very important jobs without many subordinates
    For the purpose of simplicity try to focus only on the teeth arms (infantry and armour) for the moment. This sets the general standard and the other arms may well have slight or significant different requirements which need to be taken into consideration. The principle that needs to be established IMHO is which officers need which degrees as an essential requirement at the time of commissioning (for example medical officers).

    (3) effectiveness - costs
    Effectiveness can cover a wide range of aspects. But left me assume that it means the amount and quality of training and education required to allow the officer to function 'effectively' in a war time operational environment. The cost issue would be assessed on the benefits arising from the investment. Are we on the same page here?

    (4) uncertainty about potential - desirability of having officers qualified all the time, instead of adding learning-intensive basic qualifications after many years in service
    If you mean qualified at the beginning and at the time of commissioning then (as i have said) I don't believe its necessary. You analyse the career path of the officers in each branch then you establish the what-when-where-how of training and education needed along the way. I genuinely can see no point in a degree being needed from the get-go (other than for the likes of medical officers that is).

    (5) costs of long education and training - benefits of the same
    Think I have covered this. You don't spend all the money up front. You set career milestones at which point certain courses must be successfully completed (this would be a mix of internal and degree training and education). The benefits of this training and education would have to have been apparent to have been set as a requirement. It would not be discretionary but a stipulated requirement set by the service. In other words external university or higher education that will be authorised and paid for by the military will be what will benefit the service. No chance of (for example) a Corps of Engineers officer taking three years out at government expense to read philosophy (for example).

    (6) specialisation on military skills - ability to get a job after life in uniform, ability to grasp and respect civilian stuff
    Concentrate on the military skills. If the service decides that at major or so that he has no further career growth potential then let him choose a 'second career degree and let the service send him full time to a university. He would have given the best years of his life to the service and it is fair and honourable to help him on his way in this manner IMHO.

    (7) need for high quality - need for great quantity (in case of mobilisation)
    What we have covered here is what would be the plan under normal peacetime (or with a small war somewhere). Once there is a need to mobilise then all training is limited to the 'must knows' with the 'should knows' and 'could knows' being dropped for the time being.

    Are we on the same page?

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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    The article The Perfect Officer - by Henrik Bering contains enough to keep an enquiring intellect busy for months.
    Thought I would extract some quotes from Bering's article as they apply to officer selection:

    ...Of all the jobs in the world, then as now, the wartime officer’s is the most dangerous and demanding, physically and emotionally.

    ...Among the characteristics required in a successful commander are imagination, intuition, and an ability to improvise, all qualities associated with a free and independent mind.

    …What further characterizes a great commander is the ability to keep calm under stressful circumstances, the ability to tune out irrelevant information and to keep functioning when things go wrong.

    …How do you combine the need for obedience and discipline with the need for imaginative and independent thought?

    …as the German 1936 Truppenfuhrung manual put it, “a readiness to assume responsibility is the most important of all qualities of leadership,”…

    …In [Israeli] officers’ training, the emphasis is on initiative and self reliance;
    Ok, so how do the current initial pre-course officer selection processes (in the various militaries) select for these characteristics? Then how during the actual training course leading to commissioning are situations created where cadets are tested individually for the above characteristics?

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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    I suspect different career / education / training patterns are justified for different groups of army officers

    (a) young officers and former NCOs (promising NCOs get a second NCO course (Feldwebellehrgang) and as a test the opportunity to lead a platoon for minimum 1 year or an equivalent staff task)
    (b) civilian experts joining with full civilian qualification
    (c) proved officers, selected for staff service (i.G.)
    (d) proved officers, selected for leading army field units
    (e) useful officers, selected for leading other units
    Yes, I believe so and must state again that this must be carried out in a manner suitable to the career route of the individual as deemed necessary by the individuals applicable service requirements. No way that an individual in the infantry decides he wants to read philosophy or study accounting.

    One year at platoon commanding? Only in a time of full mobilisation with the nations back against the wall. Otherwise three years is (or should be) the standard IMHO.

    example:

    (a) Quick (6 months) lieutenant course (~ "70% solution" for up to company command)

    (b) Quick (3 months) officership training (use of personal equipment, survival, regulations).

    (c) staff courses and academic studies (military history, logistics, intel, art of war, technology of war) that span years, but with interruptions by normal staff assignments - and much autodidactic learning effort is expected

    (d) command courses and academic studies that span years, but mostly command assignments. These officers should not be branch officers, but become combined arms officers.

    (e) Branch-related courses to add competence in management and the area of occupation (logistics, for example)
    Yes, as long as the courses and lines of study are set by the military and the applicable service/branch and these take place over a period rather than precommissioning or immediately thereafter.


    JMA's concerns about wasting too much training on duds should be addressed by this. The young officers would either be proved NCOs or wouldn't get much training till being commissioned.
    Yes, do not let the military be used as any easy route to get a degree in exchange for a few years service. Select them when they are young, 'bright-eyed and bushy-tailed', test them early (thank those who don't make it for their efforts and treat them with dignity on exit) and sit with the successful young officers and plan their futures sketching out both a high-road route and a low-road route telling them what is expected of them and how they will be assessed (and again given these young men are giving the best years of their lives treat them with absolute honesty and respect).

    The commissioning of NCOs should be handled carefully. While it would be crazy to ignore officer potential as it exists the potential catastrophic downside is that being an NCO gets to be seen as a second grade soldier. This is why I suggest that there is an early window of opportunity for a commission from the ranks and that being (say) within the first three years of service (normally) undergoing the normal officer training course (of say a year) with the next window of opportunity being at senior NCO level (at say warrant officer - in the Brit sense - after 15 years service. This second group would be mainly for technical/administrative/training officer positions with relatively few GD (general duties) commissions leading to platoon commanding and the like. Any army which tampers with the senior NCO structure at platoon/company/battalion level does so at its peril... IMHO

    Young recruits on the direct path to officer would not sign up for many, many years - instead, they would sign up for two years and becoming lieutenant of the reserves. The army could then invite as many as it needs to further active service (signing up for a few years with expectation to move up to captain and probably get a company command minimum for a year, then in a third step become career officers).
    I assume this is for a volunteer? (dealing with conscripts would be based on different criteria)

    Your thinking on this is interesting and I would be interested in how potential officers would view such a stepped career process. I like the idea that the military gets to decide who goes and who stays rather than guaranteed employment for a number of years by regulation.

  11. #111
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    …How do you combine the need for obedience and discipline with the need for imaginative and independent thought?
    Discipline can be done right or wrong. Those who understand the reason why an increased level of discipline is needed in an army (and it's not needed in an air force!) can will have no problem with discipline that they wouldn't have with a training plan.

    There are times for ideas and there are times when a team has to act together and quickly, towards a purpose. Poor leaders may stick to the latter all the time, but good superiors understand that different situations demand different approaches.


    Besides; Auftragstaktik leaves a lot of room for independent action within the limits of obedience.

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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post

    Yes, do not let the military be used as any easy route to get a degree in exchange for a few years service. Select them when they are young, 'bright-eyed and bushy-tailed', test them early (thank those who don't make it for their efforts and treat them with dignity on exit) and sit with the successful young officers and plan their futures sketching out both a high-road route and a low-road route telling them what is expected of them and how they will be assessed (and again given these young men are giving the best years of their lives treat them with absolute honesty and respect).
    That would be great. Especially give them a chance for a low-road route.
    .....

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post

    I assume this is for a volunteer? (dealing with conscripts would be based on different criteria)

    Your thinking on this is interesting and I would be interested in how potential officers would view such a stepped career process. I like the idea that the military gets to decide who goes and who stays rather than guaranteed employment for a number of years by regulation.
    Most German reserve officers were/are conscipts. Usually the candidates were asked after 6 months by their company commander to become a ROC and stay for 2 years (with better pay). I know some good reserve officers who would really enjoy the model Fuchs proposes.
    However, with an all-volunteer force the ROC supply may be hurt.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    Discipline can be done right or wrong. Those who understand the reason why an increased level of discipline is needed in an army (and it's not needed in an air force!) can will have no problem with discipline that they wouldn't have with a training plan.

    There are times for ideas and there are times when a team has to act together and quickly, towards a purpose. Poor leaders may stick to the latter all the time, but good superiors understand that different situations demand different approaches.

    Besides; Auftragstaktik leaves a lot of room for independent action within the limits of obedience.
    We probably need to accept that the leadership and discipline has a cultural component which means that different nations will aprroach these matters differently and with different results and there is no point in attempting to duplicate to the letter another's approach in a different environment.

    Examples of the Brit approach to discipline are:

    Pride in Oneself
    Discipline is teaching which makes a man do something which he would not, unless he had learnt that it was the right, the proper, and the expedient thing to do. At its best, it is instilled and maintained by pride in oneself, in one’s unit, in one’s profession; only at its worst by a fear of punishment.

    Field Marshal Earl Wavell The Good Soldier (1945).
    Overcoming Instincts
    Foreign visitors sometimes talk of our ‘natural’ discipline. Of course it is not natural! You might as well talk of the ‘instincts of a gentleman’. A man becomes a gentleman only by overcoming his instincts. It is the same with discipline.

    Field Marshal Sir William Slim Courage and Other Broadcasts (1957).

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    Hmm, let me explain the German army way as I learnt it.

    An anglophone scholar (forgot who - either Gudmundsson or v.Creveld) once wrote about it that for Germans (in WW2), battle was the source of discipline itself. He came close.


    The German keyword here is Gefechtsdisziplin - combat discipline.
    It's the compound of obedience with thinking and comradeship.
    A (small9 unit cannot withstand the stress of battle without discipline, thus discipline needs to become natural for army soldiers. It needs to be trained with discipline in little everyday affairs, but the superiors should always remember that it's combat, not the everyday affair that warrants this effort!

    This is of utmost importance, for exaggerations that do not pursue the goal of robustness under combat stress will stifle the "thinking" part that's of great importance for actual performance in battle (and for developing leaders).


    As a consequence, it's quite unimportant whether all soldiers wear the sleeves up, down or whether they mix it. They may march in lock-step or not.
    All that counts is that superiors used enough discipline standards to instil and maintain discipline. Discipline is a skill that need training and maintenance, it is not a performance.

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    Default Travelling....

    Just a note to say I will be travelling for the next week or so. Will look in while on the road.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    As a consequence, it's quite unimportant whether all soldiers wear the sleeves up, down or whether they mix it. They may march in lock-step or not. All that counts is that superiors used enough discipline standards to instil and maintain discipline. Discipline is a skill that need training and maintenance, it is not a performance.
    To engrave this on a large plaque, have copies made and posted at the entrance to the US Army Sergeant Majors Academy and all the various Staff and War colleges.

    Probably need one at each entrance to the Pentagon as well.

    Certainly need one on E Ring...

    Hmm. Every Division and BCT headquarters...

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    To engrave this on a large plaque, have copies made and posted at the entrance to the US Army Sergeant Majors Academy and all the various Staff and War colleges.

    Probably need one at each entrance to the Pentagon as well.

    Certainly need one on E Ring...

    Hmm. Every Division and BCT headquarters...
    If you make the plaque I'll hang it in my office at NDU
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    Quote Originally Posted by selil View Post
    If you make the plaque I'll hang it in my office at NDU
    It'll take a bit -- not as quick as I used to be and minor busy right now. PM me a Snail Mail Address in the next week or so...

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    Bravo! Although I suspect we have slim hopes of thining the ranks of the dumbest people in the world who focus on what type of socks your wearing, or if your sleeve is turned, or your boot laces aren't left over right, etc. We used to have a different breed of Sergeant Major, one that both the enlisted and officers deeply respected. Uniform violations in garrison weren't tolerated, but few were focused on non-sense in the field, they were focused on training, and in combat on effectiveness. Now we're paying them big money to be fashion police.

    Obviously our form of discipline didn't work for the PLT PBS Frontline did a special on last night. It was a case study on the most undisciplined soldiers I ever recall seeing. I suspect the senior NCOs kept them in the right uniform (fashion police patrols), but were obviously missing on combat patrols where discipline was really needed.

    http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/woundedplatoon/

    I do not lack sympathy for those with PTSD, and while the documentary attempts to make all these cases out to be PTSD they're not. Several members of this platoon had criminal records and a long history of discipline issues before going to combat, where they claim to have shot civilians for fun, they had one dumb kid trying to hug an Iraqi women, etc. Hard for me to believe the Army allowed a unit like this to exist, much less deploy, and worse deploy in combat with no adult supervision. No wonder so many Iraqis hate us.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    Obviously our form of discipline didn't work for the PLT PBS Frontline did a special on last night. It was a case study on the most undisciplined soldiers I ever recall seeing. I suspect the senior NCOs kept them in the right uniform (fashion police patrols), but were obviously missing on combat patrols where discipline was really needed.
    I suspect you're right. I saw little evidence of any real NCO involvement in what those kids did at any point. I also noticed there were incidents of unaimed pray and spray firing and just general poor tactical competence.

    We recruit but do not select. We fill out counseling sheets but do not fire due to lack of competence. We train lethality and appearance well -- discipline and common sense not at all...
    I do not lack sympathy for those with PTSD, and while the documentary attempts to make all these cases out to be PTSD they're not. Several members of this platoon had criminal records and a long history of discipline issues before going to combat, where they claim to have shot civilians for fun, they had one dumb kid trying to hug an Iraqi women, etc. Hard for me to believe the Army allowed a unit like this to exist, much less deploy, and worse deploy in combat with no adult supervision. No wonder so many Iraqis hate us.
    Yep. I didn't see much PTSD -- just a bunch of kids with no control just as occurred at Abu Gharaib and dozens (probably hundreds) of other times. The NCO Corps has has lost the bubble, I think...

    Of course, at their behest, we do now have the most atrocious set of uniforms ever...

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