Initial Officer Selection

[ganulv]

A recent post at the On Violence blog asserts that

We [in the U.S. Army] can’t become better leaders until we figure out that we are managers. Yes, management is a dirty word, but we ignored it and now most officers/senior NCOs/warrant officers can’t manage their time or communications–at the least, few do it nearly as well as they should.

Does anyone energetically second or strenuously object to the above?

[Ken White]

Both at all times but frequently one must be temporarily subjugated to the other...

I for one do not either second or object to the premise. It has merit and much truth but it is merely one way to describe the problem. Others will say that one who cannot manage time or comms is inefficient, ineffective, poorly trained or not a good leader -- all those comments are also true.

Sadly, regardless of the attitude of the United States Army Human Resources Command, not everyone of equal educational attainment and broadly similar professional background can do both those things adequately -- much less well...

In our quest for personal excellence, we often forget the fact that the US Army and our friends in other services are not optimum combat forces. They are by design, adequate (barely, some say...) forces for employment on nationally directed missions one of which may be combat. Democracies do not want their armed forces to be too competent. Won't tolerate that, in fact. Our armed forces are products of 200 plus years of evolution and ever increasing bureaucratic sclerosis subject to the whims and vagaries of Congress. They have antiquated personnel systems and compensation processes that are absolutely inimical to flexibility and good order (be that led or managed... ).

We skimp on training funds and overspend on equipment to compensate for that shortcoming to a degree. As a result of all that, the services are on balance and in fact mostly marginally trained, not too well disciplined and the Army at least has elevated people of relative inexperience and mediocre competence to positions as leaders, commanders or staff persons with which a number cannot cope effectively.. A mentality that says SFCs or CPTs must be in SFC or CPT positions, regardless of knowledges, skills and ability promotes people to check boxes and fill holes (a dogma that drives many good SSG and LTs out). Personnel management failure on high -- and that is purely a management problem -- leads to all sorts of management problems down the chain. Toleration of that poor management -- at all levels -- is a leadership problem and that absence of leadership is noted and also trickles down the chain.

The position expressed by Michael C. is his take and is certainly correct in many aspects; he's a smart guy -- but I personally think that his two art forms, management and leading are, individually, mild complications and collectively they become IMO excessive complications. Leadership is nothing more than three things -- know your job, do your job and be fair. I submit that management can well be similarly described. So can the old fashioned Army term that encompasses both those and other skills as well -- be tactically and technically competent.

That used to be the goal of all systems, processes, training and PME. That seems to have been discarded. It shows...

[JMA]

Managers organize, Leaders motivate. Military competence requires both skills.

This is a perennial issue that comes up in the military from time to time.

Lets listen to what a great soldier once said on the matter:

Leadership and Management

We do not in the Army talk of “management”, but of “leadership”. This is significant. There is a difference between leadership and management. The leader and the men who follow him represent one of the oldest, most natural and most effective of all human relationships. The manager and those he manages are a later product, with neither so romantic nor so inspiring a history. Leadership is of the spirit, compounded of personality and vision: its practice is an art. Management is of the mind, more a matter of accurate calculation, of statistics, of methods, timetables and routine; its practice is a science. Managers are necessary; leaders are essential.

- Address to the Australian Institute of Management 4 April 1957 by Field Marshal Sir William Slim Governor General of Australia.

...and another one which is short and sweet:

In A Nutshell

Fixed (things) - management
Variables (people) - leadership

- Major General Julian Thompson, Commanding 3 Command Brigade in the
Falklands Conflict 1982.

Back to the point... IMHO select officers for their leadership ability and train them to manage (where necessary)... you can't turn managers into leaders.

[Ken White]

This is a perennial issue that comes up in the military from time to time...IMHO select officers for their leadership ability and train them to manage (where necessary)... you can't turn managers into leaders.

We knew that. Though it seems we may have forgotten it...

[Stan]

Hey JMA !

... you can't turn managers into leaders.

It wasn't long ago that the Air Force and to some extent the Army thought they could convert senior NCOs (leaders) into managers.

We don't turn combat and combat support personnel into desk drivers and we really don't want desk drivers designated as leaders (see below).

Hi Ken !

A mentality that says SFCs or CPTs must be in SFC or CPT positions, regardless of knowledges, skills and ability promotes people to check boxes and fill holes...

'Nuff said

[JMA]

We knew that. Though it seems we may have forgotten it...

Well what to do about it?

Is it current (US) thinking that an attack by a battalion/company/platoon/section can be managed or is officer and NCO leadership required?

[JMA]

Hey JMA !

It wasn't long ago that the Air Force and to some extent the Army thought they could convert senior NCOs (leaders) into managers.

We don't turn combat and combat support personnel into desk drivers and we really don't want desk drivers designated as leaders (see below).

Perhaps it is important to identify which positions require management skills and which have a primary leadership requirement.

For example the US war effort is recognised (by non-US countries) to be led by outstanding competence in logistic supply (rather than fighting prowess) which arises from superior management organisational skills. US logistic systems are not flawlessly carried out as many US soldiers will tell you but nevertheless vastly superior to the rest.

I guess when NCOs reach a certain level the leadership positions reduce and there is more of a demand for paper pushing management types. So what to do with the older NCOs of an age where they are too old to lead men in battle?

[Ken White]

Well what to do about it?

Is it current (US) thinking that an attack by a battalion/company/platoon/section can be managed or is officer and NCO leadership required?

In reverse order, no, we know better; leadership is required. We also know a bit of management is required to get that unit in shape and position for that attack. We used to combine those traits fairly well for about 80% of the leaders and commanders -- nobody ever gets to 100%. Nobody. Ever...

The answer to your question is to not re-elect a single incumbent to the US Congress until they get the message that they have been so wrong for so long and they still haven't got it right. I see no real chance for improvement until that happens -- or we get in a major, existential war, we tend to throw away the stupids when those occur; performance rules...

We weren't perfect but we were better with people 40 years ago -- then the US Congress decreed that all selection criteria must be 'fair' and 'objective.' This caused managerial (or even lesser) types who would not have been selected for senior officer or NCO positions prior to the mid-60s to be considered; the move to 'objective' criteria required the use of 'metrics' in selection so it could be proven that all pegs were round (one way or another...). Add the fact that democracies do not like their Armies to be too competent; makes the legislators and the social set nervous. All that results in a very egalitarian Army.

Regrettably, warfare is not egalitarian.

[Ken White]

I guess when NCOs reach a certain level the leadership positions reduce and there is more of a demand for paper pushing management types.

Officers and NCO come with either a managerial bent -- and job -- or one that espouses leadership. Key is to put the right shaped peg in the proper hole -- that's where we fail. Started that foolishness in the 1960s, literally took the personal out of Personnel -- and that was NOT the improvement it was supposed to be...

Miserably, we seem to think that all of like schooling and experience are absolutely interchangeable. They are not, of course...

So what to do with the older NCOs of an age where they are too old to lead men in battle?

Do what the Bundeswehr did upon formation in 1955, put old one-eyed, one-armed Afrika Korps veteran Feldwebels in position as Company operations directors to whom young Hauptmann HAD to listen [Eek -- un-American, that...] -- they fought (in the combat expertise and directive sense) the Company, the Officers led it.

Also do what the Brits do, commission 'em as Captains and let serve out a few years as Trainers and technical masters of the job at hand [Also un-American because any generalist can do everything well -- even if he is 24 with only three years experience...] -- that way the Generalists can head for Generalship.

This is not rocket science...

[Fuchs]

The Bundeswehr had very ill-trained young officers in the 50's. That deficiency was resolved by the early 60's; more well-trained/well-educated lieutenants are naturally more assertive in contact with subordinate senior NCOs.

I've seen this back in my time in uniform; an Oberfeldwebel reports something to a Oberleutnant, begins to lecture him about the meaning of some detail and the Oberleutnant interrupts him, telling him that he did the exact same thing that they're talking about back when he was a Fähnrich.


So what you propose, Ken, is the American way: Expose 90-day-wonders to experienced NCOs.

[JMA]

In reverse order, no, we know better; leadership is required. We also know a bit of management is required to get that unit in shape and position for that attack.

I knew you would know that Ken ... but how many serving members (say) under 35 know that?

We used to combine those traits fairly well for about 80% of the leaders and commanders -- nobody ever gets to 100%. Nobody. Ever...

That was then... what about now?

Combine, I would suppose would be that leadership characterists were deemed essential while management ability would be deemed desirable, yes?

The answer to your question is to not re-elect a single incumbent to the US Congress until they get the message that they have been so wrong for so long and they still haven't got it right. I see no real chance for improvement until that happens -- or we get in a major, existential war, we tend to throw away the stupids when those occur; performance rules...

Well then the prognosis is not good.

We weren't perfect but we were better with people 40 years ago -- then the US Congress decreed that all selection criteria must be 'fair' and 'objective.' This caused managerial (or even lesser) types who would not have been selected for senior officer or NCO positions prior to the mid-60s to be considered; the move to 'objective' criteria required the use of 'metrics' in selection so it could be proven that all pegs were round (one way or another...). Add the fact that democracies do not like their Armies to be too competent; makes the legislators and the social set nervous. All that results in a very egalitarian Army.

Regrettably, warfare is not egalitarian.

Perhaps then (back to the title of this thread) if it is so difficult to deal with people once in the service pre-employment selection (for officers and men)becomes even more important, yes?

[JMA]

Also do what the Brits do, commission 'em as Captains and let serve out a few years as Trainers and technical masters of the job at hand [Also un-American because any generalist can do everything well -- even if he is 24 with only three years experience...] -- that way the Generalists can head for Generalship.

I said some time ago that IMHO officers (of the direct entry variety) should not become involved in the training of (enlisted) recruits and (for the most part) the training of junior NCOs. The required officers for this aspect of training should be those commissioned from the ranks.

It worked for the RLI where three ex-RSMs (regimental sergeants major) - two from the regiment itself with the last one reaching the rank of major being in charge of all recruit training. Its the experience of that environment and of the skills required of the basic soldier that makes the use of warrant officers commissioned from the ranks as training officers essential.

[JMA]

The Bundeswehr had very ill-trained young officers in the 50's. That deficiency was resolved by the early 60's; more well-trained/well-educated lieutenants are naturally more assertive in contact with subordinate senior NCOs.

I've seen this back in my time in uniform; an Oberfeldwebel reports something to a Oberleutnant, begins to lecture him about the meaning of some detail and the Oberleutnant interrupts him, telling him that he did the exact same thing that they're talking about back when he was a Fähnrich.

So what you propose, Ken, is the American way: Expose 90-day-wonders to experienced NCOs.

Well when there is a problem with (company level) officer quality then such remedial action needs to be taken. When there is a problem with NCO quality then heaven help that army... and that country.

There will always be inexperienced officers arriving in platoons where there is (hopefully) an experienced sergeant. That is how it works in the Brit and generally in the US system. You owe it to your soldiers that when you do this to a platoon that it is a person with proven officer characteristics needing experience at that level and not some clown with a pip (or bar) on his shoulder. Hence the need for detailed and careful officer selection.

[Ken White]

So what you propose, Ken, is the American way: Expose 90-day-wonders to experienced NCOs.

Because we are not (unfortunately) going to train officers the way it is done in Germany (not invented here) nor are we going to leave Officers in position long enough to become truly competent and effective (I recall that in the late 90s, the CG of the Fallschirmjaeger Division commented that he had known all five of the US Commanders rotating through his one nearby American Division...). Neither will we have a much needed General Staff (also not invented here...).

[JMA]

In an off board series of discussions it appears that the value of a university degree before or as part of the commissioning process is being questioned more and more.

My question was and remains that is it not better to take them in young and train them as soldiers and officers and test them at platoon level (hopefully in battle) before investing in their tertiary education?

One aspect seemingly not taken into account when lamenting low officer retention rates is that maybe for a greater number than acknowledged the military was used as a means to obtain a degree and a reasonable CV (resume) entry of having served as an officer. How many are in it for the education? Half?

A possibly superior approach being flighted is that instead of the military training being fitted in the breaks in the academic year is for the military selection and training taking full precedent until you have the service the right officers in which you would be prepared to invest in (in terms of education). Not going to happen in the US one accepts.

[Fuchs]

I remember Creveld wrote something about the academic issue for officers in his 'The Sword and Olive' book about the IDF. IIRC he pointed out that its introduction solved some problems, such as officers with too narrow thinking.

[JMA]

I remember Creveld wrote something about the academic issue for officers in his 'The Sword and Olive' book about the IDF. IIRC he pointed out that its introduction solved some problems, such as officers with too narrow thinking.

This education is indeed necessary.

The question I pose is when, before commissioning, parallel with the commissioning process or after commissioning when his potential has been proven, should this education take place.

[Fuchs]

You're considering drop-outs after years of training a waste.

Look at it another way; those are the officer reserves for times of need. You don't need to pay them any more (instead, they work and pay taxes), but you can still call them up.

[JMA]

You're considering drop-outs after years of training a waste.

Look at it another way; those are the officer reserves for times of need. You don't need to pay them any more (instead, they work and pay taxes), but you can still call them up.

Depends what you mean by drop-outs.

There are a few aspects here. One, where people sign up for officer training with the hidden intention of getting a degree and moving on as soon as they are able. In this case it explains the retention problems and that there is really little or nothing the military can do about it as the people leaving will give any reason for doing so other than the truth. The second reason for officers leaving (that they will not be honest about) will be that they do not want a second round of the type of warfare as experienced in Iraq and/or Afghanistan. Having spent a small fortune on their (non-military) education it turns into a waste as there are other ways to approach this.

Then if one takes the scenario where the following sequence is followed:

* careful initial pre-course selection over a period of days (along the lines of the Brit AOSB) - no harm done for those who fail the selection process.

* The first phase of training on the actual course (up to ten weeks) where the basic training/drill/physical will see a number of those unsuitable for the rigours of the military existence (certainly in war) - in this event those who drop out can select to be discharged or transfer to an other ranks/enlisted recruit course to continue serving. Note: In my experience the majority of those that make it through first phase generally make it through to commissioning. If they don't then a discharge should be offered. Sure money on training is wasted in this process but it is justified by not putting unsuitable officers in command of men. If the drop out rate during the course is high then review the initial selection process to see how these persons managed to pass that selection process.

* Young newly commissioned 2Lts spend three years commanding a platoon (with hopefully significant combat exposure). Note that there is a significant difference between mere combat experience and combat command experience. - here if the man fails to meet the requirements of an officer at that level he is either offered the chance to take a discharge or accept a low road career path. No point of passing 'failed' officers onto the reserve unless you want to destroy it.

* Now you take your young officers and discuss likely career paths honestly with them. Plan for university education in subject matter that suits the military and their likely promotion path and corps/branch. These are the people who are giving the best years of their lives to the military - treat them with respect and as national assets. Some of these may decide to leave the service at some point and be of value to the reserves.

Note: while this thread is about officers IMHO a similar process should be taking place in terms of selection and career planning among NCOs. We know we can produce any number of troopies in 6 months but seasoned NCOs like a good brandy take years to mature. They too are giving the best years of their lives to the military and need to be afforded the same respect as officers as a result.

So, back to your point, if you are talking about officers who have proved themselves as platoon commanders leaving the military after say 5 years then yes they will still be of value to the reserve.

[Fuchs]

* Young newly commissioned 2Lts spend three years commanding a platoon (with hopefully significant combat exposure).

I see this here again and again in the forum.

You got your priorities wrong.

To have a super army is not important.
To maintain peace is important.

Accordingly, you DO NOT WANT your officer corps to be combat-experienced!


A combat-experienced officer corps is a symptom of a national security policy failure!