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  1. #1
    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
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    Taking it one step further... what's the best policy in engaging an allied military force that wants and needs help, but that has a record of human rights abuse. Do you refuse to have anything to do with them, or work with them in an effort to improve things?

    Obviously that depends on our assessment of the problem and the likelihood of it improving, and on political evaluations of just how important the alliance in question is. The questions remain, though: how bad do they have to be before we refuse to have anything to do with them? Is a refusal to engage going to make any difference? Is it possible for intervention to produce lasting changes?

    Not that there's a universal answer, but it's a question worth considering, as in practice many of the governments and militaries we work in FID roles with have and will continue to have less than spotless records.
    “The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”

    H.L. Mencken

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    Posted by Dayuhan

    Taking it one step further... what's the best policy in engaging an allied military force that wants and needs help, but that has a record of human rights abuse. Do you refuse to have anything to do with them, or work with them in an effort to improve things?

    Obviously that depends on our assessment of the problem and the likelihood of it improving, and on political evaluations of just how important the alliance in question is. The questions remain, though: how bad do they have to be before we refuse to have anything to do with them? Is a refusal to engage going to make any difference? Is it possible for intervention to produce lasting changes?

    Not that there's a universal answer, but it's a question worth considering, as in practice many of the governments and militaries we work in FID roles with have and will continue to have less than spotless records.
    The questions I ask myself are:

    . what are the benefits of engaging in FID within those countries?

    . what are the risks of engaging in FID within those countries?

    And ultimately:

    . to what extend are the U.S. ready to take the risk of loosing their legitimacy at the international level (which, in my view, already has eroded to an extend that was unimaginable a few years ago)?

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    He served in China (as a French officer) for the duration of WWII. His knowledge of WWII resistance in France was second-hand from what I've read. He did later write favorably of the courage of the resisters.

    Trinquier's view of terrorist interrogation has a quasi-religious theme, which saw one end result of the terrorist's confession to be redemptive. From Modern Warfare (online at CGSC):

    The terrorist should not be considered an ordinary criminal. Actually, he fights within the framework of his organization,. without personal interest, for a cause he considers noble and for a respectable ideal, the same as the soldiers in the armies confronting him. On the command of his superiors, he kills without hatred individuals unknown to him, with the same indifference as the soldier on the battlefield. His victims are often women and children, almost always defenseless individuals taken by surprise. But during a period of history when the bombing of open cities is permitted, and when two Japanese cities were razed to hasten the end of the war in the Pacific, one cannot with good cause reproach him.[*]

    [*] Yassef Saadi, chief of the Autonomous Zone of Algiers (Z.A.A.), said after his arrest: "I had my bombs planted in the city because I didn't have the aircraft to transport them. But they caused fewer victims than the artillery and air bombardments of our mountain villages. I'm in a war, you cannot blame me."

    The terrorist has become a soldier, like the aviator or the infantryman.

    But the aviator flying over a city knows that antiaircraft shells can kill or maim him. The infantryman wounded on the battlefield accepts physical suffering, often for long hours, when he falls between the lines and it is impossible to rescue him. It never occurs to him to complain and to ask, for example, that his enemy renounce the use of the rifle, the shell, or the bomb. If he can, he goes back to a hospital knowing this to be his lot. The soldier, therefore, admits the possibility of physical suffering as part of the job. The risks he runs on the battlefield and the suffering he endures are the price of the glory he receives.

    The terrorist claims the same honors while rejecting the same obligations. His kind of organization permits him to escape from the police, his victims cannot defend themselves, and the army cannot use the power of its weapons against him because he hides himself permanently within the midst of a population going about its peaceful pursuits.

    But he must be made to realize that, when he is captured, he cannot be treated as an ordinary criminal, nor like a prisoner taken on the battlefield. What the forces of order who have arrested him are seeking is not to punish a crime, for which he is otherwise not personally responsible, but, as in any war, the destruction of the enemy army or its surrender. Therefore he is not asked details about himself or about attacks that he may or may not have committed and that are not of immediate interest, but rather for precise information about his organization. In particular, each man has a superior whom he knows; he will first have to give the name of this person, along with his address, so that it will be possible to proceed with the arrest without delay.

    No lawyer is present for such an interrogation. If the prisoner gives the information requested, the examination is quickly terminated; if not, specialists must force his secret from him. Then, as a soldier, he must face the suffering, and perhaps the death, he has heretofore managed to avoid. The terrorist must accept this as a condition inherent in his trade and in the methods of warfare that, with full knowledge, his superiors and he himself have chosen.[*]

    [*] In France during the Nazi occupation, members of the Resistance violated the rules of warfare. They knew they could not hide behind them, and they were perfectly aware of the risks to which they were exposing themselves. Their glory is to have calmly faced those risks with full knowledge of the consequences.

    Once the interrogation is finished, however, the terrorist can take his place among soldiers. From then on, he is a prisoner of war like any other, kept from resuming hostilities until the end of the conflict.

    It would be as useless and unjust to charge him with the attacks he was able to carry out, as to hold responsible the infantryman or the airman for the deaths caused by the weapons they use. According to Clausewitz:

    War . . . is an act of violence intended to compel an opponent to fulfill our Will.... Self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed usages of International Law, accompany it without impairing its power. Violence . . . is therefore the means; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate object. . . . In such dangerous things as war, the errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are the worst. As the use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the cooperation of the intelligence, it follows that he who uses force unsparingly, without reference to the bloodshed involved, must obtain a superiority if his adversary uses less vigor in its application. . . .To introduce into the philosophy of war itself a principle of moderation would be an absurdity.
    These basic principles of traditional warfare retain all of their validity in modern warfare.
    This is a long quote, but it is necessary to show from whence this very complex man came.

    A good comment on Trinquier by Tom Odom is here (from 2008).

    Regards

    Mike
    Last edited by jmm99; 12-09-2011 at 07:38 PM. Reason: add link

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    Posted by White Rabbit,

    Bill, your post made me remember that many of the French officers in Algeria--which I think includes Trinquier although I have to double-check that--often were resistant during the Second World War. Accordingly, some of them were tortured.

    While not justifying the use of torture, it might explain their use of it. If they saw it as a technique which worked on them, it is likely that they came to the conclusion that it will work on others.

    If I remember correctly in the Army of Shadows, Jean-Pierre Melville--who was himself a resistant--even depicts the use of torture by resistant on fellow resistant.
    I suspect many of the paras were WWII vets of sort (resistance or otherwise) and coming from a nation that was recently occupied by the Nazis for years which must have strongly shaped their views on what is acceptable in combat. Additionally a proud nation that lost face when the Germans defeated them was once again facing another humiliation by losing another colony. Different cultures have different values (pardon another statement of the obvious), and in many torture is an acceptable way of acquiring information, or simply terrorizing their opponents (an attempt at deterrence). It really doesn't matter if we're shocked by the behavior.

    What we have been trying to encourage/enforce in recent years (two or more decades) are internationally accepted (by many, not all nations) laws and human rights, but we have no ability to force others to abide by these rules.

    Regarding the questions on whether we should or shouldn't engage with those who practice torture, the real question in my view is can we afford not to? What is the risk of not engaging?

    As Dayuhan stated it is very hard to shape others behavior when you're not engaged. We also leave an opportunity for others to displace our influence.

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